Washington City, 30th December, 1860.
Gentlemen: I
have the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with a
copy of your “full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina,”
authorising you to treat with the Government of the United States on various
important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the Ordinance
bearing date on the 20th instant, declaring that “the Union now subsisting
between South Carolina and other States under the name of ‘the United States of
America,’ is hereby dissolved.”
In answer to this communication,
I have to say, that my position as President of the United States was clearly
defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart
from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the
Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the
Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such
discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing
between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This
would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the
dissolution of the Confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It
bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government
— involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part,
be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress
the whole question, in all its bearings.”
Such is my opinion
still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest
character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition
you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well
aware. It was my earnest desire, that such a disposition might he made of the
whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the
inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of
the Federal Forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret,
that, in your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render this
impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the
troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating that, “under present circumstances,
they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and as our
recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue,
questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”
The reason for this
change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, “an officer
of the United States, acting as we (you) are assured, not only without, but
against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus
altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we
(you) came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of an
authority which could, at any time, within the past sixty days have taken
possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in
a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my)
honor rather than to its own power.”
This brings me to a
consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they
have been observed. In my message
of the third of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the
United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair
equivalent ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the State,’ ‘for the erection
of forts, magazines, arsenals,’ &c, and over these the authority ‘to
exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the Constitution
to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the
United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be
mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act
strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for
consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This
being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the
representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview.
We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best
means of preventing a collision between the parties for the purpose of sparing
the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be
best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly,
and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper
signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception,
of which the following is a copy:
And here I must, in
justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I
objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement, on
my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was farther from
their intention — they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider
it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the
subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in
their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than
the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the
purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this
promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or
from any member of the Convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was
my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the
harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or
until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I
received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might
still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is
the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.
But I acted in the
same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal
agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would
have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.
The world knows
that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor,
and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their relative
military status.”
Bearing upon this
subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th
inst., to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant.'
It is as follows:
Memorandum
of verbal instructions to Major Anderson,
1st
Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C.
You
are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the
troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied
determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts
in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore,
carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any
measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or
which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will
not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere
with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons
may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it
proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a
contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such
instructions.
You
are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke
aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent
necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption
of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this
harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The
smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one
of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either
of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your
command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its
power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps
whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.
D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.
Fort Moultrie, S. C, Dec. 11, 1860.
This
is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.
JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.
These were the last
instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter,
with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any
degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear
that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority,
unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile
act,” on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been
alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer; and justice requires that
he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.
Be this as it may,
when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to
Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former
position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions.
This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by
the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But, before any steps could
possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on
the 28th instant, that “the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle
Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort
Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking
for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that
the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next
day after the night when the removal was made, seized, by a military force, two
of the three federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them
under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy
period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very
day (the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, the
Palmetto flag was raised over the federal Custom House and Post Office in
Charleston; and, on the same day, every officer of the Customs — Collector,
Naval Officers, Surveyor and Appraisers — resigned their offices. And this,
although it was well known, from the language of my message, that, as an
executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of
Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston, we now find
three forts confronting each other, over all of which the federal flag floated
only four days ago; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted,
and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is, under all these
circumstances, that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the
harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is
impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never
thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been
made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference
is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the
possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the
officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions,
to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice
of any such inference.
At this point of
writing, I have received information, by telegram, from Captain Humphreys, in
command of the Arsenal at Charleston, “that it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th)
been taken by force of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging
to the United States in this Arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.
Comment is
needless. After this information, I have only to add, that, whilst it is my
duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United
States against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such
means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence
can be construed into a menace against the City of Charleston.
With great personal
regard, I remain
Yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
To Honorable
Robert W. Barnwell,
James H. Adams,
James L. Orr.
SOURCE: The
Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the
Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p.
5-11
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