In the House of
Representatives, Wednesday, September 11, 1850,—On the report of the Select
Committee appointed April 22, 1850, to examine into certain official acts of
Thomas Ewing, late Secretary of the Interior, and in reply to Mr. VINTON of
Ohio, Mr. BROWN said:
MR. SPEAKER: It is
with extreme reluctance that I venture, at this late period of a protracted
session, to address the House. I feel called upon, however, by an imperative
sense of duty, to make a brief response to the speech which the honorable
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vinton] has just now concluded, and to that end I
crave the indulgence of the House.
Before proceeding to
the consideration of the subjects embraced in the report and resolutions, allow
me to advert for a moment to the manner in which that report and the
accompanying resolutions were received in this House.
Now almost five
months since, a series of resolutions were passed by the House of
Representatives directing an inquiry into the official conduct of the then
Secretary of the Interior, Thomas Ewing. A select committee was appointed, and
they were charged with the direction and prosecution of these inquiries. They
entered upon the discharge of the duties assigned them. It was then spring, the
summer has come and gone, and here in the beginning of autumn your committee
have concluded their labors. They bring their report, and lay it upon your
table, and through their chairman they ask for it that courteous and respectful
consideration which has been uniformly awarded to all reports coming from
committees of this House. They ask that the report may lie upon the table and
be printed, and that a day may be fixed for its consideration. This has been
denied. A judgment is evoked in advance of all consideration or reflection;
without reading, without printing, before a single member has had an
opportunity of examining the report, a judgment is asked. On its first
introduction into the House, the gentleman from Ohio, himself a member of the
committee, calls upon the House to pass its judgment. How well he has succeeded
in this, the House and the country already know.
Why, sir, was the
gentleman from Ohio so impatient to have this report acted upon, or rather
slurred over? Was there any important public interest suffering, or likely to
suffer by a little delay? No, sir; another and a very different interest was to
be protected by smothering this report. The conduct of a distinguished friend,
political and personal, of the gentleman, had been criticised and justly
censured; important and startling facts had been brought to light. The
existence of these facts was wholly inconsistent with the idea of a faithful
and proper administration of the Department of the Interior, and it was
necessary to give them the go by—to bury them, if possible, among the
unpublished and useless papers which accumulate during a long session of
Congress. The gentleman was familiar with all the facts. He had attended upon
the committee for more than four months. He knew what the report and the papers
contained; and I take it upon myself to say, that in opposing the motion to
print, and in insisting upon bringing the House to an immediate vote on the
resolutions, he took a course which his experience assured him could result in
nothing less than an acquittal, without a trial, of Mr. Ewing.
Mr. VINTON said he
had insisted upon an immediate consideration of the report because to postpone
it would have been equivalent to doing nothing, as it would never again have
been reached.
Mr. BROWN. That
excuse shall not avail the gentleman. If he had been anxious to have a fair
hearing, why not have asked to make the subject the SPECIAL order for some
subsequent day? Then it would have certainly come up for consideration. No,
sir, the gentleman's knowledge of the facts assured him that it would not do to
risk a fair investigation, and his tactics were employed to hurry on a decision
before the House could be informed of these facts. The gentleman knew very well
that if members could be forced to a vote without a knowledge of the facts,
they would acquit the Secretary. They would do this on the well-known ground
that all men are presumed to be innocent until their guilt is established. His
legal acumen was not severely taxed to discover that if the facts could be
withheld until a vote could be exacted, the presumption of innocence would be strongly
in favor of the accused.
Mr. VINTON said, he
had consented to the printing of the report.
Mr. BROWN. I know
that; I know the gentleman made a virtue of necessity, and consented to have
the report printed after his course had been assailed by the chairman of the
committee [Mr. Richardson]. But what was the gentleman's first movement? To
oppose any postponement of the subject, even to allow the report to be printed.
He succeeded in defeating the postponement, and we have been actually forced
into the consideration of the whole subject, and are now considering it, when
not a member, save those on the committee, has ever seen the report or knows
anything of the real state of the facts. The gentleman now makes a merit of
consenting to have the report printed. In the course of some days it will have
been published. In the mean time the House will be called on to vote. We shall
have the verdict first, and the evidence submitted to the jury afterwards.
This, to say the least of it, will be rather an irregular proceeding.
The gentleman, with
the adroitness of a politician of twenty or more winters, laid his whole scheme
so as to give it the best possible assurance of success. It is far from my
purpose to charge the gentleman with dishonorable conduct. But really, sir,
there is something about this transaction which excites my curiosity, and seems
to invite the most rigid scrutiny. The gentleman from Ohio will correct me, if
I err in my relation of the facts. He went to the chairman of the committee and
obtained the report of the majority
before its delivery to the House, as he said (and no doubt truly), to prepare a
minority report. It became important to have the report copied, and though the
capitol was full of clerks, and though the streets were crowded with persons
seeking employment, the gentleman could find no one to copy this report but
young Mr. Ewing, the son of the ex-Secretary, whose conduct had given rise to
and had been criticised in the report. The first we hear of the report, it is
in the hands of Mr. Ewing; next Senator Mason, of Virginia, has it; and then a
copy is handed round among the Virginia members on this floor. All this was
before the report had been made to the House, and without the knowledge of the
chairman or any member of the majority of that committee. Now, sir, I want to
show the effect of this proceeding.
Mr. VINTON. I have
already stated that I had nothing to do with furnishing the Virginia members
with copies of that report.
Mr. BROWN. I
recollect the gentleman's disclaimer, and do not mean to impugn his veracity.
He placed the report in the hands of young Mr. Ewing; he, of course, showed it
to his father, and he to the Virginia senators and representatives. The
gentleman gave it a particular direction, and he was shrewd enough to know
where it would land. But why, you are ready to ask, was it shown to the
Virginia members? I'll tell you, Mr. Speaker; a particular object was to be
accomplished. The report was to be
smothered. The gentleman was all-powerful with his Whig friends. He could
bring them up to the work with a pretty united front. There might be some
bolters, however, and if there was not, the party was a little too weak to
carry out the scheme. Besides, it would give the whole thing a partisan look,
if the Whigs went in a body for smothering, and the Democrats against it. It
became necessary to have some Democratic allies. The report contained a severe
criticism on certain important Virginia interests. The gentleman, with a skill
and diplomacy, worthy of Talleyrand, went to work to secure these allies in the
persons of the Virginia members. The report was very quietly, if not secretly
circulated among them. They saw the assault on the Virginia interests—the
scheme took. The vote was taken; the great body of the Whig party voted with
the gentleman, and all the Virginia Democrats went over to his standard. He
carried his point, and here we are precipitated into a discussion, before
anybody save the favored few, have seen the report or know anything of its
contents.
(Here Messrs.
Seddon, Millson, Bayly, and McMullen, all of Virginia, severally interposed,
and said that they had not been influenced in the votes given by anything said
in the report against the Virginia interests.)
Mr. BROWN resumed. I
certainly never meant to say that honorable gentlemen would knowingly and
wilfully give an improper vote merely for the sake of sustaining an unjust
local claim. But we all know that the representative is not the most impartial
judge of the rights of his own constituent. Indeed, sir, the interest of the
constituent is almost inseparable from the prejudices and predilections of his
representative. The gentleman from Ohio well understood this, and he rightly
conjectured that if it came to the knowledge of the Virginia delegation that
certain important Virginia claims had been condemned in this report, the
allegiance of that delegation might be relied on.
I am far from
assailing the motives of the members from Virginia; but I cannot help remarking
that it is a little singular that they were found separated from their
political friends on this question. It is doubtless all right and fair, but it
never happened so before. If one, or two, or three had gone over, my
astonishment would not have been excited. But when they went in a body, I could
not help inquiring into the cause of so important and significant a movement. I
acquit the delegation of all improper motives, but I still think these Virginia
claims had something to do with their votes against postponing the consideration
of this report until such time as would afford every member an opportunity to
examine into the facts.
I have been
surprised, Mr. Speaker, at the grounds taken by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Vinton], against a further consideration of the grave and important matters set
forth in the report of the majority of this committee. To my mind, it looks
very much like special pleading, for the purpose of avoiding a fair trial on
the merits of the case. The gentleman was a member of the committee. He
attended its sittings regularly. He saw the committee toiling from day to day,
through the long months of summer, in collating the facts set forth in the
report. He took a deep interest in the proceedings of the committee, and
participated actively in all its labors. Yes, sir, he was here when the
committee was raised. He was here when the inquiries were directed by the
House. He went on the committee, performed his due proportion of the work, saw
the report prepared after four months and more of toil, and then for the first
time he discovers that the House has no jurisdiction of the case—that the House
was attempting to resolve itself into an appellate court for the revision of judicial decisions made by the executive officers of the government.
Did the gentleman make this wonderful discovery himself, or was it the
offspring of some other genius? Possibly the younger Mr. Ewing, when copying
the report, may have found it out. It may be, that some or all of the Virginia
delegation discovered it, or, what is just as likely, ex-Secretary Ewing
himself may have first started the new idea. To whomsoever the paternity of the
grand conception may belong, I repudiate it as spurious. What, sir! may an
executive officer go on from year to year allowing spurious and unjust, grossly
unjust and illegal claims against the government, and paying them too, without
law or semblance of law to sanction his conduct? and must we, the
representatives of the people, fold our arms in quiet, and be silent because we
have no power or right to inquire into the official conduct of an executive
officer? If, sir, the conduct of the ex-Secretary had not been in the highest
degree reprehensible, we should have heard nothing of this plea to the
jurisdiction. Conscious innocence would not thus shrink from a fair investigation.
It is precisely because these transactions will not bear the light of open day,
that attempts are being made, and combinations formed, to bury them in this
House under the hollow pretence that we have no jurisdiction. Why was not this
discovery made five months back, when the investigation was ordered? Why was it
not made during the four months and a half that the committee was sitting? Why
was it never made until it was seen that an impartial investigation would
result in a condemnation of these transactions?—in a condemnation which would
arrest such proceedings in future, and thereby save millions to the treasury.
I now tell the House
that if the conduct of the late Secretary is not distinctly rebuked, and his
decisions repudiated, millions of dollars will be taken from the national
treasury without law and without the knowledge or sanction of Congress. If we,
the guardians of the treasury, are to stand by and witness these proceedings in
silence, because the gentleman from Ohio says we have no jurisdiction, no power
to arrest them, why, then, be it so; I take water and wash my hands of them.
How long is it since
the gentleman from Ohio found that Congress could not inquire into the conduct
of an executive officer? During these fifteen years or more that he has held a
seat on this floor, has he ever, in a single instance, voted against an inquiry
into the conduct of any Democratic executive officer? Never, sir, never. I
challenge the gentleman to a trial by the record, and dare the assertion that
he never, in all his life, voted against an inquiry into any alleged
misfeasance or malversation in Democratic office-holders. But now, when a Whig
secretary is arraigned—when the personal and political friend of the gentleman
is charged with illegal and improper conduct, he steps boldly forward, and
says, "Stop; touch not mine anointed." You may inquire into the
conduct of Democrats, but Whigs are sacred against such impertinent and
officious intermeddling.
The gentleman found
power in this House to appoint the "Bundelcund committee," and to
send them around the world on a voyage of discovery. He could delegate to that
committee power to pry into the private and official conduct of every Democrat
in and out of office. He could confer upon them the right to propound
impertinent inquiries to the editor of the Union,
and to Mr. Sengstack, as to how they conducted their private affairs, as
private citizens; and he could even find the power to bring these gentlemen to
the bar of the House and punish them for contempt, because they refused to
disclose their private transactions to the "Bundelcund" inquisition.
But he can find no power in Congress to inquire whether Mr. Ewing has or has
not paid money from the treasury without the sanction of law.
Mr. VINTON said he
had not voted for the arrest of the editor of the Union and Mr. Sengstack. He did not vote at all.
Mr. BROWN. The
gentleman did not vote at all. His party voted, and his judgment approved their
votes. I ask him if it did not?
Again, sir, the
gentleman voted last year to inquire into the conduct of the then Secretary of
the Treasury, Robert J. Walker. Where did he get his authority for that? Is the
official immunity of a Democratic Secretary of the Treasury less than that of a
Whig Secretary of the Interior?
Mr. VINTON. That
inquiry was sent to a standing committee of this House; this to a select
committee.
Mr. BROWN. That is
rather too refined for my comprehension. I thought the plea was to the
jurisdiction—to the power of the
House to direct the inquiry. Now, it seems the House may direct the inquiry, if
it only employs the proper committee to conduct it. And pray, sir, let me ask
the gentleman what powers may this House confer on standing committees, which
it may not in a like degree confer on a select committee? Neither has any power
other than that which it derives from the House, and either may receive all the
power which the House can confer-and one of them in as high a degree as the
other. The gentleman will have to look about him for some better excuse than
this to justify his vote to inquire into Secretary Walker's alleged misconduct,
and his speech today against inquiring into Mr. Ewing's official short-comings.
But my hour is
running out, and I must hurry on to a brief investigation of the facts set
forth in the report itself.
And first of the
case of G. W. and W. G. Ewing: Large sums of money were paid these persons, who
were traders among the Indian tribes in the west. The money thus paid was
clearly due from the government to the Indians. In this I agree perfectly and
entirely with the gentleman [Mr. Vinton]; but I cannot concur with him that it
was rightfully paid to the Messrs. Ewing. A critical investigation of the
claims of these traders cannot fail to convince every one of certain important facts:
the first and most important is, that the demands were enormously large,
springing up as by magic from a paltry sum of a few hundred dollars, to many
thousands, and that without there having been any additional dealings between
the parties. In many instances, the items composing the accounts were never
given, but a demand rendered for a large sum in round numbers. In the second
place, the transactions were all of an individual character; the sales, if any
were made, were all made to individual Indians; whereas, the demands for
payment were against the tribes or nations; thus rendering a whole people
responsible, without their consent, for the foolish and improvident acts of a
few individuals. Nay, more than this, it was placing the funds of a tribe of
ignorant savages at the mercy of these speculators and traders. Every one knows
that intelligent and shrewd white men can go among the Indians, and with a few
red blankets, or with strands of beads and other trinkets, make accounts on a
credit with them to any amount. And we all know, that if the United States will
undertake to pay such accounts out of the trust funds belonging to the savage
tribes, there will be found unprincipled men enough to present demands for
millions. The third point to be considered in this matter is, that Secretary
Ewing ordered the payment of these demands without sufficient proof of their
justice, even against the individual Indians, and in total disregard of the
rights of the savage tribes. It is true that large sums are now suspended to
await the action of the House on this report. If the committee is sustained,
justice will be done the Indians, and if not, their funds will be recklessly
squandered in paying the demands of the Ewings, and other traders and
speculators.
One of my colleagues
on the committee proposes to address the House more particularly on this branch
of the investigation, and to him I leave the further task of pursuing the facts
and law of this case. I will not dismiss it, however, without calling attention
to the position of the gentleman from Ohio.
If I correctly
understood the gentleman's position, it was, that inasmuch as the government
owed the money, it could make no difference whether she paid it to the Indians
or to the traders. If he means by this that it makes no difference so far as
the money is concerned—no difference in a pecuniary point of view, I quite
agree with him. But the gentleman very well understands that there are other
and higher questions involved than the mere matter of discharging a pecuniary
liability. Viewed only as a question of dollars and cents, it is a little
important, it is true, that the money when paid should pass into the proper
hands. An error like this might be committed, and, with civilized and
enlightened nations, it could be repaired by simply paying the money again. But
how is it, sir, with the Indian tribes? The government has obtained their
confidence; they have consented that we shall hold their funds in trust. By and
by they will send up a deputation to see their great father, the President, and
receive their money. They will be told that the money has been paid to white
men, and they will feel cheated; distrust will take the place of confidence.
They will sigh for revenge. They will fly to arms; and the next intelligence
from the west will be that the tomahawk and scalping knife have been taken up,
and that our frontier settlers are flying from their homes and seeking safety.
Tell me not, sir, that it makes no difference to whom the money is paid. Let
the gentleman look into this matter, and he will find that the paltry question
as to whether we shall pay this money once or twice sinks into insignificance
in comparison with the other and greater questions of morality and safety. I
hold that it is in the highest degree immoral to execute a sacred trust for an
ignorant savage in a way to suffer him to be cheated by the white man. And I
know, sir, it will be found highly dangerous to our frontiers to lose the
confidence of these Indians, and to drive them to acts of revenge for the
wrongs of the government in misapplying their money. I think, sir, that the
Secretary did wrong in paying the claims of the Messrs. Ewing, and as the
departments are only awaiting your action to determine whether they will pay
other like demands, I hope they may be correctly advised by a vote of this
House.
The second in the
series of resolutions referred to the select committee, directs them to inquire
"whether the Secretary of the Interior reopened and paid interest, to the
amount of thirty-one thousand dollars, on the pension granted to Commodore
James Barron, for services rendered in the Virginia navy during the
revolutionary war, after the principal had been fully paid and discharged; and
if said interest was paid, was it simple or compound; who was the agent or
attorney for said claim; and the authority for such claim, if any."
This inquiry has
been prosecuted, and a conclusion arrived at which seems to me to be fully
justified by the facts.
It appears from the
recorded evidence, that James Barron was a commander in the Virginia (state)
navy, from 1775 to the close of the revolutionary war, and that he died in
1787.
In May, 1779, the
state of Virginia, by an act of her legislature, promised half pay for life to
all officers in the state and continental (ARMY) line, who should serve to the
close of the war.
In 1780, she
extended the benefits of this act to the officers of the navy, who should serve
during the war.
It is clear,
therefore, that Commodore Barron was entitled to half pay for life, or from the close of the war to his death in
1787.
In 1790, long after
the close of the war, and three years after the death of Commodore Barron,
Virginia, by another act, gave to officers of the army, and they alone, five years full pay and
interest, in commutation of half pay
for life.
The benefits of the
act of 1790 being confined to officers of the army, and they alone, it is clear
that Barron, who never was in the army, was never entitled to commutation.
And so indeed it
seems to have been determined. For in 1823, his administrator, in pursuance of
a judgment rendered by the superior court of Henrico county, demanded and
received of the state of Virginia, $2008.52, that being the amount of Commodore
Barron's half pay for life, under the act of 1780.
To a plain man of
common understanding, it would seem that here was a full settlement of the
Barron claim. He was entitled to half pay, and that alone, and his
administrator, thirty-six years after his death, applied for and received it in
pursuance of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. It never was
optional with naval officers to take
either half pay for life, or in lieu thereof five years' full pay with
interest. This was a benefit extended to officers of the army, and them alone.
But suppose for a moment that officers of the navy had, by the act of 1790,
been placed on the same footing with officers of the army, and that it had been
left to their choice to take either half pay for life or full pay for five
years and interest. Suppose, I say, that this had been the law. Did not the
administrator of Commodore Barron, in 1823, make his election, and take the
half pay for life? Such sir, is the recorded fact.
The truth is, that
in 1823, there was no pretence set up by the representative of Commodore Barron
that he was entitled to anything more than half pay for life. This was all that
was claimed, and this was paid. The Commodore had been dead thirty-six years,
and the state of Virginia paid off and discharged to his administrator the only
demand which his administrator pretended to render against the government of
that state.
The next point of
inquiry is, how came the United States responsible for the debts of Virginia in
this regard?
The acts of
Virginia, passed in 1779 and 1780, were intended to promote the cause of
independence, and they no doubt had the effect of continuing in the service
many valuable officers whose private fortunes had been greatly reduced, and
who, but for the assurances thus held out, would have been compelled to look
for the means of subsistence in their declining years, elsewhere than in the
army and navy of an impoverished colony. The act of 1790 was passed after the
close of the war, and it was not, therefore, intended to promote the cause of
the war. It is perfectly clear, that the liabilities incurred by Virginia under
her acts of 1779 and 1780, were war debts, and properly chargeable to the
account of a national revolution. It is equally as clear, that her liabilities
under the act of 1790, were not incurrred in promoting or assisting the cause
of independence; and however creditable to her generosity and magnanimity the
act may have been, the liabilities could, in no proper sense, be charged to the
war debt. It was not called for by exigencies of the public service. It was, in
fact, an act of generosity—a gratuity.
I by no means say
that the United States ought not to perform acts of generosity-of gratuitous
service. She has performed many such, and they stand to her credit. I trust she
may perform many others. But did she in this instance undertake to relieve
Virginia from the payment of the gratuity or the bounty promised by her in her
act of 1790? She did not.
In the year 1832—fifty-two
years after the act of the Virginia legislature granting half pay for life,
forty-five years after the death of Commodore Barron, and nine years after
Virginia had paid to his administrator the half pay for life due him at his
decease—the Congress of the United States passed an act, the third section of
which is in these words:—
“SECTION
3. And be it further enacted, That
the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed and required to
adjust and settle those claims for half pay of the officers of the aforesaid
regiments and corps, which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment against
the state of Virginia, and for which said state would be bound on the
principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of said state; which said sums of money herein directed to be settled
and paid, shall be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise
appropriated by law.”
Now, sir, is there
one word in this act which can be construed or tortured into a remote
intimation that the United States meant to do anything more than to assume the war debt—the half-pay—as described by
Virginia in the acts of 1779 and 1780? There was a manifest propriety in the
United States assuming this liability. It was incurred in the prosecution of a
common cause, and it was right and proper it should be paid from a common
treasury. But I utterly deny that this government ever did undertake to pay commutation,
or anything more than the half-pay for life to officers of the Virginia navy;
and if she did, I call upon the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from
Virginia to point out the act.
I rest the case on
these points:
1. Virginia
undertook to pay her naval officers who served to the close of the war half-pay
for life. She never did agree to give them commutation, or any other pay in
lieu of this half-pay.
2. If Virginia had
left it optional with naval officers, as she did with army officers, to choose
between the commutation or five years' full pay and the half-pay for life, then
Barron's administrator made his election in 1823, and took the half-pay.
3. The United
States, for sufficient reasons, never did undertake to assume Virginia's
liabilities for commutation, but only for the half-pay due her army and naval
officers.
4. Virginia paid
Barron's administrator his half-pay in 1823. The United States assumed the
debt; and when she had returned to Virginia the $2008.52 paid by her to
Barron's administrator, the transaction was closed and the business settled.
We are next to
inquire when and how this matter came to be reopened, and how it was again
closed.
July 21, 1849,
twenty-six years after the payment to Barron's administrator, and sixty-two
years after the death of the commodore, James Lyons, of Virginia, a
distinguished lawyer, and leading political friend of the ex-Secretary of the
Interior, preferred a claim against the United States for commutation, or five
years' full pay, with interest, in lieu of the half-pay received by the
administrator in 1823. This claim was
promptly rejected by the Commissioner of Pensions.
An appeal was taken
by Mr. Lyons, and the case was reviewed by Mr. Secretary Ewing. He had doubts.
Yes, sir, he had doubts, and he
referred the case to Mr. Attorney-General Johnson for his legal opinion. Mr.
Johnson thought the money ought to be paid, and then Mr. Ewing thought so, too;
but for what reason they, or either of them, came to such a conclusion, we are
left in profound ignorance. Neither has ever deigned to give the slightest
intimation of the wonderful process of reasoning by which they manage to mulet the United States for $32,000, and
to throw this large amount into the hands of their friend, Mr. Lyons.
I have said the
Commissioner of Pensions promptly refused to pay this money, and so he did. He
continued so to refuse until he was peremptorily ordered by Mr. Secretary Ewing
to pay it. The order was given December 31, 1849, and seems to have been as
novel in its character as it was peremptory in its tone. The Commissioner thus
speaks of it in an official paper now before us:
"I
accordingly certify, under an order from
the said Secretary, that commutation of five years' full pay is due, and
interest thereon up to this date. The amount of commutation is $4258.31 1/3;
interest is to be calculated at six per centum per annum on this sum from the
22d of April, 1783, to the 15th day of December, 1823; add the amount of the
interest up to December 15, 1823, to the commutation, and deduct from the total
of those sums the amount paid in December, 1823, viz: $2008.52; and upon the
balance struck calculate the interest from that time up to the present
date."
In pursuance of this
order, the account was stated as follows:
|
Commutation
|
$4258.31
|
|
Interest to
December 15, 1823
|
10,385.83
|
|
Interest from
December, 1823, to January 2, 1850
|
19,382.50
|
|
|
34,026.64
|
|
Paid by Virginia
|
2,008.52
|
|
Total
|
32,018.12
|
This large sum was
accordingly paid to Mr. Lyons. If you will be at the trouble to examine the
mode of calculation, you will be at no difficulty in seeing that the interest
has been compounded.
The compounding of
the interest is admitted. No one pretends to deny this. Mr. Ewing says himself
that it was compounded, and he informed the committee that he had called upon
Mr. Lyons to refund, and that the gentleman had refused.
The decisions of
this executro-judicial tribunal cannot be reviewed, we are told by the
gentlemen from Ohio and Virginia [Messrs. Vinton and Bayly]. I should like to
know if it is the opinion of these learned gentlemen that a court, after
rendering judgment, and enforcing it too, as in this case, to a payment of the
money, may then sit as a court for the correction of its own errors, and order
the plaintiff to pay back the money which he has received in due course of law?
And if not, how long do they think it will be before Mr. Lyons will return to
the treasury the compound interest which his friend Ewing awarded him in this
case? There is but one remedy for outrages like this, and that is, to hold the
guilty judge up to public condemnation.
In deciding this
Barron case, Messrs. Ewing and Johnson, without justice, law, or reason,
overturned the uniform current of decisions of all their predecessors, and of
the Supreme Court of Virginia, for nearly twenty years; and for the truth of
this assertion I refer to the Virginia Reports in like cases, and to the decisions
and opinions of the Secretaries and Attorneys-General since 1832.
The end of this
business is found here: The United States, in 1832, undertook to pay to
Virginia $2008.42, that being the amount of Commodore Barron's half-pay for
life, and in 1850 she is compelled by Mr. Secretary Ewing to pay $32,018.12,
for commutation and interest, simple and compound, a sum which neither she nor
Virginia ever agreed to pay in whole or in part. If this decision is not
rebuked by a vote of this House, not less than two to three millions of the
public money will go in the same way.
One other point in
this connection, and I shall have done with this Barron claim. The inquiry
naturally arises, where did Mr. Ewing get the money to pay this claim? It was
taken, like the Galphin money, from appropriations intended for other purposes,
and then Congress was asked to sanction it, by voting through a deficiency
bill. No wonder this deficiency for the last year run up to four or five
millions of dollars. Secretaries abstract $32,000 for one purpose, $56,000 for
another, $230,000 for another, and Heaven only knows how much besides. Such
lawless profligacy would bankrupt the treasury, if there was a stream of liquid
gold flowing into it from morning till night.
The only remaining subject
of inquiry is embraced in the third resolution, and has reference to a large
sum of money paid to Dr. William M. Gwin, out of a trust fund belonging to the
Chickasaw tribe of Indians.
The Chickasaws
inhabited the northern part of Mississippi, and in the year 1834 ceded their
lands to the United States; and without entering into any minute details of
their several transactions, I may state simply that the United States retained
a certain part of the proceeds of the cession in trust for the benefit of the
Indians. This fund was to be expended in such manner and for such purposes as
the Indians should direct. In 1837 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and as
now appears, without any sufficient authority from the Indians, despatched
Lieutenant Seawright, of the army, to Cincinnati, to purchase provisions and
provide transports for a party of emigrating Chickasaws, they having signified
their disposition to remove West. Seawright expended for these purposes about
$144,000. The Indians received benefits to the amount of $32,000, or about that
sum, and, as the whole expenditure was without their authority, they refused to
be charged with the remaining $112,000. The officers of the treasury, however,
charged the whole sum to the general Chickasaw account, and the Indians were
notified accordingly.
This is the
foundation, briefly stated, of the claim about which the committee were charged
to inquire.
It seems that in the
year 1844, Dr. Gwin, then a citizen of Mississippi and now a Senator from
California, went among the Chickasaws in the West. He entered into a contract
with these Indians, and was empowered by a portion of them (who professed to
act for the whole) to conduct certain fiscal operations of theirs with the
United States. The written agreement with the Indians was exhibited by Dr. Gwin
to the accounting officers at Washington, and he entered upon and discharged
some of the duties devolved upon him as the agent or attorney of the
Chickasaws.
A misunderstanding
sprung up concerning this agreement. It bore, among many others, the name of
Ish-ta-ho-ta-pa, the King. This chief wrote to the Secretary of War that he had
never signed such a paper, and that if it bore his name it was without his
authority. Dr. Gwin, on having his attention called to the subject, admitted
that the King did not sign the paper, but that another person, who represented
that he had authority, had signed for him.
A letter signed W.
A., and understood to be from William Armstrong, late General Indian Agent
West, dated Choctaw Agency, 12th October, 1846, and now on file among the
official papers, thus speaks of this transaction:
“I
received at Nashville your letter informing me of Dr. G's movements. I was not
a little surprised to hear that he came so near succeeding in the Chickasaw claim.
The fact is, the whole affair was wrong.
I had no idea when Dr. G. first came over to the Chickasaws, what his business
was."
The matter was
variously canvassed, and in the end the contract was rescinded. The paper or
contract seems to have been given up or destroyed, and a new contract was
entered into. It was under this new contract that the claim of which I am about
to speak was paid. I have spoken of the first contract only because it was the
basis of Dr. Gwin's transactions with the Indians, and hence became intimately
associated with the history of the case. I now dismiss it, and shall hereafter
speak only of the second contract. This last paper is among the documents now
on my desk; but as it is without date, I am unable to say when it was executed.
It will become important in the course of this investigation to fix its date,
and I shall have recourse to other testimony for that purpose.
Before entering into
a further examination of this case, I must pause to settle a small account with
the MINORITY of the committee. In their report I find this remarkable and
strong language:
"There
is no evidence whatever among the records of the department to sustain the
finding of the committee that this claim was rejected by the proper officer,
and reopened and allowed by the Secretary of the Interior; indeed the finding
is directly contrary to the recorded fact."
In this they make a
direct issue with the majority, and I shall have recourse to the official
papers to test the question as to who is right and who is wrong.
The first trace that
I find of this case in its progress through the departments, is in the Second
Auditor's office. On the 8th of September, 1846, J. M. McCalla, Second Auditor
of the Treasury, certified that there was due W. M. Gwin, $56,021.49. This
certificate was sent to the Second Comptroller, and the next trace of it is
found in the letter which I now read:
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
SECOND COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, Sept. 9, 1846.
SIR:
The Second Auditor of the Treasury, on the 8th instant, reported to me an
account in favor of William M. Gwin for $56,021.49, chargeable upon the
appropriation for carrying into effect treaties with the Chickasaws, under the
act of April 20,1836.
As
this claim is "connected with Indian affairs," and calls for an
expenditure from an appropriation under the charge of the War Department, it
should have been transmitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for ADMINISTRATIVE
EXAMINATION, under the 3d section of the act of July 9, 1832, and the fifth
paragraph of "Revised Regulations No. 1, concerning the execution of the
act of July 9, 1832, providing for the appointment of a Commissioner of Indian
Affairs."
In
order that the claim may receive the proper administrative examination as
required by law, I herewith transmit all the papers received from the auditor
connected therewith.
With entire respect, &c.,
ALBION K. PARRIS, Comptroller.
Hon.
W. MEDILL, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Need I go further,
to show that the Indian Bureau had been improperly passed by in the
presentation of this claim? That faithful and intelligent officer, of
twenty-odd years' experience, A. K. Parris, sent it back to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs for that administrative
examination which the case required, and without which it could not
properly be paid.
I shall not
undertake to trace its history from that day, September 9, 1846, to March 12,
1850, when it was finally paid by order of Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the
Interior. Suffice it to say, it was a history of stern resistance and constant
protests, on the part of the Indians and their attorneys, against its payment.
Indeed, sir, their arguments, protests, and remonstrances are scattered through
this immense mass of papers on my desk, like the beacon-lights along a
difficult and dangerous shore.
The minority of the
committee, with a boldness which seems to defy contradiction, says: "There
is no evidence that this claim was rejected by the proper officer. Indeed the
finding is directly to the contrary." Now, sir, if this be true, how came
it that this claim was not paid? How did it happen that it lay in the Indian
office from the 9th of September, 1846, to the 12th March, 1850? How came it to
lie there until the close of Mr. Polk's administration, and until the reign of
the "Galphins" had fairly begun? We shall see. I beg to invite the
attention of the House to certain papers, which being among those officially
communicated, could not have escaped the critical eye of the gentleman [Mr.
Vinton] under whose auspices the minority report was prepared.
The first paper in
this large mass before me is a letter from William Medill, late Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, to Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior, detailing the
history of this case. It bears date June 27, 1849. In one place the writer
says:
"Of
the $112,042 99-100 found due the Chickasaws, William H. Gwin, Esquire, claims
the enormous sum of one-half for his services or instrumentality in recovering
the amount, under an alleged contract with those Indians. Without dwelling upon
the extraordinary extravagance of this demand, which is sufficiently apparent
by the mere statement of it, I would remark, that notwithstanding the peculiar
position of the Chickasaws, they, like other Indians, are the wards of the
government, and no such contract or agreements are valid or binding unless
sanctioned by the department."
And again, in
speaking of the fund out of which it was proposed to pay this “enormous sum,”
he says:
"I
am of the opinion that it could not properly be used towards repaying the
Chickasaws the amount found due to THEM by the accounting officers: and so the
Secretary of War, as I understand, decided when the report of these officers of
the result of their adjustment of the account, and the amount found due the
Chickasaws, was presented to him in September, 1846, for a requisition for
$58,124.14, to be taken from the removal and subsistence fund. HE CERTAINLY
PEREMPTORILY REFUSED TO ISSUE THE requisition."
And again:
"This
being the case, it is not seen how any portion of it could legally or properly
be used towards paying the Chickasaws the amount found due THEM.* In my
judgment, this can only properly be effected through an appropriation therefor
by Congress."
Does all this look
like there had been no rejection, no refusal to pay? Does it look as if "the
recorded fact was exactly the contrary?"
Now, let us turn
over to page five of this great book of manuscript before me, and here we find
an order from W. L. Marcy, Secretary of War. It is dated October 1, 1846, about
twenty-two days after this case had fallen into Medill's hands, and is
addressed to William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Mr. Medill, in
handing over the papers in this case to Secretary Ewing, says, referring to
this order:
"The
rule of action which has governed the Executive in cases of contracts with
Indians, as well as powers of attorney procured from them, you will find
embodied in the accompanying order of the Secretary of War of October 1,
1849."
Here is the order:
"The
practice which has heretofore prevailed, to a considerable extent, of paying
money due to Indians on powers of attorney given by them, is wholly
inconsistent with the duty of government to pay over to them, promptly and
without abatement, whatever may be due to them under any treaty or law; or for
any claim whatever to which they may be justly entitled. Agents are appointed,
and by the government, to attend to their business for them, and they should be
the medium of all their communications with the government, whether in relation
to any claim they may have, or to their wants or wishes upon any other subject.
"W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War."
How could the
minority of the committee, with this record before them, deny that there had
been any adverse decision, and even intimate that the decisions had been in
favor of the claimant? First, we have the admitted fact, that the claim was
submitted to Mr. Medill in September, 1846; that for more than three years he
did not pay it; and that he went out of office without paying it. Second, we
have his letter before he left the office, assigning his reasons at length for
not paying it; and thirdly, we have Secretary Marcy's order, so pointed and
positive that this claim could never have been paid without violating that
order. And yet, gentlemen say there has been no decision. Nay, sir, they even
assert that the decision has been in their favor.
“They must have options sharp I ween,
To see what is not to be seen.”
I pass from the
consideration of this point, and return to the second contract, which we have
seen is without date, but which is found to have been in the Second Auditor's
office as early as 8th September, 1846. It may have been there some days
earlier.
By the terms of this
contract, which I have before me, Doctor Gwin was to have for his services, as
attorney for the Indians, various large sums of money, and among others,
one-half of all that should be recovered
from the United States on account of provisions purchased at Cincinnati in
1837. The sum thus recovered, or which, I should rather say, was found to be
due on a fair settlement of the Chickasaw account, was $112,042.99. One-half of
this sum was, of course, $56,021.49, and this was the sum claimed by Doctor
Gwin. The report and resolutions have no relation to any other payment to
Doctor Gwin, and I shall, therefore, confine my remarks to this fifty-six
thousand dollars-dismissing the others with the single remark that they were
paid. We have already seen that the Second Auditor, McCalla, passed this claim
and sent it down to Second Comptroller Parris on the 8th of September, 1846. We
have also seen that the comptroller sent it on the day following to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, where it properly belonged, for administrative
examination. We have seen that it remained there to the close of Mr. Polk's
administration, and we have seen the reasons why it was not paid. Let us now
pursue the thread of its remarkable history during the three years and more
that intervened between its falling into Commissioner Medill's hands and its
final payment by order of Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior.
Within a day or two
after the claim was passed by Second Auditor McCalla, Doctor Gwin transferred
it, for value received, to Messrs. Corcoran & Riggs, bankers in this city.
Various protests of
the Indians and their attorney, together with other papers, are found on file.
But no effort seems to have been made on the part of the claimants to change
the determination of Commissioner Medill and Secretary Marcy. Early in 1849,
and after the new cabinet were fairly under way, the claimants seem to have
renewed their labors. A long resting spell had imparted to them new energy, and
they pursued the case with an earnestness and zeal worthy of a better cause. I
pass over much that was said and done between the 4th of March, 1849, and the
30th of June of that year, and resume the history with the following letter:
WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1849.
SIR:
I have just been informed that an effort is being made to transfer an
appropriation now standing on the books of the treasury "for the removal
and subsistence of Indians," to the appropriation "for carrying into
effect treaties with the Chickasaws," with a view of asking the payment or
contract made by certain Chickasaw Indians with Dr. Wm. M. Gwin. I most
respectfully ask the suspension of your action in the matter until I can have
time to file a protest on behalf of the Chickasaw nation, and state the reasons
why the claim should not be paid without being transmitted to the Chickasaw
Council for their approval.
With great respect, your obedient servant.
JOSEPH BRYAN.
HON.
T. EWING, Secretary, &c.
It will be
remembered that Mr. Bryan was the attorney of the Indians, regularly employed
to resist the payment of this claim.
On the 2d of July,
1849, Mr. Bryan filed the protest alluded to in the letter just read, and from
that protest I read the following extract:
"I
deem it altogether needless at this time to go into a history of the
transaction, as the protest of the agent, Colonel Upshaw, was filed by me in
the Indian Office, which purported to explain the whole matter, and which had
the effect of stopping the action of the War Department in the matter, and
prevented the payment of the claim under the DECISION OF THE LATE SECRETARY OF
WAR, GENERAL MARCY. Since that time no effort that I am aware of has been made
to procure its payment until now."
Nothing daunted, the
claimants pressed their suit with increased energy, and by way of showing the
nature of the opposition and the character of the obstacles thrown in their
way, I beg leave to read two or three short papers found among the files now
before me. It is impossible that these papers should have been overlooked by
the most careless searcher after truth in this case. On the 14th of July, 1848,
Colonel Pitman Colbert, a distinguished man among the Chickasaws, wrote to
Commissioner Medill the letter from which I read an extract:
"I
present myself and respectfully request to be informed of the amount of money
received by Dr. W. M. Gwin, by virtue of a power of attorney from the Chickasaw
commissioners; also a copy of that power of attorney, as it is important for my
object to know the names of the persons who made and constituted Dr. Gwin the
financial agent of the Chickasaws; and whether or not said Gwin has not
attempted to draw other sums of money by virtue of said power, since it became
notorious that his power was revoked by the universal condemnation of the
Chickasaw people; together with any other information relating to this matter
that may be in possession of your department."
On the 28th of
February, 1849, a delegation from the Chickasaw nation thus wrote to Secretary
Marcy. After speaking at some length of their claim for $112,042.99, they say:
"But
we found in connection, however, with this claim, that an agreement has been
filed between William M. Gwin on the one part, and the chiefs, headmen, and
warriors on the other part, by which it appears that one-half of said claim was
to be paid to said William M. Gwin, for his services in obtaining an adjustment
of the claim by the government, and on this agreement the Second Auditor has
allowed William M. Gwin $56,021.49, being the one-half of $112,042.99 as
stated. This account is now suspended in your office, as we are informed, and
we are bound to thank you for delaying the matter thus far, although it is important
to our people that they should be in annual receipt of the interest upon this
sum which is justly due the Chickasaw nation."
Such is the
character of all the papers in this great mass, numbering more than five
hundred pages. The Indians, from the beginning to the ending, sternly and
steadily resisted the payment of this demand. It is among the most remarkable
circumstances connected with the case, that there is not one particle of Indian
testimony to sustain it-not a single Indian of the whole tribe has ever been
found to endorse its justice, or to say it ought to be paid. Their testimony is
uniformly and unitedly against it. Their sense of its injustice may be gathered
from the paper which I now read:
A PROTEST.
Be it enacted by the General Council of the
Chiefs and Captains of the Chickasaw tribe of Indians, That the following protest be adopted, and
copies of it be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury and to the
Secretary of the Home Department at Washington city:
The
chiefs, captains, headmen, and warriors of the Chickasaw tribe of Indians in
full council assembled, have learned that Dr. William Gwin has filed in the
Treasury Department of the United States, at Washington City, an account
against the Chickasaw fund, for $56,021.49, which account we understand, is
based upon an agreement which, it is pretended, was made between the said Gwin
and the Chickasaw tribe of Indians. This agreement, if any such exist, was made
by some of our commissioners or chiefs in a private manner, without the
knowledge or consent of our nation in council, and has never been recognised,
ratified, or confirmed by a general council of our tribe, and without this it
cannot nor ought not to be binding upon our people. Our tribe cannot be bound
by the acts of any individuals of the same, unless a special power for this
purpose has been delegated to them by a general council.
The
tribe of Chickasaws, in full council assembled, after deliberation, repudiate
the action of the individuals who entered into that agreement, if any was made,
and deny that they had any authority to bind our people.
We
therefore solemnly protest against the payment of that account out of the
Chickasaw funds, as, in justice to our people, we are bound to do.
Done
in open council of our tribe, and attested by our signatures, at Boiling
Springs, Chickasaw District, July 13, 1849.
Joel Kemp,
Captain STROSS, pro wag, his X mark,
Captain PARKER, his X mark,
Captain NED, his X mark,
HOTCHIE, his X mark,
LOUIS, his X mark,
JERRY, his X mark,
ELBUB NU TURKEY, his X mark,
WILLIAM JAMES, his X mark,
ENAH NO TI CHU, his X mark,
JACK UTTUBBY, his X mark,
JOH TU CHUCK ATTIEA, his X mark,
VIBBIT UN OYUH, his X mark,
ELOSS AMBY, his X mark,
BILLY, his X mark,
PITMAN COLBERT,
LEMUEL COLBERT,
JACKSON FRAZIER,
ISAAC ATBERTEAUR, his X mark,
President of the Council.
EDUMUND PECKERS, his X mark,
Chief, Chickasaw Dirstrict C. N.
Attest:
CYRUS HARRIS, Clerk Chickasaw District.
Now, sir, I humbly
submit, that all this mass of testimony, together with a great deal more which
I have neither time nor patience to read, should, at least, have put the
Secretary on his guard. It should have been sufficient to elicit the most
searching investigation into all the facts. We shall presently see whether it had
that effect.
I said, sometime
since, that the contract was without date, and so it was; other testimony was
resorted to to [sic] fix its date. A
Mr. Charles Johnson, in a long affidavit
now before me, gives somewhat in detail a history of Dr. Gwin's contracts with
the Indians. It seems, that a general council had been called to obtain a
ratification of Dr. Gwin's last agreement with a part of the Indian
commissioners. There was great dissatisfaction among the people. Johnson
concludes his affidavit thus:
"On
the day the council met, the commissioners, in a body, resigned. I was not
present, but understood there was much excitement. The power of attorney given
to Dr. Gwin, in November, 1844, was said to be the main cause. Some two weeks after the commissioners
resigned, they came to Fort Washita, and then signed the new power of attorney.
In consequence of there having been much said respecting the papers, I
requested them to permit me to take both powers to Major Armstrong, and gave
them my word that the old one should be destroyed. I returned them both into
the hands of Major Armstrong, who, in my presence, destroyed the old one.
Colonel Upshaw, Chickasaw agent, saw all the papers, and disapproved of both
powers of attorney. At the time this affair took place, I was a trader in the
Chickasaw country.
CHARLES JOHNSON.
"CITY
OF PHILADELPHIA," ss. Sworn and subscribed before me this 29th day of
January, A. D. 1850.
“C. BRAZIER,
Ald.
and Ex-officio Justice of the Peace.”
No wonder this power
of attorney is without date. Signed officially by the commissioners two weeks after they had been compelled to
resign, it would not have looked well to date it. No wonder the Indians in
general council repudiated it, and said it had been executed without authority
and in a private manner. Can it be, Mr. Speaker, that Messrs. Ewing and
Johnson, in deciding to pay this money, could have overlooked papers like these?
But, sir, the case
does not stop here. This paper, thus executed, was lost; yes, lost. A COPY was presented by Mr. Corcoran, of the firm of
Corcoran & Riggs, to whom Dr. Gwin had transferred the claim, and on this
copy, thus presented, the money was paid.
Mr. Corcoran swore,
to the best of his belief, that it was a correct copy. But there were
subscribing witnesses, some six or eight of them, white men and Indians. And I
do not learn that an attempt was ever made to obtain their testimony that the
copy was correct.
The gentlemen from
Ohio and Virginia [Messrs. Vinton and Bayly] have dilated at great length, and
with much eloquence and learning, on this, as an adjudicated case. We have been exhorted not to lay our profane
hands on the sanctity of a judicial decision. We must needs let this thing
pass, because it is res adjudicata.
Let me ask the learned, gentleman if there is a court in the civilized world
where the plaintiff could introduce the bare copy of the most important paper,
upon no other than his own affidavit as to its correctness, and that, too, when
there were a dozen or more subscribing witnesses? This a judicial proceeding,
indeed! This the sacred ermine we are exhorted not to profane! I have about the
same respect for such "judicial proceedings" that I have for a
"Choctaw council," and about as much reverence for this sort of
ermine as I have for an Indian blanket.
Well, sir, the case
had progressed to this point, when Mr. Ewing determined to pay it; but with
that true cunning which is a part of himself, he determined to put the
Attorney-General between him and danger; so he called on him for his legal
opinion. And here is the opinion of the learned gentleman, in all its length
and breadth, height and depth. See it, sir, in all its vast proportions—its
latitude and longitude, and be silent while I read, all ye ends of the earth!
Listen!
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, January 3, 1850.
SIR:
In the cases of the claim of the Chickasaw nation against the United States,
and of Messrs. Corcoran and Riggs, as assignees of William M. Gwin, submitted
by you to this office, I have formed an opinion, after careful consideration,
which my other engagements prevent my doing more at this time than barely
stating. Should it be your wish, I will avail myself of the very first leisure
to assign my reasons.
1st.
I am of opinion that the account of the nation is to be considered now as
having been properly opened and restated, and that the balance found due by the
accounting officers of $112,842, is properly chargeable to the appropriation
for the subsistence and removal of Indians.
2d.
That the last contract with William M. Gwin, assigned to Corcoran and Riggs, is
valid, and that out of the fund payable to the Chickasaws under the first head,
whatever balance is due under that contract, should be paid to Corcoran and
Riggs.
With regard, your obedient servant,
REVERDY JOHNSON.
Hon.
T. EWING.
Shades of our
fathers defend us! Was there ever such an opinion in such a case? Here is a
case involving an immediate payment of $112,842, and contingently a vastly
larger sum. A case which has been decided against by some of the purest
officers and ablest lawyers in the Union. Its history covers a period of some
twelve or fourteen years, and is written on five hundred pages of foolscap, and
the Attorney-General disposes of it in two short sentences: "I am of
opinion that it ought to be paid." "I think Corcoran and Riggs ought
to have half the money." There it is, well and nobly said. This learned
opinion convinced the distinguished Secretary, and he penned this important
paper Veni, vidi, vici. See, sir, it
is short, and exactly to the point. To use the poetic phrase of Mr. Winthrop,
"it is as brief as the posy on a lady's ring." Harken! all yea of
little faith!
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
January 4, 1850.
The
account will be stated, and the payment made in accordance with the Attorney-General's
opinion within.
T. EWING, Secretary.
This had well-nigh
ended the whole matter; but the Chickasaws were importunate. They interposed
Johnson's affidavit and other like documents. Ewing hesitated; the thing looked
barefaced. He may for once in his life have felt that there was such a thing as
conscience. Again he called the
learned Attorney-General to his aid, and that distinguished functionary, with a
promptitude and power which few men can master, responded in the following
learned, powerful, and convincing argument:—
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
7th
March, 1850.
SIR:
In compliance with your request of the 8th January last, I have reexamined the
cases of the Chickasaw nation against the United States, and of Corcoran and
Riggs, assignees of William M. Gwin, upon which I gave you an opinion on the third
of that month, and have most carefully considered the additional evidence and
the arguments of the counsel for the parties concerned, and see no reason to
change the opinion referred to.
Indeed
the effect of the recent evidence is to satisfy me more fully, that that
opinion was right; and I therefore again advise you accordingly.
The
press of business upon me still continuing, I must wait until the final
adjournment of the Supreme Court before I can give in detail the reasons which
have led me to the conclusion to which I have come. Should you then desire it,
they will be submitted with pleasure.
I
have the honor to be, with great regard, your obedient servant,
REVERDY JOHNSON.
Hon.
THOMAS EWING, Secretary of the Interior.
This was conclusive;
the Secretary was overcome; the attorneys stood aghast; the Indians were
floored; the money was paid; Corcoran and Riggs felt comfortable; Dr. Gwin was
satisfied, and the scene closed. I drop the curtain over the transaction with
this single remark: Before many years shall have passed by, we will be called
on to refund this money to the Chickasaws.
_______________
* Let me remark
here, that in speaking of the amount due
them, the commissioner means the whole sum, $112,000, and includes, of
course, the $56,000 claimed by Dr. Gwin.
SOURCE: M. W.
Cluskey, Editor, Speeches, Messages, and Other Writings of the Hon.
Albert G. Brown, A Senator in Congress from the State of Mississippi, p. 215-33
