WASHINGTON, March 21,
1864.
. . . . IMMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet,
the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded
States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company
of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, “Shall he be
relieved?” General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a
less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be
defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that
reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's
batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt,
both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and
cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send
provisions to the garrison.
Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted
to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an
order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished
is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the
rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately
followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of
Washington was to be accomplished by this force.
I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy
Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the
Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done,
and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal
of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond. The notion
proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were
suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite
insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk,
except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long
delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops,
and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become
evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To
replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This
proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the
regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the
Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited
to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin.
After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16
were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular
regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and
suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It
was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.
The object I had in view in all this was — as there was no
law authorizing the raising of the force required — to prepare to make a
regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be
made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before
Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were
promulgated in May, 1861.
There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great
irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the
President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record
was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view — beyond
the simple provision of force — which were, order and system, and through these
efficiency and accountability.
During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in
Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to
take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their success.
The President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the
principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very
active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri.
When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from
Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of
the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's
commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise
twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most
of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet
expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew
Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me
into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two.
They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if
more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical
benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the
interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was
especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from
secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and
Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.
While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred
much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when
asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western
Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General
Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed
very early that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone
in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open
support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to
it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge
within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote
from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of
such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my
suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight
modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I
again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters,
General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from
service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under
such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or
require.
It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at
the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed
without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal
affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated
only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. Hc was not to
interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was
to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as
temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States,
keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from
Congress. . . .
SOURCES: Jacob William Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 418-20; see
John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase
Papers, Volume 4: Correspondence, April 1863-1864, p. 335-50 for the entire
letter.
