RESOLUTIONS.
Resolved,
That to conquer Mexico, and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate
it in the Union, would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war
has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government; in
conflict with its character and genius; and, in the end, subversive of our free
and popular institutions.
Resolved, That no line of policy
in the further prosecution of the war should be adopted which may lead to
consequences so disastrous.
MR. CALHOUN said: In offering, Senators, these resolutions
for your consideration, I am governed by the reasons which induced me to oppose
the war, and by which I have been governed since it was sanctioned by Congress.
In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to touch on the
reasons which governed me on that occasion further than is necessary to explain
my motives on the present.
I, then, opposed the war, not only because it might have
been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a
part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by
our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress
sanctioned the war untrue; but from high considerations of policy—because I
believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly
endanger its free institutions. But, after the war was declared, by authority
of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was
impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my
efforts to give such direction to the war as would, as far as possible, prevent
the evils and danger with which it threatened the country and its institutions.
For this purpose, at the last session, I suggested to the Senate the policy of
adopting a defensive line; and for the same purpose I now offer these
resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive which governs me on this
occasion. I am moved by no personal or party considerations. My object is
neither to sustain the Executive nor to strengthen the opposition;—but simply
to discharge an important duty to the country. In doing so, I shall express my
opinion on all points with the freedom and boldness which becomes an
independent Senator, who has nothing to ask from the Government or from the
People. But when I come to notice those points on which I differ from the
President, I shall do it with all the decorum which is due to the Chief
Magistrate of the Union.
I suggested a defensive line because, in the first place, I
believed that the only certain mode of terminating the war successfully was to
take indemnity into our own hands by occupying defensively, with our military
force, a portion of the Mexican territory, which we might deem ample for
indemnity; and, in the next, because I believed it would prevent a great
sacrifice of life and property; but, above all, because I believed that it was
the only way we could avoid the great danger to our institutions against which
these resolutions are intended to guard. The President took a different view.
He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest—that was
emphatically disavowed—but for the purpose of conquering peace—that is, to
compel Mexico to sign a treaty ceding sufficient territory to indemnify the
claims of our citizens and of the country for the expenses of the war. I could
not approve of this policy. I opposed it, among other reasons, because I
believed there was no certainty that the object intended to be effected would
be accomplished let the war be ever so successful. Congress thought
differently, and granted ample provisions, in men and money, for carrying out
the policy recommended by the President. It has now been fully tested under the
most favorable circumstances. It has been as successful as the most sanguine
hope of the Executive could have anticipated. Victory after victory followed in
rapid succession, without a single reverse. Santa Anna repelled and defeated
with all his forces at Buena Vista—Vera Cruz, with its castle, captured—the
heights of Cerro Gordo triumphantly carried—Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla occupied—and,
after many triumphant victories under the walls of Mexico, its gates opened to
us, and we put in possession of the capital. But what have all these splendid
achievements accomplished? Has the avowed object of the war been attained? Have
we conquered peace? Have we compelled Mexico to sign a treaty? Have we obtained
indemnity? No. Not a single object contemplated by the campaign has been
effected; and what is worse, our difficulties are greater now than they were at
the commencement, and the objects sought more difficult to be accomplished. To
what is this complete failure to be attributed? Not to our army. It has done
all that skill and gallantry could accomplish. It is to be attributed to the
policy pursued. The Executive aimed at indemnity in a wrong way. Instead of
taking it into our own hands, when we had territory in our possession ample to
cover the claims of our citizens and the expenses of the war, he sought it
indirectly through a treaty with Mexico. He thus put it out of our own power,
and under the control of Mexico, to say whether we should have indemnity or
not, and thereby enabled her to defeat the whole object of the campaign by
simply refusing to treat with us. Owing to this mistaken policy, after a most
successful and brilliant campaign, involving an expenditure of not less,
probably, than $40,000,000, and the sacrifice, by the sword and by disease, of
many valuable lives, probably not less than six or seven thousand, nothing is
left but the glory which our army has acquired.
But, as an apology for this, it is insisted that the
maintenance of a defensive line would have involved as great a sacrifice as the
campaign itself. The President and the Secretary of War have assigned many
reasons for entertaining this opinion. I have examined them with care. This is
not the proper occasion to discuss them, but I must say, with all due
deference, they are, to my mind, utterly fallacious; and to satisfy your mind
that such is the case, I will place the subject in a single point of view.
The line proposed by me, to which I suppose their reasons
were intended to be applied, would be covered in its whole extent—from the
Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, on the Rio Grande—by the Gulf of
California and the wilderness peopled by hostile tribes of Indians, through
which no Mexican force could penetrate. For its entire occupancy and defence,
nothing would be required but a few small vessels of war stationed in the gulf,
and a single regiment to keep down any resistance from the few inhabitants
within. From the Paso del Norte to the mouth of the river, a distance of a few
hundred miles, a single fact will show what little force will be necessary to
its defence. It was a frontier between Texas and Mexico, when the former had
but an inconsiderable population-not more than an hundred and fifty thousand at
the utmost, at any time-with no standing army, and but very few irregular
troops; yet for several years she maintained this line without any, except
slight occasional intrusion from Mexico, and this too when Mexico was far more
consolidated in her power, and when revolutions were not so frequent, and her
money resources were far greater than at present. If, then, Texas alone, under
such circumstances, could defend that frontier for so long a period, can any
man believe that now, when she is backed by the whole of the United States,—now
that Mexico is exhausted, defeated, and prostrated—I repeat, can any man
believe that it would involve as great a sacrifice to us of men and money, to
defend that frontier, as did the last campaign? No. I hazard nothing in
asserting, that, to defend it for an indefinite period would have required a
less sum than the interest on the money spent in the campaign, and fewer men
than were sacrificed in carrying it on.
So much for the past. We now come to the commencement of
another campaign, and the question recurs, What shall be done? The President,
in his message, recommends the same line of policy—a vigorous prosecution of
the war—not for conquest, that is again emphatically disavowed ; not to blot
Mexico out of the list of nations; no, he desires to see her an independent and
flourishing community-and assigns strong reasons for it-but to obtain an
honorable peace. We hear no more of conquering peace, but I presume that he
means by an honorable peace the same thing; that is, to compel Mexico to
agree to a treaty, ceding a sufficient part of her territory, as an indemnity
for the expenses of the war, and for the claims of our citizens.
I have examined with care the grounds on which the President
renews his recommendation, and am again compelled to dissent. There are many
and powerful reasons—more so, even, than those that existed at the commencement
of the last campaign—to justify my dissent. The sacrifice in money will be
vastly greater. There is a bill for ten additional regiments now before the
Senate, and another for twenty regiments of volunteers has been reported,
authorizing, in all, the raising of an additional force of something upwards of
thirty thousand. This, in addition to that already authorized by law, will be
sufficient to keep an effective army in Mexico, of not much, if any, less than
seventy thousand men, and will raise the expenses of the campaign to probably
not less than sixty millions of dollars.
To meet so large an expenditure would involve, in the
present and prospective condition of the money market, it is to be apprehended,
not a little embarrassment. Last year money was abundant, and easily obtained.
An unfortunate famine in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural
products. This turned the balance of trade greatly in our favor, and specie
poured into the country with a strong and steady current. No inconsiderable
portion of it passed into the treasury, through the duties, which kept it full,
in spite of the large sums remitted to meet the expenses of the war. The case
is different now. Instead of having a tide flowing in, equal to the drain
flowing out, the drain is now both ways. The exchanges now are against us,—instead
of being in our favor, and instead of specie flowing into the country from
abroad, it is flowing out. In the mean time, the price of stocks and treasury
notes, instead of being at or above par, have both fallen below, to a small
extent. The effects of the depreciation of treasury notes will cause them to
pass into the treasury in payment of the customs and other dues to the
Government, as the cheaper currency, instead of gold and silver; while the
expenses of the war, whether paid for by the transmission of gold and silver
direct to Mexico, or by drafts drawn in favor of British merchants or other
capitalists there, will cause whatever specie may be in the vaults of the
treasury to flow from it, either for remittance direct, on account of the
ordinary transactions of the country, or to pay the drafts which may be drawn
upon it, and which, when paid, in the present state of exchanges, will be
remitted abroad. But this process of paying in treasury notes instead of gold
and silver, and gold and silver flowing out in both directions, cannot continue
long without exhausting its specie, and leaving nothing to meet the public
expenditure, including those of the war, but treasury notes. Can they, under
such circumstances, preserve even their present value? Is there not great
danger that they will fall lower and lower, and finally involve the finances of
the Government and the circulation of the country in the greatest embarrassment
and difficulty?
Is there not great danger, with this prospect before us, and
with the necessity of raising by loans near forty millions, of a commercial and
financial crisis—even possibly a suspension by the banks. I wish not to create
panic; but there is danger, which makes a great difference in a financial and
moneyed point of view between the state of things now and at the commencement
of the last session. Looking to the future, it is to be apprehended that not a
little difficulty will have to be encountered in raising money to meet the
expenses of the next campaign, if conducted on the large scale which is
proposed. Men you may raise, but money will be found difficult to obtain. It is
even to be apprehended that loans will have to be negotiated on very
disadvantageous terms for the public. In the present state of things, if they
grow no worse, there can be no resort to treasury notes. They cannot be
materially increased, without a ruinous depreciation, and a resort must be had,
exclusively, or almost entirely so, to borrowing. But at the present prices of
stocks, to borrow so large a sum as will be necessary, can only be done at a
greatly increased rate of interest on the nominal amount of stock. In a recent
conversation with a gentleman, well informed on this subject, he said that in
his opinion, if forty millions are required, a loan could not be had for more
than ninety for one hundred, which would be about at the rate of seven per
cent.
These are formidable objections; but they are not the only
ones that are more so than they were at the commencement of the last campaign.
I hold that the avowed object for the vigorous prosecution of the war is less
certain of being realized now, than it was then; and if it should
fail to be realized, it will leave our affairs in a far worse condition than
they are at present. That object, as has been stated, is to obtain an honorable
treaty; one which, to use the language of the President, will give indemnity
for the past and security for the future—that is, a treaty which will give us a
cession of territory, not only equal to our present demand for indemnity, but equal
to the additional demand—equal to the entire expenses to be incurred in
conducting the campaign; and a guaranty from the Government of Mexico for its
faithful execution. Now, Senators, I hold that whether the war is successful or
unsuccessful, there is not only no certainty that this object will be
accomplished, but almost a certainty that it will not be. If the war be
unsuccessful; if our arms should be baffled, as I trust and believe they will
not be; if, from any unfortunate accident, such should be the case, it is clear
that we shall not be able to negotiate a treaty that will accomplish the object
intended. On the contrary, if the war should be successful, it is almost
equally certain that, in such case, the avowed object for prosecuting the war
vigorously, will not be accomplished. I might take higher ground, and maintain
that the more successfully the war is prosecuted, the more certainly the object
avowed will be defeated, while the objects disavowed would as certainly be
accomplished.
What is the object of a vigorous prosecution of the war? How
can it be successful? I can see but one way of making it so, and that is,—by
suppressing all resistance on the part of Mexico, overpowering and dispersing
her army, and utterly overthrowing her Government. But if this should be done;
if a vigorous prosecution of the war should lead to this result, how are we to
obtain an honorable peace? With whom shall we treat for indemnity for the past
and security for the future? War may be made by one party, but it requires two
to make peace. If all authority is overthrown in Mexico, where will be the
power to enter into negotiation and make peace? Our very success would defeat
the possibility of making peace. In that case the war would not end in peace,
but in conquest; not in negotiation, but in subjugation; and defeat, I repeat,
the very object you aim to accomplish, and accomplish that which you disavow to
be your intention, by destroying the separate existence of Mexico,—overthrowing
her nationality, and blotting out her name from the list of nations,—instead of
leaving her a free Republic, which the President has so earnestly expressed his
desire to do.
If I understand his message correctly, I have his own
authority for the conclusion to which I come. He takes very much the same view
that I do, as to how a war ought to be prosecuted vigorously, and what would be
its results,—with the difference as to the latter resting on a single
contingency, and that a remote one. He says that the great difficulty of
obtaining peace results from this, that the people of Mexico are divided under
factious chieftains, and that the chief in power dare not make peace, because
for doing so he would be displaced by a rival. He also says, that the only way
to remedy this evil and to obtain a treaty, is to put down the whole of them,
including the one in power, as well as the others. Well, what then? Are we to
stop there? No. Our generals are, it seems, authorized to encouraged and to
protect the well disposed inhabitants in establishing a republican government.
He says they are numerous, and are prevented from expressing their opinions and
making an attempt to form such a government, only by fear of those military
chieftains. He proposes, when they have thus formed a government, under the
encouragement and, protection of our army, to obtain peace by a treaty with the
government thus formed, which shall give us ample indemnity for the past and
security for the future. I must say I am at a loss to see how a free and
independent republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and
authority of its conquerors. I can readily understand how an aristocracy or a
despotic government might be, but how a free republican government can be so
established, under such circumstances, is to me incomprehensible. I had always
supposed that such a government must be the spontaneous wish of the people;
that it must emanate from the hearts of the people, and be supported by their
devotion to it, without support from abroad. But it seems that these are
antiquated notions—obsolete ideas—and that free popular governments may be made
under the authority and protection of a conqueror.
But suppose the difficulties surmounted, how can we make a
free government in Mexico? Where are the materials? It is to be, I presume, a
confederated government like their former. Where is the intelligence in Mexico
for the construction and preservation of such a government? It is what she has
been aiming at for more than twenty years, but so utterly incompetent are her
people for the task, that it has been a complete failure from first to last.
The great body of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is concentrated in
the priesthood, who are naturally disinclined to that form of government; the
residue, for the most part, are the owners of the haciendas, the larger
planters of the country, but they are without concert and destitute of the
means of forming such a government. But if it were possible to establish such a
government, it could not stand without the protection of our army. It would
fall as soon as it is withdrawn.
If it be determined to have a treaty, it would be a far
preferable course, it appears to me, to abstain from attacking or destroying
the government now existing in Mexico, and to treat with it, if indeed it be
capable of forming a treaty which it could maintain and execute. Upon this
point I do not profess to have any information beyond that derived from conversations
with those who have been in Mexico; but from all that I can hear, it may be
doubted, whether we have not already pushed what is called a vigorous
prosecution of the war so far, as not to leave sufficient power and influence
in the Government to enter into a treaty which would be respected, when our
forces are withdrawn. Such I know to be the opinion of intelligent officers.
They concur in thinking that the existing Government at Queretaro, if it should
enter into a treaty in conformity with the views expressed by the Executive,
would be overthrown, and that we should be compelled to defend that portion of
Mexico which we require for indemnity defensively, or be compelled to return
and renew the prosecution of the war. If such is its weakness, it may be
apprehended that even now, without pushing the vigorous prosecution of the war
further, we are greatly exposed to the danger which these resolutions are
intended to guard against, and that it requires great discretion and prompt
action on our part to avoid it.
But before leaving this part of the subject, I must enter my
solemn protest, as one of the Representatives of a State of this Union,
against pledging protection to any government established in Mexico under our
countenance or encouragement. It would inevitably be overthrown as soon as our
forces are withdrawn; and we would be compelled, in fulfilment of plighted
faith, implied or expressed, to return and reinstate such Government in power,
to be again overturned and again reinstated, until we should be compelled to
take the government into our own hands, just as the English have been compelled
again and again to do in Hindostan, under similar circumstances, until it has
led to its entire conquest. Let us avoid following the example which we have been
condemning, as far back as my recollection extends.
The President himself entertains doubt, whether the plan of
forming a government in the manner which I have been considering, and treating
with it for indemnity, may not fail. In that case, he agrees that the very
course to which I have said the vigorous prosecution of the war will inevitably
lead, must be taken. He says, after having attempted to establish such a
government—after having employed the best efforts to secure peace—if all fail,
"we must hold on to the occupation of the country. We must take the full
measure of indemnity into our own hands, and enforce such terms as the honor of
the country demands." These are his words. Now, what is this? Is it not an
acknowledgment, that if he fail in establishing a government with which he can
treat, in Mexico-after putting down all resistance under the existing
Government, we must make a conquest of the whole country, and hold it subject
to our control? Can words be stronger? "Occupy the whole country"—"
take the full measure of indemnity"—no defensive line—no treaty, and,
"enforce terms." Terms on whom? On the Government? No, no, no. To
enforce terms on the people individually. That is to say, to establish a
government over them in the form of a province.
The President is right. If the vigorous prosecution of the
war should be successful, and the contingency on which he expects to make a
treaty fail, there will be no retreat. Every argument against calling back the
army and taking a defensive line will have double force, after having spent
$60,000,000, and acquired the possession of the whole of Mexico; and the
interests in favor of keeping possession would be much more powerful then than
now. The army itself will be larger—those who live by the war, the numerous
contractors, the merchants, the sutlers, the speculators in land and mines, and
all who are profiting directly or indirectly by its prosecution, will be
adverse to retiring, and will swell the cry of holding on to our conquests.
They constitute an immense body of vast influence, who are growing rich by what
is impoverishing the rest of the country.
It is at this stage that the President speaks of taking the
indemnity into our own hands. But why delay it until the whole country is
subdued? Why not take it now? A part of Mexico would be a better indemnity now,
than the whole of Mexico would be at the end of the next campaign, when
$60,000,000 will be added to the present expenditures. We would indeed acquire
a control over a much larger portion of her population, but we would never be
able to extort from them, by all the forms of taxation to which you can resort,
a sum sufficient to pay the force necessary to hold them in subjection. That
force must be a large one, not less, certainly, than 40,000 men, according to
the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Davis), who must be regarded
as a competent judge upon this point. He stated in debate the other day, that
the army now there, exceeding that number, are in danger; and urged, on that
account, the immediate passage of the bill to raise ten regiments. On this
subject, it is as well to speak out plainly at once. We shall never obtain
indemnity for the expenditures of the war. They must come out of the pockets of
the people of the United States; and the longer the war is continued, and
the more numerous our army, the greater will be the debt, and the heavier the
burden imposed upon the country.
If these views be correct, the end of the policy recommended
by the President-whether contemplated or notwill be, to force the Government to
adopt one or the other alternative alluded to in these resolutions. With this
impression, I cannot support the policy he recommends, for the reasons assigned
in the first resolution. The first of these is, that it would be inconsistent
with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted. That it would be
so, is apparent from what has already been said. Since the commencement of the
war until this time, the President has continually disavowed the intention of conquering
Mexico, and subjecting her to our control. He has constantly proclaimed that
the only object was indemnity, and that the war is prosecuted to obtain it by
treaty. And yet, if the results should be as I have stated, the end will be,
that what was disavowed will be accomplished, and what has been avowed to be
its object, will be defeated. Such a result would be a deep and lasting
impeachment of the sincerity or the intelligence of the Government of its
sincerity, because directly opposed to what it has continually and emphatically
disavowed; of its intelligence, for not perceiving what ought to have been so
readily anticipated.
We have heard much of the reputation which our country has
acquired by this war. I acknowledge it to the full amount, as far as the
military is concerned. The army has done its duty nobly, and conferred high
honors on the country, for which I sincerely thank them; but I apprehend that
the reputation acquired does not go beyond this, and that, in other respects,
we have lost instead of acquiring reputation by the war. It would seem certain,
from all publications from abroad, that the Government itself has not gained
reputation in the eyes of the world for justice, moderation, or wisdom.
Whether this be deserved or not, it is not for me to inquire
at present. I am now speaking merely of reputation; and in this view it appears
that we have lost abroad, as much in civil and political reputation as we have
acquired for our skill and valor in arms. But much as I regard military glory—much
as I rejoice to witness the display of that indomitable energy and courage
which surmounts all difficulties—I would be sorry indeed that our Government
should lose any portion of that high character for justice, moderation, and
discretion, which distinguished it in the early stages of our history.
The next reason assigned is, that either holding Mexico as a
province, or incorporating her into the Union, would be unprecedented by any
example in our history. We have conquered many of the neighboring tribes of
Indians, but we have never thought of holding them in subjection, or of
incorporating them into our Union. They have been left as an independent people
in the midst of us, or been driven back into the forests. Nor have we ever
incorporated into the Union any but the Caucasian race. To incorporate Mexico
would be the first departure of the kind; for more than half of its population
are pure Indians, and by far the larger portion of the residue mixed blood. I
protest against the incorporation of such a people. Ours is the government of
the white man. The great misfortune of what was formerly Spanish America, is to
be traced to the fatal error of placing the colored race on an equality with
the white. This error destroyed the social arrangement which formed the basis
of their society. This error we have wholly escaped; the Brazilians, formerly a
province of Portugal, have escaped also to a considerable extent, and they and
we are the only people of this continent who made revolutions without anarchy.
And yet, with this example before them, and our uniform practice, there are
those among us who talk about erecting these Mexicans into territorial
governments, and placing them on an equality with the people of these
States. I utterly protest against the project.
It is a remarkable fact in this connection, that in the
whole history of man, as far as my information extends, there is no instance
whatever of any civilized colored race, of any shade, being found equal to the
establishment and maintenance of free government, although by far the largest
proportion of the human family is composed of them; and even in the savage
state, we rarely find them any where with such governments, except it be our
noble savages; for noble I will call them for their many high qualities. They,
for the most part, had free institutions, but such institutions are much more easily
sustained among a savage than a civilized people. Are we to overlook this great
fact? Are we to associate with ourselves, as equals, companions, and fellow-citizens,
the Indians and mixed races of Mexico? I would consider such association as
degrading to ourselves, and fatal to our institutions.
The next remaining reasons assigned, that it would be in
conflict with the genius and character of our Government, and, in the end,
subversive of our free institutions, are intimately connected, and I shall
consider them together.
That it would be contrary to the genius and character of our
Government, and subversive of our free popular institutions, to hold Mexico as
a subject province, is a proposition too clear for argument before a body so
enlightened as the Senate. You know the American constitution too well,—you
have looked into history, and are too well acquainted with the fatal effects
which large provincial possessions have ever had on the institutions of free
states,—to need any proof to satisfy you how hostile it would be to the
institutions of this country, to hold Mexico as a subject province. There is
not an example on record of any free state holding a province of the same
extent and population, without disastrous consequences. The nations conquered
and held as a province, have, in time, retaliated by destroying the
liberty of their conquerors, through the corrupting effect of extended
patronage and irresponsible power. Such, certainly, would be our case. The
conquest of Mexico would add so vastly to the patronage of this Government,
that it would absorb the whole powers of the States; the Union would become an
imperial power, and the States reduced to mere subordinate corporations. But
the evil would not end there; the process would go on, and the power
transferred from the States to the Union, would be transferred from the
Legislative Department to the Executive. All the immense patronage which
holding it as a province would create,—the maintenance of a large army, to hold
it in subjection, and the appointment of a multitude of civil officers
necessary to govern it, would be vested in him. The great influence which it
would give the President, would be the means of controlling the Legislative
Department, and subjecting it to his dictation, especially when combined with
the principle of proscription which has now become the established practice of
the Government. The struggle to obtain the Presidential chair would become
proportionably great—so great as to destroy the freedom of elections. The end
would be anarchy or despotism, as certain as I am now addressing the Senate.
Let it not be said that Great Britain is an example to the
contrary; that she holds provinces of vast extent and population, without
materially impairing the liberty of the subject, or exposing the Government to
violence, anarchy, confusion, or corruption. It is so. But it must be
attributed to the peculiar character of her government. Of all governments that
ever existed, of a free character, the British far transcends all in one
particular, and that is, its capacity to bear patronage without the evils
usually incident to it. She can bear more, in proportion to population and
wealth, than any government of that character that ever existed:—I might even
go further, and assert than despotism itself in its most absolute form. I
will not undertake to explain why it is so. It will take me further from the
course which I have prescribed for myself, than I desire; but I will say, in a
few words, that it results from the fact that her Executive and the House of
Lords (the conservative branches of her Government) are both hereditary, while
the other House of Parliament has a popular character. The Roman Government
exceeded the British in its capacity for conquest. No government ever did
exist, and none probably ever will, which, in that particular, equalled it; but
its capacity to hold conquered provinces in subjection, was as nothing compared
to that of Great Britain; and hence, when the Roman power passed beyond the
limits of Italy, crossed the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and the Alps, liberty
fell prostrate; the Roman people became a rabble; corruption penetrated every
department of the Government; violence and anarchy ruled the day, and military
despotism closed the scene. Now, on the contrary, we see England, with
subject-provinces of vastly greater territorial extent, and probably of not
inferior population (I have not compared them); we see her, I repeat, going on
without the personal liberty of the subject being materially impaired, or the
Government subject to violence or anarchy! Yet England has not wholly escaped
the curse which must ever befall a free government which holds extensive
provinces in subjection; for, although she has not lost her liberty, or fallen
into anarchy, yet we behold the population of England crushed to the earth by
the superincumbent weight of debt and taxation, which may one day terminate in
revolution. The wealth derived from her conquests and provincial possessions
may have contributed to swell the overgrown fortunes of the upper classes, but
has done nothing to alleviate the pressure on the laboring masses below. On the
contrary, the expenses incident to their conquest, and of governing and holding
them in subjection, have been drawn mainly from their labor, and have increased
instead of decreasing the weight of the pressure. It has placed a burden upon
them which, with all their skill and industry, with all the vast accumulation
of capital and power of machinery with which they are aided,—they are scarce
capable of bearing, without being reduced to the lowest depths of poverty.
Take, for example, Ireland, her earliest and nearest conquest, and is it not to
this day a cause of heavy expense, and a burden, instead of a source of revenue
?
On the contrary, our Government, in this particular, is the
very reverse of the British. Of all free governments, it has the least
capacity, in proportion to the wealth and population of the country, to bear
patronage. The genius of the two, in this particular, is precisely opposite,
however much alike in exterior forms and other particulars. The cause of this
difference, I will not undertake to explain on the present occasion. It results
from its federal character and elective chief magistrate; and so far from the
example of Great Britain constituting a safe precedent for us to follow, the
little she has gained from her numerous conquests and vast provincial
possessions, and the heavy burdens which it has imposed upon her people to meet
the consequent expenses, ought to be to us a warning never to be forgotten;
especially when we reflect that, from the nature of our Government, we would be
so liable to the other and greater evils from which she, from the nature of her
Government, is, in a great measure, exempted. Such and so weighty are the
objections to conquering Mexico, and holding it as a subject province.
Nor are the reasons less weighty against incorporating her
into the Union. As far as law is concerned, this is easily done. All that is
necessary is to establish a territorial government for the several States in
Mexico, of which there are upwards of twenty,—to appoint governors, judges, and
magistrates, and to give to the population a subordinate right of making laws—we
defraying the cost of the government. So far as legislation goes, the work will
be done; but there would be a great difference between these territorial
governments, and those which we have heretofore established within our own
limits. These are only the offsets of our own people, or foreigners from the
same countries from which our ancestors came. The first settlers in the
territories are too few in number to form and support a government of their
own, and are under obligation to the Government of the United States for
forming one for them, and defraying the expense of maintaining it; knowing, as
they do, that when they have sufficient population, they will be permitted to
form a constitution for themselves, and be admitted as members of the Union.—During
the period of their territorial government, no force is necessary to keep them
in a state of subjection. The case will be entirely different with these
Mexican territories; when you form them, you must have powerful armies to hold
them in subjection, with all the expenses incident to supporting them. You may
call them territories, but they would, in reality, be but provinces under
another name, and would involve the country in all the difficulties and dangers
which I have already shown would result from holding the country in that
condition. How long this state of things would last, before they would be
fitted to be incorporated into the Union as States, we may form some idea, from
similar instances with which we are familiar. Ireland has been held in
subjection by England for many centuries; and yet remains hostile, although her
people are of a kindred race with the conquerors. The French colony in Canada
still entertain hostile feelings towards their conquerors, although living in
the midst of them for nearly one hundred years. If we may judge from these
examples, it would not be unsafe to conclude that the Mexicans never will be
heartily reconciled to our authority. The better class have Castilian blood in
their veins, and are of the old Gothic stock—quite equal to the Anglo-Saxons in
many respects, and in some superior. Of all the people upon earth, they
are the most pertinacious; they hold out longer, and often when there would
seem to be no prospect of ever making effectual resistance. It is admitted, I
believe, on all hands, that they are now universally hostile to us, and the
probability is, will continue so.
But suppose this difficulty removed. Suppose their hostility
should cease, and they should become desirous of being incorporated into our
Union. Ought we to admit them? Are the Mexicans fit to be politically
associated with us? Are they fit not only to govern themselves, but for
governing us also? Are any of you, Senators, willing that your State should
constitute a member of a Union, of which twenty odd Mexican States, more than
one-third of the whole, would be a part, the far greater part of the
inhabitants of which are pure Indians, not equal in intelligence and elevation
of character to the Cherokees, Choctaws, or any of our Southern Indian tribes?
We make a great mistake in supposing all people are capable
of self-government. Acting under that impression, many are anxious to force
free governments on all the people of this continent, and over the world, if
they had the power. It has been lately urged in a very respectable quarter,
that it is the mission of this country to spread civil and religious liberty
over all the globe, and especially over this continent—even by force, if
necessary. It is a sad delusion. None but a people advanced to a high state of
moral and intellectual excellence are capable in a civilized condition, of
forming and maintaining free governments; and among those who are so far
advanced, very few indeed have had the good fortune to form constitutions
capable of endurance. It is a remarkable fact in the political history of man,
that there is scarcely an instance of a free constitutional government, which
has been the work exclusively of foresight and wisdom. They have all been the
result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. It is a very difficult task
to make a constitution worthy of being called so. This admirable federal
constitution of ours, is the result of such a combination. It is superior to
the wisdom of any or all of the men by whose agency it was made. The force of
circumstances, and not foresight or wisdom, induced them to adopt many of its
wisest provisions.
But of the few nations who have been so fortunate as to
adopt a wise constitution, still fewer have had the wisdom long to preserve
one. It is harder to preserve than to obtain liberty. After years of
prosperity, the tenure by which it is held is but too often forgotten; and I
fear, Senators, that such is the case with us. There is no solicitude now about
liberty. It was not so in the early days of the republic. Then it was the first
object of our solicitude. The maxim then was, that "Power is always stealing
from the many to the few;" "The price of liberty is perpetual
vigilance." Then no question of any magnitude came up, in which the first
inquiry was not, "Is it constitutional?"—"Is it consistent with
our free, popular institutions?"—"How is it to affect our
liberty?" It is not so now. Questions of the greatest magnitude are now
discussed without reference or allusion to these vital considerations. I have
been often struck with the fact, that in the discussions of the great questions
in which we are now engaged, relating to the origin and the conduct of this
war, their effect on the free institutions and the liberty of the people have
scarcely been alluded to, although their bearing in that respect is so direct
and disastrous. They would, in former days, have been the great and leading
topics of discussion; and would, above all others, have had the most powerful
effect in arousing the attention of the country. But now, other topics occupy
the attention of Congress and of the country-military glory, extension of the
empire, and the aggrandizement of the country. To what is this great change to
be attributed ? Is it because there has been a decay of the spirit of liberty among
the people? I think not. I believe that it was never more ardent. The true
cause is, that we have ceased to remember the tenure by which liberty alone can
be preserved. We have had so many years of prosperity—passed through so many
difficulties and dangers without the loss of liberty—that we begin to think
that we hold it by right divine from heaven itself. Under this impression,
without thinking or reflecting, we plunge into war, contract heavy debts,
increase vastly the patronage of the Executive, and indulge in every species of
extravagance, without thinking that we expose our liberty to hazard. It is a
great and fatal mistake. The day of retribution will come; and when it does,
awful will be the reckoning, and heavy the responsibility somewhere.
I have now shown, Senators, that the conquest of Mexico, and
holding it as a subject province, or incorporating it into our Union, is liable
to the many and irresistible objections assigned in the first resolution. I
have also shown that the policy recommended by the President, if carried out,
would terminate, in all probability, in its conquest, and holding it either in
one or the other mode stated; and that such is the opinion of the President
himself, unless, in the mean time, peace can be obtained. Believing, then, that
this line of policy might lead to consequences so disastrous, it ought not, in
my opinion, in the language of the second resolution, to be adopted. Thus thinking,
I cannot give it my support. The question is then presented—What should be
done? It is a great and difficult question, and daily becoming more so. I, who
have used every effort in my power to prevent this war, might excuse myself
from answering it, and leave it to those who have incurred greater
responsibility in relation to it. But I will not shrink from any responsibility
where the safety of the country or its institutions are at stake.
The first consideration in determining what line of policy,
in the present state of things, ought to be adopted, is to decide what
line will most effectually guard against the dangers which I have shown would
result from the conquest of Mexico, and the disastrous consequences which would
follow it.
After the most mature reflection which I have been able to
give to the subject, I am of opinion now, and have been from the first, that
the only one by which it can be certainly guarded against, is to take the
question of indemnity into our own hands—to occupy defensively, and hold
subject to negotiation, a portion of the territory of Mexico, which we may deem
ample to cover all proper claims upon her, and which will be best suited to us
to acquire, and least disadvantageous to her to lose. Such was my impression
when the message of the President of the United States recommended to Congress
the recognition of the existence of a war with Mexico. My view, at that time,
as to the proper course to be pursued, was to vote the supplies, to rescue
General Taylor and his army from the dangers which surrounded them, and take
time to determine whether we should recognize the war or not. Had it been
adopted, I would have insisted on raising a provisional army, to be collected
at some proper point, and to be trained and disciplined: but to postpone the
declaration of war until the Congress of Mexico, in which, according to her
Constitution, the war-making power resided, should be allowed time to disavow
the intention of making war on us, and to adjust all differences between the
two countries. But if she refused, even then I would have advised to seize, by
way of reprisal, the portion of her territory which we might select, and hold
it defensively, as I have just stated, instead of declaring war formally
against her; and that mainly for the purpose of avoiding the very dangers
against which these resolutions are intended to guard. But such was the urgency
which was supposed then to exist, that no time was allowed to present or press
these views upon the Senate. Such a course, besides the saving of an immense
sacrifice of men and money, and avoiding the many other evils to which the
course adopted has already subjected the country, would have effectually
prevented our being entangled in the affairs of Mexico, from which we find it
now so difficult to extricate ourselves. This consideration alone gives it
decisive advantages over the course adopted, and makes it vastly superior, even
if it should involve the same sacrifice of men and money to maintain a
defensive line, as would, to use the usual phrase, the vigorous prosecution of
the war. Mexico is to us as a dead body, and this is the only way that we can
cut the cord which binds us to the corpse.
In recommending this line of policy, I look not to the
interests of Mexico, but to those of our own country, and to the preservation
of its free popular institutions. With me, the liberty of the country is all in
all. If this be preserved, every thing will be preserved, but if lost, all will
be lost. To preserve it, it is indispensable to adopt a course of moderation
and justice towards all other countries; to avoid war whenever it can be
avoided; to let those great causes which are now at work, and which, by the
mere operation of time, will raise our country to an elevation and influence
which no country has ever heretofore attained, continue to work. By pursuing
such a course, we may succeed in combining greatness and liberty—the highest
possible greatness with the largest measure of liberty and do more to extend
liberty by our example over this continent and the world generally, than would
be done by a thousand victories. It may be, in expressing these sentiments,
that I find no response in the breasts of those around me. If so, it must be
attributed to the fact that I am growing old, and that my principles and
feelings belong to a period of thirty or thirty-five years anterior to the
present date. It is not, however, the first time I have ventured in their
maintenance to stand alone on this floor. When General Jackson, some years
since, during the latter part of his administration, recommended to
Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, I stood alone
in my place here, and raised my voice against it, on the ground that there was
no just cause of war with her; that, in entering into the treaty to indemnify
our citizens for old claims against her, the King of France and his Ministers
declared to our Minister, that it required a vote of the Chambers to make the
appropriation to carry it into effect; and that they were no further
responsible than to use their best efforts to induce them to do so. This was
all communicated to our Executive, and the treaty accepted and ratified, with
this condition attached. And yet the President, although he admitted that the
King and his Ministers had fully redeemed their pledge to use their best
efforts to obtain the necessary appropriation, recommended the adoption of the
measure to which I have alluded, and which would have been tantamount to war.
Fortunately the Government of Great Britain, by her interposition, prevented
it. This example, I fear, has contributed much to give the strong tendency,
which we have since witnessed, to resort to menace and force in the settlement
of our differences with other powers.
According to my opinion, all parties are interested in
adopting a line of policy which will with certainty disentangle us from the
affairs of Mexico, and avoid the great sacrifices of men and money, and the
many other evils to which the war exposes us. Let me say to my friends, who
support the administration in their policy, that if you persist, and if peace
by some good fortune should not be obtained, the war will go on from year to
year, and you will be utterly overthrown as a party. Do you not see that its
effect, in reference to our internal affairs, is to drive you into a course of
policy directly contrary to that which you have professed to support, and in
favor of that which you have charged your opponents with supporting. You have
ever professed to oppose, as a party, a national debt, and charged your
opponents with being its advocates. But what, I ask, is the effect of the
war in this respect? Is it not to create an immense national debt, greater than
that which the party to which you are opposed could possibly have created by
any other policy, had they been in power? This campaign, on which you look so
lightly, will add to it a sum more than half as great as the entire debt of the
Revolution. You have been opposed to the extension of the patronage of the
Executive, at least in profession. But this war is doing more to enlarge his patronage
than any other policy which your opponents could have adopted. You profess to
be in favor of a metallic currency. Do you not see that with the increase of
stocks and treasury notes, you are in danger of being plunged again into the
lowest depths of the paper system? You, as a party, have advocated the doctrine
of free trade. Do you not see that, by the vast increase of the expenditures of
the country, and the heavy interest which you will have to pay on the public
debt, you are creating a necessity for increasing the duties on imports to the
highest point that revenue will admit, and thus depriving the country of all
the practical benefits of free trade, and preventing the Government from making
any material reduction, until the whole debt is paid, which cannot be expected
during this generation? What could your opponents have done more, or even as
much, to destroy a system of policy which you claim to distinguish you from
them, and to establish that which you allege to be the reason why they should be
excluded from power? Has not, and will not, this war policy, if persisted in,
effectually and finally obliterate the line of policy which you have insisted
on as distinguishing you from them? Why, then, to save yourselves from such a
result, do you hesitate to adopt the course of policy I have suggested, as the
only certain means of preventing these and other evils, and the danger to which
our institutions are exposed? The pride of opinion may resist. I know the
difficulty, and respect it, with which we yield measures that we have
advocated, even when time has shown them to be wrong. But, true magnanimity and
the highest honor command that we should abandon them, when they threaten to be
injurious instead of beneficial to the country. It would do great credit to the
party in power to adopt the policy now, in reference to the war, of taking
indemnity into our own hands, by assuming a defensive position, which, it can
hardly be doubted they would have done when the war was recognized, if they had
foreseen the difficulties and dangers to which it has led. It would be a noble
sacrifice of individual pride to patriotism.
In asserting that the only alternative is between the policy
recommended by the President and the adoption of a defensive position, I have
put out of the question the policy of taking no territory. I have done so,
because I believe the voice of the country has decided irrevocably against it,
and that to press it as the alternative, would render almost certain the final
adoption of the policy recommended by the President, notwithstanding the
disasters which it threatens. Let me say to my friends on the other side of the
Chamber (for as such I regard them, for political differences here do not
affect our personal relations), that they have contributed by their course to
fix the determination not to terminate the war without some suitable indemnity
in territory. I do not refer to your vote recognizing the existence of war
between the Republic of Mexico and the United States. I well know that you voted
with a view to furnish immediate support to General Taylor and his army, then
surrounded by imminent danger, and not with the intention of recognizing the
war; and that you remonstrated and protested against that interpretation being
put upon your votes. But since it passed, and the war was recognized, most of
you have continued to vote for appropriations to prosecute the war, when the
object of prosecuting it was avowed to be to acquire territory as an indemnity.
Now, I cannot see how the two can be reconciled—how you can refuse to take
indemnity in territory, when you have voted means for the express purpose of
obtaining such indemnity. The people are not able to understand why you should
vote money so profusely to get indemnity, and refuse to take it, when obtained;
and hence public opinion has been brought so decidedly to the conclusion not to
terminate the war without territorial indemnity. But if such indemnity is to be
had without involving the hazard of conquering the country, with all the
dangers to which it would expose us, we must decide whether we shall adopt a
defensive position or not, now-this very session. It will, in all possibility,
be too late at the next.
I have now, Senators, delivered my sentiments with freedom
and candor, upon all the questions connected with these resolutions. I propose
nothing now. But if I find that I will be supported, I will move to raise a
Committee to deliberate upon the subject of the defensive line.
The opportunity is favorable, while there are so many
officers from Mexico now in the city, whose opinion would be of great value in
determining on the one to be adopted. If the course of policy which I have
suggested should be adopted, we may not get peace immediately. The war may
still continue for some time; but be that as it may, it will accomplish the
all-important object-will extricate the country from its entanglement with
Mexico.
SOURCE: Richard C. Crallé, Editorn, The Works of John C. Calhoun: Speeches of John C. Calhoun Delivered in
the House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States, Vol.
4, pp. 396-424
