John Tyler to Governor John Letcher, January 31, 1861

To the Governor of the State of Virginia:

DEAR SIR,

SHERWOOD FOREST,

January 31, 1861.

I received your communication notifying me of my appointment by the concurrent vote of the two houses of the General Assembly, as a commissioner to the President of the United States, with instructions respectfully to request the President to abstain, pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly, from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms between the States which have seceded or shall secede, and the government of the United States, on the afternoon of Monday, the 21st instant, by the mail of that day, and in disregard of a severe state of indisposition under which I had labored for some time previous, I resolved at all hazards to myself personally to carry out, so far as I could, the patriotic wishes of the Legislature. By the earliest conveyance, I reached Richmond on the evening of the succeeding day (Tuesday, 22d), and having had an interview with your excellency and my co-commissioner, proceeded by the morning train of cars the next day (Wednesday, 23d) for the city of Washington, which I reached on the afternoon of the same day. I am thus particular in giving precise dates, so that the Legislature may perceive that with all possible promptitude and dispatch I obeyed their wishes; and also to show that I was duly sensible of the importance of time in the whole proceeding. Immediately after reaching Washington, I addressed a note (marked No. 1) to the President of the United States, informing him of my arrival and asking an early hour to be designated by him, to enable me to place him in possession of the wishes and feelings of the Legislature of Virginia, and the instructions which, in the form of her legislative resolves, all having direct reference to the disturbed and painful condition of public affairs, I was desirous of laying before him. He responded promptly by note, and left it optional with myself to select 8 o'clock of that evening, or an early hour the next morning, for the time of the proposed conference. My note (No. 2), for reasons therein set forth, informed him that I would wait upon him in the morning of the ensuing day. My note announcing my arrival, if the objects which had brought me to Washington had any consideration in the mind of the President would, I did not doubt, suspend any hostile movement against any seceding State in the interval of time between its date and the hour at which I should wait upon him the next morning, and supersede the necessity of a night visit.

On the next morning, at the hour of ten, I repaired to the President's mansion, and met from him a warm and cordial reception. I lost no time in handing to him your letter of appointment, attested by the seal of the State, and legislative resolutions. He said that they were the first full copies of the resolutions which he had seen, and after reading them he remarked, that he considered them very important, and was good enough to add, that being borne by myself, he should feel it his duty to make them the subject of a special message to Congress. Either I suggested or he voluntarily remarked, most probably the latter, that he should accompany them with a strong recommendation to Congress, with whom, he said, rested the entire power over the subject of war or peace, to abstain from all action of a hostile character, until Virginia should have had a fair opportunity to exert all her efforts to preserve the public peace and restore harmony to the Union. I said to him, that my mission was to him; that he was commander-in-chief of the army and navy—could regulate the movement of soldiers and ships in peace and war, and that everything that Virginia desired was that the statu quo should be observed. I represented to him that the people of Virginia were almost universally inclined to peace and reconciliation. That I need not inform him of the sacrifices the State had made for the Union in its initiation, or of her instrumentality in the creation of the Constitution. That her efforts to reconstruct or preserve depended for their success on her being permitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside collision. He replied, that he had in no measure changed his views as presented in his annual message; that he could give no pledges; that it was his duty to enforce the laws, and the whole power rested with Congress. He complained that the South had not treated him properly; that they had made unnecessary demonstration by seizing unprotected arsenals and forts, and thus perpetrating acts of useless bravado, which had quite as well been let alone. I suggested to him, that while these things were, I admitted, calculated to fret and irritate the northern mind, that he would see in them only the necessary results of popular excitement, which, after all, worked no mischief in the end, if harmony between the States was once more restored; that the States wherein the seizures had been made, would account for all the public property; and that in the mean time the agency for its preservation was only changed. He repeated his sense of the obligations which rested upon him; could give no pledges but those contained in his public acts, and recurred again to the proceedings of the Legislature and his intention to send them to Congress in a special message, accompanied with a strong recommendation to avoid the passage of any hostile legislation. I asked if I might be permitted to see the sketch of the message, to which he unhesitatingly replied that he would take pleasure in showing it to me next morning. Much more occurred in the course of our interview, which lasted for an hour and a half; all, however, relating exclusively to the above topics, and I left him entirely satisfied with the results of my interview. The President was frank and entirely confiding in his language and whole manner. A moment's reflection satisfied me that if the message contained the recommendation to Congress to abstain from hostile legislation, I was at liberty to infer a similar determination on his part of a state of quietude.

Friday, 25.—I waited on him again the following morning, and he lost no time in reading me so much of the sketch of the proposed message as related to the recommendation to Congress. I suggested no change or alteration, believing it to be amply sufficient, and I became only anxious for its presentation to Congress. He said he should have it all prepared to be submitted to his Cabinet on that day, and would send it in the next day. On the afternoon of the same day—Friday, 25—I was waited upon by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, who stated that they had called upon me at the request of the President, to express his regret that in consequence of the adjournment over to Monday, he would not be able to send in his message until Monday. While in conversation with those gentlemen, which chiefly turned on the condition of public affairs, I was startled by the receipt of a telegraphic despatch from Judge Robertson, my co-commissioner, dated at Charleston, South Carolina, enquiring into the foundation of a rumor which had reached that place, that the steamship Brooklyn, with troops, had sailed for the South from Norfolk. I immediately handed over the despatch to the gentlemen, with the suitable enquiries. The Attorney General said, in substance: "You know, sir, that I am attached to the law department, and not in the way of knowing anything about it." The Secretary of State said that he had heard and believed that the Brooklyn had sailed with some troops, but he did not know either when she sailed or to what point she was destined. I then said, "I hope that she has not received her orders since my arrival in Washington." On this point the gentlemen could give me no information, but expressed no doubt but that the President would give me the information if requested. I excused myself to them, and immediately withdrawing to the adjoining room, I addressed to the President note No. 3, which Mr. Staunton, the Attorney General, kindly volunteered to bear in person, and without loss of time, to the President. In a short time afterwards, Mr. Staunton returned, to inform me that he had carried the note to the President's house, but for a reason not necessary here to state, he could not see the President, but had placed it in the hands of his servant, to be delivered at the earliest opportunity. The reply of the President, No. 2, reached me at half after eleven o'clock that night. In the interim, I had despatched by telegraph, to Judge Robertson, the information I had collected, and upon the opening of the telegraph office the next morning (Saturday), the material parts of the President's reply relating to the sailing of the Brooklyn, viz: that she had gone on an errand "of mercy and relief," and that she was not destined to South Carolina. The orders for the sailing of the ship, as will be seen, were issued before I reached Washington. After receiving the letter, and willingly adopting the most favorable construction of its expressions, I resolved to remain in Washington until after Monday, when the message would go to the two houses. I listened to its reading in the Senate with pleasure, and can only refer to the newspapers for its contents, as no copies were printed and obtainable by me, before I left Washington, on Tuesday morning, the 29th instant. On Monday afternoon I bade my adieu to the President in the accompanying letters, marked No. 4, to which I received his reply, marked No. 3.

The morning newspapers contained the rumor that the proceeding had been adopted of mounting guns on the land side of Fortress Monroe, and in my letter I deemed it no way inappropriate to call the attention of the President to those rumors.

Thus has terminated my mission to the President under the legislative resolutions. I trust that the result of the Brooklyn's cruise may terminate peacably. No intimation was given me of her having sailed in either of my interviews with the President, and all connected with her destination remains to me a State secret. I had no right to require to be admitted into the inner vestibule of the Cabinet, however much I might complain should the results prove the errand of the ship from the first to have been belligerent and warlike.

I am, dear sir,

Respectfully and truly yours,

JOHN TYLER.

Governor LETCHER.

SOURCES: Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia Begun and Held at the Capitol in the City 0f Richmond, on Monday, the Seventh Day of January, in the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-One—Being The Eighty-Fifth Year Of The Commonwealth. Extra Session, Doc. No. 13, p. 5-7; Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p. 587-90

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, March 20, 1861

Dr. Hitchcock, of California, the surgeon of General Taylor at the battle of Buena Vista, who saved the life of Jeff. Davis by extracting from the wound he received a piece of steel of a spur and part of its leather strap, brought me direct from Secretary Black a despatch instructing me to oppose any recognition by this Government of a Minister from the Confederate States. . . I immediately asked an interview with Lord John Russell. As this despatch relates to high questions of domestic politics, and is dated as late as the 28th of February, only three days before the Inauguration, it suggests the possibility of its having been sanctioned by Mr. Lincoln, for his inaugural speaks to the same effect.

Macaulay's fifth volume, edited by Lady Trevelyan, is just out, and is a brilliant specimen of picturesque history. His sketch of Peter the Great and his development & of the rival pretensions to the Spanish succession are admirable in every way.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 442

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, April 3, 1865

Intelligence of the evacuation of Petersburg and the capture of Richmond was received this A.M., and the city has been in an uproar through the day.

Most of the clerks and others left the Departments, and there were immense gatherings in the streets. Joy and gladness lightened every countenance. Secessionists and their sympathizers must have retired, and yet it seemed as if the entire population, the male portion of it, was abroad in the streets. Flags were flying from every house and store that had them. Many of the stores were closed, and Washington appeared patriotic beyond anything ever before witnessed. The absence of the Assistant, Chief Clerk, and Solicitor compelled my attendance until after 3 P.M. close of mail.

Attorney-General Speed and myself met by agreement at Stanton's room last night at nine, to learn the condition of affairs with the armies. We had previously been two or three times there during the day. It was about eleven before a dispatch was received and deciphered. The conversation between us three was free, and, turning on events connected with the Rebellion, our thoughts and talk naturally traveled back to the early days of the insurrection and the incipient treason in Buchanan's cabinet. Stanton became quite communicative. He was invited, as I have previously understood, through the influence of Black. Says Buchanan was a miserable coward, so alarmed and enfeebled by the gathering storm as to be mentally and physically prostrated, and he was apprehensive the President would not survive until the fourth of March. The discussion in regard to the course to be pursued towards Anderson and the little garrison at Sumter, became excited and violent in December, 1860. On the 27th or 29th of that month there were three sessions of the Cabinet in council. Sitting late at night, Buchanan, wrapped in an old dressing-gown or cloak, crouched in a corner near the fire, trembled like an aspen leaf. He asked what he should do. Declared that Stanton said he ought to be hung and that others of the Cabinet concurred with him. This, Stanton said, grew out of his remarks that if they yielded up Sumter to the conspirators it was treason, and no more to be defended than Arnold's. In the discussion Holt was very emphatic and decided in his loyalty, Toucey the most abject and mean. When called upon by the President for his opinion, Toucey said he was for ordering Anderson to return immediately to Fort Moultrie. He was asked if he was aware that Moultrie was dismantled, and replied that would make no difference, Anderson had gone to Sumter without orders, and against orders of Floyd, and he would order him back forthwith. Stanton says he inquired of Toucey if he ever expected to go back to Connecticut after taking that position, and Toucey said he did, but asked Stanton why he put the question. Stanton replied that he had inquired in good faith, that he might know the character of the people in Connecticut or Toucey's estimate of them, for were he, S., to take that position and it were known to the people of Pennsylvania, he should expect they would stone him the moment he set foot in the State, stone him through the State, and tie a stone around his neck and throw him in the river when he reached Pittsburg. Stanton gives Toucey the most despicable character in the Buchanan cabinet, not excepting Floyd or Thompson.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 272-4

James Buchanan to Jeremiah H. Black, March 6, 1857

Washington, 6 March, 1857.

my Dear Sir: I have this moment signed your commission as Attorney General of the United States, and have done this with great pleasure. I hope that you may find it agreeable to yourself to accept this important office, and I entertain no doubt that we shall get on harmoniously and happily together.

There were certainly great difficulties in the way of your appointment, and Mr. Glaucy [sic] Jones has behaved very well in contributing to the result. I may also add that Governor Bigler is quite satisfied with it, and I venture to express the hope that any past difficulties between you and himself may pass away and be forgotten. We must be a unit here if possible.

I hope you will come to Washington immediately, and in the meantime believe me to be always

Very respectfully your friend,

James Buchanan.

Hon. J. S. Black.

SOURCE: Mary Black Clayton, Reminiscences of Jeremiah Sullivan Black, p. 99-100

Memorandum of James Buchanan, Monday, December 17, 1860

On Monday, 17 December, 1860, both Mr. Thompson & Judge Black informed me that they had held conversations with General Cass on the subject of his resignation & that he had expressed a desire to withdraw it & return to the Cabinet. I gave this no encouragement. His purpose to resign had been known for several days, & his actual resignation had been prepared three days before it was delivered to me. The world knew all about it, & had he returned, the explanation would have been very embarrassing. Besides, I knew full well that his fears would have worried the administration as well as himself in the difficult times which were then upon us. His great error was that he would assume no responsibility which he could possibly avoid.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Comprising his Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence, Volume 11: 1860-1868, p. 67

Jeremiah S. Black to Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, January 16, 1861

department Of State, January 16, 1861.

lieutenant-general Winfield Scott:

Dear General: The habitual frankness of your character, the deep interest you take in everything that concerns the public defense, your expressed desire that I should hear and understand your views — these reasons, together with an earnest wish to know my own duty and to do it, induce me to beg you for a little light, which perhaps you alone can shed, upon the present state of our affairs.

1. Is it the duty of the Government tore-enforce Major Anderson?

2. If yes, how soon is it necessary that those re-enforcements should be there?

3. What obstacles exist to prevent the sending of such re-enforcements at any time when it may be necessary to do so?

I trust you will not regard it as presumption in me if I give you the crude notions which I myself have already formed out of very imperfect materials.

A statement of my errors, if errors they be, will enable you to correct them the more easily.

I. It seems now to be settled that Major Anderson and his command at Fort Sumter are not to be withdrawn. The United States Government is not to surrender its last hold upon its own property in South Carolina. Major Anderson has a position so nearly impregnable that an attack upon him at present is wholly improbable, and he is supplied with provisions which will last him very well for two months. In the meantime Fort Sumter is invested on every side by the avowedly hostile forces of South Carolina. It is in a state of seige. They have already prevented communication between its commander and his own Government, both by sea and land. There is no doubt that they intend to continue this state of things, as far as it is in their power to do so. In the course of a few weeks from this time it will become very difficult for him to hold out. The constant labor and anxiety of his men will exhaust their physical power, and this exhaustion, of course, will proceed very much more rapidly as soon as they begin to get short of provision.

If the troops remain in Fort Sumter without any change in their condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina remains as it is now, the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of time only. If he is not to be relieved, is it not entirely clear that he should be ordered to surrender at once? It having been determined that the latter order shall not be given, it follows that relief must be sent him at some time before it is too late to save him.

II. This brings me to the second question: When should the re-enforcements and provisions be sent? Can we justify ourselves in delaying the performance of that duty?

The authorities of South Carolina are improving every moment, and increasing their ability to prevent re-enforcement every hour, while every day that rises sees us with a power diminished to send in the requisite relief. I think it certain that Major Anderson could be put in possession of all the defensive powers he needs with very little risk to this Government, if the efforts were made immediately; but it is impossible to predict how much blood or money it may cost if it be postponed for two or three months.

The fact that other persons are to have charge of the Government before the worst comes to the worst has no influence upon my mind, and, I take it for granted, will not be regarded as a just element in making up your opinion.

The anxiety which an American citizen must feel about any future event which may affect the existence of the country, is not less if he expects it to occur on the 5th of March than it would be if he knew it was going to happen on the 3d.

III. I am persuaded that the difficulty of relieving Major Anderson has been very much magnified to the minds of some persons. From you I shall be able to ascertain whether I am mistaken or they. I am thoroughly satisfied that the battery on Morris Island can give no serious trouble. A vessel going in where the Star of the West went will not be within the reach of the battery's guns longer than from six to ten minutes. The number of shots that could be fired upon her in that time may be easily calculated, and I think the chances of her being seriously injured can be demonstrated, by simple arithmetic, to be very small. A very unlucky shot might cripple her, to be sure, and therefore the risk is something. But then it is a maxim, not less in war than in peace, that where nothing is ventured nothing can be gained. The removal of the buoys has undoubtedly made the navigation of the channel more difficult. But there are pilots outside of Charleston, and many of the officers of the Navy, who could steer a ship into the harbor by the natural landmarks with perfect safety. This, be it remembered, is not now a subject of speculation; the actual experiment has been tried. The Star of the West did pass the battery, and did overcome the difficulties of the navigation, meeting with no serious trouble from either cause. They have tried it; we can say probatum est; and there is an end to the controversy.

I am convinced that a pirate, or a slaver, or a smuggler, who could be assured of making five hundred dollars by going into the harbor in the face of all the dangers which now threaten a vessel bearing the American flag, would laugh them to scorn, and to one of our naval officers who has the average of daring, “the danger's self were lure alone!”

There really seems to me nothing in the way that ought to stop us except the guns of Fort Moultrie. If they are suffered to open a fire upon a vessel bearing re-enforcements to Fort Sumter, they might stop any other vessel as they stopped the Star of the West. But is it necessary that this intolerable outrage should be submitted to? Would it not be an act of pure self-defense on the part of Major Anderson to silence Fort Moultrie, if it be necessary to do so, for the purpose of insuring the safety of a vessel whose arrival at Fort Sumter is necessary for his protection, and could he not do it effectually? Would the South Carolinians dare to fire upon any vessel which Major Anderson would tell them beforehand must be permitted to pass, on pain of his guns being opened upon her assailants? But suppose it impossible for an unarmed vessel to pass the battery, what is the difficulty of sending the Brooklyn or the Macedonian in? I have never heard it alleged that the latter could not cross the bar, and I think if the fact had been so it would have been mentioned in my hearing before this time. It will turn out upon investigation, after all that has been said and sung about the Brooklyn, that there is water enough there for her. She draws ordinarily only sixteen and one-half feet, and her draught can be reduced eighteen inches by putting her upon an even keel. The shallowest place will give her eighteen feet of water at high tide. In point of fact, she has crossed that bar more than once. But apart even from these resources, the Government has at its command three or four smaller steamers of light draught and great speed, which could be armed and at sea in a few days, and would not be in the least troubled by any opposition that could be made to their entrance.

It is not, however, necessary to go into the details, with which, I presume, you are fully acquainted. I admit that the state of things may be somewhat worse now than they were a week ago, and are probably getting worse every day; but is not that the strongest reason that can be given for taking time by the forelock?

I feel confident that you will excuse me for making this communication. I have some responsibilities of my own to meet, and I can discharge them only when I understand the subject to which they relate. Your opinion, of course, will be conclusive upon me, for on such a matter I cannot do otherwise than defer to your better judgment. If you think it most consistent with your duty to be silent, I shall have no right to complain.

If you would rather answer orally than make a written reply, I will meet you either at your own quarters or here in the State Department, as may best suit your convenience.

I am, most respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. S. Black.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 237-9

James Buchanan to Jacob Thompson, January 9, 1861

Washington, 9th January, 1861.

Sir: I have received and accepted your resignation on yesterday of the office of Secretary of the Interior.

On Monday evening, 31 December, 1860, I suspended the orders which had been issued by the War and Navy Departments to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Of this I informed you on the same evening. I stated to you my reason for this suspension, which you knew, from its nature, would be speedily removed. In consequence of your request, however, I promised that these orders should not be renewed “without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet.”

This promise was faithfully observed on my part. In order to carry it into effect, I called a special Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, 2 January, 1861, in which the question of sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter was amply discussed both by yourself and others. The decided majority of opinions was against you. At this moment the answer of the South Carolina “Commissioners” to my communication to them of the 31st December was received and read. It produced much indignation among the members of the Cabinet. After a further brief conversation I employed the following language: “It is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent.” Judge Black said, at the moment of my decision, that after this letter the Cabinet would be unanimous, and I heard no dissenting voice. Indeed, the spirit and tone of the letter left no doubt on my mind that Fort Sumter would be immediately attacked, and hence the necessity of sending reinforcements thither without delay.

Whilst you admit “that on Wednesday, January 2d, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet,” you say, “but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something [more] than was then said.” You are certainly mistaken in alleging that “no conclusion was reached.” In this your recollection is entirely different from that of your four oldest colleagues in the Cabinet. Indeed, my language was so unmistakable, that the Secretaries of War and the Navy proceeded to act upon it without any further intercourse with myself than what you heard or might have heard me say. You had been so emphatic in opposing these reinforcements, that I thought you would resign in consequence of my decision. I deeply regret that you have been mistaken in point of fact, though I firmly believe honestly mistaken. Still, it is certain you have not the less been mistaken.

Yours very respectfully,

James Buchanan.

Hon. JACOB THOMPSON.

SOURCE: John Bassett More, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Volume 11, p. 100-1; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 181-2