Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, January 20, 1861

If we are in turmoil on the western side of the Atlantic, they are not much better off on this eastern side. The King of Prussia has just said to his general officers in Berlin: “The aspect of the times is very serious, and menaces great dangers. Gentlemen, there is a distinct prospect of struggles in which I shall need the entire devotion of your hearts. If I and those other sovereigns wishing for peace do not succeed in dissipating beforehand the coming thunder-storm, we shall want the whole of our strength in order to stand our ground. You will have to strain every nerve if you wish to render the army adequate to the future calls of the country. Gentlemen, do not allow yourselves to be subject to any self-delusion respecting the magnitude of coming struggles. If I do not succeed in obviating war, the war will be one in which we shall have either to conquer or be lost to our position in the world!” What convulsion is it that thus thunders in the index? We hear the cry of “Peace, peace,” in every direction, but we see specially dark clouds in various quarters. Hungary is on the eve of revolt, Denmark is arming to maintain her rights in Schleswig and Holstein, Italy, under the magical inspiration of Garibaldi, will insist upon having, as parts of the temporal sovereignty of Victor Emmanuel, both Rome and Venice. War upon Austria then would seem inevitable, and it cannot fail to draw into its vortex Russia, Prussia, Germany, and, not impossibly, Turkey. But the words of solemnity used by the monarch involve a deeper meaning. They refer to the military avalanche which a breath from Louis Napoleon may precipitate across the Rhine,—his vast force of six or eight hundred thousand, his numerous and formidable ships of war, and his actual position as the chief of the revolutionary movement. The language is portentous, infinitely more so than the address of Baron Hubner on 1st of January, 1859. Where on the face of the earth can the stranger, Peace, take up her permanent abode?

The news from home during this week has been deplorable. On the 10th inst. the President sent a message to Congress which depicts the state of things in the gloomiest colours. South Carolina, at Charleston, has fired repeated volleys at a United States transport carrying troops for Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, and has compelled her to retire. The Brooklyn, a second-class screw steamer of fourteen guns, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane are about to convoy the troops back again to Charleston on board the Star of the West, and we may expect our next news to announce a bloody fight, possibly a bombardment of the city. Seward has made a speech in the Senate which the Times calls “grand and conciliatory,” but which obviously asserts a determination to enforce the laws. Servile insurrection, too, seems. contemplated in Virginia, some twenty-five barrels of gunpowder having been disinterred from secret hiding places.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 430-2

William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 13, 1861

SEMINARY, Jan. 13, 1861.

 . . . I see no change to note here in public sentiment, the fact that Seward has been named as secretary of state to Lincoln enables the leaders to show that their suspicions were right that the Republicans and abolitionists are identical. I am therefore confirmed in my opinion that the cotton states are off and it is an even chance with all the slave states. I take the Missouri Republican and National Intelligencer which seem to oppose secession but they cannot stem the torrent.

The revolution has begun and the national government has shown weakness in all its attempts. Anderson is the only one who has acted. General Scott in sending reinforcements ought not to have trusted the Star of the West, the same in which we went to California some [seven?] years ago. She could not venture to receive a fire. Frigates and strong war steamers should have gone, which could have forced their way past the land batteries. I hope still this will be done. It will be a triumph to South Carolina to beat Uncle Sam.

Still Charleston is nothing to New Orleans and I am satisfied the forts at the mouth¹ and the lakes² will be taken by order of Governor Moore of this state before they can be occupied by the U.S. All these are acts of War has begun. And it is idle to say the South is not in earnest. Louisiana has not yet seceded, yet the delegates favorable to such a course are elected, even in New Orleans where the Union feeling is thought to be strongest. I have no doubt that ultimately I will be turned off as unfaithful, but I must see my way clearer than I yet can before I leave from choice. . .

_______________

¹ Of the Mississippi. – ED.

² Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne. – ED.

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 332-3

Emory Upton to his Sister, January 12, 1861

 WEST POINT, January 12, 1861.

MY DEAR SISTER: This is examination-week. My reports have not been quite so good as you may have desired, but I shall be quite satisfied with the results of the examinations. .. Truly troublous times are upon us. We are at sea, with no chart to guide us. What the end will be, our wisest statesmen can not foresee. The South is gone, and the question is, Will the Government coerce her back? The attempt, I think, will be made, but we can not predict the result. Southern men are brave, and will fight well, but their means for prosecuting a long war wanting.  Four States are now out of the Union, and South Carolina has fired the first gun.  She has resisted the entrance of the Star of the West to Fort Sumter, and, no doubt, there will be bloodshed before you  receive this, since the Brooklyn (man-of-war) is on the way to Charleston, and is bound to re-enforce that fort. . . . Members of my class continue to resign.  The corps is already sensibly reduced in numbers, and, from present Prospects we will almost be reduced to a moiety.  Should the United States officers from the seceding States resign, there will be many vacancies, and, very probably, they would be filled by graduating us soon. . . . In my next letter I will try to say nothing upon secession, but it is the absorbing topic of thought at present.

SOURCE: Peter Smith Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton, p. 30-1

Captain Gustavus V. Fox: Memorandum for the Relief of Fort Sumter, February 6, 1861

ST. GERMAIN HOTEL,

New York, February 6, 1861.

Since the repulse of the steamer Star of the West at Charleston it may be assumed that all the channels over the bar are obstructed, but as the bar is more than four miles in length the spaces between these channels are too extensive to be closed. Therefore at high water and smooth sea the bar is perfectly accessible to vessels drawing say seven feet of water. The U. S. has no steamers of this draft. The skillfull officers at Charleston, aware of this fact, will conclude that relief must go in at high water in boats or light draft steamers incapable of bearing a very offensive armament. They will be perfectly prepared for such attempts by arming, and heavily manning all the steamers they possess and at the critical moment will throw themselves alongside the relief vessels and thus jeopardise the movement by the very detention of the conflict. To elude their vigilance or attempt a strategem however ingenious I consider too liable to failure.

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea steamer and hire two powerful light draft New York tug boats, having the necessary stores on board. These to be convoyed by the U.S.S. Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. (The Pawnee is the only available steam vessel of war north of the Gulf of Mexico; draws twelve feet of water and has seven heavy guns. As a steamer she seems to be a failure, but may be got ready for this emergency — at least she is, unfortunately, our only resource.) The Harriet Lane I understand to be an excellent and efficient vessel, but either of these steamers alone may be liable to capture, by an overwhelming force.

Arriving off the bar, I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance, and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this, the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city.

Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cummings point, and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have, distant on either hand from mid channel about three-quarters of a mile. Two hours before high water, at night, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, should run in to Fort Sumpter.

[Endorsement:]

Proposition of Relief of Fort Sumpter Accepted by the Govt. Mch, 1861.

SOURCES: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 4, p. 223-4; Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 8-9

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Diary of William Howard Russell: May 9, 1861

My faithful Wigfall was good enough to come in early, in order to show me some comments on my letters in the “New York Times.” It appears the papers are angry because I said that New York was apathetic when I landed, and they try to prove I was wrong by showing there was a “glorious outburst of Union feeling,” after the news of the fall of Sumter. But I now know that the very apathy of which I spoke was felt by the Government of Washington, and was most weakening and embarrassing to them. What would not the value of “the glorious outburst” have been, had it taken place before the Charleston batteries had opened on Sumter — when the Federal flag, for example, was fired on, flying from the “Star of the West,” or when Beauregard cut off supplies, or Bragg threatened Pickens, or the first shovel of earth was thrown up in hostile battery? But no! New York was then engaged in discussing State rights, and in reading articles to prove the new Government would be traitors if they endeavored to reinforce the Federal forts, or were perusing leaders in favor of the Southern Government. Haply, they may remember one, not so many weeks old, in which the “NewYork Herald” compared Jeff Davis and his Cabinet to the “Great Rail Splitter,” and Seward, and Chase, and came to the conclusion that the former “were gentlemen” — (a matter of which it is quite incompetent to judge) — “and would, and ought to succeed.” The glorious outburst of “Union feeling” which threatened to demolish the “Herald” office, has created a most wonderful change in the views of the proprietor, whose diverse-eyed vision is now directed solely to the beauties of the Union, and whose faith is expressed in “a hearty adhesion to the Government of our country.” New York must pay the penalty of its indifference, and bear the consequences of listening to such counsellors.

Mr. Deasy, much dilapidated, returned about twelve o'clock from his planter, who was drunk when he went over, and would not let him go to the beaver-dam. To console him, the planter stayed up all night drinking, and waking him up at intervals, that he might refresh him with a glass of whiskey. This man was well off, owned land, and a good-stock of slaves, but he must have been a “mean white,” who had raised himself in the world. He lived in a three-roomed wooden cabin, and in one of the rooms he kept his wife shut up from the stranger's gaze. One of his negroes was unwell, and he took Deasy to see him. The result of his examination was, “Nigger! I guess you won't live more than an hour.” His diagnosis was quite correct.

Before my departure I had a little farewell levee — Mr. Toombs, Mr. Browne, Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Walker, Major Deas, Col. Pickett, Major Calhoun, Captain Ripley, and others — who were exceedingly kind with letters of introduction and offers of service. Dined as usual on a composite dinner — Southern meat and poultry bad — at three o'clock, and at four, P. M., drove down to the steep banks of the Alabama River, where the castle-like hulk of the “Southern Republic” was waiting to receive us. I bade good-by to Montgomery without regret. The native people were not very attractive, and the city has nothing to make up for their deficiency, but of my friends there I must always retain pleasant memories, and, indeed, I hope some day I shall be able to keep my promise to return and see more of the Confederate ministers and their chief.

The vessel was nothing more than a vast wooden house, of three separate stories, floating on a pontoon which upheld the engine, with a dining-hall or saloon on the second story surrounded by sleeping-berths, and a nest of smaller rooms upstairs; on the metal roof was a “musical” instrument called a “calliope,” played like a piano by keys, which acted on levers and valves, admitting steam into metal cups, where it produced the requisite notes, — high, resonant, and not unpleasing at a moderate distance. It is 417 miles to Mobile; but at this season the steamer can maintain a good rate of speed, as there is very little cotton or cargo to be taken on board at the landings, and the stream is full.

The river is about 200 yards broad, and of the color of chocolate and milk, with high, steep, wooded banks, rising so much above the surface of the stream that a person on the upper deck of the towering “Southern Republic” cannot get a glimpse of the fields and country beyond. High banks and bluffs spring up to the height of 150 or even 200 feet above the river, the breadth of which is so uniform as give the Alabama the appearance of a canal, only relieved by sudden bends and rapid curves. The surface is covered with masses of drift-wood, whole trees, and small islands of branches. Now and then a sharp, black, fang-like projection standing stiffly in the current gives warning of a snag, but the helmsman, who commands the whole course of the river, from an elevated house amidships on the upper deck, can see these in time; and at night pine-boughs are lighted in iron cressets at the bows to illuminate the water.

The captain, who was not particular whether his name was spelt Maher, or Meaher, or Meagher (les trots se disent), was evidently a character, — perhaps a good one. One with a gray eye full of cunning and of some humor, strongly marked features, and a very Celtic mouth of the Kerry type. He soon attached himself to me, and favored me with some wonderful yarns, which I hope he was not foolish enough to think I believed. One relating to a wholesale destruction and massacre of Indians, he narrated with evident gusto. Pointing to one of the bluffs, he said that, some thirty years ago, the whole of the Indians in the district being surrounded by the whites, betook themselves to that spot, and remained there without any means of escape, till they were quite starved out. So they sent down to know if the whites would let them go, and it was agreed that they should be permitted to move down the river in boats. When the day came, and they were all afloat, the whites anticipated the boat-massacre of Nana Sahib at Cawnpore, and destroyed the helpless red skins. Many hundreds thus perished, and the whole affair was very much approved of.

The value of land on the sides of this river is great, as it yields nine to eleven bales of cotton to the acre, — worth £10 a bale at present prices. The only evidences of this wealth to be seen by us consisted of the cotton sheds on the top of the banks, and slides of timber, with steps at each side down to the landings, so constructed that the cotton bales could be shot down on board the vessel. These shoots and staircases are generally protected by a roof of planks, and lead to unknown regions inhabited by niggers and their masters, the latter all talking politics. They never will, never can be conquered, — nothing on earth could induce them to go back into the Union. They will burn every bale of cotton, and fire every house, and lay waste every field and homestead, before they will yield to the Yankees. And so they talk through the glimmering of bad cigars for hours.

The management of the boat is dexterous,— as she approaches a landing-place, the helm is put hard over, to the screaming of the steam-pipe and the wild strains of “Dixie” floating out of the throats of the calliope, and as the engines are detached, one wheel is worked forward, and the other backs water, so she soon turns head up stream, and is then gently paddled up to the river bank, to which she is just kept up by steam — the plank is run ashore, and the few passengers who are coming in or out are lighted on their way by the flames of pine in an iron basket, swinging above the bow by a long pole. Then we see them vanishing into black darkness up the steps, or coming down clearer and clearer till they stand in the full blaze of the beacon which casts dark shadows on the yellow water. The air is glistening with fire-flies, which dot the darkness with specks and points of flame, just as sparks fly through the embers of tinder or half-burnt paper.

Some of the landings were by far more important than others. There were some, for example, where an iron railroad was worked down the bank by windlasses for hoisting up goods; others where the negroes half-naked leaped ashore, and rushing at piles of firewood, tossed them on board to feed the engine, which, all uncovered and open to the lower deck lighted up the darkness by the glare from the stoke-holes, which cried forever, “Give, give!” as the negroes ceaselessly thrust the pine-beams into their hungry maws. I could understand how easily a steamer can “burn up,” and how hopeless escape would be under such circumstances. The whole framework of the vessel is of the lightest resinous pine, so raw that the turpentine oozes out through the paint; the hull is a mere shell. If the vessel once caught fire, all that could be done would be to turn her round, and run her to the bank, in the hope of holding there long enough to enable the people to escape into the trees; but if she were not near a landing, many must be lost; as the bank is steep down, the vessel cannot be run aground; and in some places the trees are in eight and ten feet of water. A few minutes would suffice to set the vessel in a blaze from stem to stern; and if there were cotton on board, the bales would burn almost like powder. The scene at each landing was repeated, with few variations, ten times till we reached Selma, 110 miles distance, at 11.30 at night.

Selma, which is connected with the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers by railroad, is built upon a steep, lofty bluff, and the lights in the windows, and the lofty hotels above us, put me in mind of the old town of Edinburgh, seen from Prince's Street. Beside us there was a huge storied wharf, so that our passengers could step on shore from any deck they pleased. Here Mr. Deasy, being attacked by illness, became alarmed at the idea of continuing his journey without any opportunity of medical assistance, and went on shore.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 182-6

Jeremiah S. Black to Brevet Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, January 16, 1861

department Of State, January 16, 1861.

lieutenant-general Winfield Scott:

Dear General: The habitual frankness of your character, the deep interest you take in everything that concerns the public defense, your expressed desire that I should hear and understand your views — these reasons, together with an earnest wish to know my own duty and to do it, induce me to beg you for a little light, which perhaps you alone can shed, upon the present state of our affairs.

1. Is it the duty of the Government tore-enforce Major Anderson?

2. If yes, how soon is it necessary that those re-enforcements should be there?

3. What obstacles exist to prevent the sending of such re-enforcements at any time when it may be necessary to do so?

I trust you will not regard it as presumption in me if I give you the crude notions which I myself have already formed out of very imperfect materials.

A statement of my errors, if errors they be, will enable you to correct them the more easily.

I. It seems now to be settled that Major Anderson and his command at Fort Sumter are not to be withdrawn. The United States Government is not to surrender its last hold upon its own property in South Carolina. Major Anderson has a position so nearly impregnable that an attack upon him at present is wholly improbable, and he is supplied with provisions which will last him very well for two months. In the meantime Fort Sumter is invested on every side by the avowedly hostile forces of South Carolina. It is in a state of seige. They have already prevented communication between its commander and his own Government, both by sea and land. There is no doubt that they intend to continue this state of things, as far as it is in their power to do so. In the course of a few weeks from this time it will become very difficult for him to hold out. The constant labor and anxiety of his men will exhaust their physical power, and this exhaustion, of course, will proceed very much more rapidly as soon as they begin to get short of provision.

If the troops remain in Fort Sumter without any change in their condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina remains as it is now, the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of time only. If he is not to be relieved, is it not entirely clear that he should be ordered to surrender at once? It having been determined that the latter order shall not be given, it follows that relief must be sent him at some time before it is too late to save him.

II. This brings me to the second question: When should the re-enforcements and provisions be sent? Can we justify ourselves in delaying the performance of that duty?

The authorities of South Carolina are improving every moment, and increasing their ability to prevent re-enforcement every hour, while every day that rises sees us with a power diminished to send in the requisite relief. I think it certain that Major Anderson could be put in possession of all the defensive powers he needs with very little risk to this Government, if the efforts were made immediately; but it is impossible to predict how much blood or money it may cost if it be postponed for two or three months.

The fact that other persons are to have charge of the Government before the worst comes to the worst has no influence upon my mind, and, I take it for granted, will not be regarded as a just element in making up your opinion.

The anxiety which an American citizen must feel about any future event which may affect the existence of the country, is not less if he expects it to occur on the 5th of March than it would be if he knew it was going to happen on the 3d.

III. I am persuaded that the difficulty of relieving Major Anderson has been very much magnified to the minds of some persons. From you I shall be able to ascertain whether I am mistaken or they. I am thoroughly satisfied that the battery on Morris Island can give no serious trouble. A vessel going in where the Star of the West went will not be within the reach of the battery's guns longer than from six to ten minutes. The number of shots that could be fired upon her in that time may be easily calculated, and I think the chances of her being seriously injured can be demonstrated, by simple arithmetic, to be very small. A very unlucky shot might cripple her, to be sure, and therefore the risk is something. But then it is a maxim, not less in war than in peace, that where nothing is ventured nothing can be gained. The removal of the buoys has undoubtedly made the navigation of the channel more difficult. But there are pilots outside of Charleston, and many of the officers of the Navy, who could steer a ship into the harbor by the natural landmarks with perfect safety. This, be it remembered, is not now a subject of speculation; the actual experiment has been tried. The Star of the West did pass the battery, and did overcome the difficulties of the navigation, meeting with no serious trouble from either cause. They have tried it; we can say probatum est; and there is an end to the controversy.

I am convinced that a pirate, or a slaver, or a smuggler, who could be assured of making five hundred dollars by going into the harbor in the face of all the dangers which now threaten a vessel bearing the American flag, would laugh them to scorn, and to one of our naval officers who has the average of daring, “the danger's self were lure alone!”

There really seems to me nothing in the way that ought to stop us except the guns of Fort Moultrie. If they are suffered to open a fire upon a vessel bearing re-enforcements to Fort Sumter, they might stop any other vessel as they stopped the Star of the West. But is it necessary that this intolerable outrage should be submitted to? Would it not be an act of pure self-defense on the part of Major Anderson to silence Fort Moultrie, if it be necessary to do so, for the purpose of insuring the safety of a vessel whose arrival at Fort Sumter is necessary for his protection, and could he not do it effectually? Would the South Carolinians dare to fire upon any vessel which Major Anderson would tell them beforehand must be permitted to pass, on pain of his guns being opened upon her assailants? But suppose it impossible for an unarmed vessel to pass the battery, what is the difficulty of sending the Brooklyn or the Macedonian in? I have never heard it alleged that the latter could not cross the bar, and I think if the fact had been so it would have been mentioned in my hearing before this time. It will turn out upon investigation, after all that has been said and sung about the Brooklyn, that there is water enough there for her. She draws ordinarily only sixteen and one-half feet, and her draught can be reduced eighteen inches by putting her upon an even keel. The shallowest place will give her eighteen feet of water at high tide. In point of fact, she has crossed that bar more than once. But apart even from these resources, the Government has at its command three or four smaller steamers of light draught and great speed, which could be armed and at sea in a few days, and would not be in the least troubled by any opposition that could be made to their entrance.

It is not, however, necessary to go into the details, with which, I presume, you are fully acquainted. I admit that the state of things may be somewhat worse now than they were a week ago, and are probably getting worse every day; but is not that the strongest reason that can be given for taking time by the forelock?

I feel confident that you will excuse me for making this communication. I have some responsibilities of my own to meet, and I can discharge them only when I understand the subject to which they relate. Your opinion, of course, will be conclusive upon me, for on such a matter I cannot do otherwise than defer to your better judgment. If you think it most consistent with your duty to be silent, I shall have no right to complain.

If you would rather answer orally than make a written reply, I will meet you either at your own quarters or here in the State Department, as may best suit your convenience.

I am, most respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. S. Black.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 237-9

Joseph Holt to Major Robert Anderson, January 16, 1861

war Department, January 16, 1861.

Major Robert Anderson,

First Artillery, Commanding Fort Sumter.

Sir: Your dispatch No. 17, covering your correspondence with the Governor of South Carolina, has been received from the hand of Lieutenant Talbot. You rightly designate the firing into the Star of the West as “an act of war,” and one which was actually committed without the slightest provocation. Had their act been perpetrated by a foreign nation, it would have been your imperative duty to have resented it with the whole force of your batteries. As, however, it was the work of the Government of South Carolina, which is a member of this confederacy, and was prompted by the passions of a highly-inflamed population of citizens of the United States, your forbearance to return the fire is fully approved by the President. Unfortunately, the Government had not been able to make known to you that the Star of the West had sailed from New York for your relief, and hence, when she made her appearance in the harbor of Charleston, you did not feel the force of the obligation to protect her approach as you would naturally have done had this information reached you.

Your late dispatches, as well as the very intelligent statement of Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Government of the apprehensions recently entertained for your safety. In consequence, it is not its purpose at present to re-enforce you. The attempt to do so would, no doubt, be attended by a collision of arms and the effusion of blood — a national calamity which the President is most anxious, if possible, to avoid. You will, therefore, report frequently your condition, and the character and activity of the preparations, if any, which may be being made for an attack upon the fort, or for obstructing the Government in any endeavors it may make to strengthen your command.

Should your dispatches be of a nature too important to be intrusted to the mails, you will convey them by special messengers. Whenever, in your judgment, additional supplies or re-enforcements are necessary for your safety, or for a successful defense of the fort, you will at once communicate the fact to this Department, and a prompt and vigorous effort will be made to forward them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Holt.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 205

Major Robert Anderson to Governor Francis W. Pickens, January 9, 1861

Fort Sumter, South Carolina, January 9, 1861.

Sir: Two of your batteries fired this morning upon an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my Government. As I have not been notified that war has been declared by South Carolina against the Government of the United States, I cannot but think that this hostile act was committed without your sanction or authority. Under that hope, and that alone, did I refrain from opening fire upon your batteries. I have therefore respectfully to ask whether the above-mentioned act, one I believe without a parallel in the history of our country or of any other civilized government, was committed in obedience to your instructions, and to notify you, if it be not disclaimed, that I must regard it as an act of war, and that I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessel to pass within range of the guns in my fort. In order to save, as far as lies within my power, the shedding of blood, I beg that you will have due notice of this, my decision, given to all concerned. Hoping, however, that your answer may be such as will justify a further continuance of forbearance upon my part, I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,

Major First Artillery, Commanding.

To His Excellency the Governor of South Carolina.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 188

Major Robert Anderson to Governor Francis W. Pickens, January 9, 1861

Headquarters, Fort Sumter, S. C,

January 9, 1861.

To His Excellency F. W. Pickens,

Governor of the State of South Carolina.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and to say that, under the circumstances, I have deemed it proper to refer the whole matter to my Government and that I intend deferring the course indicated in my note of this morning, until the arrival from Washington of the instructions I may receive. I have the honor, also, to express a hope that no obstructions will be placed in the way of, and that you will do me the favor to afford every facility to, the departure and return of the bearer, Lieutenant T. Talbot, United States Army, who has been directed to make the journey.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Robert Anderson,

Major U. S. A., commanding."

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 190-1

Isaac W. Hayne to James Buchanan, January 31, 1861

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1861.

SIR: I had the honor to hold a short interview with you on the 14th instant, informal and unofficial. Having previously been informed that you desired that whatever was official should be, on both sides, conducted by written communications, I did not at that time present my credentials, but verbally informed you that I bore a letter from the governor of South Carolina, in regard to the occupation of Fort Sumter, which I would deliver the next day under cover of a written communication from myself. The next day, before such communication could be made, I was waited upon by a senator from Alabama, who stated that he came on the part of all the senators then in Washington from the States which had already seceded from the United States, or would certainly have done so before the first day of February next. The senator from Alabama urged that he and they were interested in the subject of my mission in almost an equal degree with the authorities of South Carolina. He said that hostilities commenced between South Carolina and your government would necessarily involve the States represented by themselves in civil strife: and fearing that the action of South Carolina might complicate the relations of your government to the seceded and seceding States, and thereby interfere with a peaceful solution of existing difficulties, these senators requested that I would withhold my message to yourself until a consultation among themselves could be had. To this I agreed, and the result of the consultation was the letter of these senators addressed to me, dated January 15, a copy of which is in your possession. To this letter I replied on the 17th, and a copy of that reply is likewise in your possession. This correspondence, as I am informed, was made the subject of a communication from Senators Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and Slidell, addressed to you, and your attention called to the contents. These gentlemen received on the — day of January a reply to their application, conveyed in a letter addressed to them dated — —, signed by the Hon. J. Holt, Secretary of War ad interim. Of this letter you of course have a copy. This letter from Mr. Holt was communicated to me under cover of a letter from all the senators of the seceded and seceding States who still remained in Washington, and of this letter, too, I am informed you have been furnished with a copy.

This reply of yours, through the Secretary of War ad interim, to the application made by the senators was entirely unsatisfactory to me. It appeared to me to be not only a rejection in advance of the main proposition made by these senators, to wit: that “an arrangement should be agreed on” between the authorities of South Carolina and your government, “at least until the 15th of February next,” by which time South Carolina and the States represented by the senators  “might in convention devise a wise, just, and peaceable solution of existing difficulties.” “In the meantime,” they say, “we think,” that is, these senators, “that your State (South Carolina) should suffer Major Anderson to obtain necessary supplies of food, fuel, or water, and enjoy free communication, by post or special messenger, with the President, upon the understanding that the President will not send him reenforcements during the same period;” but, besides this rejection of the main proposition, there was, in Mr. Holt’s letter, a distinct refusal to make any stipulation on the subject of re-enforcement, even for the short time that might be required to communicate with my government. This reply to the senators was, as I have stated, altogether unsatisfactory to me, and I felt sure would be so to the authorities whom I represented. It was not, however, addressed to me, or to the authorities of South Carolina; and as South Carolina had addressed nothing to your government, and had asked nothing at your hands, I looked not to Mr. Holt's letter, but to the note addressed to me by the senators of the seceded and seceding States. I had consented to withhold my message at their instance, provided they could get assurances satisfactory to them that no re-enforcemcnts would be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the peace should not be disturbed by any act of hostility.

The senators expressed in their note to me of the 23d instant their entire confidence “that no re-enforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the period requisite for full communication between you (myself) and your (my) government,” and renewed their request that I would withhold the communication with which I stood charged, and await further instructions.

This I have done. The further instructions arrived on the 30th instant, and bear date the 26th. I now have the honor to make to you my first communication as special envoy from the government of South Carolina. You will find enclosed the original communication to the President of the United States from the governor of South Carolina, with which I was charged in Charleston on the 12th day of January instant, the day on which it bears date. I am now instructed by the governor Of South Carolina to say that his opinion as to the propriety of the demand which is contained in this letter “has not only been confirmed by the circumstances which your (my) mission has developed but is now increased to a conviction of its necessity. The safety of the State requires that the position of the President should be distinctly understood. The safety of all seceding States requires it as much as the safety of South Carolina. If it be so that Fort Sumter is held as Property, then, as property, the rights, whatever they may be, of the United States can be ascertained, and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge of the State of South Carolina you are (I am) authorized to give.” “If Fort Sumter is not held as property, it is held,” say my instructions, “as a military post, and such a post within the limits of South Carolina will not be tolerated.” You will perceive that it is upon the presumption that it is solely as property that you continue to hold Fort Sumter that I have been selected for the performance of the duty upon which I have entered. I do not come as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but as the legal officer of the State — its attorney general — to claim for the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain, and to pledge the State to make good all injury to the rights of property which arise from the exercise of the claim.

South Carolina, as a separate, independent sovereign, assumes the right to take into her own possession everything within her limits essential to maintain her honor or her safety, irrespective of the question of property, subject only to the moral duty requiring that compensation should be made to the owner. This right she cannot permit to be drawn into discussion. As to compensation for any property, whether of an individual or a government, which she may deem it necessary for her honor or safety to take into her possession, her past history gives ample guarantee that it will be made, upon a fair accounting, to the last dollar.

The proposition now is that her law officer should, under authority of the governor and his council, distinctly pledge the faith of South Carolina to make such compensation in regard to Fort Sumter, and its appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the money value of the property of the United States delivered over to the authorities of South Carolina by your command. I will not suppose that a pledge like this can be considered insufficient security. Is not the money value of the property of the United States in this fort, situated where it cannot be made available to the United States for any one purpose for which it was originally constructed, worth more to the United States than the property itself? Why then, as property, insist on holding it by an armed garrison? Yet such has been the ground upon which you have invariably placed your occupancy of this fort by troops — beginning prospectively with your annual message of the 4th December, again in your special message of the 9th January, and still more emphatically in your message of the 28th January. The same position is set forth in your reply to the senators, through the Secretary of War ad interim. It is there virtually conceded that Fort Sumter “is held merely as property of the United States, which you deem it your duty to protect and preserve.” Again, it is submitted that the continuance of an armed possession actually jeopards the property you desire to protect. It is impossible but that such a possession, if continued long enough, must lead to collision. No people not completely abject and pusillanimous could submit indefinitely to the armed occupation Of a fortress in the midst of the harbor of its principal city, and commanding the ingress and egress Of every ship that enters the port — the daily ferry-boats that ply upon its waters moving but at the sufferance of aliens. An attack upon this fort would scarcely improve it as property, whatever the result; and if captured, it would no longer be the subject of account. To protect Fort Sumter merely as property, it is submitted that an armed occupancy is not only unnecessary, but that it is manifestly the worst possible means which can be resorted to for such an object.

Your reply to the senators, through Mr. Holt, declares it to be your sole object “to act strictly on the defensive, and to authorize no movement against South Carolina, unless justified by a hostile movement on their part.” Yet, in reply to the proposition of the senators — that no re-enforcements should be sent to Fort Sumter, provided South Carolina agrees that during the same period no attack should be made — you say “it is impossible for me (your Secretary) to give you (the senators) any such assurance;” that “it would be manifest violation of his (your) duty, to place himself (yourself) under engagements that he (you) would not perform the duty, either for an indefinite or a limited period.” In your message of the 28th instant, in expressing yourself in regard to a similar proposition, you say: “However strong may be my desire to enter into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to abstain ‘from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms’ between this and any other government. It would, therefore, be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control. If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he should be bound to obey, though in conflict with his agreement.” The proposition, it is suggested, was addressed to you under the laws as they now are, and was not intended to refer to a new condition of things arising under new legislation. It was addressed to the executive discretion, acting under existing laws. If Congress should, under the war-making power, or in any other way, legislate in a manner to affect the peace of South Carolina, her interests, or her rights, it would not be accomplished in secret; South Carolina would have timely notice, and she would, I trust, endeavor to meet the emergency.

It is added, in the letter of Mr. Holt, that “ at the present moment it is not deemed necessary to re-enforce Major Anderson, because he makes no such request, and feels quite secure in his position;” “but should his safety require it, every effort will be made to supply re-enforccments.” This would seem to ignore the other branch of the proposition made by the senators, viz: that no attack was to be made on Fort Sumter during the period suggested, and that Major Anderson should enjoy the facilities of communication, &c., &c. I advert to this point, however, for the purpose of saying that to send re-enforcements to Fort Sumter could not serve as a means of protecting and Warning Mulberry; for, as must be known to your government, it would inevitably lead to immediate hostilities, in which property on all sides would necessarily suffer. South Carolina has every disposition to preserve the public peace, and feels, I am sure, in full force, those high “ Christian and moral duties" referred to by your Secretary; and it is submitted that on her part there is scarcely any consideration of mere property, apart from honor and safety, which could induce her to do aught to jeopard that peace, still less to inaugurate a protracted and bloody civil war. She rests her position on something higher than mere property. It is a consideration of her own dignity as a sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to demand that this property should not longer be used as a military post by a government she no longer acknowledges. She feels this to be an imperative duty. It has, in fact, become an absolute necessity of her condition.

Repudiating, as you do, the idea of coercion, avowing peaceful intentions, and expressing a patriot's horror for civil war and bloody strife among those who once were brethren, it is hoped that, on further consideration, you will not, on a mere question of property, refuse the reasonable demand of South Carolina, which honor and necessity alike compel her to vindicate. Should you disappoint this hope, the responsibility for the result surely does not rest with her. If the evils of war are to be encountered, especially the calamities of civil war, an elevated statesmanship would seem to require that it should be accepted as the unavoidable alternative of something still more disastrous, such as national dishonor, or measures materially affecting the safety or permanent interests of a people; that it should be a choice deliberately made, and entered upon as war, and of set purpose. But that war should be the incident or accident attendant on a policy professedly peaceful, and not required to effect the object which is avowed, as the only end intended, can only be excused where there has been no warning given as to the consequences.

I am further instructed to say that South Carolina cannot, by her silence, appear to acquiesce in the imputation that she was guilty of an act of unprovoked aggression in firing on the “Star of the West.” Though an unarmed vessel, she was filled with armed men, entering her territory against her will with the purpose of re-enforcing a garrison held within her limits against her protest. She forbears to recriminate by discussing the question of the propriety of attempting such a re-enforcement at all, as well as of the disguised and secret manner in which it was intended to be effected; and on this occasion she will say nothing as to the manner in which Fort Sumter was taken into the possession of its present occupants. The interposition of the senators who have addressed you was a circumstance unexpected by my government, and unsolicited certainly by me. The governor, while he appreciates the high and generous motives by which they were prompted, and while he fully approves the delay which, in deference to them, has taken place in the presentation of this demand, feels that it cannot longer be withheld.

I conclude with an extract from the instructions just received by me from the government of South Carolina. “The letter of the President, through Mr. Holt, may be received as the reply to the question you were instructed to ask, as to his assertion of his right to send re-enforcements to Fort Sumter. You were instructed to say to him, if he asserted that right, that the State of South Carolina regarded such a right, when asserted, or with an attempt at its exercise, as a declaration of war. If the President intends it shall not be so understood, it is proper, to avoid any misconception hereafter, that he should be informed of the manner in which the governor will feel bound to regard it. If the President, when you have stated the reasons which prompt the governor in making the demand for the delivery of Fort Sumter, shall refuse to deliver the fort upon the pledge you have been authorized to make, you will communicate that refusal without delay to the governor. If the President shall not be prepared to give you an immediate answer, you will communicate to him that his answer may be transmitted within a reasonable time to the governor at this place, (Charleston, South Carolina.) The governor does not consider it necessary that you (I) should remain longer in Washington than is necessary to execute this, the closing duty of your (my) mission in the manner now indicated to you, (me.) As soon as the governor shall receive from you information that you have closed your mission, and the reply, whatever it may be, of the President, he will consider the conduct which will be necessary on his part.”

Allow me to request that you would as soon as possible inform me whether, under these instructions, I need await your answer in Washington. And if not, I would be pleased to convey from you to my government information as to the time when an answer may be expected in Charleston.

With consideration, I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

ISAAC W. HAYNE,

Special Envoy.

His EXCELLENCY JAMES BUCHANAN, President.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, Editor, Works of James Buchanan, Volume 11, p. 132-7

Joseph Holt to Major Robert Anderson, January 10, 1861

War Department,

January 10, 1861.

Major Robert Anderson,

First Artillery, Commanding at Fort Sumter, S. C.:

sir: Your dispatches to No. 16, inclusive, have been received. Before the receipt of that of 31st December,* announcing that the Government might re-enforce you at its leisure, and that you regarded yourself safe in your present position, some two hundred and fifty instructed recruits had been ordered to proceed from Governor's Island to Fort Sumter on the Star of the West, for the purpose of strengthening the force under your command. The probability is, from the current rumors of to-day, that this vessel has been fired into by the South Carolinians, and has not been able to reach you. To meet all contingencies, the Brooklyn has been dispatched, with instructions not to cross the bar at the harbor of Charleston, but to afford to the Star of the West and those on board all the assistance they may need, and in the event the recruits have not effected a landing at Fort Sumter they will return to Fort Monroe.

I avail myself of the occasion to express the great satisfaction of the Government at the forbearance, discretion and firmness with which you have acted, amid the perplexing and difficult circumstances in which you have been placed. You will continue, as heretofore, to act strictly on the defensive; to avoid, by all means compatible with the safety of your command, a collision with the hostile forces by which you are surrounded. But for the movement, so promptly and brilliantly executed, by which you transferred your forces to Fort Sumter, the probability is that ere this the defenselessness of your position would have invited an attack, which, there is reason to believe, was contemplated, if not in active preparation, which must have led to the effusion of blood, that has been thus so happily prevented. The movement, therefore, was in every way admirable, alike for its humanity [and] patriotism, as for its soldiership.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Holt,

Secretary of War ad interim.

_______________

* Received January 5, 1861.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 136-7; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 177

John M. Forbes to N. M. Beckwith, January 24, 1862

Boston, January 24, 1862.

. . . Barren proclamations to those beyond our reach will just now hurt Kentucky and the Northern harmony more than it will help the cause; treating slaves well that we do reach is the best preparation, and best proclamation to others. I saw in New York one of the blacks (yellow), [who was] carried off and sold from the Star of the West when captured. He said the slaves knew in the most distant plantations how we used those who came to us, and that much stress was laid upon the return by our soldiers of a few fugitives! He says intelligence runs fast through the plantations, and he thinks a proclamation of freedom, following up well-attested good faith to those who had come in, would have great effect. In the same “Post” you will find an editorial upon the sinews of war: containing much good financial doctrine.

We were just going over the dam into an irredeemable currency about a week ago, when a few of us made a rally for the doctrines of that editorial! and we saved it for the time, brought Chase over half way, where he would by the logic of events have been soon forced to come all right, but the horde of debtors, and gamblers, and fools, with the “Herald” at their head, are at it again, and the result is still doubtful. With such leaders, what but a sturdy Anglo-Saxon people, or a miracle-dealing God, can save us from destruction! If we survive the military and diplomatic and financial blunders, it will be because we are the strongest people and have the strongest government on the face of the earth! I was in New York last week seeing Will off to the war, — to Beaufort with his regiment, the First Massachusetts Cavalry; a hard trial for his mother — but we must do our share, and if he goes to the Spirit Land, we may not be long behind. . . .

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 287-8

William Gilmore Simms to William Porcher Miles, probably January 13, 1861

Sunday¹ Night, 12 P. M.

I am sleepless, my dear Miles, and must write. If you should be sleepless also, it is not improbable but that my letters will help you to a soporific condition. It seems to me that you will have a little respite. The opening fire upon the Star of the West changes materially the aspect of things to the Federal government, and they will hardly think to send supplies to Sumter except under cover of armed vessels, which is the inauguration of open war upon the State, which the President and cabinet will hardly attempt unless under authority of Congress. Congress alone, I believe, has the power to declare war. There is no telling, however, what may be done when the power is under the hands of a weak administration, counseled and governed, in fact, by a person whose whole training has endowed [him] with military ideas as paramount to all.² We must, of course, prepare for two dangers, treachery and assault. But it strikes me that the unexpected fire of Fort Morris will compel a pause in the Federal councils, for the better maturing of plans, and some respite for preparation will be allowed you. Not an hour should be lost in preparation. To have numerous guns, to bear equally upon an assailing squadron and Fort Sumter, seems to be the necessity. Looking at the map, I note that Mount Pleasant is distant from Fort Sumter some two miles, while I estimate Moultrie to be some one and a quarter. A battery at Mount Pleasant, cutting the western angle of Sullivan's Island, seems to be in direct range with Sumter, and if within reach of heavy cannon, then a battery of earth at this point, with half a dozen thirty-two pounders, might operate successfully against it, at all events compel a very useful diversion of its fires. So I find that on the sandhills below Fort Johnson, and on the sandhills at the extreme western verge of Fort Morris, batteries of say three heavy cannon each might face Fort Sumter, framed of logs faced with iron and filled in with sand, which could contribute largely to its distraction, if not its injury. On these sandhills, also, you possess an advantage in their elevation, which will tend to reduce the superiority of Sumter in height. Two or three batteries along these hills and at these points, mere bastions, having two or three guns each of heavy calibre, could be thrown up very suddenly, assuming, as I do, that you can command, from the popular patriotism, any amount of slave labor. I would have them so planted as not to face the portholes of Sumter, yet be able to take them at an angle. Shot entering a porthole obliquely would be more mischievous, perhaps, than if direct, since the zigzag course they would pursue would be likely to kill every man on one side or other of the guns, besides abrading the embrasure very seriously. In reference to Wappoo Cut, let me mention that, as the obvious entrance to that cut is by the Stono, there is an old fort, once thought a pretty strong one, at the mouth of the Stono, on Cole's Island. This might be manned by volunteers from the precinct, officered by some good military man. It covers Bird Key [?] and is very well placed, though still, I think, it would be good policy to stop up Wappoo Cut, or keep an armed schooner in Ashley River, at the mouth of it. I am writing, you perceive, without the slightest knowledge of what has been done; and it is quite probable that all my suggestions have been anticipated. If, however, you fancy there is anything in them, communicate with Jamison and any military friends on whose judgment you rely. Ranging timbers properly mortised might be prepared by the mechanics of the city, and the iron bars laid on, if desired, before shipment to the desired points. It is my impression that old Fort Johnson ranges Moultrie in the same line with Sumter. If so, it is a question how far it would be proper to use the former place with heavy cannon which might range across the strait. You should employ all the heavy cannon you can. Jamison told me that you had an abundance. Unless Fort Morris has numerous pieces, she could hardly play any efficient game with many assailing vessels. I do not know where Fort Morris is placed, but suppose it to be fronting equally the Ship and the Twelve-feet channel. In that event, unless the sandhills interpose, it is under the range of Fort Sumter, provided the distance be within three miles, as I suppose it to be. I should have said four, but for the threat of Anderson to fire on Fort Morris. A battery between Fort Morris and the Lighthouse, on the edge of the sandhills, might rake the Ship Channel with a plunging fire, yet I should think be out of range and even sight of Fort Sumter. I think I said, in a previous letter, that in sighting the guns for long distances telescopes should be used; of course, I meant only the ordinary ship spyglasses, of which a sufficient number for each battery could be obtained in the city. With another battery to second Fort Morris, each of twelve guns at least, and heavy ones, you could give a telling account of all entering vessels. They might all be sunk with good gunnery. But two shot only taking effect out of eighteen fired, would seem to show that the gunnery was not sufficiently practiced. I write only from report. To-night, I learn that (on dit) there has been a mutiny in Fort Sumtsr, and that Anderson has had to shoot one of his men, and put ten more in irons; and that this was the reason why he did not fire on Forts Morris and Moultrie. By the “Mercury” it is said that some negotiations are on foot which will prevent bloodshed. The inference is that Fort Sumter will be given up. This is hardly probable. I suspect treachery. We should suspect nothing else. Anderson wishes communication with the city. If opportunity is allowed him to see what we are doing, or to hear of it, or if he is allowed to corrupt mercenaries, we shall have worse mischief. We must not be too confiding, too easy of faith, too courteous, even to an enemy, who, if he had the right feeling, would at once resign his command and throw up his position on the distinct ground of his Southern birth and associations. He should be kept corked up closely, until we are quite ready to draw him off. If he still keep his position, and we are to have an attempt by the war steamers, Fort Sumter must and will take part in it; the vital point is how to neutralize his action in the engagement. I see but the one suggested, to keep as many batteries at work on him, breaching and otherwise, and a cloud of vessels and men ready for scaling, as will effectively divert his regards from those forts which are designed for the defense of the harbor. And unless Fort Morris be made strong in guns, I see that vessels of heavy draft in deep water may shell it ad libitum, while the smaller craft passes in. I am very doubtful whether a fort on the east end of Sullivan's can do more than cover the Maffit and Rattlesnake channels, if these. It can hardly do much mischief to vessels entering the Ship Channel. Something will depend upon the calibre of its guns. Do, if you can spare a half hour, write me, in charity, how we stand, and with what degree of preparation, and believe me

W. GlLMORE SlMMS

_______________

¹ Probably the Sunday that followed the firing on the Star of the West, i. e. January 13, 1861.

² It seems plain that Simms here alludes to General Winfield Scott. Cass had had a military training, hut he had resigned from the Cabinet when the above was written.

SOURCE: William Peterfield Trent, William Gilmore Simms, p. 255-60

Diary of Thomas Ebenezer Thomas: January 10, 1861

The State of Mississippi yesterday seceded from the Union, by 32 to 15 votes in the Convention. Yesterday, also, THE FIRST GUN FIRED in the coming Civil War! The Charleston forts fired on the U. S. Steamer, Star of the West, sent to re-enforce Maj. Anderson at Ft. Sumpter.

May God defend the right, and deliver the oppressed!

SOURCE: Alfred A. Thomas, Editor, Correspondence of Thomas Ebenezer Thomas, p. 109

Jacob Thompson to James Buchanan, January 8, 1861

Washington, D. C, Jany. 8th, 1861.

To H1s Excellency James Buchanan, President U. S.

Sir: It is with extreme regret I have just learned that additional troops have been ordered to Charleston. This subject has been frequently discussed in Cabinet Council; and when on Monday night, 31st of December ult., the orders for reinforcements to Fort Sumter were countermanded, I distinctly understood from you, that no order of the kind would be made without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet. It is true that on Wednesday, Jany. 2nd, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet, but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something [more] than was then said.

I learn, however, this morning, for the first time, that the steamer Star of the West sailed from New York on last Saturday night with Two Hundred and fifty men under Lieut. Bartlett, bound for Fort Sumter.

Under these circumstances I feel myself bound to resign my commission as one of your constitutional advisers into your hands.

With high respect, your obdt. svt.

J. Thompson.

SOURCE: John Bassett More, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Volume 11, p. 100; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 181

Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, January 11, 1862

Washington,

January 11. 1862.

My dear Sir.

I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of this date, and to thank you, with profound respect, for its kind and generous tone. When you were elected President, a result to which I contributed my best exertions, I had no thought of leaving the Senate of the United States, or of accepting any position in your gift. But when you invited me to Springfield, Illinois, and presented me the choice of one, of two named places in the list of your Constitutional advisers, I could not, for grave public reasons, and after great reflection, refuse a trust so trying and laborious. My life had been one of constant labor and excitement; I looked to the Senate as the best field, after such a life, in which to serve my Country and my State. It was only when I realized that I might be of service to the general cause in the darkly foreshadowed future, that I ventured to undertake the manifold and various responsibilities of the War Department. I felt when I saw the traitors leaving their seats in Congress, and when the Star of the West was fired upon in Charleston Harbor, that a bloody conflict was inevitable.

I have devoted myself, without intermission, to my official duties; I have given to them all my energies; I have done my best. It is impossible, in the direction of operations so extensive, but that some mistakes happen and some complications and complaints arise. In view of these recollections, I thank you from a full heart, for the expression of your “confidence in my ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust.” Thus my own conscientious sense of doing my duty by the Executive and by my Country, is approved by the acknowledged head of the Government itself.

When I became a member of your Administration, I avowed my purpose to retire from the Cabinet, as soon as my duty to my country would allow me to do so. In your letter of this day's date, so illustrative of your just and upright character, you revive the fact that I sometime ago, expressed the same purpose to you, and in reminding me of this you proffer for my acceptance one of the highest diplomatic positions in your gift, as an additional mark of your confidence and esteem.

In retiring from the War Department, I feel that the mighty Army of the United States, is ready to do battle for the Constitution – that it is marshalled by gallant and experienced leaders – that it is fired with the greatest enthusiasm for the good cause: and also, that my successor, in this department, is my personal friend, who unites to wonderful intellect and vigor, the grand essential of being in earnest in the present struggle, and of being resolved upon a speedy and overwhelming triumph of our arms. I therefore, gratefully accept the new distinction you have conferred upon me, and as soon as important and long neglected private business has been arranged, I will enter upon the important duties of the mission to which you have called me.

I have the honor to be, my dear Sir,

Your obedient and humble Servant

Simon Cameron.

Abraham Lincoln.

President of the United States

SOURCE: Roy P. Basler, Editor, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 5, p. 97; A copy of this letter can be found in the Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.

Chivalric Warriors

It was the chivalry of South Carolina who started the rebellion.  It was they who led off in the drama of secession.  The first company of volunteers against the Union was raised in the Palmetto State.  The first rebel gun was fired on the sacred soil of that wayward and pettish Commonwealth.  From Charleston and Columbia, its only cities, came the original statements of the universal cowardice and poltroonery of the “Yankees,” and those lofty boasts of the invincible courage of the citizens of South Carolina, who “could whip five to one of Lincoln’s mercenaries.”  Well, we have had nearly a year of war.  Where have the South Carolinians distinguished themselves?  They gathered some eight or ten thousand men, with the assistance of North Carolina and Georgia, about the harbor of Charleston, planted miles of batteries, drove out to sea the Star of the West, an unarmed transport, and compelled a garrison of less than one hundred men to evacuate Fort Sumter.  This is the sum of their glorious achievements.  At Bull Run the South Carolina troops were the first to run, whilst the Federals were in the tide of their first successes on that bloody field.  At Port Royal they scampered like sheep at the approach of the Federal fleet.  And this is the whole record of the Palmetto chivalry in the secession war.  Amongst the killed and wounded rebels in the bulletins of the engagements of this year, you look in vain for those belonging to South Carolina regiments.  They do not die in the last ditch.  They fail to offer themselves up as sacrifices for their bleeding country.  They do not exterminate the race of Yankees.  Whilst the record of the rebel Virginians, Tennesseans and others of the more Northern States of Secessia is full of valor and heroic daring, South Carolina, with all her vain-glorious vaunting, presents a page that is densely blank.  So much for barking dogs that will not bite!

The original seceders made a good thing of it when, finding there was going to be fighting to do, they coaxed the border States into their causeless and cruel war.  This explains their anxiety to get Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland into their Confederate concern, after they had succeeded in seducing Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina and Arkansas. – The brunt of the hard work, the raising of men and means, and the fighting itself, has all fallen on the poor dupes that were cajoled into Secessionism after the rebel government was organized at Montgomery, whilst the aristocratic gentlemen of the cotton States have had comparatively an easy time of it.  These latter congratulated themselves that the horrors of war would be kept far away from their immediate neighborhoods, but they are soon to find out – indeed, they are having a taste of it already – that they reckoned without their host.  We feel exceedingly sorry, of course, for the people of Charleston, whom late reports represent as getting very much frightened. – {St. Louis Republican.

– Published in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 12, 1862, p. 4