Showing posts with label Congress. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Congress. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Congressman Albert G. Brown’s Speech on the Homestead Bill, and in Vindication of the Policy of Providing Homes for the Homeless on the Public Lands, in the United States House of Representatives, April 28, 1852

"Despise not these Squatters."

The bill to encourage agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and all other branches of industry, by granting to every man who is the head of a family, and a citizen of the United States, a homestead of one hundred and sixty acres of land out of the public domain, upon condition of occupancy and cultivation of the same, for the period herein specified, being under consideration, in Committee of the Whole—Mr. BROWN said:

MR. CHAIRMAN: — It is my purpose to submit a few remarks on the proposition before the committee, and, however tempted by the example of others, I shall endeavor to keep within the lines of legitimate debate on the bill and the pending amendments.

I claim to have been among the earliest, as I have certainly been among the most steadfast friends of the wise and humane policy of providing homes for the homeless.

This government is the largest landed proprietor in the world. Its acres of untilled soil are numbered by the hundreds of millions. Of the area embraced within the limits of the Union, only about one-third is in the hands of private individuals. Nearly two-thirds belong to, or are subject to the disposition of the federal government. Under the general authority to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States, Congress has from time to time disposed of the territory for cash, and on a credit. Congress has disposed of the territory for school purposes and for internal improvement purposes, giving it to the states, to corporations, and to private companies, for these and other purposes. Congress has, from time to time, voted bounties to soldiers, to be paid in land; and these bounties have been voted in times of war, as an inducement to volunteer, and in time of peace as a naked gratuity. This legislation—these modes of disposing of territory—has received the sanction of all the presidents, and of every class of politicians. Precedent, I grant you, is the weakest of all authority, but so far as it goes, it settles the question of power in this case. If Congress can sell the public lands on a credit, or for one dollar and a quarter cash, per acre, why may we not sell them for one dollar, or for ten cents, or for one cent per acre? If we can give the new states, as we did in 1842, five hundred thousand acres each for internal improvement purposes—if, as in the case of every new state, the sixteenth section in each township can be given for common-school purposes-if, as in the case of my own and most of the new states, we can give lands for seats of government, and for colleges and for universities-if, as in the case of the Mexican war, and later, in the case of all our Indian and other wars, the honorably-discharged soldier can have lands given him, is it not idle to dispute the plenary power of the government to dispose of these lands-to give them, if you choose, to actual settlers?

The government holds the lands of Oregon by the same title—certainly by no higher title than it holds the lands in Mississippi, Minnesota, and other states and territories—and it is within the recollection of all of us, that during the last Congress we gave lands to the settlers in Oregon—to some a whole section; to some a half section, and to some a quarter section. Here is a precedent exactly in point, and it covers the whole question of power.

No one doubts my disposition to construe the powers of this government strictly-to confine it within the sphere of its delegative powers. And yet, looking at the unlimited authority given by the Constitution to dispose of the territory as property, I am free to confess that my mind is not only clear, but it is free from any shadow of doubt as to the power.* It is given in express terms, and nothing is left to implication. That the power may be abused is certainly true; and that abuses may violate the spirit of the Constitution is just as true. It is expected of Congress that it will dispose of the territory judiciously, and for the common good. A prodigal and wasteful disposition of it would be an abuse of power, and therefore a violation of the spirit of the Constitution.

The abuse, or the apprehended abuse of a power, does not at all affect the question of its existence. Congress, for example, has the power to declare war, and to this there is no limit. An unnecessary or wanton declaration would violate the spirit of the Constitution, but it would not affect the question of power. No one can dispute the power of Congress to declare war, however much we may deprecate its exercise in a given case.

The power to dispose of the public lands is just as clear as the power to declare war, and it is quite as unlimited.† I apprehend, therefore, that gentlemen are mistaken when they deny the constitutional power of Congress to pass this bill. The power is one thing, the propriety of its exercise is another, and a very different thing.

This brings us to consider the expediency of passing this bill. If it shall be found promotive of all the essential interests of the government, I take it, there can be no dispute about its expediency. And if it shall be found expedient, we shall be excluded from the conclusion that it is violative of the spirit of the Constitution. No exercise of a specific grant of power can violate the spirit of the Constitution, when it is only carried to the extent of promoting the general welfare.

If the bill shall pass in the form in which it was moved by my honorable friend from Tennessee [Mr. Johnson], or if the substitute moved by myself shall be preferred, in either case the great essential object aimed at by the friends of the homeless will have been attained. Homes will have been provided for all.

I shall presently contrast the relative advantages of the original bill and the substitute. But before entering upon this branch of the subject, allow me to submit a few general remarks on the point as to how the general interest of the country is to be promoted by the passage of this bill. The field for observation which opens at this point is a large one, and I do not propose to occupy the whole, nor indeed any considerable part of it.

It is indisputably true that every government has a general interest, as every good man certainly has a special interest, in preserving and promoting the public morals. Homeless people are generally an idle people, and idle people almost always become vicious. It has been aptly said, "an idle mind is the devil's work-shop." Men with homes are sometimes vicious, but men without homes are generally so. As a conservator of the public morals, I would pass this bill, and thus promote the general welfare.

We all have a stake in the happiness of our kind. Poverty and happiness are not incompatible. Indeed, they may be found in very good companionship. But when poverty becomes so inexorable as to turn a man, with his wife and children, out of doors, happiness is very apt to take its departure. A very sublime degree of piety might enable one of us to exclaim, "the foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the son of man hath not where to lay his head," and yet be happy. But, I take leave to say, it has fallen to the lot of but few of us to be blessed with such a sublimity of piety. As one who looks to the happiness of the people, I will vote for this bill, and in this way promote the general welfare.

Every man who loves his country will sow the seeds of patriotism, not among thorns, nor upon stony ground, but upon good ground, where they may vegetate and bring forth fruit, ten, sixty, and an hundred fold.

When the hundreds and thousands of your homeless people look out upon your vast domains, and see them tenanted only by wild beasts, they will ask, is my poverty so great a crime that my government prefers these beasts to me? am I to be kept in penury and want, and leave to my children no inheritance but poverty, whilst my government guards, like a surly mastiff, this mighty wilderness, which God in his providence has created for man, and not for beasts? These men's hearts will become stony, and the seeds of patriotism, though sown therein by your wisest, purest, and best political husbandmen, will not vegetate. Withdraw, then, your sullen, dogged watch over these lands. Say to your people, Heaven, in its bounteous providence, has given these lands and their fulness for your benefit: go and enjoy them.

Their hearts will leap with joy; the seeds of patriotism, though sown by such poor husbandmen as ourselves, will spring up and grow. They will put forth shoots that will entwine themselves about the country, and, growing stronger as they grow older, they will knit the hearts of the people to the government as with threads of steel. As I would encourage patriotism, I would pass this bill, and thus promote the general welfare.

The whole country as a unit, and all its parts, is and are interested in the profitable employment of the productive industry of the nation. It has been well said that "the man who makes two blades of grass grow this year, where but one grew last year, is a benefactor of his race." How much more must he be a benefactor who subtracts hundreds and thousands from the consuming, and adds them to the producing classes; or causes by his judicious policy, a barren wilderness to pour its millions into the nation's store-house! As I would employ labor—as I would reduce the number of consumers and increase the number of producers; as I would reap rich harvests next year, where nothing has been planted this year—I would pass this bill, and in this way promote the general welfare.

If the public morals may be improved, the public happiness promoted, patriotism enlarged, and the wealth of the nation increased by the passage of this bill, why shall we not pass it?

We have seen there is no lack of power. It seems to be promotive of the general welfare. If there be well-founded objections to its passage, they must therefore exist in some other quarter. This leads me to inquire whether any general or local interest will be injured if the bill passes?

It has been urged by the representatives from the old states that it will draw off their population. That the new states will grow strong under its operations, whilst the old states will grow proportionably weak. This objection is not well taken.

That there will be an impetus given to emigration, if the bill passes, is possible, but of its character, in the main, there can be no question. The landed proprietors—those who have comfortable homes, and are living independently—will find no sufficient inducement in the provisions of this bill to abandon those lands, give up their homes, and seek the privations incident to a new country. The well settled and prosperous portion of your citizens will not leave you to embrace the advantages of this bill.

In all the old states there are large numbers who are landless and houseless, who are dependent on the bounty or favor of others for the means of living. There are many thousands who belong to the consuming rather than to the producing class. Is it your interest or your policy to retain such a population? Is it not better to give them up, let them go, and even encourage their exit? I do not mean to say that these people, under other circumstances, might not be good and profitable citizens. I intend to say that a man without a house, and without a home, is very likely to fall into bad habits, and to become an incubus upon the country in which he lives. And that it is therefore better to encourage this emigration to a country where he can have land, a house, a home, and where he will be almost certain to become a useful citizen. Of the thousands in the old states who have neither lands nor houses, how few will ever rise above their present position! Some, I know, will set poverty at defiance, and move on to independence, or, it may be, to fortune. But the great mass will live and die as they have begun life, with no estate but penury.

In this view of the subject, the local interests of the old states will not be injured, but must, on the contrary, be essentially promoted by the passage of this bill.

I can imagine no worse condition of society than where a considerable portion of the people are without homes of their own, nor any better condition than where every man is his own landlord. Instead of sending sheriffs with armed posses to collect rents for the lordly proprietor, let us say to the unhappy tenants, Give up these lands, and take others that are better. They are the free-will offering of your government. In all this I see no sacrifice, but rather the promotion of the local interests of the old states.

The fear has been expressed that the passage of this bill will encourage an influx of foreigners, and that, instead of 500,000 per annum, we shall have 1,000,000 of emigrants to our shores. I do not think so. All come now that can get here. They come for freedom, and not for land. But suppose this prediction should prove true, I shall not be appalled. Let them come; yes, sir, let them come. They are of the same great family with ourselves. Heaven made this mighty continent not for our benefit alone, but for the use and benefit of all mankind. Let them come to it freely. It is the gift of God, and we have no right to withhold it from his people.

What is the objection to an increase of our foreign population? I have heard but one that is worthy of consideration; and that is, that they congregate about our towns, oftentimes become unruly, and too frequently swell the calendars of crime. This bill strikes down this objection at a single blow. It encourages these people to abandon the purlieus of your towns and cities; to give up vagrancy and crime, and become the owners, occupants, and independent cultivators of the soil. Does any man object to the Irish or German emigrant who cultivates the soil with his own hands? Is he not as orderly, as quiet, and as law abiding a citizen as your native sons? And do not the products of his labor go as far towards an increase of your national wealth? For one, I am willing to receive all who come to us from abroad, if they come to cultivate the soil.

Heaven has bounded our republic with two mighty oceans, thus placing a barrier deep and wide between us and the despots of the old world. I would not impiously defy the protection of Providence by crossing this barrier to attack despotism in its stronghold; but upon every breeze that sweeps the Atlantic I would send a message to the oppressed millions of Europe, bidding them come—come to an asylum on these shores, prepared by the Almighty, and defended by his chosen people.

It is said again, that this is a scheme of the Jesuits to extend the Catholic religion in our country, and to cripple or put down the Protestant faith. I was raised a Protestant believer, and I hope to die a professor of the Protestant religion. But it is no part of my Protestant faith to fear the Catholics. I am no more afraid that the Catholics will upset the Protestant church, than I am that the subjects of crowned heads in Europe will overturn Democracy in America. To the Catholic as well as to the Protestant emigrant, I extend a hearty greeting, and a cordial welcome. If he cultivates the soil, he will most likely be a Democrat; and whether he worships in a Catholic or Protestant church, he will make us a good citizen.

I have heard it said, the effect of this bill, if it becomes a law, will be to encourage foreign emigration, and that as most of these come to us with strong anti-slavery prejudices, we of the South are but nerving the arm of an enemy when we advocate its passage. If slavery is to be defended by excluding those from abroad who have prejudices against it, its doom is fixed, and the sooner the fiat for its extinction goes forth the better. I place my defence of this institution on the high ground of moral, social, religious, and political propriety, and if I cannot defend it on this ground I will not defend it at all. The right is never so much in danger as when its advocates shrink from an open and manly vindication of it. Justice may be overthrown if its votaries skulk and prevaricate in its support. Resting the defence of slavery upon high moral principles, I do not fear its overthrow, unless by the brute force of superior numbers. An untamed multitude, revelling in the insolence of unbridled power, may tear down the Constitution and bury slavery beneath its ruins. If this is the destiny to which the mighty North is conducting us, it does not matter whether we reach it during our pilgrimage on earth, or leave the journey half concluded, and entail on our children the melancholy task of following it to the end.

If American-born citizens will do their duty, we have nothing to fear from our emigrant population. If the native son refuses to do his duty, and wages war upon the Constitution, and upon the rights of his neighbors, we have then nothing to hope from any quarter. We must stand firmly by our section, and self-poised in the vindication of our rights.

If we contrast the relative position of the two great sections as to the public domain, we shall see how little there is in the idea that this bill gives an undue advantage to the North.

There is comparatively little soil in the Southern States belonging to, or under the control of the United States, and that little is of inferior quality. There are vast tracts in the Western States and territories, and much of it is of very superior quality. It follows, therefore, that, under the present system of disposing of the public lands, emigration to the Southern States must fall off rapidly at first, and presently cease altogether, whilst the stream to the West will increase in volume, and continue for a great while. The refuse lands in Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Missouri, and Arkansas, will never be occupied at $1.25 per acre, and out of these states we have little or no government lands in the slave states. The good lands in Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the western territories, will very soon be occupied at $1.25 an acre, or even at a higher figure.

I am for changing the policy so as to give us occupants for our refuse lands; and if in doing this, we send tenants to your virgin soil a few years earlier than they would otherwise go, I do not still perceive but that we shall be more gainers than losers by the operation.

I submit to my southern friends whether it is not better to divide the emigration with the North for a few years at least? Is it not better to take an addition to our population of a million in five years, and give the North two millions in the same time, than to stop emigration to the South entirely, and let the North have her two millions at the end of ten years? I take this to be true, that without a change of policy we shall never get our poor lands settled; and it is just as true, that the virgin soil of the West will be occupied in a few years, whether we change our policy or not. I want a change. It will people our lands, and if it has the effect of giving to the North as many emigrants in five years as she would otherwise get in ten, let it be so. It is only a question of time with them. Emigrants will go to them after a while under any policy. With us it is different. Our lands have all been picked and culled, and the refuse tracts may be peopled under this bill, but never at a cost of $1.25 per acre. I throw out these observations to show my southern friends that this is not a losing business to us.

I admit the obligation of a representative to guard the interest of his own constituents, and in this view I am for reform. I admit my sectional predilections—prejudice, if you please—and yet in this view I am for reform. Regarded in any and every light, I am for that policy which will populate our vacant lands, and give homes to the homeless and houses to the houseless.

The people who will be chiefly benefited by this bill, are among the most meritorious and yet the least cared for of all our population. The landless, the homeless, the houseless—who are they, and what are they in the old states? Hardy sons of toil, slighted by the world for the crime of being poor, and elevated to the dignity of freemen only on election days. In the new states, under the operations of this bill, they will become freeholders and householders, and will be at all times, and in every season, equal to the proudest nabobs in Christendom.

I know something, Mr. Chairman, of squatter life. It was my fortune to have been raised in a new and unsettled country. I know something of the toils, and hardships, and privations encountered by the squatters. I shall not detain you with a recital of all that I have seen, and heard, and felt. One incident I may relate. I will tell you why my heart is with these people. When I was a boy—a very little boy—an honest, but poor man settled (squatted is a better word) in the country where I yet reside. Removing from South Carolina, he pitched his tent amid the unbroken forest in the dead of winter. He had two sons able to work. He was in a strange land, without money and without friends. But with an iron will, such as none but squatters have, he attacked the forest. It receded before him, and in three short months the sun, which had been shut out for many centuries, was permitted to shine on a spot of earth in which the squatter had planted corn. Day by day he might have been seen following his plough, while his two sons plied the hoe. Toil brought him bread-and he raised up his sons to know, as Heaven's wise decree, that "by the sweat of their brows they should gain their bread." Industry and economy brought not wealth, but a competency. The elder of the two sons followed the example of the father, and cultivated the soil. Fortune smiled and he prospered. The younger, with such moderate qualification as a frontier country could afford, studied law and practised with success. In an evil hour for his private fortune, he was drawn into politics. He was elected to the state legislature, to Congress, judge of the circuit court, governor of his state, to Congress again and again, but he never forgot that he was the squatter's son. He stands before you to-day the humble advocate of the squatter's rights.

That, which was my father's fortune, and the fortune of his sons, has been, and may be again the fortune of others in a more pre-eminent degree. Nature has created no aristocracy of intellect. Despise not these squatters. Among them is many a rough diamond. They and their sons may rise to the first honors in the republic. Reared in no hot bed of aristocracy, never enfeebled by the enervating influences of wealth and luxury, their bodies are capable of unlimited endurance, and their minds are prepared for that rational progress which is the pride and boast of "Young America," and of the age in which we live. Is it at all wonderful, Mr. Chairman, that my heart should be always open to the privations and hardships, the wants and sufferings of the squatters on the public lands?

My associations with these people have never ceased, and I trust they never may. I have partaken of their fare. I have eat their bread, and slept beneath their humble roofs. Generous to a fault, with hearts free from guile, they receive their guests with an open, frank, and manly bearing, that says at once, You are welcome. A squatter never says from his lips am glad to see you, and in his heart wish the devil had you. This is a refinement on duplicity which belongs alone to the "rich and well-born."

I approach that point in this discussion which, of all others, is the most interesting: The best and most certain means of securing every man a home. How may this be done? My friend, the mover of the main proposition [Mr. Johnson of Tennessee], thinks this end will the most certainly, and in the best manner be secured, by giving to every man the right to settle on the public lands, and by conveying to him the title in fee simple, after a continuous residence of five years.

I am not going to make an argument against my friend's proposition. I honor the head that conceived it. The heart that is capable of such appreciation of the poor man's wants, is entitled to and receives the homage of my poor esteem. The nation, and, indeed, all mankind, should yield a grateful tribute to the mind that, almost unaided, has forced the consideration of this subject upon the American Congress. No; I am not about to oppose the main proposition; but I am about to inquire whether, in its details, it offers us the best guarantee that the first great object sought by us, that of giving homes to the homeless, will most certainly be obtained.

It proposes to surrender to the occupant the absolute title, after a continuous residence of five years on the land. If all men had capacity for managing with success their own private affairs; if all were provident, and we had security against the misfortunes of ten thousand kinds to which men are subject; if we had not already a full realization of the fact, that

"Man's inhumanity to man,

Makes countless thousands mourn;"

if men would learn to "love their neighbors as themselves;" then I should think that no better scheme had ever been devised than that of my friend from Tennessee, for securing every man a home. But we must look at men as they are, and shape our acts accordingly.

I feel under no sort of obligation to give land to any man by my vote, to be used in paying debts improvidently or viciously contracted. I shall not undertake to pay debts forced upon any man by misfortune. If debts have been contracted in consequence of disease or death; or of fire or water, or any other misfortune; or if, as is too often the case, they have been contracted by a foolish improvidence, or by drinking and gaming, I cannot and will not, in my legislative capacity, undertake to provide the means for their payment.

Suppose you give these lands in the mode proposed: Is there not great danger, that at the end of the five years' occupancy, a great deal of them will pass into the hands of sharpers and speculators, as the bounties to your soldiers have passed? It is no disparagement to mankind to say, that hundreds and thousands of them have no capacity for the transaction of business. God has made them so. May not a class of men more cunning than those for whom you are providing, draw settlers into contracts, involve them in debt, and at the end of five years, seize the very land you are now so generously giving?

It is not more a matter of reproach than of pity, that men will drink and gamble, and thus waste their substance. One man plies another with intoxicating drinks, or decoys him to the gaming table. In the one or the other case, he is made the easy victim of craft or villany, and this land which you are now voting in a spirit of generosity, may go to settle the account between them.

It is no man's fault that misfortunes fall upon him, and yet disease may prostrate him and involve him in debt. His domestic animals may die. Too much rain or too much drought, a late spring or an early frost, may cut off or destroy his crop. Floods, storms, or fires, may lay waste his property. A thousand misfortunes like these may run him in debt; and then inexorable creditors may come and take away his land, and leave him no better off than before you gave it to him.

To all this I am opposed, and against all these contingencies I would provide, as far as possible; and hence the substitute which I have proposed to the original bill.

The leading idea of my substitute is, that the settler shall have the right of occupancy so long as he chooses to remain on the land, being never required to pay for it, but always at liberty to do so whenever it becomes his desire and his interest to own the soil in fee simple. The fee under my substitute remains in the government until the occupant can receive it with safety, of which he is made the judge. If the substitute is adopted, it will make no difference how a squatter's debts may have been contracted—whether by improvidence or dissipation or misfortune his home is secure. The government gives him the right of occupancy, and no power on earth can take it from him. Secure in its possession, the energies of his mind and body will be free to expand and rise above the petty tyranny of a neighboring creditor. He will not be afraid to improve his grounds, or repair his fence, or stop the leaks in his cabin, lest he excite the eye of cupidity. He will not watch the clouds with a aching brow, lest it fail to rain upon his growing crop, thus dooming it to destruction, and himself to bitter disappointment in getting the means to buy his preemption. Let fortune smile, or fortune frown; let it rain, or let it shine; let storms or devastating floods come upon him, he may look them all in the face, and say, this is my home, this the castle of my defence: my government stretches over me its strong protecting arms, and bids my heart be still, for in this, at least, I am secure. I fix no five years of security; and after that, nor any other period, expose the poor man's home to execution sale; but for five years, and for all time thereafter, he is made secure in its occupancy. He need not look with a sad heart to the end of the five years, nor fear that his creditors will then come to take possession of his home, and turn him out of doors. His wife need not water with her tears a favorite plant, nor count the hours that are bringing the moment of her separation from her humble cottage. His children may pursue their childish sports, nor sigh as they look for the last time on some favored spot, made sacred by the recollection of many an happy hour spent there in childish revelry. Whatever may be his and their relations with the world, the whole family—husband, wife, and children—may rest secure in the possession of their home. There they may cluster around them the comforts of life-nor disturb their moments of quiet or repose with anxious fears, lest some inexorable creditor shall snatch it from them. Such, sir, is my substitute.

If fortune smiles on the humble occupant; if, by his labor, he has enhanced the value of the land, and for this, or for any other reason, he desires to possess it in his own right, he may pay for it at the minimum price of $1.25. This is his privilege; but it is a privilege that belongs to no one else. If, by his labor, he makes the land worth $10 an acre, he may still buy it for $1.25; and this he may do at the end of five years, or twenty years, or at any other time that suits him best. And if he never does it, the government will never permit another to take it from him. If he has made an unfortunate location, my substitute allows him to change it; and this he may do as often as he chooses-it being stipulated that whenever a place is abandoned or given up by an occupant it is again subject to entry or occupancy by any one who may choose to take it. If the husband dies, his right of occupancy survives to his widow. If both husband and wife should die, leaving infant children, the fee passes to these children, and it may be sold for their benefit. This provision has been inserted for two reasons: first, infant children cannot occupy the land alone; and secondly, these objects of misfortune, thrown, without father or mother, on the charities of the world, are entitled to our protection. If they find a parent's care nowhere else, I would let them to this extent, at least, find it in their government.

I have purposely excluded the adult children from all interest in the homestead, and for the reason that, as they become of age, each one acquires the same right that his father had before him; and I desired to encourage the rising generation to enter upon the active duties of life at an early age, instead of lingering under the parental roof.

That the new states within which these lands lie might have no just ground of complaint, I have expressly reserved to them the right of taxation. It will be the privilege of states to tax the settler, and in default of payment to sell his right of occupancy. The purchaser at such sale will acquire the same and no greater right than the settler. That is, he will acquire the right of occupancy for an indefinite term, with the privilege of entering the land at his pleasure, and to suit his own convenience.

There is one feature in my substitute which I must not omit to mention. It perpetuates the existing preemption laws. The same parties who are entitled to preempt under the law as it now is, will have the right if the substitute is adopted, and they will enter upon the lands under the same regulations and in the same way that they now do. The only alteration proposed being in the removal of the twelve months' limitation, and all other limitations as to the time when the right of occupancy shall cease. The right of occupancy without payment, under my substitute, is unlimited, it being the exclusive privilege, but never the duty, of the occupant to buy the land. The perpetuation of the existing law of preemption is better than the enactment of new laws. First, because the old laws have been adjudicated by the courts; second, because they have been construed by the executive departments; and thirdly, because the people generally understand them, and will need only to be told, if the substitute passes, that the law exists just as it did before, with the single exception that they will not be compelled to pay until it suits them.

I have already pointed out some of the public and private advantages which will result from the passage of the original bill. All these will result in an equal degree from the adoption of the substitute. I have pointed out some of the advantages which are peculiar to my proposition; but there are others to which I must advert.

The proposition has been assailed on the ground of its squandering the public lands and cutting off the revenue resulting from their sale. I shall show that there is nothing in these objections. What is it that you give under my substitute? Nothing but the right of occupancy, the right to occupy a bit of land in the wilderness, and therefore unproductive-and the right to improve and cultivate that land, and make it useful to the occupant and beneficial to the general wealth. In this there is not only a private, but public advantage. You make that productive which was before useless, and of no public or private benefit. But you answer, that I put an occupant on the land who may be a drone -one who will not cultivate or buy it himself, and yet, by his occupancy, keeps off all others; and generally that these unlimited rights of occupancy will prevent sales, and therefore destroy the land revenue. In all this, I think you are mistaken. That which a squatter on the public lands most needs is to have his energies—physical and mental left free. This twelve months' limitation hangs like an incubus about him. It paralyzes his body and disturbs his mind. Whilst he can hope to pay for his land at the expiration of the time limited by law, his energies are unshaken; but when hope dies-when, from any one of a thousand causes I could name, he foresees that he cannot pay, his energies sink-then it is he becomes a drone. He will not work, because he sees that every lick he strikes enhances the value of his little home, and more strongly attracts the eye of the speculator. These are the shackles that have bound many an honest and industrious man, and made him an easy victim to idleness and vice. Let us knock them off -let the man's mind and body have fair play. Give him plenty of time and plenty of land to work out his fortune, and nine times in ten he will do it.

Your present preemption system is a curse to the settler. He is first inveigled on to a piece of public land, and then he is afraid to improve it, lest some speculator, with more money than himself, shall take it from him. It is this fear that cramps his energies, and makes him idle, and sometimes vicious. I have great confidence in the squatters, if you will only give them an open field and a fair fight.

But, as a revenue measure, I should advocate this bill. Its earliest advantages will be found in the increased productions of the country. It will, as I said before, subtract largely from the consuming classes, and add as largely to the producers. I need not attempt to estimate the advantages to the national wealth, if all the loafers and idlers in the Union can be set to work. The advantages would indeed be incalculable. This measure proposes a bonus to all who will cultivate the soil. How many thousands will accept it I cannot say-but that many will I have no doubt.

The next advantage which I anticipate, will be found in the increased sales of the public lands. Yes, sir, instead of diminishing, I anticipate an increase of revenue from this source; and particularly if my substitute is adopted. When a man has settled on a piece of land, and has by his labor increased its value from one dollar and a quarter to five or ten dollars per acre, he will find many reasons for desiring to possess himself of the freehold; first, because he may want to sell it, and thus increase his active wealth; or he may, and in many cases he will, prefer to own the land in his own right, that he may enjoy the privilege of making an equal distribution of it among his children; and then there is a certain feeling of independence which all men experience in owning, by a clear title, the lands and houses they occupy. These are some of the reasons which will induce the settlers to purchase the land. What we ask of you is simply the right to occupy, free from all restraint and apprehension; and we give you the guarantee which these and other reasons afford, all of which are founded in human nature, that your sales will be increased instead of being diminished.

I pass over the general advantages resulting from early settlement on your frontiers; I say nothing of the gregarious habits of men-how one man goes because another has gone before him. I will not pause to count how much more land men will want when their industry has lifted them up in the world. These and many other considerations I pass over, because my time is almost out.

A word in conclusion to the friends of this measure.

It is an old trick in this House, when the enemies of a bill cannot slaughter it in an open field, to attack it in ambuscade. Many important bills have been killed off in this way, and you could no more discover the hand that strikes the blow, than you could tell "who it was that struck Billy Patterson." The bounty-land bill was disposed of in this way for ten years.

The modus operandi is this: We go into committee of the whole on a bill. Here the ayes and noes are not recorded, and consequently no responsibility attaches to any man's vote. All manner of amendments are offered. Some intended in good faith to perfect the bill, but much the greater portion to make it ridiculous. They are passed on a division, or by tellers indiscriminately, until finally the features of the bill are so distorted that its friends do not recognise it, and they turn from it in disgust. It is then left to the tender mercies of its enemies, and they table it without compunction or hesitation.

We are about closing the debate on this bill, and then we shall be brought to vote on amendments. I anticipate the usual course of proceeding. I shall not be surprised to see an amendment proposing to give every man a horse and a plough; another to supply him with all the necessary farming utensils, and a third to give him a negro to work his land, and others of like kind, and all intended to bring the bill into ridicule, and finally to destroy it. I need not say that such a mode of attack is ungenerous. Give us a fair record vote; let every man take the responsibility, and if the bill is lost, the country will know who were its friends and who its enemies, and with this we shall be satisfied.

I call upon the friends of this measure to stand by it and protect it as far as possible in committee against these amendments. If amendments are proposed in good faith, let us give to them a just, fair, and proper consideration. But let us stand united against all ridiculous and frivolous amendments meant only to destroy the bill. If improper amendments are adopted in committee, let us not on that account abandon the bill, or allow it to be tabled in the House. We can have the ayes and noes in the House on each amendment, and thus vote them out or force gentlemen to stand by them on the record. This is the only policy that will save this bill from the fate of many of its predecessors.

With an ardent desire that this measure may pass-that it may be sent as a messenger of joy to the humble abodes of the squatters; and that, as a harbinger of mercy, it may visit the landless, the houseless, and the homeless everywhere, I take my leave of it for the time being, and commend it to the paternal care of its friends in the House.

_______________

* See art. 4, sec. 3, U. S. Constitution.

† This proposition may be stated too broadly. General Millson inquired of Mr. Brown, at a later period of the debate, whether Congress could give the whole of the public lands to the President of the United States? Mr. Brown answered, "Yes; Congress has the power. To exercise it would be a monstrous abuse of power, and would, therefore, violate the spirit of the Constitution." General Millson reminded him that the compensation of the President could not be increased during his term of service. Mr. Brown admitted, that in this view of the subject, he had stated his proposition too broadly. If the gentleman from Virginia had asked him (Mr. B.) if the President's compensation could be increased by giving him land, Mr. B. would have answered, No. But this was rather a question as to the power to receive on the part of the executive, than the power to give on the part of the legislature.

Mr. B. admits that the power of Congress over the territory, as given in the third section, article 4, of the Constitution, may be limited (as in the case cited by General Millson) by the prohibitory clauses in other parts of the Constitution. But he maintains that there is no such prohibition in regard to the settlers or other citizens, and therefore that the power is plenary as to them. It was this class of people that Mr. Brown had in his mind's eye when he stated his proposition that Congress had as unlimited power over the public lands as it had to declare war. And in this view of the case he adheres to his first proposition.

SOURCE: M. W. Cluskey, Editor, Speeches, Messages, and Other Writings of the Hon. Albert G. Brown, A Senator in Congress from the State of Mississippi, pp. 304-16

Saturday, April 25, 2026

Senator John C. Calhoun to Thomas G. Clemson, September 6, 1847

Fort Hill 6th Sept 1847

MY DEAR SIR, I agree with you, that the political condition of all western Europe is very unsettled, and especially France. Nor are we much better off. Our future is very uncertain. The old parties are disorganized. The administration weak; and the termination of the Mexican war, and what will grow out of it, uncertain. We must wait for the developements of the next 12 months to know where we are. In the meantime, Clay and his friends are making a great effort to bring him out again, as a candidate, and will probably succeed. Taylor has lost ground greatly, and will probably be ruled off. He has written too many letters, and some of them very illy advised. Wright has died,1 — a severe blow to the Hunkers; and Benton is denouncing the administration, whether to break with them, or control them is uncertain; probably the latter. We (the State rights party) are making an effort to establish an independent press at Washington, as the organ of the South. A large amount has already been subscribed, and it is hoped, it will be in operation by the meeting of Congress.
_______________

1 Silas Wright died August 27, 1847.

SOURCE: J. Franklin Jameson, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899, Volume II, Calhoun’s Correspondence: Fourth Annual Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, p. 736-7

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Diary of Gideon Welles, Saturday, July 7, 1866

Am in better health than at any time for the last two or three weeks. Congress accomplishes little that is good, and is really delaying national unity and prosperity. There is little statesmanship in the body, but a vast amount of party depravity. The granting of acts of incorporation, bounties, special privileges, favors, and profligate legislation of every description is shocking. Schemes for increasing the enormous taxation which already exists to benefit the iron and wool interests are occupying the session.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 548-9

Diary of Gideon Welles, Tuesday, July 10, 1866

No very striking matters in Cabinet. Seward read a long dispatch to Mr. Adams. Stanton excepted to the mention of our domestic affairs in such a document. I cared less about it in a confidential dispatch to our own Minister, but I did not like the phrase, or expressed hope, that Congress would concede to the Southern Members their seats. I preferred to hope that Congress would not much longer deny them their rights to seats.

Dennison, who has been absent for a fortnight in Ohio, was present.

Received telegram from California that my nephew, Samuel Welles, was severely injured by explosion of a boiler. Am distressed and anxious about him.

Doolittle called, and I went with him to McCulloch's. Had an hour's conversation. Doolittle is getting along and doing well. He is an honest, conscientious, and patriotic but credulous man. In this movement for a convention, of which he is the principal getter-up, he had permitted himself to be hampered by a hope that he could control in a great degree the Republican organization and retain it intact. He cannot give up that organization, of which the Radicals have possession, without reluctance. This is Seward's policy, and he has influenced Doolittle much on this point. Even yet he clings to Raymond. Is confident that Raymond will get a majority of the National Republican Committee to unite in favor of the Philadelphia Convention. It may be well enough, but is of less consequence than D. supposes. I think R. has scarcely any influence with the Committee. Seward thinks otherwise.

I told both Doolittle and McCulloch that I would thank them to inform me of the shape things were in, and were to be in, in New York. The President's friends and supporters were the Democrats, whom Seward, Weed, and Raymond were opposing, while their special friends were all Radicals and fighting the President. But while their followers are thwarting and resisting the President, the triumvirate claim to be his friends, and are actually and undeniably, by their intrigues, directing his movements, influencing and controlling such men as Doolittle to evade the true issue. I trust D. is beginning to have a more correct appreciation of matters.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 550-1

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Congressman Horace Mann to Reverend Cyrus Pierce, March 27, 1852

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1852.

C. PIERCE, Esq.

DEAR SIR,— . . . I found I was doing no good here, and that it seemed impossible for me to effect any; and therefore I took a short excursion into the State of New York, in hopes to redeem a little of my time from worthlessness by preaching the gospel of temperance and education. I spoke on these themes to willing or unwilling ears for about twenty-five successive nights, and returned in better health.

I find people in the western part of the State of New York more alive to the importance of thorough female education than we are in Massachusetts. They are seeking to reach the true point, however, not by public and free institutions for all, but by private institutions for those who can afford it. I spoke on this point to some social parties, not in the way of a lecture, but of a private conversation, with liberty of catechism. At Rochester, a meeting was held for the establishment of a female college whose curriculum of studies should be equal to that of other colleges; and some very sensible and energetic women are engaged in the enterprise. At Lima, about twenty miles from Rochester, they have a college for both sexes; and I was invited and present at two or three social parties where the young lady-students composed a part of the company. They have here a preparatory school of some six hundred or seven hundred pupils, whom I addressed. At M'Grawville, a little farther in the interior, is another college, whose doors are open not only for both sexes, but avowedly for all colors. Another college, already largely endowed,* is about to be opened at Yellow Springs, Ohio. Sixty thousand dollars are to be expended the ensuing summer for buildings. This is established with especial reference to the education of females. (Confidentially, what should you think of your humble servant's complying with a request to preside over this?) I think the young ladies of the West are stronger, larger, and better developed in every way, than those in Boston and its vicinity. A few miles out of Rochester, I attended an examination of a boarding-school, kept by Mrs. Brewster, formerly Miss Bloss, the historian; and I think I never saw twenty young ladies together to be compared to that number in her first class. There was not an ordinary looking person among them; and twenty such foreheads I never beheld before "all in a row." I saw a great many intelligent and earnest people. Doubtless the character of my mission selected this class from among the masses as a magnet will pick out steel filings from sand, and brought them around me; but their existence and their affinities were the main thing to rejoice at. I advocated the Maine Law with the zeal of one crying in the wilderness.

I felt very deeply indebted to you for the pains you took to set me right in the matter of the Normal schoolhouse and premises. I was so much disturbed by the apparent course of, that I wrote him a letter of inquiry, putting the thing in a not unfriendly and uncomplaining manner, and making no reference to any sources of information. He replied at some length, solemnly declaring that he had never given any impression that the property belonged to the school, the Board, or the State; but, on the other hand, had showed Mr. Quincy's letter to all the people of West Newton and elsewhere who had any interest in knowing the facts. What think you of this? If his letter were by me, I would send it to you, that you might know how broad his denials are. It is enough to say they are as broad as language can make them.

As to politics, I do not know as there is any thing here that you do not know as well as we do. Congress does little else but intrigue for the respective candidates. The partisans are now so zealously at work for their respective favorites, that they have little time for assailing their opponents. As soon, however, as the nominations are made, the battle will be set in array, and the batteries will be played with Napoleon-like energy. I did not go to the North at all on a political mission; but still, where there was so much said, I could not but hear some of it. The hostility to Mr. Fillmore, throughout the northern and western parts of New York, is very intense. It is not merely an opposition of principle for his abandonment of all the great doctrines of freedom, but it is personal. The objections to Mr. Webster, so far as principle is concerned, are very much the same as those urged against Mr. Fillmore. As to the candidates of the other party, all you can say is, that one is as bad as possible, and the other a good deal worse. Any idea of getting a man who is as he should be is out of the question. I fear the only resource left us will be to get rid of the worst. But here you will say I touch on the expediency doctrine, which I shall not now attempt to discuss.

M. sends very much love to you both. If R. were here, I know she would do the same; for she has it in her heart. So has

H. MANN.
_______________

* Mr. Mann proved to be mistaken about the endowment of this college. - ED.

SOURCE: Mary Tyler Peabody Mann, Life of Horace Mann, pp. 360-2

Friday, January 16, 2026

Cadet William T. Sherman to John Sherman, April 13, 1839

MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, N.Y., April 13, 1839.
Dear Brother:
*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

It appears that although you were pleased with Cincinnati as a city, you were not with the visit, taken all in all. From this I judge that your speculations did not turn out as well as expected. You must not be astonished if I say that if such be the case I am glad of it, because, had you succeeded, your attention would have been turned from your present business, with your success in which so many are interested. I presume by this time you must be nearly done with the works on the Muskingum. Those dams and locks of which you have spoken will no doubt be some of the finest specimens of workmanship in Ohio, and the more I think of it, the more I regret that I did not go and see them last summer. By the arrangement I suppose steamboats will be able to go up as far as Zanesville. I presume you have heard of these Maine difficulties before now. All is now calm in that quarter, the troops having been withdrawn from the disputed territory by both parties, and as far as our Government is concerned the thing is in a fair way of being amicably adjusted, but doubts are entertained with regard to the course which England will adopt. All anxiously await the return of the steamship Great Western which carried out the news, and as the time of her usual return has passed by several days, it is supposed that the time of her departure from England had been delayed in order to receive the news by the ship Liverpool, that left New York about eight or ten days after her; and as among the latter were the proceedings of Congress and the President's message, there is every reason to expect by this vessel some decisive news, and if they are ready for war, I think we will soon be. For my part, there is no nation that I would prefer being at variance with than the British, in this case more especially as our cause is plainly right and just. If anything occurs soon, I will write again or send the paper containing it. . . .

Your affectionate brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, pp. 7-8

Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Diary of Gideon Welles, Wednesday, June 27, 1866

Had some conversation with Senator Grimes respecting the legislation of this Congress, which is passing acts of corporations, special privileges, and grants ad libitum. Members of Congress have the reputation of being largely interested in many of their legislative favors. I think Grimes is not. Among other things a proposition to create a Department of Education is pending, not a Bureau, which would be bad enough, but a Department. Grimes, I see, did not favor it and in the course of his remarks said the high pressure for an extreme and almost prohibitory tariff was fast driving him into free trade. This is the natural result of extreme measures, — pushed too far they cause a reaction.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 542

Diary of Gideon Welles, Thursday, June 28, 1866

I understand that the Democratic Members of Congress have concluded to unite in the movement for the national convention of the 14th of August. I had some doubts whether they would readily come into it. Old party organizations and associations are strong. The Democratic papers have hesitated, and the New York World opposed the movement.

This opposition of the World is agreeable to Weed and company, and was intended by the New York Times, which was prompted by Weed and Seward, to foreshadow the convention and to assume that it was the Union Convention or Union Party Convention.

Senators Doolittle, Nesmith, Buckalew, and Harris and myself met in Colonel Cooper's room this evening, casually and accidentally. Most of the conversation was on the convention and the condition of parties. Harris is something of a trimmer, and, I perceive, a good deal embarrassed how to act, yet not prepared to take anti-Radical ground. Doolittle tried to persuade him that his true course was to go forward with the new movement, and, among other things, said that it was the movement which would ultimately prevail, — we should not succeed this fall but that the next election we should be successful. Of course such an admission would make such a calculating politician as Harris stick to the Radicals, for the next fall elections will be decisive of the Senatorial contest in New York. He will, therefore, under Doolittle's admission, go with the Radicals as the most likely way to secure his return to the Senate, — of which, however, there is not the remotest probability. He will be disappointed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 542-3

Saturday, January 10, 2026

Diary of Horatio Nelson Taft, Saturday, March 29, 1862

We have had quite a snow storm today and the streets are again wet and muddy. No particular news from any of the armies. The Bombardment of Island No 10 continues. I presume it is merely to keep a large force of the rebels Gun Boats &c away from other points New Orleans perhaps while our troops attack them. Bought a Draft this morning for 730, less 1/4 pr ct at discount and sent to Doct Davids wife, Lyons, as requested. The 98th is now encamped near Alexandria. “Bud” rode down there today and saw them. The 27th are at their old camp near the Seminary. Twenty thousand men passed over the River yesterday and last night, but soldiers and officers seem to be about as thick on the Ave as ever. Congress is draging along the Tax Bill, and discussing the everlasting Negro. When will that question end?

SOURCE: Horatio Nelson Taft, The Diary of Horatio Nelson Taft, 1861-1865. Volume 1, January 1,1861-April 11, 1862, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington D. C.

Sunday, January 4, 2026

Governor Rutherford B. Hayes to Benjamin F. Potts, December 21, 1869

COLUMBUS, December 21, 1869.

DEAR GENERAL:—I have your letter of the 20th and am glad to know, what I believed before, that you would stand by the flag notwithstanding the attractions of Montana until the crisis of organization and the Fifteenth Amendment is passed. I am advised, I think authentically, that the Hamilton members have settled to give the pro tempore Speaker of the Senate to the Democrats, Clerk to the Republicans, and so alternate through the offices and committees. In the House, Speaker, Republican, Clerk, Democrat, etc., on down. [The prospect for the ratification of the] Fifteenth Amendment [is] hopeful. Russell's vacancy will be filled in time. There may be an effort to claim that no vacancy existed authorizing a special election, Russell not being a Senator until admitted and sworn. But West says it is all bosh. There was a vacancy, etc., etc. Congratulations and regards to Mrs. Governor Potts.

Sincerely,
R. B. HAYES.
GENERAL B. F. POTTS.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 3, pp. 78-9

Thursday, December 18, 2025

John J. Crittenden to Senator Archibald Dixon, March 7, 1854

FRANKFORT, March 7, 1854.

MY DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged by your letter of 7th of February, and thank you for the information and kind suggestions it contains. I fully appreciate the frank and friendly spirit in which it was written.

You tell me there is a feeling among the Whigs at Washington "to run me for the Presidency, and that you fully participate in that feeling." I am grateful and proud to be held in such estimation by my friends; but I beg you to be assured that I entertain no expectation and no aspiration to become a candidate for the Presidency. No ambition for that high office troubles me. In the speech which I made on the 16th of last month I did not allude to the Nebraska bill. The festive occasion—a public dinner—on which it was made did not require me to speak on that subject. Besides, I had no inclination to make any public parade of my opinions, as though they were of consequence. On the other hand, I had no motive or wish to conceal them. I have not, therefore, hesitated here, in private circles, when it happened to become the subject of conversation, to express my views without reserve. I stated these views to the Hon. Presley Ewing, now at Washington, in a telegraphic reply to an inquiry which he had addressed to me from that place a few days ago. I will now, with the same readiness and frankness, state them briefly to you, without prolonging this letter by explanations and arguments.

Considering the question as an open one, it seems to me clear that Congress ought to leave it to the people of the Territories, preparing to enter the Union as States, to form their constitutions in respect to slavery as they may please, and ought to admit them into the Union whether they have admitted or excluded slavery; but that question, it seems to me, can scarcely be considered as an open one.

The country has long rested in the belief that it is settled by the Missouri Compromise, so far as it respects all the territory embraced by it, and of which Nebraska and Kansas are parts. I hope, however, that the North may consent to yield that compromise, and concur in substituting the principle of the Nebraska bill for the rule fixed by the Missouri Compromise. But without such a concurrence of Northern representatives as would fairly manifest the assent of the North to such substitution, I do not think the South ought to disregard or urge the repeal of that compromise to which she was a party.

The Missouri Compromise has long been considered as a sort of landmark in our political progress. It does not appear to me that it has ever been superseded or abrogated; and I think it is to be apprehended that its repeal, without sincere concurrence of the North, will be productive of serious agitations and disturbances.

That concurrence will relieve the subject from difficulty, as the parties to compromise have an undoubted right to set it aside at their pleasure. By such a course it seems to me the North would lose nothing, and would but afford another evidence of her wisdom and her patriotism. This, however, is a subject for her own consideration.

The great interest of the country requires that we should avoid, as far as possible, all agitation of the slavery question.

To use the language of Mr. Jefferson, "it sounds like a firebell at midnight." I am now, as I always have been, disposed to abide and stand by any past or future compromise or settlement of that question, provided it be only tolerably just and equal, not dishonorable, rather than to hazard the mischiefs of continued and corroding agitation. For these reasons I was content with the present compromises and regretted their disturbance. For the same reason I would maintain, for the sake of quiet, any different compromise or settlement that may be now or hereafter made, if not dishonorable or grossly unfair. This course, it seems to me, is demanded no less by the interest of the slaveholding States than for the tranquillity of the Union and its safety.

I have thus, sir, endeavored to give you an imperfect sketch of my views on the subject of the Nebraska bill. It will enable you to discover by comparison how far I differ in opinion with you and our other friends in Washington. Whatever these differences may be, they shall on my part be only differences of opinion. They will never disturb my general relations, personal or political, to you or to them. I will only add, sir, that if the Nebraska bill, with its repeal of the "Missouri Compromise," shall pass, my hope and wish is that it may prove by its consequences the correctness of your views, and its results may be as beneficial to the country as your purposes and intentions, I am sure, have been upright and patriotic.

I am your friend,
J. J. CRITTENDEN.
Hon. ARCHIBALD DIXON.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 102-3

Major General Winfield Scott to John J. Crittenden, March 21, 1854

NEW YORK, March 21, 1854.

Dear CRITTENDEN,—In a long life, not without some pleasing incidents, I have very rarely been so much gratified as at the receipt of your letter, inclosing the resolution of the Kentucky legislature (adopted unanimously) recommending the passage by Congress of the pending bill for giving me the rank of lieutenant-general. The source of this compliment, and the channel of communication under it, render it very dear to me. Indeed, it is probable that the resolution may, as was intended, prove to be more than an empty compliment, by stimulating the branch of Congress that has yet to act, before I can receive the additional rank, pay, and emoluments. Not a Kentuckian (and not a Whig) in the present Congress has voted against me; but, on the test-question to lay the bill on the table, Gray, Boyd, Chrisman, and Elliot were silent or absent. Dining with a large party the day that I received your letter, I chanced to mention to a leading Whig the Kentucky compliment, when it instantly occurred to him that the legislature of New York might follow that noble lead. He asked me for the resolution, and some notes, and I have no doubt that my friend (your political friend), Benjamin D. Silliman, followed up his good intentions. The legislature of New York has bestowed upon me two signal compliments, with exactly an interval of a third of a century between them. My bill is held back, that it may not be swamped in the whirlpool of passion created by the Nebraska question. God grant that the revival of the slavery question may not dissolve the Union. The excitement caused by the compromise measures had nearly died out, and I was in favor of letting well enough alone. When you return to the Senate I shall begin to regret having left Washington. Oh, for the old times of Letcher, Crittenden, Preston, Barrow, etc.! I saw Preston in October; he talked much about you. Kind regards to friends. Wishing you all happiness,

Your friend,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 105-6

Major General Winfield Scott to John J. Crittenden, April 3, 1854

NEW YORK, April 3, 1854.

Dear CRITTENDEN,—Herewith I inclose you a copy of General Smith's letter that you supposed would soon reach me. I have sent the original to Washington, with my indorsement, notwithstanding the refusal of the Secretary of War in the case of Major Crittenden, which came to hand since I last wrote to you. Whether the secretary will yield to the second application I think very doubtful. Lieutenant Bonaparte now applies for the first time, and as the French minister will privately support his request, it may give success to both applications. The Nebraska bill stops all business in the House, and the Maine liquor law (with the governor's veto) operates the same way at Albany upon the Kentucky resolutions introduced there. All signs fail in a drought, and I am in a perpetual drought, by being thrown (to borrow a metaphor from Bunyan) into that "slough of despond," the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. With Mrs. Crittenden within-doors, and Letcher next-door neighbor, I suppose you to be beyond the reach of cares and vexations. Happy man! and may you long continue so. Just received a letter from Coombs, spoiling to get his money, and disgusted with Washington. Your immediate representative (Breckinridge) and mine (Cutting) have agreed to let each other die in the regular course of nature. I heartily rejoice. B. always votes for my bill, and Cutting will, at the next trial, change to the same side. I am called to dinner; never have a good one without thinking of you.

Always, as heretofore, yours,
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Hon. J. J. CRITTENDEN.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 106-7

Monday, October 13, 2025

Senator Charles Sumner to John Bigelow, March 2, 1852

Congress and all the world have a vacation to-day to quaff fresh air, sunshine, and champagne on board the 'Baltic.'1 I voted for the adjournment, but did not care to put myself in the great man-trap set especially for members of Congress. I see nothing certain in the Presidential horizon. In all my meditations I revert with new regret to the attempted reconciliation in '49 in your State. Without that we should now control the free States.

I read carefully and enjoyed much Mr. Bryant's address.2 It was a truthful, simple, and delicate composition, and, much as I value sculpture and Greenough, I cannot but add will be a more durable monument to Cooper than any other. Webster's historical article was crude and trite enough.
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1 Of the Collins line of steamships, whose owners were then seeking a subsidy.

2  On J. Fenimore Cooper, Feb. 25, 1852, at a meeting of which Mr. Webster was chairman, called to raise funds for a monument to the novelist. Sumner's reply to the invitation to attend the meeting is printed in his Works, vol. iii. p. 43.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 279

Thursday, October 9, 2025

Judge I. T. Bosworth to Daniel S. Dickinson, March 9, 1857

BINGHAMTON, March 1, 1857.

MY DEAR JUDGE—Your favor of the 27th came duly to hand, and, as the merchants say, "contents noted." I penned you my "incomprehensible" note while in the tedious attendance upon rather a beggarly circuit. It is said that when a pun or witticism needs explanation to give it point, it is a sorry manifestation, and I do not see why what our old and departed friend Judge S. was wont to call a "sarcasm" does not fall within the same category. However, at the hazard of coming within the rule, I will translate my Greek.

My eye, at the moment of writing, fell upon the movements of the Corruption Committee at Washington, and seeing that the Hon. ——— was to be expelled, reminded me of how much I had enjoyed, some twenty-three years ago, laughing at you for turning the same individual out of your law office for stealing a large pane of glass out of the door of E——'s newly fitted up house over the Chenango Bridge, to supply one that he had broken out of the door of your office; and to complete the joke he got a light too large by three inches one way and one the other. The fun I had at the time over it all came back to me, and hence my revival of it to you thus obscurely;—not thinking that the brick and mortar, excitement and turmoil, and judicial care of the city, had shut you out from keeping track of individuals, as we do in the country.

*          *          *          *          *

Yes, my dear Judge, I might wear out life as you do. I have enjoyed some rather gratifying triumphs in my day, both political and professional; but never anything has so much drawn out my anxiety and solicitude in advance, has so much mortified and vexed me when adverse, nor afforded me the same satisfaction in success, as the matter to which you allude.

I still like professional pursuits better than official life. If I had money to spend profusely, I could enjoy myself in rural occupations; but eternal, like internal improvement, is too expensive a luxury for a poor man.

I like excitement, and as I also want income, it would work well if we did not have so much mere litigation over subjects where the parties cannot pay very large fees, and, if able, no counsel could have the face to charge them. These cases, as you know, are fought out with a pertinacity almost unknown in the city, or if known, would command a thousand dollars to our one hundred. If you do not engage in them, others will, and hey block up the courts and delay other business at home, and prevent you from going abroad to attend to business of more importance if you have it. The present system is far less pleasant for the country than the former. There is, or rather would be enough good business to engage me constantly if it were not impeded by this profitless litigation, and much time is wasted in this, in working or in waiting, to the prevention of more important business. If I was within four or five hours ride of the city, instead of nine or ten, I would open an office there.

Mrs. Dickinson and daughters join me in regards to yourself and Mrs. Bosworth and family

Sincerely yours,
D. S. DICKINSON.

SOURCE: John R. Dickinson, Editor, Speeches, Correspondence, Etc., of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson of New York, Vol. 2, pp. 500-2

Tuesday, September 30, 2025

Speech of Senator John C. Calhoun on His Resolutions in Reference on the War with Mexico Delivered in the United States Senate, January 4, 1848

RESOLUTIONS.

Resolved, That to conquer Mexico, and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate it in the Union, would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government; in conflict with its character and genius; and, in the end, subversive of our free and popular institutions.

 

Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be adopted which may lead to consequences so disastrous.

MR. CALHOUN said: In offering, Senators, these resolutions for your consideration, I am governed by the reasons which induced me to oppose the war, and by which I have been governed since it was sanctioned by Congress. In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to touch on the reasons which governed me on that occasion further than is necessary to explain my motives on the present.

I, then, opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue; but from high considerations of policy—because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. But, after the war was declared, by authority of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my efforts to give such direction to the war as would, as far as possible, prevent the evils and danger with which it threatened the country and its institutions. For this purpose, at the last session, I suggested to the Senate the policy of adopting a defensive line; and for the same purpose I now offer these resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive which governs me on this occasion. I am moved by no personal or party considerations. My object is neither to sustain the Executive nor to strengthen the opposition;—but simply to discharge an important duty to the country. In doing so, I shall express my opinion on all points with the freedom and boldness which becomes an independent Senator, who has nothing to ask from the Government or from the People. But when I come to notice those points on which I differ from the President, I shall do it with all the decorum which is due to the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

I suggested a defensive line because, in the first place, I believed that the only certain mode of terminating the war successfully was to take indemnity into our own hands by occupying defensively, with our military force, a portion of the Mexican territory, which we might deem ample for indemnity; and, in the next, because I believed it would prevent a great sacrifice of life and property; but, above all, because I believed that it was the only way we could avoid the great danger to our institutions against which these resolutions are intended to guard. The President took a different view. He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest—that was emphatically disavowed—but for the purpose of conquering peace—that is, to compel Mexico to sign a treaty ceding sufficient territory to indemnify the claims of our citizens and of the country for the expenses of the war. I could not approve of this policy. I opposed it, among other reasons, because I believed there was no certainty that the object intended to be effected would be accomplished let the war be ever so successful. Congress thought differently, and granted ample provisions, in men and money, for carrying out the policy recommended by the President. It has now been fully tested under the most favorable circumstances. It has been as successful as the most sanguine hope of the Executive could have anticipated. Victory after victory followed in rapid succession, without a single reverse. Santa Anna repelled and defeated with all his forces at Buena Vista—Vera Cruz, with its castle, captured—the heights of Cerro Gordo triumphantly carried—Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla occupied—and, after many triumphant victories under the walls of Mexico, its gates opened to us, and we put in possession of the capital. But what have all these splendid achievements accomplished? Has the avowed object of the war been attained? Have we conquered peace? Have we compelled Mexico to sign a treaty? Have we obtained indemnity? No. Not a single object contemplated by the campaign has been effected; and what is worse, our difficulties are greater now than they were at the commencement, and the objects sought more difficult to be accomplished. To what is this complete failure to be attributed? Not to our army. It has done all that skill and gallantry could accomplish. It is to be attributed to the policy pursued. The Executive aimed at indemnity in a wrong way. Instead of taking it into our own hands, when we had territory in our possession ample to cover the claims of our citizens and the expenses of the war, he sought it indirectly through a treaty with Mexico. He thus put it out of our own power, and under the control of Mexico, to say whether we should have indemnity or not, and thereby enabled her to defeat the whole object of the campaign by simply refusing to treat with us. Owing to this mistaken policy, after a most successful and brilliant campaign, involving an expenditure of not less, probably, than $40,000,000, and the sacrifice, by the sword and by disease, of many valuable lives, probably not less than six or seven thousand, nothing is left but the glory which our army has acquired.

But, as an apology for this, it is insisted that the maintenance of a defensive line would have involved as great a sacrifice as the campaign itself. The President and the Secretary of War have assigned many reasons for entertaining this opinion. I have examined them with care. This is not the proper occasion to discuss them, but I must say, with all due deference, they are, to my mind, utterly fallacious; and to satisfy your mind that such is the case, I will place the subject in a single point of view.

The line proposed by me, to which I suppose their reasons were intended to be applied, would be covered in its whole extent—from the Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, on the Rio Grande—by the Gulf of California and the wilderness peopled by hostile tribes of Indians, through which no Mexican force could penetrate. For its entire occupancy and defence, nothing would be required but a few small vessels of war stationed in the gulf, and a single regiment to keep down any resistance from the few inhabitants within. From the Paso del Norte to the mouth of the river, a distance of a few hundred miles, a single fact will show what little force will be necessary to its defence. It was a frontier between Texas and Mexico, when the former had but an inconsiderable population-not more than an hundred and fifty thousand at the utmost, at any time-with no standing army, and but very few irregular troops; yet for several years she maintained this line without any, except slight occasional intrusion from Mexico, and this too when Mexico was far more consolidated in her power, and when revolutions were not so frequent, and her money resources were far greater than at present. If, then, Texas alone, under such circumstances, could defend that frontier for so long a period, can any man believe that now, when she is backed by the whole of the United States,—now that Mexico is exhausted, defeated, and prostrated—I repeat, can any man believe that it would involve as great a sacrifice to us of men and money, to defend that frontier, as did the last campaign? No. I hazard nothing in asserting, that, to defend it for an indefinite period would have required a less sum than the interest on the money spent in the campaign, and fewer men than were sacrificed in carrying it on.

So much for the past. We now come to the commencement of another campaign, and the question recurs, What shall be done? The President, in his message, recommends the same line of policy—a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest, that is again emphatically disavowed ; not to blot Mexico out of the list of nations; no, he desires to see her an independent and flourishing community-and assigns strong reasons for it-but to obtain an honorable peace. We hear no more of conquering peace, but I presume that he means by an honorable peace the same thing; that is, to compel Mexico to agree to a treaty, ceding a sufficient part of her territory, as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and for the claims of our citizens.

I have examined with care the grounds on which the President renews his recommendation, and am again compelled to dissent. There are many and powerful reasons—more so, even, than those that existed at the commencement of the last campaign—to justify my dissent. The sacrifice in money will be vastly greater. There is a bill for ten additional regiments now before the Senate, and another for twenty regiments of volunteers has been reported, authorizing, in all, the raising of an additional force of something upwards of thirty thousand. This, in addition to that already authorized by law, will be sufficient to keep an effective army in Mexico, of not much, if any, less than seventy thousand men, and will raise the expenses of the campaign to probably not less than sixty millions of dollars.

To meet so large an expenditure would involve, in the present and prospective condition of the money market, it is to be apprehended, not a little embarrassment. Last year money was abundant, and easily obtained. An unfortunate famine in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural products. This turned the balance of trade greatly in our favor, and specie poured into the country with a strong and steady current. No inconsiderable portion of it passed into the treasury, through the duties, which kept it full, in spite of the large sums remitted to meet the expenses of the war. The case is different now. Instead of having a tide flowing in, equal to the drain flowing out, the drain is now both ways. The exchanges now are against us,—instead of being in our favor, and instead of specie flowing into the country from abroad, it is flowing out. In the mean time, the price of stocks and treasury notes, instead of being at or above par, have both fallen below, to a small extent. The effects of the depreciation of treasury notes will cause them to pass into the treasury in payment of the customs and other dues to the Government, as the cheaper currency, instead of gold and silver; while the expenses of the war, whether paid for by the transmission of gold and silver direct to Mexico, or by drafts drawn in favor of British merchants or other capitalists there, will cause whatever specie may be in the vaults of the treasury to flow from it, either for remittance direct, on account of the ordinary transactions of the country, or to pay the drafts which may be drawn upon it, and which, when paid, in the present state of exchanges, will be remitted abroad. But this process of paying in treasury notes instead of gold and silver, and gold and silver flowing out in both directions, cannot continue long without exhausting its specie, and leaving nothing to meet the public expenditure, including those of the war, but treasury notes. Can they, under such circumstances, preserve even their present value? Is there not great danger that they will fall lower and lower, and finally involve the finances of the Government and the circulation of the country in the greatest embarrassment and difficulty?

Is there not great danger, with this prospect before us, and with the necessity of raising by loans near forty millions, of a commercial and financial crisis—even possibly a suspension by the banks. I wish not to create panic; but there is danger, which makes a great difference in a financial and moneyed point of view between the state of things now and at the commencement of the last session. Looking to the future, it is to be apprehended that not a little difficulty will have to be encountered in raising money to meet the expenses of the next campaign, if conducted on the large scale which is proposed. Men you may raise, but money will be found difficult to obtain. It is even to be apprehended that loans will have to be negotiated on very disadvantageous terms for the public. In the present state of things, if they grow no worse, there can be no resort to treasury notes. They cannot be materially increased, without a ruinous depreciation, and a resort must be had, exclusively, or almost entirely so, to borrowing. But at the present prices of stocks, to borrow so large a sum as will be necessary, can only be done at a greatly increased rate of interest on the nominal amount of stock. In a recent conversation with a gentleman, well informed on this subject, he said that in his opinion, if forty millions are required, a loan could not be had for more than ninety for one hundred, which would be about at the rate of seven per cent.

These are formidable objections; but they are not the only ones that are more so than they were at the commencement of the last campaign. I hold that the avowed object for the vigorous prosecution of the war is less certain of being realized now, than it was then; and if it should fail to be realized, it will leave our affairs in a far worse condition than they are at present. That object, as has been stated, is to obtain an honorable treaty; one which, to use the language of the President, will give indemnity for the past and security for the future—that is, a treaty which will give us a cession of territory, not only equal to our present demand for indemnity, but equal to the additional demand—equal to the entire expenses to be incurred in conducting the campaign; and a guaranty from the Government of Mexico for its faithful execution. Now, Senators, I hold that whether the war is successful or unsuccessful, there is not only no certainty that this object will be accomplished, but almost a certainty that it will not be. If the war be unsuccessful; if our arms should be baffled, as I trust and believe they will not be; if, from any unfortunate accident, such should be the case, it is clear that we shall not be able to negotiate a treaty that will accomplish the object intended. On the contrary, if the war should be successful, it is almost equally certain that, in such case, the avowed object for prosecuting the war vigorously, will not be accomplished. I might take higher ground, and maintain that the more successfully the war is prosecuted, the more certainly the object avowed will be defeated, while the objects disavowed would as certainly be accomplished.

What is the object of a vigorous prosecution of the war? How can it be successful? I can see but one way of making it so, and that is,—by suppressing all resistance on the part of Mexico, overpowering and dispersing her army, and utterly overthrowing her Government. But if this should be done; if a vigorous prosecution of the war should lead to this result, how are we to obtain an honorable peace? With whom shall we treat for indemnity for the past and security for the future? War may be made by one party, but it requires two to make peace. If all authority is overthrown in Mexico, where will be the power to enter into negotiation and make peace? Our very success would defeat the possibility of making peace. In that case the war would not end in peace, but in conquest; not in negotiation, but in subjugation; and defeat, I repeat, the very object you aim to accomplish, and accomplish that which you disavow to be your intention, by destroying the separate existence of Mexico,—overthrowing her nationality, and blotting out her name from the list of nations,—instead of leaving her a free Republic, which the President has so earnestly expressed his desire to do.

If I understand his message correctly, I have his own authority for the conclusion to which I come. He takes very much the same view that I do, as to how a war ought to be prosecuted vigorously, and what would be its results,—with the difference as to the latter resting on a single contingency, and that a remote one. He says that the great difficulty of obtaining peace results from this, that the people of Mexico are divided under factious chieftains, and that the chief in power dare not make peace, because for doing so he would be displaced by a rival. He also says, that the only way to remedy this evil and to obtain a treaty, is to put down the whole of them, including the one in power, as well as the others. Well, what then? Are we to stop there? No. Our generals are, it seems, authorized to encouraged and to protect the well disposed inhabitants in establishing a republican government. He says they are numerous, and are prevented from expressing their opinions and making an attempt to form such a government, only by fear of those military chieftains. He proposes, when they have thus formed a government, under the encouragement and, protection of our army, to obtain peace by a treaty with the government thus formed, which shall give us ample indemnity for the past and security for the future. I must say I am at a loss to see how a free and independent republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and authority of its conquerors. I can readily understand how an aristocracy or a despotic government might be, but how a free republican government can be so established, under such circumstances, is to me incomprehensible. I had always supposed that such a government must be the spontaneous wish of the people; that it must emanate from the hearts of the people, and be supported by their devotion to it, without support from abroad. But it seems that these are antiquated notions—obsolete ideas—and that free popular governments may be made under the authority and protection of a conqueror.

But suppose the difficulties surmounted, how can we make a free government in Mexico? Where are the materials? It is to be, I presume, a confederated government like their former. Where is the intelligence in Mexico for the construction and preservation of such a government? It is what she has been aiming at for more than twenty years, but so utterly incompetent are her people for the task, that it has been a complete failure from first to last. The great body of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is concentrated in the priesthood, who are naturally disinclined to that form of government; the residue, for the most part, are the owners of the haciendas, the larger planters of the country, but they are without concert and destitute of the means of forming such a government. But if it were possible to establish such a government, it could not stand without the protection of our army. It would fall as soon as it is withdrawn.

If it be determined to have a treaty, it would be a far preferable course, it appears to me, to abstain from attacking or destroying the government now existing in Mexico, and to treat with it, if indeed it be capable of forming a treaty which it could maintain and execute. Upon this point I do not profess to have any information beyond that derived from conversations with those who have been in Mexico; but from all that I can hear, it may be doubted, whether we have not already pushed what is called a vigorous prosecution of the war so far, as not to leave sufficient power and influence in the Government to enter into a treaty which would be respected, when our forces are withdrawn. Such I know to be the opinion of intelligent officers. They concur in thinking that the existing Government at Queretaro, if it should enter into a treaty in conformity with the views expressed by the Executive, would be overthrown, and that we should be compelled to defend that portion of Mexico which we require for indemnity defensively, or be compelled to return and renew the prosecution of the war. If such is its weakness, it may be apprehended that even now, without pushing the vigorous prosecution of the war further, we are greatly exposed to the danger which these resolutions are intended to guard against, and that it requires great discretion and prompt action on our part to avoid it.

But before leaving this part of the subject, I must enter my solemn protest, as one of the Representatives of a State of this Union, against pledging protection to any government established in Mexico under our countenance or encouragement. It would inevitably be overthrown as soon as our forces are withdrawn; and we would be compelled, in fulfilment of plighted faith, implied or expressed, to return and reinstate such Government in power, to be again overturned and again reinstated, until we should be compelled to take the government into our own hands, just as the English have been compelled again and again to do in Hindostan, under similar circumstances, until it has led to its entire conquest. Let us avoid following the example which we have been condemning, as far back as my recollection extends.

The President himself entertains doubt, whether the plan of forming a government in the manner which I have been considering, and treating with it for indemnity, may not fail. In that case, he agrees that the very course to which I have said the vigorous prosecution of the war will inevitably lead, must be taken. He says, after having attempted to establish such a government—after having employed the best efforts to secure peace—if all fail, "we must hold on to the occupation of the country. We must take the full measure of indemnity into our own hands, and enforce such terms as the honor of the country demands." These are his words. Now, what is this? Is it not an acknowledgment, that if he fail in establishing a government with which he can treat, in Mexico-after putting down all resistance under the existing Government, we must make a conquest of the whole country, and hold it subject to our control? Can words be stronger? "Occupy the whole country"—" take the full measure of indemnity"—no defensive line—no treaty, and, "enforce terms." Terms on whom? On the Government? No, no, no. To enforce terms on the people individually. That is to say, to establish a government over them in the form of a province.

The President is right. If the vigorous prosecution of the war should be successful, and the contingency on which he expects to make a treaty fail, there will be no retreat. Every argument against calling back the army and taking a defensive line will have double force, after having spent $60,000,000, and acquired the possession of the whole of Mexico; and the interests in favor of keeping possession would be much more powerful then than now. The army itself will be larger—those who live by the war, the numerous contractors, the merchants, the sutlers, the speculators in land and mines, and all who are profiting directly or indirectly by its prosecution, will be adverse to retiring, and will swell the cry of holding on to our conquests. They constitute an immense body of vast influence, who are growing rich by what is impoverishing the rest of the country.

It is at this stage that the President speaks of taking the indemnity into our own hands. But why delay it until the whole country is subdued? Why not take it now? A part of Mexico would be a better indemnity now, than the whole of Mexico would be at the end of the next campaign, when $60,000,000 will be added to the present expenditures. We would indeed acquire a control over a much larger portion of her population, but we would never be able to extort from them, by all the forms of taxation to which you can resort, a sum sufficient to pay the force necessary to hold them in subjection. That force must be a large one, not less, certainly, than 40,000 men, according to the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Davis), who must be regarded as a competent judge upon this point. He stated in debate the other day, that the army now there, exceeding that number, are in danger; and urged, on that account, the immediate passage of the bill to raise ten regiments. On this subject, it is as well to speak out plainly at once. We shall never obtain indemnity for the expenditures of the war. They must come out of the pockets of the people of the United States; and the longer the war is continued, and the more numerous our army, the greater will be the debt, and the heavier the burden imposed upon the country.

If these views be correct, the end of the policy recommended by the President-whether contemplated or notwill be, to force the Government to adopt one or the other alternative alluded to in these resolutions. With this impression, I cannot support the policy he recommends, for the reasons assigned in the first resolution. The first of these is, that it would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted. That it would be so, is apparent from what has already been said. Since the commencement of the war until this time, the President has continually disavowed the intention of conquering Mexico, and subjecting her to our control. He has constantly proclaimed that the only object was indemnity, and that the war is prosecuted to obtain it by treaty. And yet, if the results should be as I have stated, the end will be, that what was disavowed will be accomplished, and what has been avowed to be its object, will be defeated. Such a result would be a deep and lasting impeachment of the sincerity or the intelligence of the Government of its sincerity, because directly opposed to what it has continually and emphatically disavowed; of its intelligence, for not perceiving what ought to have been so readily anticipated.

We have heard much of the reputation which our country has acquired by this war. I acknowledge it to the full amount, as far as the military is concerned. The army has done its duty nobly, and conferred high honors on the country, for which I sincerely thank them; but I apprehend that the reputation acquired does not go beyond this, and that, in other respects, we have lost instead of acquiring reputation by the war. It would seem certain, from all publications from abroad, that the Government itself has not gained reputation in the eyes of the world for justice, moderation, or wisdom.

Whether this be deserved or not, it is not for me to inquire at present. I am now speaking merely of reputation; and in this view it appears that we have lost abroad, as much in civil and political reputation as we have acquired for our skill and valor in arms. But much as I regard military glory—much as I rejoice to witness the display of that indomitable energy and courage which surmounts all difficulties—I would be sorry indeed that our Government should lose any portion of that high character for justice, moderation, and discretion, which distinguished it in the early stages of our history.

The next reason assigned is, that either holding Mexico as a province, or incorporating her into the Union, would be unprecedented by any example in our history. We have conquered many of the neighboring tribes of Indians, but we have never thought of holding them in subjection, or of incorporating them into our Union. They have been left as an independent people in the midst of us, or been driven back into the forests. Nor have we ever incorporated into the Union any but the Caucasian race. To incorporate Mexico would be the first departure of the kind; for more than half of its population are pure Indians, and by far the larger portion of the residue mixed blood. I protest against the incorporation of such a people. Ours is the government of the white man. The great misfortune of what was formerly Spanish America, is to be traced to the fatal error of placing the colored race on an equality with the white. This error destroyed the social arrangement which formed the basis of their society. This error we have wholly escaped; the Brazilians, formerly a province of Portugal, have escaped also to a considerable extent, and they and we are the only people of this continent who made revolutions without anarchy. And yet, with this example before them, and our uniform practice, there are those among us who talk about erecting these Mexicans into territorial governments, and placing them on an equality with the people of these States. I utterly protest against the project.

It is a remarkable fact in this connection, that in the whole history of man, as far as my information extends, there is no instance whatever of any civilized colored race, of any shade, being found equal to the establishment and maintenance of free government, although by far the largest proportion of the human family is composed of them; and even in the savage state, we rarely find them any where with such governments, except it be our noble savages; for noble I will call them for their many high qualities. They, for the most part, had free institutions, but such institutions are much more easily sustained among a savage than a civilized people. Are we to overlook this great fact? Are we to associate with ourselves, as equals, companions, and fellow-citizens, the Indians and mixed races of Mexico? I would consider such association as degrading to ourselves, and fatal to our institutions.

The next remaining reasons assigned, that it would be in conflict with the genius and character of our Government, and, in the end, subversive of our free institutions, are intimately connected, and I shall consider them together.

That it would be contrary to the genius and character of our Government, and subversive of our free popular institutions, to hold Mexico as a subject province, is a proposition too clear for argument before a body so enlightened as the Senate. You know the American constitution too well,—you have looked into history, and are too well acquainted with the fatal effects which large provincial possessions have ever had on the institutions of free states,—to need any proof to satisfy you how hostile it would be to the institutions of this country, to hold Mexico as a subject province. There is not an example on record of any free state holding a province of the same extent and population, without disastrous consequences. The nations conquered and held as a province, have, in time, retaliated by destroying the liberty of their conquerors, through the corrupting effect of extended patronage and irresponsible power. Such, certainly, would be our case. The conquest of Mexico would add so vastly to the patronage of this Government, that it would absorb the whole powers of the States; the Union would become an imperial power, and the States reduced to mere subordinate corporations. But the evil would not end there; the process would go on, and the power transferred from the States to the Union, would be transferred from the Legislative Department to the Executive. All the immense patronage which holding it as a province would create,—the maintenance of a large army, to hold it in subjection, and the appointment of a multitude of civil officers necessary to govern it, would be vested in him. The great influence which it would give the President, would be the means of controlling the Legislative Department, and subjecting it to his dictation, especially when combined with the principle of proscription which has now become the established practice of the Government. The struggle to obtain the Presidential chair would become proportionably great—so great as to destroy the freedom of elections. The end would be anarchy or despotism, as certain as I am now addressing the Senate.

Let it not be said that Great Britain is an example to the contrary; that she holds provinces of vast extent and population, without materially impairing the liberty of the subject, or exposing the Government to violence, anarchy, confusion, or corruption. It is so. But it must be attributed to the peculiar character of her government. Of all governments that ever existed, of a free character, the British far transcends all in one particular, and that is, its capacity to bear patronage without the evils usually incident to it. She can bear more, in proportion to population and wealth, than any government of that character that ever existed:—I might even go further, and assert than despotism itself in its most absolute form. I will not undertake to explain why it is so. It will take me further from the course which I have prescribed for myself, than I desire; but I will say, in a few words, that it results from the fact that her Executive and the House of Lords (the conservative branches of her Government) are both hereditary, while the other House of Parliament has a popular character. The Roman Government exceeded the British in its capacity for conquest. No government ever did exist, and none probably ever will, which, in that particular, equalled it; but its capacity to hold conquered provinces in subjection, was as nothing compared to that of Great Britain; and hence, when the Roman power passed beyond the limits of Italy, crossed the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and the Alps, liberty fell prostrate; the Roman people became a rabble; corruption penetrated every department of the Government; violence and anarchy ruled the day, and military despotism closed the scene. Now, on the contrary, we see England, with subject-provinces of vastly greater territorial extent, and probably of not inferior population (I have not compared them); we see her, I repeat, going on without the personal liberty of the subject being materially impaired, or the Government subject to violence or anarchy! Yet England has not wholly escaped the curse which must ever befall a free government which holds extensive provinces in subjection; for, although she has not lost her liberty, or fallen into anarchy, yet we behold the population of England crushed to the earth by the superincumbent weight of debt and taxation, which may one day terminate in revolution. The wealth derived from her conquests and provincial possessions may have contributed to swell the overgrown fortunes of the upper classes, but has done nothing to alleviate the pressure on the laboring masses below. On the contrary, the expenses incident to their conquest, and of governing and holding them in subjection, have been drawn mainly from their labor, and have increased instead of decreasing the weight of the pressure. It has placed a burden upon them which, with all their skill and industry, with all the vast accumulation of capital and power of machinery with which they are aided,—they are scarce capable of bearing, without being reduced to the lowest depths of poverty. Take, for example, Ireland, her earliest and nearest conquest, and is it not to this day a cause of heavy expense, and a burden, instead of a source of revenue ?

On the contrary, our Government, in this particular, is the very reverse of the British. Of all free governments, it has the least capacity, in proportion to the wealth and population of the country, to bear patronage. The genius of the two, in this particular, is precisely opposite, however much alike in exterior forms and other particulars. The cause of this difference, I will not undertake to explain on the present occasion. It results from its federal character and elective chief magistrate; and so far from the example of Great Britain constituting a safe precedent for us to follow, the little she has gained from her numerous conquests and vast provincial possessions, and the heavy burdens which it has imposed upon her people to meet the consequent expenses, ought to be to us a warning never to be forgotten; especially when we reflect that, from the nature of our Government, we would be so liable to the other and greater evils from which she, from the nature of her Government, is, in a great measure, exempted. Such and so weighty are the objections to conquering Mexico, and holding it as a subject province.

Nor are the reasons less weighty against incorporating her into the Union. As far as law is concerned, this is easily done. All that is necessary is to establish a territorial government for the several States in Mexico, of which there are upwards of twenty,—to appoint governors, judges, and magistrates, and to give to the population a subordinate right of making laws—we defraying the cost of the government. So far as legislation goes, the work will be done; but there would be a great difference between these territorial governments, and those which we have heretofore established within our own limits. These are only the offsets of our own people, or foreigners from the same countries from which our ancestors came. The first settlers in the territories are too few in number to form and support a government of their own, and are under obligation to the Government of the United States for forming one for them, and defraying the expense of maintaining it; knowing, as they do, that when they have sufficient population, they will be permitted to form a constitution for themselves, and be admitted as members of the Union.—During the period of their territorial government, no force is necessary to keep them in a state of subjection. The case will be entirely different with these Mexican territories; when you form them, you must have powerful armies to hold them in subjection, with all the expenses incident to supporting them. You may call them territories, but they would, in reality, be but provinces under another name, and would involve the country in all the difficulties and dangers which I have already shown would result from holding the country in that condition. How long this state of things would last, before they would be fitted to be incorporated into the Union as States, we may form some idea, from similar instances with which we are familiar. Ireland has been held in subjection by England for many centuries; and yet remains hostile, although her people are of a kindred race with the conquerors. The French colony in Canada still entertain hostile feelings towards their conquerors, although living in the midst of them for nearly one hundred years. If we may judge from these examples, it would not be unsafe to conclude that the Mexicans never will be heartily reconciled to our authority. The better class have Castilian blood in their veins, and are of the old Gothic stock—quite equal to the Anglo-Saxons in many respects, and in some superior. Of all the people upon earth, they are the most pertinacious; they hold out longer, and often when there would seem to be no prospect of ever making effectual resistance. It is admitted, I believe, on all hands, that they are now universally hostile to us, and the probability is, will continue so.

But suppose this difficulty removed. Suppose their hostility should cease, and they should become desirous of being incorporated into our Union. Ought we to admit them? Are the Mexicans fit to be politically associated with us? Are they fit not only to govern themselves, but for governing us also? Are any of you, Senators, willing that your State should constitute a member of a Union, of which twenty odd Mexican States, more than one-third of the whole, would be a part, the far greater part of the inhabitants of which are pure Indians, not equal in intelligence and elevation of character to the Cherokees, Choctaws, or any of our Southern Indian tribes?

We make a great mistake in supposing all people are capable of self-government. Acting under that impression, many are anxious to force free governments on all the people of this continent, and over the world, if they had the power. It has been lately urged in a very respectable quarter, that it is the mission of this country to spread civil and religious liberty over all the globe, and especially over this continent—even by force, if necessary. It is a sad delusion. None but a people advanced to a high state of moral and intellectual excellence are capable in a civilized condition, of forming and maintaining free governments; and among those who are so far advanced, very few indeed have had the good fortune to form constitutions capable of endurance. It is a remarkable fact in the political history of man, that there is scarcely an instance of a free constitutional government, which has been the work exclusively of foresight and wisdom. They have all been the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. It is a very difficult task to make a constitution worthy of being called so. This admirable federal constitution of ours, is the result of such a combination. It is superior to the wisdom of any or all of the men by whose agency it was made. The force of circumstances, and not foresight or wisdom, induced them to adopt many of its wisest provisions.

But of the few nations who have been so fortunate as to adopt a wise constitution, still fewer have had the wisdom long to preserve one. It is harder to preserve than to obtain liberty. After years of prosperity, the tenure by which it is held is but too often forgotten; and I fear, Senators, that such is the case with us. There is no solicitude now about liberty. It was not so in the early days of the republic. Then it was the first object of our solicitude. The maxim then was, that "Power is always stealing from the many to the few;" "The price of liberty is perpetual vigilance." Then no question of any magnitude came up, in which the first inquiry was not, "Is it constitutional?"—"Is it consistent with our free, popular institutions?"—"How is it to affect our liberty?" It is not so now. Questions of the greatest magnitude are now discussed without reference or allusion to these vital considerations. I have been often struck with the fact, that in the discussions of the great questions in which we are now engaged, relating to the origin and the conduct of this war, their effect on the free institutions and the liberty of the people have scarcely been alluded to, although their bearing in that respect is so direct and disastrous. They would, in former days, have been the great and leading topics of discussion; and would, above all others, have had the most powerful effect in arousing the attention of the country. But now, other topics occupy the attention of Congress and of the country-military glory, extension of the empire, and the aggrandizement of the country. To what is this great change to be attributed ? Is it because there has been a decay of the spirit of liberty among the people? I think not. I believe that it was never more ardent. The true cause is, that we have ceased to remember the tenure by which liberty alone can be preserved. We have had so many years of prosperity—passed through so many difficulties and dangers without the loss of liberty—that we begin to think that we hold it by right divine from heaven itself. Under this impression, without thinking or reflecting, we plunge into war, contract heavy debts, increase vastly the patronage of the Executive, and indulge in every species of extravagance, without thinking that we expose our liberty to hazard. It is a great and fatal mistake. The day of retribution will come; and when it does, awful will be the reckoning, and heavy the responsibility somewhere.

I have now shown, Senators, that the conquest of Mexico, and holding it as a subject province, or incorporating it into our Union, is liable to the many and irresistible objections assigned in the first resolution. I have also shown that the policy recommended by the President, if carried out, would terminate, in all probability, in its conquest, and holding it either in one or the other mode stated; and that such is the opinion of the President himself, unless, in the mean time, peace can be obtained. Believing, then, that this line of policy might lead to consequences so disastrous, it ought not, in my opinion, in the language of the second resolution, to be adopted. Thus thinking, I cannot give it my support. The question is then presented—What should be done? It is a great and difficult question, and daily becoming more so. I, who have used every effort in my power to prevent this war, might excuse myself from answering it, and leave it to those who have incurred greater responsibility in relation to it. But I will not shrink from any responsibility where the safety of the country or its institutions are at stake.

The first consideration in determining what line of policy, in the present state of things, ought to be adopted, is to decide what line will most effectually guard against the dangers which I have shown would result from the conquest of Mexico, and the disastrous consequences which would follow it.

After the most mature reflection which I have been able to give to the subject, I am of opinion now, and have been from the first, that the only one by which it can be certainly guarded against, is to take the question of indemnity into our own hands—to occupy defensively, and hold subject to negotiation, a portion of the territory of Mexico, which we may deem ample to cover all proper claims upon her, and which will be best suited to us to acquire, and least disadvantageous to her to lose. Such was my impression when the message of the President of the United States recommended to Congress the recognition of the existence of a war with Mexico. My view, at that time, as to the proper course to be pursued, was to vote the supplies, to rescue General Taylor and his army from the dangers which surrounded them, and take time to determine whether we should recognize the war or not. Had it been adopted, I would have insisted on raising a provisional army, to be collected at some proper point, and to be trained and disciplined: but to postpone the declaration of war until the Congress of Mexico, in which, according to her Constitution, the war-making power resided, should be allowed time to disavow the intention of making war on us, and to adjust all differences between the two countries. But if she refused, even then I would have advised to seize, by way of reprisal, the portion of her territory which we might select, and hold it defensively, as I have just stated, instead of declaring war formally against her; and that mainly for the purpose of avoiding the very dangers against which these resolutions are intended to guard. But such was the urgency which was supposed then to exist, that no time was allowed to present or press these views upon the Senate. Such a course, besides the saving of an immense sacrifice of men and money, and avoiding the many other evils to which the course adopted has already subjected the country, would have effectually prevented our being entangled in the affairs of Mexico, from which we find it now so difficult to extricate ourselves. This consideration alone gives it decisive advantages over the course adopted, and makes it vastly superior, even if it should involve the same sacrifice of men and money to maintain a defensive line, as would, to use the usual phrase, the vigorous prosecution of the war. Mexico is to us as a dead body, and this is the only way that we can cut the cord which binds us to the corpse.

In recommending this line of policy, I look not to the interests of Mexico, but to those of our own country, and to the preservation of its free popular institutions. With me, the liberty of the country is all in all. If this be preserved, every thing will be preserved, but if lost, all will be lost. To preserve it, it is indispensable to adopt a course of moderation and justice towards all other countries; to avoid war whenever it can be avoided; to let those great causes which are now at work, and which, by the mere operation of time, will raise our country to an elevation and influence which no country has ever heretofore attained, continue to work. By pursuing such a course, we may succeed in combining greatness and liberty—the highest possible greatness with the largest measure of liberty and do more to extend liberty by our example over this continent and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand victories. It may be, in expressing these sentiments, that I find no response in the breasts of those around me. If so, it must be attributed to the fact that I am growing old, and that my principles and feelings belong to a period of thirty or thirty-five years anterior to the present date. It is not, however, the first time I have ventured in their maintenance to stand alone on this floor. When General Jackson, some years since, during the latter part of his administration, recommended to Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, I stood alone in my place here, and raised my voice against it, on the ground that there was no just cause of war with her; that, in entering into the treaty to indemnify our citizens for old claims against her, the King of France and his Ministers declared to our Minister, that it required a vote of the Chambers to make the appropriation to carry it into effect; and that they were no further responsible than to use their best efforts to induce them to do so. This was all communicated to our Executive, and the treaty accepted and ratified, with this condition attached. And yet the President, although he admitted that the King and his Ministers had fully redeemed their pledge to use their best efforts to obtain the necessary appropriation, recommended the adoption of the measure to which I have alluded, and which would have been tantamount to war. Fortunately the Government of Great Britain, by her interposition, prevented it. This example, I fear, has contributed much to give the strong tendency, which we have since witnessed, to resort to menace and force in the settlement of our differences with other powers.

According to my opinion, all parties are interested in adopting a line of policy which will with certainty disentangle us from the affairs of Mexico, and avoid the great sacrifices of men and money, and the many other evils to which the war exposes us. Let me say to my friends, who support the administration in their policy, that if you persist, and if peace by some good fortune should not be obtained, the war will go on from year to year, and you will be utterly overthrown as a party. Do you not see that its effect, in reference to our internal affairs, is to drive you into a course of policy directly contrary to that which you have professed to support, and in favor of that which you have charged your opponents with supporting. You have ever professed to oppose, as a party, a national debt, and charged your opponents with being its advocates. But what, I ask, is the effect of the war in this respect? Is it not to create an immense national debt, greater than that which the party to which you are opposed could possibly have created by any other policy, had they been in power? This campaign, on which you look so lightly, will add to it a sum more than half as great as the entire debt of the Revolution. You have been opposed to the extension of the patronage of the Executive, at least in profession. But this war is doing more to enlarge his patronage than any other policy which your opponents could have adopted. You profess to be in favor of a metallic currency. Do you not see that with the increase of stocks and treasury notes, you are in danger of being plunged again into the lowest depths of the paper system? You, as a party, have advocated the doctrine of free trade. Do you not see that, by the vast increase of the expenditures of the country, and the heavy interest which you will have to pay on the public debt, you are creating a necessity for increasing the duties on imports to the highest point that revenue will admit, and thus depriving the country of all the practical benefits of free trade, and preventing the Government from making any material reduction, until the whole debt is paid, which cannot be expected during this generation? What could your opponents have done more, or even as much, to destroy a system of policy which you claim to distinguish you from them, and to establish that which you allege to be the reason why they should be excluded from power? Has not, and will not, this war policy, if persisted in, effectually and finally obliterate the line of policy which you have insisted on as distinguishing you from them? Why, then, to save yourselves from such a result, do you hesitate to adopt the course of policy I have suggested, as the only certain means of preventing these and other evils, and the danger to which our institutions are exposed? The pride of opinion may resist. I know the difficulty, and respect it, with which we yield measures that we have advocated, even when time has shown them to be wrong. But, true magnanimity and the highest honor command that we should abandon them, when they threaten to be injurious instead of beneficial to the country. It would do great credit to the party in power to adopt the policy now, in reference to the war, of taking indemnity into our own hands, by assuming a defensive position, which, it can hardly be doubted they would have done when the war was recognized, if they had foreseen the difficulties and dangers to which it has led. It would be a noble sacrifice of individual pride to patriotism.

In asserting that the only alternative is between the policy recommended by the President and the adoption of a defensive position, I have put out of the question the policy of taking no territory. I have done so, because I believe the voice of the country has decided irrevocably against it, and that to press it as the alternative, would render almost certain the final adoption of the policy recommended by the President, notwithstanding the disasters which it threatens. Let me say to my friends on the other side of the Chamber (for as such I regard them, for political differences here do not affect our personal relations), that they have contributed by their course to fix the determination not to terminate the war without some suitable indemnity in territory. I do not refer to your vote recognizing the existence of war between the Republic of Mexico and the United States. I well know that you voted with a view to furnish immediate support to General Taylor and his army, then surrounded by imminent danger, and not with the intention of recognizing the war; and that you remonstrated and protested against that interpretation being put upon your votes. But since it passed, and the war was recognized, most of you have continued to vote for appropriations to prosecute the war, when the object of prosecuting it was avowed to be to acquire territory as an indemnity. Now, I cannot see how the two can be reconciled—how you can refuse to take indemnity in territory, when you have voted means for the express purpose of obtaining such indemnity. The people are not able to understand why you should vote money so profusely to get indemnity, and refuse to take it, when obtained; and hence public opinion has been brought so decidedly to the conclusion not to terminate the war without territorial indemnity. But if such indemnity is to be had without involving the hazard of conquering the country, with all the dangers to which it would expose us, we must decide whether we shall adopt a defensive position or not, now-this very session. It will, in all possibility, be too late at the next.

I have now, Senators, delivered my sentiments with freedom and candor, upon all the questions connected with these resolutions. I propose nothing now. But if I find that I will be supported, I will move to raise a Committee to deliberate upon the subject of the defensive line.

The opportunity is favorable, while there are so many officers from Mexico now in the city, whose opinion would be of great value in determining on the one to be adopted. If the course of policy which I have suggested should be adopted, we may not get peace immediately. The war may still continue for some time; but be that as it may, it will accomplish the all-important object-will extricate the country from its entanglement with Mexico.

SOURCE: Richard C. Crallé, Editorn, The Works of John C. Calhoun: Speeches of John C. Calhoun Delivered in the House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States, Vol. 4, pp. 396-424