Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: December 24, 1864

Christmas eve! Clear and cold.

A dispatch from Hon. J. L. Orr and H. V.   (on their way home) informs the Secretary that from the delay in the transportation of troops over the Piedmont Railroad, there must be either criminal neglect or treachery concerned in it.

Again it is rumored that Savannah has been evacuated. There is something in the air that causes agitation in official circles. Mr. Secretary Seddon's room was locked nearly all day yesterday.

If troops cannot be transported expeditiously over the Piedmont Road, fears may be entertained for Wilmington, when, the gale subsiding, the enemy's fleet has reappeared.

There is a rumor on the street that the government is to be removed to Lynchburg.

Gen. Lee has induced the President and Secretary of War to call for the clerks (detailed ones) to repair to the trenches again this weather. The emergency must be great, as these soldiers get, as clerks, $4000 per annum, and rations, etc.

A dispatch from Gen. Bragg.

WILMINGTON, N. C., December 23d, 1864.-The fleet, which drew off in the rough weather, is again assembled; seventy vessels now in sight on the coast. The advance of the troops (C. S.) only reached here to-night.—B. B.

The clerks are drawing lots; one-half being ordered to the trenches. Of two drawn in this bureau (out of five) one is peremptorily ordered by the Secretary to remain, being sickly, and the other has an order to go before a medical board "to determine whether he is fit for service in the trenches for a few days." Great commotion naturally prevails in the departments, and it is whispered that Gen. Lee was governed in the matter by the family of the President, fearing a Christmas visit from the negro troops on this side the river.

The following note was received to-day from the Vice-President:

RICHMOND, VA, December 23d, 1864.—Hon. Jas. A. Seddon, Secretary of War: Will you please send me, through the post-office, a passport to leave the city? I wish to depart in a few days. Yours respectfully,

ALEX. H. STEPHENS.

The President is hard at work making majors, etc.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 363-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, August 11, 1865

The question of the Indian war on the Plains was again brought forward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The Secretary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to General Grant, and General G. says he has not ordered it. McCulloch wanted to know the probable expense, the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton thought McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged; said General Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper man, was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead of twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number. This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department.

McCulloch inquired what should be done in regard to appointing officers of customs, revenue, etc., who could not take the oath which Congress prescribes. Speed advocated delay in making appointments. There was some favor of a modified oath. I queried whether the President was not empowered by the Constitution to select and nominate, and the Senate, if it chose, to confirm, independent of this restriction. In other words, was the President's constitutional prerogative to be thus narrowed by Congress? Seward said the President had signed the law, which in its operation was undoubtedly embarrassing to the Administration and injurious to the country. I remarked his signature could not make the law constitutional, if it was not constitutional; that one executive could not in this way tie up his successor. I was therefore for appointing good, true, honest men, whether they could or could not take this oath. Stanton was for appointing them without the oath, because the States are yet in rebellion. They were to be considered provisional appointments, and the law of Congress was inoperative until after the Rebellion was wholly suppressed. No other one indorsed or controverted this view, except as they had previously expressed their individual opinions. But the result was unanimous that the appointments should be made; that the current business of the Administration and the country must go on, notwithstanding unwise and ill-considered legislation.

Questions in relation to pardons were discussed. The President said that few had been granted, notwithstanding the clamor that was raised. No one who had been educated at public expense at either the Military or Naval School, no officer of the Army or Navy, no Member of Congress who had left his seat, no member of the Rebel government who had deserted and gone into that service, had been pardoned, nor did he propose at present to pardon any one of that class. It was understood that neither Davis, Stephens, nor any member of the Rebel Cabinet should be paroled.

The cases of Orr of South Carolina and Bennett of Kentucky came up. There was a kindly feeling towards Orr, but not towards Bennett. Orr had resisted secession but was compelled to go with his State, reluctantly and resistingly. Bennett went of his own accord and was a traitor to his State as well as the Union. Yet Bennett was, and is, urgently presented for pardon by Union men as well as others. This whole question is to be a troublesome one, and requires careful and discreet management. To some extent the action of the government must depend on the conduct of the Rebels and the people themselves. If they continue to organize themselves in opposition to the government, and strive to elect men on that basis, they will provoke stern measures towards themselves. One difficulty is whom to trust. All have violated their obligations as citizens by going into rebellion, and, if pardoned, will they act in better faith hereafter? Many Union men, in heart and sentiment, were forced by the State governments under which they lived into the Rebellion.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 357-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 26, 1864

Sunshine and showers.

Senator Henry's letter was referred to Gen. Bragg, who returned it to-day with the indorsement that the suggested movement had not escaped attention, and a good result might soon be looked for. And sure enough, a dispatch was received from Atlanta to-day, announcing the capture of some 250 of the enemy's wagons laden with stores!

It is to be hoped that Gen. Lee has some scheme of a similar character, to relieve Grant of his supply trains. Troops are daily coming hither, infantry and cavalry, whence in one hour and a half the former reach Lee's army. The great battle still hangs fire, but to be of greater magnitude when it does occur.

Gen. Bragg did a good thing yesterday, even while Senator Orr was denouncing him. He relieved Gen. Winder from duty here, and assigned him to Goldsborough, N. C. Now if the rogues and cut-throats he persisted in having about him be likewise dismissed, the Republic is safe! Gen. Ransom has now full charge of this department.

Mr. Secretary Seddon is sick, and Mr. Assistant Secretary Campbell is crabbed-Congress not having passed his Supreme Court bill. And if it were passed, the President would hardly appoint him judge.

It is said one of our iron-clads is out-the rest to follow immediately. Let Butler beware!

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 219

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 27, 1864

Clouds and sunshine; cooler.

Nothing additional from the West. Several thousand Georgia mounted troops have arrived during the last 24 hours, in readiness to march to Lee. One Georgia regiment has 1200, and a South Carolina regiment that went up this morning 1000 men. Lee's army is at Ashland—17 miles distant.

The enemy are marching down the Pamunky, north side. They will doubtless cross it, and march through New Kent and Charles City Counties to the James River, opposite Butler's army. Grant probably intends crossing his army to the south side, which, if effected, might lose us Richmond, for the city cannot subsist a week with its southern communications cut. We should starve.

But Beauregard means to make another effort to dislodge Butler, immediately. It will probably be a combined movement, the iron clads co-operating. It is a necessity, and it must be done without delay, no matter what the cost may be. If Butler remains, the railroads will be cut. If the city be taken, not only will the iron-clads be lost, but a large proportion of the army may be cut off from escape. Immense munitions would certainly fall into the hands of the enemy.

The Whig and Enquirer both denounced Gen. Bragg to-day.

Senator Orr's assault in the Senate on Gen. Bragg was followed by another from Wigfall, who declared there was a want of confidence in the President. Mr. Orr said his appointment was discourtesy to the Secretary of War, whereupon the Secretary fell ill yesterday, but to-day he is well again. Nevertheless, the Senate voted Gen. B. the salary, etc. allowed a general in the field. And Gen. Winder has been treated as cavalierly as he treated me. Retribution is sure.

The city is excited with rumors. One is that Beauregard, when about to engage the enemy last week, was ordered by Bragg to evacuate Petersburg-certainly an insane measure. Gen. Beauregard (so the story runs) telegraphed the President (who was with him, as I heard) to know if such an order had his sanction. The President replied that Gen. Bragg's orders were authorized by him. Beauregard disregarded the order and fought the battle, saving Petersburg. Then Beauregard tendered his resignation, which was not accepted. It is also said that the order was directed to the commandant of the garrison; but the courier was stopped by Generals Wise and Martin, who gave the paper to Beauregard. There is another rumor that Bragg's orders caused Lee to fall back; and, of course, the credulous people here are despondent; some in despair. There may be some design against the President in all this.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 219-21

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 2, 1864

So lax has become Gen. Winder's rule, or deficient, or worse, the vigilance of his detectives,—the rogues and cut-throats,—one of them keeps a mistress in a house the rent of which is more than his salary, that five Jews, the other day, cleared out in a schooner laden with tobacco, professedly for Petersburg, but sailed directly to the enemy. They had with them some $10,000 in gold; and as they absconded to avoid military service in the Confederate States, no doubt they imparted all the information they could to the enemy.

Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, asked the Secretary of War to-day to make such arrangements as would supply the State Department with regular files of Northern papers. They sometimes have in them important diplomatic correspondence, and the perusal of this is about all the Secretary of State has to do.

It is rumored that the Hon. Robert Toombs has been arrested in Georgia for treason. I cannot believe it, but I know he is inimical to the President.

The British papers again seem to sympathise with us.

Senator Orr writes to the Secretary that a resolution of the Senate, asking for copies of Gen. Beauregard's orders in 1862 for the fortification of Vicksburg (he was the first to plan the works which made such a glorious defense), and also a resolution calling for a copy of Gen. B.'s charges against Col. ——, had not been responded to by the President. He asks that these matters may be brought to the President's attention.

The weather is beautiful and spring-like again, and we may soon have some news both from Tennessee and North Carolina. From the latter I hope we shall get some of the meat endangered by the proximity of the enemy.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 140-1

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: January 19, 1864

A furious storm of wind and rain occurred last night, and it is rapidly turning cold to-day.

The prisoners here have had no meat during the last four days, and fears are felt that they will break out of confinement.

Yesterday Senator Orr waited upon the President, to induce him to remove Col. Northrop, the obnoxious Commissary-General. The President, it is said, told him that Col. N. was one of the greatest geniuses in the South, and that, if he had the physical capacity he would put him at the head of an army.

A letter from Mrs. Polk, widow of President Polk, dated at Nashville, expresses regret that a portion of her cotton in Mississippi was burnt by the military authorities (according to law), and demanding remuneration. She also asks permission to have the remainder sent to Memphis, now held by the enemy. The Secretary will not refuse.

I bought a pretty good pair of second-hand shoes at auction today for $17.50; but they were too large. I will have them sold again, without fear of loss.

A majority of the Judiciary Committee, to whom the subject was referred, have reported a bill in the Senate vacating the offices of all the members of the cabinet at the expiration of every two years, or of every Congress. This is a blow at Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Memminger, etc., and, as the President conceives, at himself. It will not pass, probably; but it looks like war between the Senate and the Executive. Some of the Secretaries may resign on the 18th of February, when this Congress expires. Nous verrons.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 131-2

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, January 1, 1861

Washington, D. C,

January 1st, 1861.

Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the Message to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance” as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.

Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.

In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.”

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.

You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. — No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR.

Commissioners.

To his Excellency, the President

of the United States.

[Endorsement.]

Executive Mansion,

3½ o'clock, Wednesday.

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 12-20

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 28, 1860

Washington, 28th December, 1860.

Sir: We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are “authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light houses and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt and for a division of all other property held by the Government of the United States as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the Government at Washington.”

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage and a future of good will and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that, we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shews, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

We have the honor, Sir, to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,

J. H. ADAMS,

JAMES L. ORR,

Commissioners.

To the President

of the United States.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 3-4

James Buchanan to the Congress of the United States, January 8, 1861

Washington City, January 8, 1861.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

At the opening of your present session I called your attention to the dangers which threatened the existence of the Union. I expressed my opinion freely concerning the original causes of those dangers, and recommended such measures as I believed would have the effect of tranquilizing the country and saving it from the peril in which it had been needlessly and most unfortunately involved. Those opinions and recommendations I do not propose now to repeat. My own convictions upon the whole subject remain unchanged.

The fact that a great calamity was impending over the nation was even at that time acknowledged by every intelligent citizen. It had already made itself felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. The necessary consequences of the alarm thus produced were most deplorable. The imports fell off with a rapidity never known before, except in time of war, in the history of our foreign commerce; the Treasury was unexpectedly left without the means which it had reasonably counted upon to meet the public engagements; trade was paralyzed; manufactures were stopped; the best public securities suddenly sunk in the market; every species of property depreciated more or less, and thousands of poor men who depended upon their daily labor for their daily bread were turned out of employment.

I deeply regret that I am not able to give you any information upon the state of the Union which is more satisfactory than what I was then obliged to communicate. On the contrary, matters are still worse at present than they then were. When Congress met, a stronge hope pervaded the whole public mind that some amicable adjustment of the subject would speedily be made by the representatives of the States and of the people which might restore peace between the conflicting sections of the country. That hope has been diminished by every hour of delay, and as the prospect of a bloodless settlement fades away the public distress becomes more and more aggravated. As evidence of this it is only necessary to say that the Treasury notes authorized by the act of 17th of December last were advertised according to the law and that no responsible bidder offered to take any considerable sum at par at a lower rate of interest than 12 per cent. From these facts it appears that in a government organized like ours domestic strife, or even a well-grounded fear of civil hostilities, is more destructive to our public and private interests than the most formidable foreign war.

In my annual message I expressed the conviction, which I have long deliberately held, and which recent reflection has only tended to deepen and confirm, that no State has a right by its own act to secede from the Union or throw off its federal obligations at pleasure. I also declared my opinion to be that even if that right existed and should be exercised by any State of the Confederacy the executive department of this Government had no authority under the Constitution to recognize its validity by acknowledging the independence of such State. This left me no alternative, as the chief executive officer under the Constitution of the United States, but to collect the public revenues and to protect the public property so far as this might be practicable under existing laws. This is still my purpose. My province is to execute and not to make the laws. It belongs to Congress exclusively to repeal, to modify, or to enlarge their provisions to meet exigencies as they may occur. I possess no dispensing power.

I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State, and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld that power even from Congress. But the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government is clear and undeniable.

But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States toward each other has already far transcended and cast in the shade the ordinary executive duties already provided for by law, and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the subject entirely above and beyond Executive control. The fact can not be disguised that we are in the midst of a great revolution. In all its various bearings, therefore, I commend the question to Congress as the only human tribunal under Providence possessing the power to meet the existing emergency. To them exclusively belongs the power to declare war or to authorize the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution, and they alone possess the power to remove grievances which might lead to war and to secure peace and union to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the responsibility.

The Union is a sacred trust left by our Revolutionary fathers to their descendants, and never did any other people inherit so rich a legacy. It has rendered us prosperous in peace and triumphant in war. The national flag has floated in glory over every sea. Under its shadow American citizens have found protection and respect in all lands beneath the sun. If we descend to considerations of purely material interest, when in the history of all time has a confederacy been bound together by such strong ties of mutual interest? Each portion of it is dependent on all and all upon each portion for prosperity and domestic security. Free trade throughout the whole supplies the wants of one portion from the productions of another and scatters wealth everywhere. The great planting and farming States require the aid of the commercial and navigating States to send their productions to domestic and foreign markets and to furnish the naval power to render their transportation secure against all hostile attacks.

Should the Union perish in the midst of the present excitement, we have already had a sad foretaste of the universal suffering which would result from its destruction. The calamity would be severe in every portion of the Union and would be quite as great, to say the least, in the Southern as in the Northern States. The greatest aggravation of the evil, and that which would place us in the most unfavorable light both before the world and posterity, is, as I am firmly convinced, that the secession movement has been chiefly based upon a misapprehension at the South of the sentiments of the majority in several of the Northern States. Let the question be transferred from political assemblies to the ballot box, and the people themselves would speedily redress the serious grievances which the South have suffered. But, in Heaven's name, let the trial be made before we plunge into armed conflict upon the mere assumption that there is no other alternative. Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point and afford the people, both North and South, an opportunity for reflection. Would that South Carolina had been convinced of this truth before her precipitate action! I therefore appeal through you to the people of the country to declare in their might that the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitutional means. I most earnestly recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively to the question how this can be accomplished in peace. All other questions, when compared to this, sink into insignificance. The present is no time for palliations. Action, prompt action, is required. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a distinct and practical proposition for conciliation may drive us to a point from which it will be almost impossible to recede.

A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can be produced is surely not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by letting the North have exclusive control of the territory above a certain line and to give Southern institutions protection below that line ought to receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed, it may not be entirely satisfactory, but when the alternative is between a reasonable concession on both sides and a destruction of the Union it is an imputation upon the patriotism of Congress to assert that its members will hesitate for a moment.

Even now the danger is upon us. In several of the States which have not yet seceded the forts, arsenals, and magazines of the United States have been seized. This is by far the most serious step which has been taken since the commencement of the troubles. This public property has long been left without garrisons and troops for its protection, because no person doubted its security under the flag of the country in any State of the Union. Besides, our small Army has scarcely been sufficient to guard our remote frontiers against Indian incursions. The seizure of this property, from all appearances, has been purely aggressive, and not in resistance to any attempt to coerce a State or States to remain in the Union.

At the beginning of these unhappy troubles I determined that no act of mine should increase the excitement in either section of the country. If the political conflict were to end in a civil war, it was my determined purpose not to commence it nor even to furnish an excuse for it by any act of this Government. My opinion remains unchanged that justice as well as sound policy requires us still to seek a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the North and the South. Entertaining this conviction, I refrained even from sending reenforcements to Major Anderson, who commanded the forts in Charleston Harbor, until an absolute necessity for doing so should make itself apparent, lest it might unjustly be regarded as a menace of military coercion, and thus furnish, if not a provocation, at least a pretext for an outbreak on the part of South Carolina. No necessity for these reenforcements seemed to exist. I was assured by distinguished and upright gentlemen of South Carolina that no attack upon Major Anderson was intended, but that, on the contrary, it was the desire of the State authorities as much as it was my own to avoid the fatal consequences which must eventually follow a military collision.

And here I deem it proper to submit for your information copies of a communication, dated December 28, 1860, addressed to me by R. W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, and James L. Orr, “commissioners” from South Carolina, with the accompanying documents, and copies of my answer thereto, dated December 31.

In further explanation of Major Anderson's removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, it is proper to state that after my answer to the South Carolina “commissioners” the War Department received a letter from that gallant officer, dated on the 27th of December, 1860, the day after this movement, from which the following is an extract:

I will add as my opinion that many things convinced me that the authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act.

Evidently referring to the orders, dated December 11, of the late Secretary of War.

Under this impression I could not hesitate that it was my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we could not probably have held longer than forty-eight or sixty hours to this one, where my power of resistance is increased to a very great degree.

It will be recollected that the concluding part of these orders was in the following terms:

The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of either one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

It is said that serious apprehensions are to some extent entertained (in which I do not share) that the peace of this District may be disturbed before the 4th of March next. In any event, it will be my duty to preserve it, and this duty shall be performed.

In conclusion it may be permitted to me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed, and, whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for my country.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

SOURCE: James Daniel Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, 1789-1908, Volume 5, p. 655-9