Dear Sir: After much
speculation and no little misrepresentation about the capitulation of Monterey,
I perceive by our recent newspapers, that a discussion has arisen as to who is
responsible for that transaction. As one of the commissioners who were
entrusted by General Taylor with the arrangements of the terms upon which the
city of Monterey and its fortifications should be delivered to our forces, I
have had frequent occasion to recur to the course then adopted, and the
considerations which led to it. My judgment after the fact has fully sustained
my decisions at the date of the occurrence; and feeling myself responsible for
the instrument as we prepared and presented it to our commanding general, I
have the satisfaction, after all subsequent events, to believe that the terms
we offered were expedient, and honorable, and wise. A distinguished gentleman
with whom I acted on that commission, Governor Henderson, says, in a recently
published letter, "I did not at the time, nor do I still like the terms,
but acted as one of the commissioners, together with Geenral Worth and Colonel
Davis, to carry out General Taylor's instructions. We ought and could have made
them surrender at discretion," &c., &c.
From each position
taken in the above paragraph I dissent. The instructions given by General
Taylor only presented his object, and fixed a limit to the powers of his
commissioners; hence, when points were raised which exceeded our discretion,
they were referred to the commander; but minor points were acted on, and
finally submitted as a part of our negotiation. We fixed the time within which
the Mexican forces should retire from Monterey. We agreed upon the time we
would wait for the decision of the respective governments, which I recollect
was less by thirty-four days than the Mexican commissioners asked—the period
adopted being that which, according to our estimate, was required to bring up
the rear of our army with the ordnance and supplies necessary for further
operations.
I did not then, nor
do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion. Had I
entertained the opinion it would have been given to the commission, and to the
commanding general, and would have precluded me from signing an agreement which
permitted the garrison to retire with the honors of war. It is demonstrable,
from the position and known prowess of the two armies, that we could drive the
enemy from the town; but the town was untenable whilst the main fort (called
the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy. Being without siege
artillery or entrenching tools, we could only hope to carry this fort by storm,
after a heavy loss from our army; which, isolated in a hostile country, now
numbered less than half the forces of the enemy. When all this had been
achieved, what more would we have gained than by the capitulation?
General Taylor's
force was too small to invest the town. It was, therefore, always in the power
of the enemy to retreat, bearing his light arms. Our army-poorly provided, and
with very insufficient transportation—could not have overtaken, if they had
pursued the flying enemy. Hence the conclusion that, as it was not in our power
to capture the main body of the Mexican Army, it is unreasonable to suppose
their general would have surrendered at discretion. The moral effect of
retiring under the capitulation was certainly greater than if the enemy had
retreated without our consent. By this course we secured the large supply of
ammunition he had collected in Monterey—which, had the assault been continued,
must have been exploded by our shells, as it was principally stored in
"the Cathedral," which, being supposed to be filled with troops, was
the especial aim of our pieces The destruction which this explosion would have
produced must have involved the advance of both divisions of our troops; and I
commend this to the contemplation of those whose arguments have been drawn from
facts learned since the commissioners closed their negotiations. With these
introductory remarks, I send a copy of a manuscript in my possession, which was
prepared to meet such necessity as now exists for an explanation of the views
which governed the commissioners in arranging the terms of capitulation, to
justify the commanding general, should misrepresentation and calumny attempt to
tarnish his well-earned reputation, and, for all time to come, to fix the truth
of the transaction. Please publish this in your paper, and believe me your
friend, etc.,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
SOURCE: Dunbar
Rowland, Editor, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters,
Papers and Speeches, Volume 1, p. 63-5
