Washington, D. C,
January 1st, 1861.
In reference to the declaration with which your reply
commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly
defined in the
Message
to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the
relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much
less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently,
you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an
entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to
make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina
having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies
all our political organizations,
declared
herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no
special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us.
Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were
prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal
considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from
extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive
us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us,
to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the
subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample
recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence
necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which
we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of
our letter into which you have fallen.
You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition
might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power
to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the
possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore,
deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours
render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which
you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important
part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last
twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance”
as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.
Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the
authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation,
and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted
not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion
in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which
you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained
here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration
which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to
have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose
only to meet the chief points of the argument.
Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her
intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the
United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in
force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you
anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your
annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce
a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and
would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South
Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that
this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a
desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in
the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from
the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of
ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when
applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the
resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than
allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at
Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had
taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most
distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the
record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of
this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of
the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose
communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on
assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no
attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of
the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until
Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took
from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no
such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent
into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at
present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper,
although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of
highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding
obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed)
that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to
those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You
sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of
conduct in conformity with such an understanding.
Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice
from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners,
and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which
we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an
interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you
appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day,
Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That
news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until
half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet.
On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You
could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the
crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat
in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major
Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the
pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you
did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its
obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by
demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from
the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina,
instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate
yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will
examine both.
In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever,
in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will
stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our
mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of
our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire
to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but
that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and
we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us,
we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we
added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of
the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are
a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under
present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of
Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the
face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there
is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from
declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to
which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser
and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we
urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the
events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the
spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this
withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice
one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I
will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible
contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between
myself and any human being.”
In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that
your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you
did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor.
And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive
assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most
unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and
patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such
suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the
subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge
that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own
wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the
authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you
the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the
United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not
avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before
these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from
Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated
to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven
successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and
true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and
entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour
complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if
the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your
orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you
had pledged your honor to maintain.
You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your
immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your
decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve
hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the
authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment
of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had
known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented
your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty
days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts
against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most
important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to
know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of
those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by
Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from
securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many
and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe
unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their
Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill.
They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was
consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely
had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. — No other words will describe
his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a
hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a
superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his
guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his
post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war.
No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have
taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the
State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending
circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun,
until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their
intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are
writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that
reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun
shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent
series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported
by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this
without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have
said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from
the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this
precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile
act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only
justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been
alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you
have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the
action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a
legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this
we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a
memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page
as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.
By your course, you have probably rendered civil war
inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of
South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice
as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies
before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.
Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your
note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or
of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our
arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the
garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we
propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.
We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servants,
R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H.
ADAMS,
JAMES
L. ORR.
Commissioners.
To his Excellency, the President
of the United States.
[Endorsement.]
Executive Mansion,
3½ o'clock, Wednesday.
This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a
character that he declines to receive it.
SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners
of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of
the United States, p. 12-20
