Showing posts with label Francis W Pickens. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Francis W Pickens. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 11, 2023

John Tyler to James Buchanan, Saturday Evening, February 9, 1861

Saturday evening, February 9, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: I communicated to Governor Pickens what passed between us as to Mr. Holt's letter, and I am happy to say that the reply, received a moment ago, leaves me no ground to fear any early disturbance. The whole subject is referred to the convention at Montgomery, as I plainly infer. The conclusion is in these words: "Everything which can be done consistently with the honor and safety of this State, to avoid collision and bloodshed, has been and will be the purpose of the authorities here."

Thus, my dear sir, the inquietude you expressed may be dismissed.

Very truly and faithfully yours,
JOHN TYLER.

SOURCES: Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p. 612; John Bassett Moore, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan: Comprising His Speeches, State Papers and Private Correspondence, Vol. 11: 1860-1868, p. 142

Tuesday, October 10, 2023

John Tyler to James Buchanan, February 20, 1861—2 p.m.

TWO O'CLOCK P. M., February 20, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: I have this moment received a telegram from Charleston. The Governor says: Received your message; know nothing about the report you spoke of; no one is authorized to speak for me; things must stand without any movement in force." I would send the dispatch, but the latter part of it relates to another matter.

Truly and sincerely your friend,
JOHN TYLER.

SOURCE: Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p. 614

Monday, March 20, 2023

Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, January 16, 1861

I have been kept for a week, and am still, in a state of great anxiety about the dangerous political excitements at home. The President has taken an attitude less friendly to the secessionists. This has been owing, it would seem, to the occupation of Fort Moultrie and the seizure of a revenue cutter, in the harbour of Charleston, by the South Carolina authorities. General Floyd, as Secretary of War, had pledged his honour to Governor Pickens that there should be no change in the status of the fortifications in the harbour.

Major Anderson, in command, with prudent strategy, shifted his little garrison of twenty men from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. The South Carolina Commissioners at Washington protested, alleging breach of faith. Floyd demanded orders to Anderson to go back. The President declined. Governor Pickens sent militia into Fort Moultrie and seized a United States cutter. Floyd resigned on 29th of December, and his resignation was quietly accepted on the 31st by the President, who appointed Postmaster-General Holt to conduct the department until a successor was named. The President has addressed Congress, announced his determination to protect the property and collect the revenue of the United States with all the power at his disposal, and is said to have directed the frigate Brooklyn to be held in readiness at Norfolk, while two revenue cutters are proceeding to Charleston harbour, on board which a new Collector, McIntyre, of Pennsylvania, will exact the duties on imports. In the interim reinforcements are being sent to Southern garrisons, as a determination to seize them has shown itself in Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina. These facts, if well founded, place the country in imminent risk of civil war; and if, at the bottom of the whole, there exist, as Mr. Daniel, our Minister to Turin, vehemently assured me on Monday last was the case, an immense majority in the South who desire disunion and have been preparing to accomplish it for twenty years, it would seem that a sanguinary convulsion is unavoidable. Perhaps a large movement of militia, similar to the one made by Washington in 1794 against our Whiskey Insurrection, would overawe the disaffected and restore tranquillity. Certainly, South Carolina has taken, by capturing forts and cutters, a more decisively insurrectionary character than could be attributed to the disorderly riots of Pennsylvania.

My old friend "Betsey Bonaparte" and her son have enlisted Berryer and Legrand in a trial to come off on the 25th inst., before the Court of First Instance in Paris, asserting the validity of the marriage of Jerome in Baltimore in 1803, and claiming to share in the property he has left. If the marriage be sustained, the necessary result would be the illegitimacy of Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilde. Here is fine garbage for Imperial scandal! and "Betsey" is not one, though she can't lack much of eighty, to shrink in the pursuit of money or to be scared by a crown.

SOURCE: George Mifflin Dallas, Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, While United States Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839, and to England 1856 to 1861, Volume 3, p. 428-30

Tuesday, November 24, 2020

Governor Francis W. Pickens to Jefferson Davis, February 27, 1861

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Charleston, S.C., February 27, 1861.
The PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES,  &c.,
Montgomery, Ala :

DEAR SIR: I received yours dated the 22d instant by Colonel Lucas, inclosing the resolution of Congress expressly taking charge of the military operations in the harbor of Charleston.* I have the fullest confidence that you and Congress will do everything that may be due to the honor and the rights of South Carolina.

Of course we feel that our honor and safety require that Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the very earliest moment possible. We have had great difficulties to contend with. By the extraordinary movement  of the United States garrison from Fort Moultrie we were suddenly and unexpectedly precipitated into a situation which created the most hostile feelings, and were at the outset involved in the most scientific and expensive branches of modern warfare, where the most exact military knowledge and experience were required.

I felt this, and therefore telegraphed you to come by Charleston on your way to Mississippi, in order to consult on military matters, &c. I again sent to the governor of Georgia for General Twiggs, and then sent to you for a military engineer, as I desired the highest military approbation. Before taking the last step I earnestly wished the best military counsels.

Major Whiting is here, and thinks our energies have been too much directed to attacking Fort Sumter, and not enough to the defenses of the harbor, so as to prevent re-enforcements, &c. You will see him, and, of course, now we will await your orders and the directions of Congress, as we feel that our cause is common, and that it is due to our common government that we should do nothing to involve all the States united in a permanent war by any separate act of ours, unless it shall be necessary in self-defense or to prevent re-enforcements; but in the mean time I will go on with the same activity as ever in preparing our defenses and our men for any event that may arise.

We would desire to be informed if when thoroughly prepared to take the fort shall we do so, or shall we await your order; and shall we demand the surrender, or will that demand be made by you?

An answer to this by telegram is desired.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. W. PICKENS.
_______________

* Resolution approved February 15 and 22.  See under last date.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 258-9

Leroy P. Walker to Governor Francis W. Pickens, March 1, 1861

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,     
Montgomery, March 1, 1861.
GOV. F. W. PICKENS, Charleston, S. C.:

Your letter to President received. This Government assumes the control of military operations at Charleston, and will make demand of the fort when fully advised. An officer goes to-night to take charge.

L. P. WALKER,    
Secretary of War.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 259

Resolution of the Confederate Congress, February 22, 1861

CONGRESS, February 22, 1861.

Mr. Bartow, from the Committee on Military Affairs, reported the following resolution, which was adopted, viz:

Resolved, That the President of the Confederate States be requested to communicate, in such manner as he may deem expedient, to the governors of South Carolina and Florida the resolution of Congress concerning Forts Sumter and Pickens.

_______________

SEE: Resolution in Relation to the Occupation of Forts Sumter and Pickens, February 15, 1861

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 258; Don Carlos Seitz, Braxton Bragg, General of the Confederacy, p. 29

Sunday, October 6, 2019

Dr. Francis Mallory* to Congressman Robert M. T. Hunter, January 12, 1840

Near Hampton, [va.], January 12, 1840.

Dear Hunter: For some months past I had almost given over talking or reading of politics and my papers by the dozens were filed on my table unopened. So that your election might for a season have escaped my observation, so seldom is it that I leave home except to officiate occasionally in the humble capacity of an attendant on human misery. Indeed I am utterly secluded from the gay world and its noisy concerns. While in this state of existence an afternoons chat with a neighbor, both of us mounted on a rail, was broken in upon by a horseman in full gallop who had sought me out to communicate your good fortune. It proved to be our friend Booker and most happily did we converse over your distinguished person. To congratulate you at this late season would perhaps be out of place. I have for several days intended dropping you a Line but my old enemy, procrastination hovers around me closer than ever. Most heartily I rejoice at this unexpected tho’ not undeserved honor. You have nothing to fear, but act out your part and the “just of all parties will sustain you.” To speak on this occasion as I feel and think would, to one of your modesty, savor somewhat of deceit or flattery; and I can only repeat that I rejoice in your elevation and trust it is only the promise of still better fortune and more distinguished honors. Altho’ I can understand by what means your election was effected I cannot at this distance from the centre of action account for some few votes, such for instance as that of Rhett and more especially Dixon Lewis on the last ballot.1 The former you know is no favorite of mine. I have no faith in the soundness of his head or the honesty of his heart. Like most reforming gentlemen he is a selfish changeling. As sure as you live he will deceive some of those who now confidently calculate on his services. B. H. Rhett aspires to be a leader and will some day or other set up for himself. So soon as the weather breaks, for we have had a most severe winter, I will send you up some good oysters. By the way who brews your punch now that I am no longer an honourable? Does Mr. Speaker heat his water in a shaving can as of yore to fabricate this divine distillation and regale himself with an air bath in a sitting posture by the round table as was the case on a certain occasion which now shall be nameless.

I like not Calhoun's reconciliation (so far as I understand it) with V[an] B[uren]. He has reversed his position. The Whigs on whom at least he depended for support he has in a measure driven off. His recent quarrel with Clay, altho I think not at first the aggressor, was ill timed and will prove ruinous. If he leans alone on Locofoism he will find it a broken reed. The bulk of the Whigs begin already to look up to him as their man against Benton, and Clay's friends are true to him to the last. Besides Clay is broken down as a Pre[sidential] candidate and by some little management his party in the South might have been secured. But I pretend to no knowledge of these things and let them pass. As regards myself politically speaking I have no hopes or fears. Mr. Loyall, the Navy agent, is about resigning his office to become Pres[iden]t of a Bank in Norfolk. My friend Robertson would like to obtain it on acc[oun]t of a poor brother-in-Law who could fill the station of club and thus provide for a large family. He is every way fit for this or any other station. His politics too are right—that is he is with us on any subject. Holleman will strive to sustain a Betonian in the person of his friend Dr. Batten of Smithfield. Robertson is the Leading Whig in the district and on the score of policy the adm[inistration] would gain. He is an honest fellow—a perfect gentleman and my best friend. Can you withoutt [sic] prejudice to your position without violence to your personal feelings assist him? Trust me in the matter as a friend. Be candid for from the circumstances surrounding, you ought only to be governed. Be not guided by ordinary rules on such occasions, for I know, and I hope, I appreciate the delicacy of your position. I would not call you friend if I thought you could not act with the utmost freedom toward me. If you can properly act, consult with Pickens and my late associates and do what you can for me, but decide and act at once. Send T G Broughton and son and S. T. Hill of Portsm[outh], Va., a document now and then. They will be pleased. If you see or write to Mason tender him my best salutations. If Mrs. Hunter is in the city and young Mr. Speaker be pleased to present me to them with my best respects. Wishing you, Hunter, every honor to which your heart aspires and every happiness which a virtuous and independent mind can here enjoy

I remain
[Dr. Francis Mallory.]

[P. S.]—Sewart is in Washington. Poor fellow he has become a vagabond—one of the last acts of his political life was a deliberate and I fear a mercenary conspiracy against my election. I pity him and still more his destitute family. My friends name is Geo. H. Robertson.
_______________

* A Whig Representative in Congress from Virginia, 1837-1843.

1 Robert B. Rhett voted for Francis W. Pickens of South Carolina; Dixon H. Lewis for George M. Keim of Pennsylvania. Benton, Abridgement of Debates of Congress, XIV, 8.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916 in Two Volumes, Volume II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter 1826-1876, p. 31-3

Tuesday, July 16, 2019

George Fitzhugh to Congressman Robert M. T. Hunter, December 15, 1839

Port Royal, [va.], December 15,1839.

Dear Hunter: I have not seen one single whig to whom the nomination of Harrison is acceptable. Many already declare they will vote for Van Buren in preference, some say they will not vote at all, and the rest that they will vote for any body sooner than Van Buren and for that reason alone will sustain Harrison.

Excuse me for suggesting to you that this is a favourable opportunity for you to let it be known that you will under present circumstances sustain the re-election of Van Buren. Dont let it be known however through me but if possible through some states right Whig in your District who is likely to pursue the same course. It seems to me this course will at once place you in an easy situation, in which you may enjoy the fruits of a pretty wide spread reputation, acquired, perhaps, in part by the painful notoriety of your late neutral position.

Of course, I only urge you to express opinions, which I believe you sincerely entertain.

I have been tracking Bob Hunter lately. * * * He is so far every thing I could desire. I should be glad to hear from you occasionally, I am too busy to visit Washington. Present my compliments to Mr. Pickens and tell him I have instructed you to sustain him for speaker.

SOURCE: Charles Henry Ambler, Editor, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1916 in Two Volumes, Volume II, Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter 1826-1876, p. 30

Wednesday, April 3, 2019

Commandant Samuel F. DuPont to Gustavus V. Fox, January 4, 1862

Confidential.
Port Royal, Jany. 4, 62.
My Dear Sir

The Vanderbilt played us a scurvy trick yesterday, having gone off without our mail, paid no attention to a gun from this ship, nor to a Tug which followed her out to the bar making signals all the time. Whether it was accident or design for a particular purpose — I cannot say.

The Oriental takes to-day the official reports of a clever joint Expedition, well conducted on both sides, in which the gun boats have been signally successful and drawing as much admiration from the troops engaged, as the whole fleet did on the day of the capture of the Forts.

The getting of them up the Port Royal or Beaufort River and then into the Coosaw (our Potomac) but thoroughly swept now, was a great feat, like the Spaniards over the dykes in Holland. Of course they often grounded, but they care no more for this than putting a mud flat on the beach. With light anchors hanging from the bowsprit and the armed boats from this ship they were even turned in their length — it having been asserted they would not be able to do this in either of the rivers. The truth is, wherever Raymond Rodgers is, things are sure to go right — he possesses more enterprise with care and forethought combined than I have met with before. Gen. Stevens has sent me a handsome letter in reference to the cooperation, semi-official. Our howitzers under Irwin composed their only field artillery. This army code of signals is very superior, Rodgers and Stevens kept up the most perfect communication. The general impression is that the rebels did not come up to the mark, after a great deal of taunting and invitation heretofore for our troops to “dare come” on the fort land, and leave the islands. Our shell did immense execution. A Colonel out with the skirmishers could see them burst among the rebel troops within the line of works—four men literally torn in fragments were killed by the bursting of one. Stevens thinks Evans was in command — the Leesburg man.

Now My Dear friend a little business. In order to carry out the above Expedition which has raised very much the morale of our troops, and in spite of themselves giving them a still higher opinion of us, I had to withdraw Ammen from Edisto, leaving Budd shaking in his boots lest the Charleston Navy come down upon him. The Ottawa had to come up from Tybee leaving Drayton with a lame duck the Wyandotte, and the old Vandalia, with heavy fire rafts building up the river. A three hundred feet one having been cut adrift by a loyal man from under Pulaski, was caught in Tybee and gave us excellent timber. The Pembina had to be taken from old Gillis threatened by the Georgia Navy in Wassaw, the 'Andrew' being disabled in her rudder. The blockading ships are getting out of coal and how I can relieve them I can hardly tell. Now, most important operations are pending between the Comdg General and myself based on naval and army reconnaissances and contraband knowledge, of communications from Wassaw inlet into the Savannah River, also into the latter, through the islands on its northern or left bank, such as Venus and Elba—allowing Pulaski to be cut off from all supplies, a vastly better plan than a regular approach with mortars, which will cost a half million of dollars. I send a report from Captain Gilmore and wish I had John Rodgers' sent up last night from Wassaw (another man worth his weight in Gold) and you would then have some insight into our plans. We can debouche into the Savannah river between Pulaski and Jackson, rather near the latter, and hold the river there against Tattnall while the troops are occupying Elba and fortifying it. On the mainland there is hard ground enough for Sherman to move on the city, but he must have cavalry; he can get there by boats through the inland waters and is now drawing up piles from Wall's Cut, sunk after the fight here and a hulk sunk besides. Now I don't want to press you — but I am spread to my utmost capacity and if you cannot send me more of the regular Gunboats and particularly one or two of the new side wheel ones, (one of them to be given to John Rodgers) why I must wait — because you are the judge and not me where they are most wanted. I won't growl, but you have sent me nothing yet. Another item. Our army friends beat us all to pieces on the means of communicating and transportation, and I have to fall back upon them oftener than is pleasant to them — for example I did not dare remove my force from Wassaw and had to get them to tow down a coal ship for me, and by the way this brought up a question of insurance and further compensation to the Collier, please see to this in future charters. I have already asked the Department for a dispatch vessel. I dare not send the Tugs outside. No Commodores Perry nor Barney yet, and what has become of that Light vessel! Coal, Coal too, please tell Lenthall — fortunately the army has long strings of coal vessels and have given us one to-day. Please also tell Mr. Lenthall three of his carpenters have gone home and we want more, a good boat builder among them, sending none but such as are willing to stay. Please hurry on the Forbes and what has become of Watmough! No machinery yet for Unadilla a painful lame bird and an eye sore in the harbor — if her commander a very worthy man is promoted do send a flash of a fellow out to her.

Steedman has sent me word that the Nassau people are going to try Cedar Keys, afraid of the North East gales on this side and so many of their small craft having been run into the breakers the last by the Gem of the Sea at Georgetown. I am dispatching the Florida there though it is on McKean's ground, for she may catch the Gladiator or her cargo distributed, and she will see to the safety of the Lighthouses &c. The Rail Road from Cedar Keys has caused this diversion from this Coast.

We are getting short of officers. The Vandalia is very short.

We had news from Wassaw last night that the Negroes were to have a stampede from Savannah—the Fingal had gone back and unloaded, and that Tattnall's vessel had been burnt by the slaves — that 17000 men were between Sh & Brunswick, intending to set fire to the former city when overpowered. Some of the contraband who bring news in this way are very superior darkies. “William” who went with the Gun boats especially so. I intend to give him fifty dolls for his pilotage and enter him as a Pilot — he knows every foot of the inland waters. These men risk their lives to serve us without the slightest hesitation, indeed like Governor Pickens they seem insensible to fear — make no bargains about their remuneration, leave all that with entire confidence to us. The batteries at Skiddaway, Thunderbolt, and Green island (on the Ogeechee) are pretty fierce and the water shallow — but what I have told you above will fool them all. The contraband report great gloom in Savannah at what they call the apology to England, every one looking to a war. A thousand cavalry in from Virginia and say the rebels have given up Western Virga.

Best regards to Mr. Welles.
Yours faithfully
S. F. Dupont
Hon. G. V. Fox Ass. Sec
Washington

I have nothing from my home since 10" Dec. I believe our Lyceum mail don't come. Savannah bad with scurvy has come in for wood and water and provisions.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 86-90

Saturday, August 11, 2018

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, January 1, 1861

Washington, D. C,
January 1st, 1861.

Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the Message to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance” as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.
Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.

In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.”

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.

You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H. ADAMS,
JAMES L. ORR.
Commissioners.
To his Excellency, the President
of the United States.


[Endorsement.]

Executive Mansion,
3½ o'clock, Wednesday.

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 12-20

Monday, July 23, 2018

Result Of Gustavus V. Fox's Plan For Reinforcing Fort Sumpter; In His Own Writing

My plan for reinforcing Fort Sumpter was this—

From the outer edge of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.

I proposed to anchor three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might dictate.

Rough weather would render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan was brought to the Prests notice early in March and its practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.

The military authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured the Prest that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown in the fort it could not be taken.

I visited Major Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order. Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Prest to reinforce and provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the military power against the plan.

As Major Anderson's supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made so many preposterous demands  that the Prest decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York, and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.

Unwilling to mention to the Prest the misgivings of those around me I determined to go forward alone.

Instead of the 300 sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the 8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H. Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the 13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort was set on fire by hot shot and by 3 P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.

The defects of the fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Prest of the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the Prest was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury to the Govt.

The Charleston people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled. The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.

In fact their fire upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.

G. V. Fox.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41

Saturday, April 7, 2018

Gustavus V. Fox to Governor Francis W. Pickens, April 12, 1861


[April 12, 1861]
F. W. Pickens, Gov. S. C.

Sir,

The U. S. Govt has directed me to deliver a quantity of provisions to Major Anderson at Fort Sumpter, due notice of which has probably been given to you by special messenger from Washington.

Accordingly I send herewith the first load. If your batteries open fire it will be upon an unarmed boat, and unarmed men performing an act of duty and humanity.

G. V. Fox
In charge of Transport

Herewith I commence sending you the subsistence entrusted to my charge to be delivered at Fort Sumpter.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 18

Gustavus V. Fox to Captain Daniel Jackson, April 12, 1861

Capt. Daniel Jackson
Pilot—

Sir—

I send you to Fort Sumpter with a load of provisions to be delivered with a letter to Major A. when you will immediately return. If you are fired upon going in, turn back at once. If any one opposes your entrance deliver to that person the letter addressed to Gov. Pickens and return — if your entrance is still opposed.

Very truly,
G. V. Fox

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 18

Thursday, March 22, 2018

Gustavus V. Fox to Montgomery Blair, March 31, 1861

N. York
31 Mch. '61
Dr Judge,

I saw Mr. Aspinwall yesterday and in the evening met him and Capt. Marshall. From being for a long time most earnest in this matter, they are now astonished at the idea of Govt attempting it declaring that the time has past and that the people are reconciled to leaving this position and making the stand on Pickens &c. &c. &c. We argued the point till midnight. They propose making no move till Tuesday on account of the loan, promising that they can get me ready in time after that. I really think they doubt my word in the matter. I hope orders to the proper party for making the contracts will be sent at once. I had no chance to say to Mr. Welles that the heaviest howitzers must be put on the men of war for use in the tugs. The vital point in my opinion is a naval force that can destroy their naval preparations. All else is easy. Como Stringham is the person for the Sec'y to consult. The tugs may be obliged to go in and grapple with the enemy and the naval force must be sufficient, beyond a doubt, to accomplish it. I only suggested the three vessels as being all that were available. The navy will answer that this force is all right. I am sure of all else. I shall take ten boats in the Baltic so as to use either them or the tugs, as circumstances may require. I wish copies of the latest letters from Major Anderson, say since my visit, may be sent me, where there is any reference to matters. You have no idea of the fears existing with these gentlemen and I am not sure that they will decline all participation. So fall away, in the hour of peril, hands and hearts that should stand by our Govt. I am real heart sick, not discouraged, at the delays, obstacles and brief time allowed for a vital measure that should have had months' careful preparations.

I called upon Mrs. Anderson. She showed me a private letter from her husband where he writes, “I have just recd a letter from Genl Beauregard wherein he says Col Lamon told Gov. Pickens that in a few days I (Major A) would be transferred to another place."

Write or telegraph me at once, 77 Nassau St. care of Lowery.

Sincerely yrs
G. V. Fox.

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 12-13

Monday, March 19, 2018

Gustavus V. Fox to Virginia Woodbury Fox, March 19, 1861

Washington D.C.
Mch 19, ’61
Dr V.

I am real homesick for the kind company of the dearest wife in the world — the best and the sweetest. But our Uncle Abe Lincoln has taken a high esteem for me and wishes me to take dispatches to Major Anderson at Fort Sumpter with regard to its final evacuation and to obtain a clear statement of his condition which his letters, probably guarded, do not fully exhibit. I have really great curiosity to see the famous Fort and several of my naval intimates are there in command. Gov. Pickens may turn me back but I think not. I leave this eve and ought to return here Sunday and N. Y. Tuesday or Wednesday. Minna thinks I am going to N. Y. and knows nothing of my visit here, though very inquisitive: be careful in all your letters. Write me Friday or Sat. and tell me how you are and all about the Dr and where you are.

Aff
GUS

SOURCES: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 9-10

Wednesday, March 7, 2018

Montgomery Blair to Gustavus V. Fox, January 31, 1861

Wash. 31 Jany 61
Dear Fox:

I recd yours about the Tug of War yesterday and laid it before Genl Scott, who upon reading it said it had been reported by Blount and your qualifications extolled to the highest degree and that he knew no man in whose judgment of a Sailor he had more implicit confidence than in Blount. I gave him a short sketch of your personal history myself and left the letter. I rather suspect, from what appears in the papers, that there may have been already attempts and perhaps powerful attempts made to relieve Fort Sumpter upon your scheme substantially, that is, by boats from heavier vessels lying out at night. I have some doubt whether in fact the authorities would not connive at reenforcement made in a manner not to subject them to suspicion of complicity. I cannot think the Gov. of S.C. is at all anxious to drive the Gnl Gov't to an expedition against Charleston involving a great battle between the forces of the North and South to relieve this garrison. It must come to that, if relief is not furnished in the manner you suggest. In a controversy of the sort I refer to, there must be immense destruction of life, and no one can doubt what the ultimate result must be. I can therefore well see that men of forecaste should seek to avoid bringing it to their own doors. I am not sure however that it will not come to that, and it may not in the end be the worst course. The real cause of our trouble arises from the notion generally entertained at the South that the men of the North are inferiors and the rebellion springs altogether from pride which revolts against submission to supposed inferiors. You hear these blusterers say every where that one Southern man is equal to half a dozen Yankees, and that feeling has impelled them to appeal from the Constitutional mode of determining who shall govern, to arms. They will not submit, they say, to mere numbers made up of the Mudsills, the factory people and shop keepers of the North. They swell just like the grandiloquent Mexicans. And I really fear that nothing short of the lesson we had to give Mexico to teach the Spanish don better manners, will ever satisfy the Southern Gascons that the people of the North are their equals even upon the field upon which they have now chosen to test the questions. And it is my deliberate opinion that nothing will do so much to secure real and permanent fraternity between the Sections as a decisive defeat on this field. It will show the Southern people that they wholly mistake the quality of the men they are taught by demagogues to despise. Having taught them to respect the North, conciliatory language wd be listened to as proceeding from kindness of feeling and not from fear and in a short time a better state of feeling wd grow up than has ever existed between the two Sections.

I do not at all believe in the dissolution of the Union, or that the application of force involving the destruction of life to preserve the Union will so exasperate the Sections as to render reconciliation impossible. On the contrary, I believe that it is necessary to enforce the laws to prevent a deeper contempt falling upon the North than is now entertained by the South, and that having vindicated the laws and secured respect even at the cost of blood, the real good feeling which the people of the North have for the South will work off all bitterness in a short time. In other words, in this, as in all cases, I believe it is wisest and most politic to do exactly right. It is not right to suffer this noble fabric of freedom to be overthrown by demagoguery. It needs but determination in the rulers of the people to maintain and to save it from all its enemies, and with less of blood and treasure than any alarmist will believe. I am for the Union, now and forever, and against all its enemies, whether fire-eaters or abolitionists.

Love to Gin and believe me,
Yrs truly,
M. BLAIR

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 3-5

Monday, September 25, 2017

Salmon P. Chase to John Townsend Trowbridge of Somerville, Massachusetts, March 21, 1864

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1864.

. . . . IMMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet, the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, “Shall he be relieved?” General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt, both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send provisions to the garrison.

Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of Washington was to be accomplished by this force.

I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done, and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond. The notion proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk, except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops, and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin. After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16 were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.

The object I had in view in all this was — as there was no law authorizing the raising of the force required — to prepare to make a regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were promulgated in May, 1861.

There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view — beyond the simple provision of force — which were, order and system, and through these efficiency and accountability.

During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their success. The President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri. When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two. They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.

While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed very early that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters, General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or require.

It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. Hc was not to interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States, keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from Congress. . . .

SOURCES: Jacob William Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 418-20; see John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 4: Correspondence, April 1863-1864, p. 335-50 for the entire letter.

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Official Reports of the Operations in Charleston Harbor, S. C., December 20, 1860 – April 14, 1861: No. 26. – Joint reports of Maj. D. R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army; and Col. Charles Allston, jr., Commander H. T. Hartstene, C. S. Navy, and Messrs. William Porcher Miles and Roger A. Pryor, aides-de-camp

No. 26.

Joint reports of Maj. D. R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army; and Col. Charles Allston, jr., Commander H. T. Hartstene, C. S. Navy,  and Messrs. William Porcher Miles and Roger A. Pryor, aides-de-camp.

CHARLESTON, April 15, 1861.

SIR: We, the undersigned, beg leave to submit the following report of our visit to Fort Sumter, and of our interview with Major Anderson, on Saturday, the 13th instant, in obedience to your orders.

We arrived at the fort about a quarter to 3 o'clock p.m.; were met at the wharf by Captain Seymour, and were at once conducted to the presence of Major Anderson. We informed him that we came from you to say that, on learning the fort was in flames, and his flag down, you had sent Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Lee, members of your staff, to offer any assistance in your power, and that as soon as his flag of truce was hoisted you sent us to receive any propositions he might wish to make. Major Anderson said an exceedingly disagreeable and embarrassing mistake had occurred; that his flagstaff had been shot down, but that as soon as it could be done his flag was again hoisted.

Just at this time it was reported to him that General Wigfall was outside the fort demanding to see the commanding officer. Major Anderson said that he went out and met General Wigfall, who told him that he came from General Beauregard to demand the surrender of the fort, and urged Major Anderson to haul down his flag and run up a flag of truce; that General Beauregard would give him the same terms offered before the conflict began. Major Anderson then stated that he was much surprised to learn from Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Lee, who had arrived at the fort soon after he had lowered his flag, that although General Wigfall was on the staff of General Beauregard, he had been two days away from him, and was acting on the staff of some general on Morris Island; that as soon as he (Major Anderson) learned this, he told Captain Lee that he would immediately run up his flag and recommence his firing.

Major Anderson then read to us a note which he had sent to you by the hands of Captain Lee, in which he said that he would surrender the fort on the same terms offered by you in your letter to him on the 11th instant. On learning this we told him that we were authorized to offer him those terms, excepting only the clause relating to the salute to the flag, to which Major Anderson replied it would be exceedingly gratifying to him, as well as to his command, to be permitted to salute their flag, having so gallantly defended the fort under such trying circumstances, and hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as such a privilege was not unusual. We told him we were not authorized to grant that privilege, and asked him what his answer would be if not permitted to salute his flag. He said he would not urge the point, but would prefer to refer the matter again to you, and requested us to see you again and get your reply.

Major Anderson requested us to say to Governor Pickens and yourself that, as an evidence of his desire to save the public property as much as possible, he had three times on Friday and twice on Saturday sent his men up to extinguish the fire under the heavy fire of our batteries, and when the magazines were in imminent danger of being blown up.

We then returned to the city and reported to you substantially as above.

We have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHAS. ALLSTON, JR.,
Colonel and A. D.C.
Brig. Gen. G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Commanding Provisional Army.
_______________

CHARLESTON, S.C., April 14, 1861.

GENERAL: In accordance with your order we have the honor to take the following report:

On Saturday, April 13, at about 7 o'clock p.m., we proceeded to Fort Sumter by your order to arrange finally the conditions of the evacuation. We presented your communication to Major Anderson, who, after perusing it, read it aloud to his officers, all of whom, we believe, were present. The major expressed himself much gratified with the tenor of the communication and the generous terms agreed to by you. We inquired of Major Anderson when he desired to leave, He said as soon as possible, and suggested 9 o'clock the next morning. It was arranged that the Catawba or some other steamer should convey the major and his command either directly to New York or put them on board the United States fleet then lying outside the bar, according as one or the other plan might be agreed upon after a conference with the commander of the fleet. Major Anderson requested us to take Lieutenant Snyder down to the fleet for the purpose of arranging the matter. This Captain Hartstene undertook to do.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WM. PORCHER MILES,
R. A. PRYOR,
H. J. HARTSTENE, C. S. N,
Aides-de-Camp.
Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,
Comdg. Provisional Army, C. S. A.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 64-6; This report is quoted in Samuel Wylie Crawford’s The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 442.

Sunday, November 13, 2016

Major Robert Anderson to Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, April 5, 1861

No. 94.]
fort Sumter, S. C., April 5, 1861.
(Received A. G. O., April 8.)
Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Army:

Colonel: I have the honor to report everything still and quiet, and to send herewith the report of Lieutenant Snyder, whom I sent yesterday with a short note and a verbal message to the Governor of South Carolina. No reply has been received to my note.

I cannot but think that Mr. Crawford has misunderstood what he has heard in Washington, as I cannot think that the Government would abandon, without instructions and without advice, a command which has tried to do all its duty to our country.

I cannot but think that if the Government decides to do nothing which can be construed into a recognition of the fact of the dissolution of the Union, that it will, at all events, say to me that I must do the best I can, and not compel me to do an act which will leave my motives and actions liable to misconception.

I am sure that I shall not be left without instructions, even though they may be confidential. After thirty odd years of service I do not wish it to be said that I have treasonably abandoned a post and turned over to unauthorized persons public property intrusted to my charge. I am entitled to this act of justice at the hands of my Government, and I feel confident that I shall not be disappointed. What to do with the public property, and where to take my command, are questions to which answers will, I hope, be at once returned. Unless we receive supplies, I shall be compelled to stay here without food or to abandon this post very early next week.

Confidently hoping that I shall receive ample instructions in time,

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Robert Anderson,
Major First Artillery, Commanding.


SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 241; Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 391-2

1st Lieutenant George W. Snyder to Major Robert Anderson, April 4, 1861

FORT SUMTER S.C., April 4, 1861.
Maj. ROBERT ANDERSON,
First Artillery, U. S. Army Commanding Fort Sumter :

MAJOR: In compliance with your directions, I went, under a flag of truce, to the city of Charleston, in company with Captain Talbot, and had an interview with Governor Pickens and General Beauregard. In the interview with the governor, Captain Talbot only being present, I stated all the circumstances connected with the visits of Captain Seymour and myself to Cummings Point and the schooner Rhoda H. Shannon, which had been fired into by the batteries on Morris Island, on the 3d instant. I called his attention to the fact that he had not complied with his own proposition, to warn all vessels bearing the United States flag not to enter the Harbor. The governor replied that he and General Beauregard, with their staff officers, were standing on the piazza of the Moultrie House on Sullivan's Island, and saw the whole affair, and that my statement corroborated entirely his own personal observation, although it differed slightly from the report of Colonel De Saussure, the commanding officer on Morris Island. The governor said that the commander of the vessel whose duty it was to warn vessels not to enter the harbor had left his post, and had reported that the weather was too boisterous and the sea too rough for him to go out to the schooner Shannon; that this commander had already been sent for, and would be dismissed; that the commander of the cutter would be reprimanded for not going out and examining whether the Shannon were disabled; and that peremptory orders had been sent to Morris Island to stop this random firing.

The governor also said that if Major Anderson deemed it his duty to send out, under unfavorable circumstances, and examine the condition of the schooner Shannon, it was doubly theirs, imposed by humanity, and also by the commercial interest of their harbor.

General Beauregard was invited in, and I repeated what I had said to Governor Pickens to him. The general replied in the same terms as the governor, adding that the practice firing on Morris Island would take place at particular hours.

There was an objection made to Captain Talbot leaving Fort Sumter for Washington, but this was finally overruled and the captain allowed to depart. The governor said that orders had been received from Montgomery not to allow any man in the ranks, or any laborers, to leave Fort Sumter, and not to allow Major Anderson to obtain supplies in Charleston; that Mr. Crawford, a commissioner from the Confederate States, now in Washington, had sent a dispatch to him stating that he was authorized to say that no attempt would be made to re-enforce Fort Sumter with men or provisions, but that Mr. Lincoln would not order Major Anderson to withdraw from Fort Sumter, and would leave him to act for himself; also, advising the governor not to allow any supplies to be sent from the city to Fort Sumter.

I called the attention of both General Beauregard and Governor Pickens to the schooner lying near the left flank of Fort. Sumter. They said they knew nothing of her, but would send and ascertain, and direct her to move further from the fort. Governor Pickens remarked that as they were now acting under the authority of the Confederate States he had consulted with General Beauregard, who was now in command of the troops stationed here.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. SNYDER,
First Lieut. of Engineers, U. S.. Army.



Monday, April 8.
Sent by James E. Harvey by telegraph, last Saturday morning.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 241-2