Showing posts with label William J Worth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label William J Worth. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 13, 2026

Major Alexander B. Bradford* to Colonel Jefferson Davis, September 26, 1846

(From the Mississippi Department of Archives and History.)

Camp near Monterey, Mexico        
September 26, 1846
Col. Jefferson Davis,
        Sir,

I was called upon by you last evening to make such report of the conduct of the Mississippi Riflemen as came within my immediate observation during the battle of Monterey, and in conformity thereto I herein send you a statement which I vouch to be correct as far as it proposes to detail. On the morning of the 21st Inst. our Brigade under the command of Genl. Quitman moved out in the direction of Monterey; the Tennessee Regiment on the right. When we arrived opposite the city, we halted a short time, and then were ordered to move south by the left flank, the Tennesseeans still being in front. A brisk cannonade was kept up upon us until we had moved our Regiment with its whole front nearly opposite the Lower Fort or Redoubt of the Town, the Tennesseeans still being on the left. At this moment a most destructive fire opened from the Fort of Grape, Canister and musketry-raking our whole line from right to left. We instantly received orders to charge and they were as promptly executed, and the Fort carried by storm. As far as my attention was directed to the first occupation of the Fort by our troops, I can say that Lieut. Col. McClung of our Regiment was the first on the wall, followed immediately afterward by others of the Regiment. At this moment I heard Adjutant Griffith proclaim we had taken the Fort. As to the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the Regiment on this day, I say with pleasure they did their duty nobly. On the 22d Genl. Worth on the part of the American Army had the field, and we had but little to do except to receive such shots at the lower Fort, which was in our possession, as the enemy thought proper to send at us.

On the morning of the 23d you were ordered out by Genl. Quitman with two companies of our Regiment, and two companies of the Tennesseans to take the Fort No. 3 opposite to our then position, which you promptly did. In about an hour thereafter I was ordered by Genl. Quitman to move out quickly with the balance of the Regiment, except Capt. Taylor's company, which was ordered by you to remain and guard the Fort, to sustain him in an attack made with the detachment under your command on the lower part of the Town. We instantly moved out, and immediately after passing the creek, a heavy fire of grape and musketry opened, by which we were annoyed and exposed to for several hundred yards; yet it was met with admirable firmness by the Riflemen until their arrival in Town, where a warmer salute awaited them, which was received with equal spirit by the whole Regiment. We remained some time under cover of the houses, during which time a portion of the Regiment joined your command, and a portion remained with me. We were afterwards ordered by Genl. Quitman to charge on the Town, and the command was executed with almost unparalleled firmness. We carried the Street here for several hundred yards under a continued shower of grape and canister shot, accompanied with musketry, and took a position in the heart of the Town and maintained it firmly for several hours under a most galling fire the whole time, and until we were ordered by the commanding General to draw off, and then retired in good order.

The officers with me of the Mississippi Riflemen, as far as now recollected, were Capts. Willis & McManus; Lieuts, Patterson, Townsend, Wade, Arthur, Bradford and Markham, who all behaved with great presence of mind and courage, as did every soldier who accompanied us. Indeed their gallantry was conspicuous throughout, and met my entire approbation. I cannot close without making mention of Capt. Bennett of the 1st Tennessee Regiment under Col Campbell, and Capt. Hewitt, of the 2d Regiment of Texas mounted men under Col. Woods, who voluntarily served with my command and under my orders. They both together with their companies behaved with great gallantry, and from them I received most efficient aid. Dr. Veech, Quarter Master of Col. Woods' Regiment was also with me the whole time, and with his great coolness and courage rendered me essential service. All reflected on themselves the highest honor.

I have the honor to be
Your most obdt. svt.
A. B. Bradford Major
Miss. Riflemen
(Copy)
            R. Griffith Ad’t
            Regt. Miss. Riflemen
Endorsed:
            No. 4
            Major A. B. Bradford’s Statement
_______________

* Alexander Bradford, a lawyer, made his home at Holly Springs, Mississippi, and was well known as a successful lawyer. During the Seminole War, in 1836, he seems to have rendered important service as a soldier. In the Mexican War he was major in Jefferson Davis's regiment. He was a candidate for Governor of Mississippi in 1847 against Joseph W. Matthews.

SOURCE: Dunbar Rowland, Editor, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Volume 1, pp. 114-6

Tuesday, April 23, 2024

Major Robert Selden Garnett to Senator Robert M. T. Hunter, July 8, 1855

FT. MONROE, VA., July 8, 1855.

MY DEAR COUSIN: Your kind letter of the 25th Ult was misdirected to me at New York and did not overtake me at this place until a few days since. I am truly obliged to you for the frankness and liberality with which you have given me your views in relation to my proposed marriage. I do not understand you as fully approving the step under the circumstances, and fully appreciate—perhaps indeed even concur with you in your doubts as to its wisdom. I need hardly assure you that I had rather have had your approval of it than that of any relation I have. I owe so much of my professional services and advancement to your kind exertions that I have felt it to be a sort of duty I owed you to speak with you freely and fully on the subject. I should have only felt too happy if the step could have met with your unqualified approbation, yet my own judgment told me that it would be unreasonable to expect it. I sincerely hope, however, and believe, that as time rolls on I shall be able to show that I have not made after all so great a mistake as would appear to be the case at first. In comparing my own case with that of hundreds of other officers of the army, the advantages appear to me to be all on my side. There are 86 majors in the Army. Of this number about 8 are bachelors. The rest are married men; many with large families and some even grand-fathers. In most of these cases, these officers married while in the subordinate grades of the Army, with small pay and when they and their families were consequently subjected to many inconveniences from which my rank will now entirely exempt me. Yet many of these people have lived very happily, have educated and established their children well as they could, and express themselves content with their present and past life. Many of these officers too—indeed the most distinguished in our service—acquired their professional reputations as married men, and that too when they married as subalterns such for instance as Taylor, Worth, Lee, Smith, Mansfield, Huger &c &c. Marriage does not appear to have affected in the slightest degree their activity or efficiency. This was a point upon which I reflected much before taking this step and upon which I have but few apprehensions.

My rank in the army has freed me from many of the onerous and confining details of company, and subaltern duties. My movements are not now so much controlled by the movements of a particular line of men. I am much less subjected to that constant change of station so inimical to the comforts of married life in the army. I shall as a general thing henceforth, be in command when I go to my post, and will thus have the power and means of securing to myself many comforts &c. of which, as a Capt[ain] or Subaltern, I would have been necessarily deprived. I cannot believe that my professional prospects or standing will be injuriously effected by this step. Indeed I think that they may be materially improved, for what I most desire now is to have two or three years of quietness at some remote post where I may devote myself without interruption to professional reading and study, and I truly believe that I could do so much more successfully as a married man than as a single one. My own doubts and anxieties, however, lie in quite another direction. Life in the army is more precarious than in any other walk or pursuit of life; and an officer ought not perhaps to calculate upon living the usual term of years and then dying of old age. The obligation then to provide for his family for the future in case of his death is more urgent and imperative upon a married officer than upon other men; and as Miss Nelson is poor, I feel the full weight of this obligation in my case. Had I only to guard against disease I might perhaps safely calculate upon living long enough to do, as hundreds of other officers have done with fewer advantages than I have―viz, to lay up a respectable competency for my family in case of my death. This I confess is a point upon which I feel the greatest anxiety. During my life unless I should be ejected from the army, and this is improbable, I shall have no fears as to my ability to secure to her all the comforts she can reasonably desire; but it is a very painful reflection to me to think that I may be killed off and leave her in straightened circumstances—with nothing but my name. For this reason only, it has always, been my desire, if married at all, to marry a lady with some means of her own. If I felt certain that I should live 10 or 15 years longer, I should feel no anxiety on this subject, for with the increased pay and rank which I cannot help from acquiring in the meantime I feel confident that I could secure her against such a misfortune. A great many of our officers who have married with small pay and in the lower grades have managed to put away money and to live comfortable—some have become independent and even rich; and it seems to me that there must be something radically wrong about me, if I cannot, with my rank and advantages, now do the same.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916, in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter (1826-1876), p. 166-8

Tuesday, April 16, 2024

Colonel Jefferson Davis’ Memoranda of the Transactions in Connexion with the Capitulation of Monterey, Capital of Nueva Leon, Mexico, October 7, 1846

By invitation of General Ampudia, commanding the Mexican army, General Taylor accompanied by a number of his officers, proceeded on the 24th September, 1846, to a house designated as the place at which General Ampudia requested an interview. The parties being convened, General Ampudia announced, as official information, that commissioners from the United States had been received by the government of Mexico; and that the orders under which he had prepared to defend the city of Monterey, had lost their force by the subsequent change of his own government, therefore he asked the conference. A brief conversation between the commanding generals, showed their views to be so opposite, as to leave little reason to expect an amicable arrangement between them.

General Taylor said he would not delay to receive such propositions as General Ampudia indicated. One of General Ampudia's party, I think, the governor of the city, suggested the appointment of a mixed commission; this was acceded to, and General W. G. Worth of the United States army, General J. Pinckney Henderson, of the Texan volunteers, and Colonel Jefferson Davis, of the Mississippi riflemen on the part of General Taylor; and General J. Ma. Ortega, General P. Requena, and Señor the Governor M. Ma. Llano on the part of Gen. Ampudia, were appointed.

General Taylor gave instructions to his commissioners which, as understood, for they were brief and verbal, will be best shown by the copy of the demand which the United States commissioners prepared in the conference room here incorporated:

Copy of demand by United States Commissioners.

 

"I. As the legitimate result of the operations before this place, and the present position of the contending armies, we demand the surrender of the town, the arms and munitions of war, and all other public property within the place.

 

"II. That the Mexican armed force retire beyond the Rinconada, Linares, and San Fernando, on the coast.

 

"III. The commanding general of the army of the United States agrees that the Mexican officers reserve their side arms and private baggage; and the troops be allowed to retire under their officers without parole, a reasonable time being allowed to withdraw the forces.

 

"IV. The immediate delivery of the main work, now occupied, to the army of the United States.

 

"V. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the United States shall not occupy the town until the Mexican forces have been withdrawn, except for hospital purposes, storehouses, &c.

 

"VI. The commanding general of the United States agrees not to advance beyond the line specified in the second section before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the respective governments can be heard from."

The terms of the demand were refused by the Mexican commissioners, who drew up a counter proposition, of which I only recollect that it contained a permission to the Mexican forces to retire with their arms. This was urged as a matter of soldierly pride, and as an ordinary courtesy. We had reached the limit of our instructions, and the commission rose to report the disagreement.

Upon returning to the reception room, after the fact had been announced that the commissioners could not agree upon terms, General Ampudia entered at length upon the question, treating the point of disagreement as one which involved the honor of his country, spoke of his desire for a settlement without further bloodshed, and said he did not care about the pieces of artillery which he had at the place. General Taylor responded to the wish to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. It was agreed the commission should reassemble, and we were instructed to concede the small arms; and I supposed there would be no question about the artillery. The Mexican commissioners now urged that, as all other arms had been recognised, it would be discreditable to the artillery if required to march out without anything to represent their arm, and stated, in answer to an inquiry, that they had a battery of light artillery, manoeuvred and equipped as such. The commission again rose, and reported the disagreement on the point of artillery.

General Taylor hearing that more was demanded than the middle ground, upon which, in a spirit of generosity, he had agreed to place the capitulation, announced the conference at an end; and rose in a manner which showed his determination to talk no more. As he crossed the room to leave it, one of the Mexican commissioners addressed him, and some conversation, which I did not hear, ensued. Gen. Worth asked permission of Gen. Taylor, and addressed some remarks to Gen. Ampudia, the spirit of which was that which he manifested throughout the negotiation, viz: generosity and leniency, and a desire to spare the further effusion of blood. The commission reassembled, and the points of capitulation were agreed upon. After a short recess we again repaired to the room in which we had parted from the Mexican commissioners; they were tardy in joining us, and slow in executing the instrument of capitulation. The 7th, 8th, and 9th articles were added during this session. At a late hour the English original was handed to Gen. Taylor for his examination; the Spanish original having been sent to General Ampudia. Gen. Taylor signed and delivered to me the instrument as it was submitted to him, and I returned to receive the Spanish copy with the signature of General Ampudia, and send that having Gen. Taylor's signature, that each general might countersign the original to be retained by the other. Gen. Ampudia did not sign the instrument as was expected, but came himself to meet the commissioners. He raised many points which had been settled, and evinced a disposition to make the Spanish differ in essential points from the English instrument. Gen. Worth was absent. Finally he was required to sign the instrument prepared for his own commissioners, and the English original was left with him that he might have it translated, (which he promised to do that night,) and be ready the next morning with a Spanish duplicate of the English instrument left with him. By this means the two instruments would be made to correspond, and he be compelled to admit his knowledge of the contents of the English original before he signed it.

The next morning the commission again met; again the attempt was made, as had been often done before by solicitation, to gain some grant in addition to the compact. Thus we had, at their request, adopted the word capitulation in lieu of surrender; they now wished to substitute stipulation for capitulation. It finally became necessary to make a peremptory demand for the immediate signing of the English instrument by General Ampudia, and the literal translation (now perfected) by the commissioners and their general. The Spanish instrument first signed by Gen. Ampudia was destroyed in the presence of his commissioners; the translation of our own instrument was countersigned by Gen. Taylor, and delivered. The agreement was complete, and it only remained to execute the terms.

Much has been said about the construction of article 2 of the capitulation, a copy of which is hereto appended. Whatever ambiguity there may be in the language used, there was a perfect understanding by the commissioners upon both sides, as to the intent of the parties. The distinction we made between light artillery equipped and manoeuvred as such, designed for and used in the field, and pieces being the armament of a fort, was clearly stated on our side; and that it was comprehended on their's, appeared in the fact, that repeatedly they asserted their possession of light artillery, and said they had one battery of light pieces. Such conformity of opinion existed among our commissioners upon every measure which was finally adopted, that I consider them, in their sphere, jointly and severally responsible for each and every article of the capitulation. If, as originally viewed by Gen. Worth, our conduct has been in accordance with the peaceful policy of our government, and shall in any degree tend to consummate that policy, we may congratulate ourselves upon the part we have taken. If otherwise, it will remain to me as a deliberate opinion, that the terms of the capitulation gave all which could have followed, of desirable result, from a further assault. It was in the power of the enemy to retreat, and to bear with him his small arms, and such a battery as was contemplated in the capitulation. The other grants were such as it was honorable in a conquering army to bestow, and which it cost magnanimity nothing to give.

The above recollections are submitted to Generals Henderson and Worth for correction and addition that the misrepresentation of this transaction may be presented by a statement made whilst the events are recent and the memory fresh.

JEFFERSON DAVIS,        
Colonel Mississippi Riflemen.
Camp near Monterey, October 7th, 1846.

The above is a correct statement of the leading facts connected with the transactions referred to, according to my recollection. It is, however, proper, that I should further state, that my first impression was, that no better terms than those first proposed, on the part of Gen. Taylor, ought to have been given, and I so said to General Taylor when I found him disposed to yield to the request of General Ampudia; and, at the same time, gave it as my opinion that they would be accepted by him before we left the town. General Taylor replied, that he would run no risk where it could be avoided—that he wished to avoid the further shedding of blood, and that he was satisfied that our government would be pleased with the terms given by the capitulation; and being myself persuaded of that fact, I yielded my individual views and wishes; and, under that conviction, I shall ever be ready to defend the terms of the capitulation.

J. PINCKNEY HENDERSON,        
Major General Commanding the Texan Volunteers.

I not only counselled and advised, the opportunity being offered the general-in-chief, the first proposition; but cordially assented and approved the decision taken by General Taylor in respect to the latter, as did every member of the commission, and for good and sufficient military and national reasons-and stand ready, at all times and proper places, to defend and sustain the action of the commanding general, and participation of the commissioners. Knowing that malignants, the tremor being off, are at work to discredit and misrepresent the case, (as I had anticipated,) I feel obliged to Col. Davis for having thrown together the material and facts.

W. J. WORTH,        
Brig. Gen. commanding 2d division.
Monterey, Oct. 12th, 1846.

Terms of the capitulation of the city of Monterey, the capital of Nueva Leon, agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners-to wit: General Worth, of the United States army; General Henderson, of the Texan volunteers; and Col. Davis, of the Mississippi riflemen, on the part of Major General Taylor, commanding-in-chief of the United States forces; and General Requena and General Ortego, of the army of Mexico, and Señor Manuel M. Llano, Governor of Nueva Leon, on the part of Señor General Don Pedro Ampudia, commanding-in-chief the army of the north of Mexico.

Article 1. As the legitimate result of the operations before this place, and the present position of the contending armies, it is agreed that the city, the fortifications, cannon, the munitions of war, and all other public property, with the under-mentioned exceptions, be surrendered to the commanding general of the United States forces now at Monterey.

Article 2. That the Mexican forces be allowed to retain the following arms-to wit: The commissioned officers, their side-arms; the infantry, their arms and accoutrements; the cavalry, their arms and accoutrements; the artillery, one field battery, not to exceed six pieces, with twenty-one rounds of ammunition.

Article 3. That the Mexican armed forces retire within seven days from this date beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Pusos.

Article 4. That the citadel of Monterey be evacuated by the Mexican, and occupied by the American forces to-morrow morning, at 10 o'clock.

Article 5. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the United States will not occupy the city until the Mexican forces have withdrawn, except for hospital and storage purposes.

Article 6. That the forces of the United States will not advance beyond the line specified in the 3d article, before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders of the respective governments can be received.

Article 7. That the public property to be delivered, shall be turned over and received by officers appointed by the commanding general of the two armies.

Article 8. That all doubts, as to the meaning of any of the preceding articles, shall be solved by an equitable construction, and on principles of liberality to the retiring army.

Article 9. That the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, may be saluted by its own battery.

W. J. WORTH,        
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.

J. PINCKNEY HENDERSON,        
Maj. Gen. commanding the Texan volunteers.

JEFFERSON DAVIS,        
Colonel Mississippi riflemen.

J. M. ORTEGA,
T. REQUENA,
MANUEL M. LLANO,
Approved:
PEDRO AMPUDIA,

 
Z. TAYLOR,        
Maj. Gen. U. S. A. commanding.
Done at Monterey, Sept. 24, 1846.

SOURCE: Dunbar Rowland, Editor, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Volume 1, p. 65-71

Wednesday, March 6, 2024

Colonel Jefferson Davis to the Editor of the Washington Union, January 6, 1847

(From Washington Union, Feb. 11, 1847.)

Victoria, Tamaulipas, Mexico.
January 6, 1847.

Dear Sir: After much speculation and no little misrepresentation about the capitulation of Monterey, I perceive by our recent newspapers, that a discussion has arisen as to who is responsible for that transaction. As one of the commissioners who were entrusted by General Taylor with the arrangements of the terms upon which the city of Monterey and its fortifications should be delivered to our forces, I have had frequent occasion to recur to the course then adopted, and the considerations which led to it. My judgment after the fact has fully sustained my decisions at the date of the occurrence; and feeling myself responsible for the instrument as we prepared and presented it to our commanding general, I have the satisfaction, after all subsequent events, to believe that the terms we offered were expedient, and honorable, and wise. A distinguished gentleman with whom I acted on that commission, Governor Henderson, says, in a recently published letter, "I did not at the time, nor do I still like the terms, but acted as one of the commissioners, together with Geenral Worth and Colonel Davis, to carry out General Taylor's instructions. We ought and could have made them surrender at discretion," &c., &c.

From each position taken in the above paragraph I dissent. The instructions given by General Taylor only presented his object, and fixed a limit to the powers of his commissioners; hence, when points were raised which exceeded our discretion, they were referred to the commander; but minor points were acted on, and finally submitted as a part of our negotiation. We fixed the time within which the Mexican forces should retire from Monterey. We agreed upon the time we would wait for the decision of the respective governments, which I recollect was less by thirty-four days than the Mexican commissioners asked—the period adopted being that which, according to our estimate, was required to bring up the rear of our army with the ordnance and supplies necessary for further operations.

I did not then, nor do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion. Had I entertained the opinion it would have been given to the commission, and to the commanding general, and would have precluded me from signing an agreement which permitted the garrison to retire with the honors of war. It is demonstrable, from the position and known prowess of the two armies, that we could drive the enemy from the town; but the town was untenable whilst the main fort (called the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy. Being without siege artillery or entrenching tools, we could only hope to carry this fort by storm, after a heavy loss from our army; which, isolated in a hostile country, now numbered less than half the forces of the enemy. When all this had been achieved, what more would we have gained than by the capitulation?

General Taylor's force was too small to invest the town. It was, therefore, always in the power of the enemy to retreat, bearing his light arms. Our army-poorly provided, and with very insufficient transportation—could not have overtaken, if they had pursued the flying enemy. Hence the conclusion that, as it was not in our power to capture the main body of the Mexican Army, it is unreasonable to suppose their general would have surrendered at discretion. The moral effect of retiring under the capitulation was certainly greater than if the enemy had retreated without our consent. By this course we secured the large supply of ammunition he had collected in Monterey—which, had the assault been continued, must have been exploded by our shells, as it was principally stored in "the Cathedral," which, being supposed to be filled with troops, was the especial aim of our pieces The destruction which this explosion would have produced must have involved the advance of both divisions of our troops; and I commend this to the contemplation of those whose arguments have been drawn from facts learned since the commissioners closed their negotiations. With these introductory remarks, I send a copy of a manuscript in my possession, which was prepared to meet such necessity as now exists for an explanation of the views which governed the commissioners in arranging the terms of capitulation, to justify the commanding general, should misrepresentation and calumny attempt to tarnish his well-earned reputation, and, for all time to come, to fix the truth of the transaction. Please publish this in your paper, and believe me your friend, etc.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

SOURCE: Dunbar Rowland, Editor, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Volume 1, p. 63-5