Showing posts with label Wm B Franklin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wm B Franklin. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 1, 2020

Major-General William F. Smith to Senator Solomon Foot, July 30, 1864

College Point, L. I., July 30, 1864.
Hon. S. Foot:

Dear Senator: — I am extremely anxious that my friends in my native State should not think that the reasons of General Grant relieving me from duty was brought about by any misconduct of mine, and, therefore, I write to put you in possession of such facts in the case as I am aware of, and think will throw light upon the subject.

About the very last of June or the first of July, Generals Grant and Butler came to my headquarters and shortly after their arrival, General Grant turned to General Butler, and said: “That drink of whiskey I took has done me good,” and then directly afterwards asked me for a drink. My servant opened a bottle for him and he drank of it, when the bottle was corked up and put away. I was aware at this time that General Grant had within six months pledged himself to drink nothing intoxicating, but did not feel it would better matters to decline to give it upon his request in General Butler's presence.

After the lapse of an hour or less the general asked me for another drink, which he took. Shortly after his voice showed plainly that the liquor had affected him and after a little time he left. I went to see him upon his horse, and as I returned to my tent, I said to a staff officer of mine, who had witnessed his departure: “General Grant has gone away drunk; General Butler has seen it and will never fail to use the weapon which has been put into his hands.” Two or three days after that I applied for a leave of absence for the benefit of my health, and General Grant sent word to me not to go, if it were possible to stay, and I replied, in a private note, warranted by our former relations, a copy of which note I will send you in a few days. The next day the Assistant Secretary of War (Mr. Dana) came to tell me that he had been sent by General Grant to say what it becomes necessary to repeat in view of subsequent events, to wit: That he, General G., had written a letter the day before to ask that General Butler might be relieved from that department July 2, and I placed in command of it, giving as a reason that he could not trust General Butler with the command of troops in the movements about to be made, and saying also that next to General Sherman he had more confidence in my ability than in that of any general in the field. The order1 from Washington dated July 7, sent General B. to Fortress Monroe, and placed me in command of the troops, then under him, and General Grant said he would make the changes necessary to give me the troops in the field belonging to that department. I had only asked that I should not be commanded in battle by a man that could not give an order on the field, and I had recommended General Franklin or General Wright for the command of the department. I was at the headquarters of General Grant on Sunday, July 10, and there saw General B., but had no conversation with him. After General B. had left, I had a confidential conversation with General Grant about changes he was going to make. In this connection it is proper to state that our personal relations were of the most friendly character. He had listened to and acted upon suggestions made by me upon more than one important occasion. I then thought and still think (whatever General Butler's letter writers may say to the contrary) that he knew that any suggestion I might make for his consideration would be dictated solely by an intense desire to put down this Rebellion, and not from any personal considerations personal to myself, and that no personal friendships had stood in the way of what I considered my duty with regard to military management, a course not likely to be pursued by a man ambitious of advancement. In this confidential conversation with General Grant, I tried to show him the blunders of the late campaign of the Army of the Potomac and the terrible waste of life that had resulted from what I considered a want of generalship in its present commander. Among other instances I referred to the fearful slaughter at Cold Harbor, on the 3d of June. General Grant went into the discussion defending General Meade stoutly, but finally acknowledged, to use his own words, “that there had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothing about it because it could do no good.” Not a word was said as to my right to criticise General Meade then, and I left without a suspicion that General Grant had taken it in any other way than it was meant, and I do not think he did misunderstand me.

On my return from a short leave of absence on the 19th of July, General Grant sent for me, to report to him, and then told me that he “could not relieve General Butler,” and that as I had so severely criticised General Meade he had determined to relieve me from the command of the Eighteenth Corps and order me to New York City to await orders. The next morning the general gave some other reason, such as an article in the Tribune reflecting on General Hancock, which I had nothing in the world to do with, and two letters which I had written before the campaign began to two of General Grant's most devoted friends, urging upon them to try and prevent him from making the campaign he had just made. These letters, sent to General Grant's nearest friends, and intended for his eye, necessarily sprang from an earnest desire to serve the man upon whom the country had been depending, and these warnings ought to have been my highest justification in his opinion and, indeed, would have been, but that it had become necessary to make out a case against me. All these matters, moreover, were known to the general before he asked that I might be put in command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, and, therefore, they formed no excuse for relieving me from the command I held. I also submit to you that if it had been proven to him that I was unfitted for the command I then held, that that in no wise changed the case with reference to General Butler and his incompetency, and did not furnish a reason why he should not go where the President had ordered him at the request of General Grant, and that as General Grant did immediately after an interview with General Butler suspend the order and announce his intention of relieving me from duty there, other reasons must be sought, different from any assigned, for this sudden change of views and action. Since I have been in New York, I have heard from two different sources (one being from General Grant's headquarters and one a staff officer of a general on intimate official relations with General Butler) that General Butler went to General Grant and threatened to expose his intoxication if the order was not revoked. I also learned that General Butler had threatened to make public something that would prevent the President's re-election. General Grant told me (when I asked him about General Butler's threat of crushing me) that he had heard that General Butler had made some threat with reference to the Chicago convention, which he (Butler) said “he had in his breeches pocket,” but General Grant was not clear in expressing what the threat was. I refer to this simply because I feel convinced that the change was not made for any of the reasons that have been assigned, and whether General Butler has threatened General Grant with his opposition to Mr. Lincoln at the coming election, or has appealed to any political aspirations which General Grant may entertain, I do not know, but one thing is certain, I was not guilty of any acts of insubordination between my appointment and my suspension, for I was absent all those days on leave of absence from General Grant. I only hope this long story will not tire you, and that it will convince you that I have done nothing to deserve a loss of the confidence which was reposed in me.

Yours very truly,
Wm. F. Smith,            
Major-General.

P. S. I have not referred to the state of things existing at headquarters when I left, and to the fact that General Grant was then in the habit of getting liquor in a surreptitious manner, because it was not relevant to my case; but if you think at any time the matter may be of importance to the country I will give it to you. Should you wish to write to me, please address care of S. E. Lyon, Jauncy Court, 39 Wall Street, N. Y.

Wm. F. S.
_______________

1 This order was approved by the President in General Order No. 36, adjutant-general’s office, July 28, 1864.

SOURCE: Benjamin F. Butler, Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benj. F. Butler, p. 1088-90

Saturday, April 25, 2020

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George B. McClellan, December 2, 1861

CONFIDENTIAL.]
SAINT LOUIS, MO., [December 2,] 1861.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commander-in- Chief, Washington, D.C.:

GENERAL: As stated in a former communication, Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman, on reporting here for duty, was ordered to inspect troops (three divisions) at Sedalia and vicinity, and if, in the absence of General Pope, he deemed there was danger of an immediate attack, he was authorized to assume the command. He did so, and commenced the movements of the troops in a manner which I did not approve, and countermanded. I also received information from officers there that General S[herman] was completely "stampeded" and was "stampeding" the army. I therefore immediately ordered him to this place, and yesterday gave him a leave of absence for twenty days to visit his family in Ohio. I am satisfied that General S[herman's] physical and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to render him for the present entirely unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may restore him. I am satisfied that in his present condition it would be dangerous to give him a command here. Can't you send me a brigadier-general of high rank capable of commanding a corps d'armée of three or four divisions? Say Heintzelman, F. J. Porter, Franklin, or McCall. Those of lower grades would be ranked by others here. Grant cannot be taken from Cairo, nor Curtis from this place at present. Sigel is sick, and Prentiss operating against insurgents in Northern Missouri. I dare not intrust the "mustangs" with high commands in the face of the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 H. W. HALLECK,               
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 52, Part 1 (Serial No. 109), p. 198

Friday, April 13, 2018

Captain William Thompson Lusk to Elizabeth Adams Lusk, January 27, 1863

79th Highlanders,                  
Camp Near Falmouth, Va.,  
Jan. 27th, 1863.
My dear Mother:

I have not written either you or other friends to whom I am indebted in an epistolary, for some little time past, because I sincerely cherished the hope that a short leave of absence was at length about to be granted me. As a last card I wrote to Doster to try what he could do for me in Washington. I immediately received a reply from him to the effect that he had applied to the War Department and that I might hope for the coveted “leave” the next day. That was more than a week ago, so I suppose I have had my usual ill-luck, and have nothing more to hope for. Morrison becomes more affable and annoying every day. He cannot forgive me the fright I gave him in regard to the Majority. Fear of American influence in the Regiment is his great Bug-a-boo. He watches me like a cat, and I suppose will catch me at something one of these days, which will serve as a pretext for disgracing me. Then he will talk hypocritically of his great regard and fondness for me, but that he is a soldier and must do his duty. Nothing can exceed the sweetness and amiability of the gentleman toward those he particularly dislikes. Bah! Why should I trouble you with these things? I do not doubt that at best your own fond fears make things out much worse than they really are. I hope I may soon see Sam here. He wrote me he intended running down. I should feel delighted to see him.

I wish I could ascertain something positive regarding the new Regiment. If it is not going to succeed, I would try and get something in the line of my profession provided for me. However I hate to back down, as I resolved at the outset that, for the period of the war, I would serve in any capacity Providence might find best, only reserving my intention to induce Providence to be as pliable as possible.

Joe Hooker commands the army of the Potomac. Everybody appears entirely indifferent to the matter. Heroes of many defeats, we are not inclined to give gratuitous confidence to anyone. Whoever finally succeeds any better than McClellan did, has a fine chance for immortality. The army of the Potomac is splendid in material, and once taught that their best efforts are not to be wasted, they will tell for themselves a splendid story. With McClellan they did best, because they believed that his plans contained all that human skill was capable of. Every new General will be splendidly supported in his first battle. If the battle end in another Golgotha, the old cry will be raised, “McClellan, or a new man!” Sumner and Franklin, piqued, it is reported are about to withdraw likewise. So, peaceful revolutions are occurring in the Army. Let us pray, and hope for the best. Possibly we are adopting the right course to find the right man, possibly the right course to insure our ruin. If Burnside was not a Napoleon, he was a first-rate soldier, and in a subordinate position can do splendid service to the country. Alas! Good-bye.

Affec'y.,
Will.

SOURCE: William Chittenden Lusk, Editor, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 273-5

Thursday, March 22, 2018

Captain William Thompson Lusk to Elizabeth Adams Lusk, December 22, 1862

Camp Near Falmouth, Va.
Dec. 22nd, 1862.
My dear Mother:

Since the late disastrous affair at Fredericksburg, as before, I look in vain for some tidings from you. These mails! As for me, it is of less importance, for the letters you write me will eventually reach me, but with you I hope that long ere this, you may have had the pleasant tidings of my safety throughout the late battle. Of that fight I have not words to express my indignation. It was so uncalled for. Not being a participant myself, only an anxious witness, I can fully appreciate the terrible character of the massacre. No one was more desirous than I for an onward movement, but not for such an one. The idea of an attempt directly in the front was scouted at by those who professed to know, as sheer madness, concerning which the result could not be doubtful. Yet it was attempted, but at whose orders we cannot tell. Rumors reach us of the resignation of Lincoln's Cabinet. God grant this be true. We may fall into worse hands, but there is the hope of something better. I have lost faith in Halleck, and for this reason. Last summer I wrote Walter I had cheered the last time for McClellan. I did this on the authority of Gen. Halleck. Halleck was an unsuccessful competitor of Stevens for the honors of his class. At Newport News Halleck had an interview with Stevens, the result of which I afterwards learned. In this interview Halleck represented McClellan as solely responsible for the misfortunes of the Peninsula; represented that McClellan had received everything from the administration he had requested; that McClellan was responsible for the division in his command, resulting in the creation of McDowell's Department. This and much else against McClellan, which Halleck's subsequent report, and the revelations from the McDowell Court of Inquiry, prove to have been base and malignant falsehoods. Since then it has been my good fortune to have been twice in battle under McClellan. How admirably those battles were planned and executed, I, who have seen so much mismanagement, so many defeats, know best how to appreciate. Therefore I say, as I heard a rebel officer once say “God bless old Stonewall Jackson,” ‘God bless McClellan.” We have had enough of Halleck — and disgrace.

Mother, do not wonder that my loyalty is growing weak. I love the Nation too well to willingly pardon the “unfortunate Abraham Lincoln” as the London Times so aptly calls him. With resources enough to have long since ended the controversy, with resources enough to end it before the opening of Spring, sixty years will not end it if we are obliged to sustain the paltry policy of the administration. I am sick and tired of disaster, and the fools that bring disaster upon us. I believe Burnside to be brave and honest, a good soldier and worthy of honor, but I know that no one in this country has a heartier esteem for McClellan than he. No one bends more to McClellan than Gen. Burnside. The President I doubt not is honest, but “let the shoemaker stick to the last.” Let Lincoln turn his talents to splitting rails. I prefer George McClellan to Abraham Lincoln, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The same energy, the same good-sense, the same foresight exhibited by us that the South has shown, and the rebellion is a dead letter. The same fatal disregard of common sense on our part, and the Southern independence is won. At least so I feel, and so I write strongly, who so earnestly pray for the triumph of our cause.

I have just received your letter, and feel truly thankful to learn you had heard of my safety previous to the arrival of my own letter written the day after we recrossed the Rappahannock. Day before yesterday I was on picket, and saw several officers of the rebel service who came to our lines under a flag of truce. One of them who came from near Atlanta, told me he knew Alfred Tyler; that it was a mistake that Alfred was on Gen. Lawton's staff; that, on the contrary, he still was employed on the Macon and Atlanta R. R., and was reputed to be one of the truest supporters of the Southern movement in his district. The same officer, Capt. McBride, appeared to know enough of Tyler's family and family affairs to make his statement worthy of credit. The same officer further told me that among the brave officers of his army that fell at Fredericksburg, was Henry Lord King, whom you will remember was an old admirer of Sarah Phelps. King fell, pierced by nine minie balls, in the attack made on our left (Franklin's Division). Morrison professes to be a strong supporter of mine now. He says that there had been so much intriguing in the Regiment, that he suspected me for some time, but my action with regard to More has fully satisfied him, and he professes himself anxious to serve me in any way. What the professions are worth I have yet to learn.

Give my best, my dearest love to my sisters. Tell Uncle Phelps that I leave my proposition to be settled according to his judgment, and with best love to him and all my friends, I remain,

Your affec. son,
W. T. Lusk.

SOURCE: William Chittenden Lusk, Editor, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 254-7

Friday, October 27, 2017

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: January 12, 1862

At church in the morning.  Good, plain sermon. Wished much to join in communion, but felt myself to subject to temptation to sin. After church went to see Cameron by appointment, but being obliged to meet the President, etc., at one, could only excuse myself. At President's, found Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, and Seward and Blair. Meigs decided against dividing forces; in favor of battles in front. President said McClellan's health was much improved; and thought it best to adjourn until to-morrow; and have all then present, attend, with McC. at three. Home, and talk, and reading. Dinner. Cameron came in. Advised loan in Holland, and recommended Brooks, Lewis, and another whom I have forgotten. Then turned to department matters; and we talked of his going to Russia, and Stanton as successor; and he proposed I should again see the President. I first proposed seeing Seward, to which he assented. He declared himself determined to maintain himself at the head of his department, if he remained; and to resist, hereafter, all interferences. I told him I would, in that event, stand by him faithfully. He and I drove to Willard's, where I left him, and went myself to Seward's. I told him, at once, what was in my mind — that I thought the President and Cameron were both willing that C. should go to Russia. He seemed to receive the matter as new; except so far as suggested by me last night. Wanted to know who would succeed Cameron. I said Holt and Stanton had been named; that I feared Holt might embarrass us, on the slavery question, and might not prove quite equal to the emergency; that Stanton was a good lawyer and full of energy; but I could not, of course, judge him as an executive officer as well as he (S.) could, for he knew him when he was in Buchanan's Cabinet. Seward replied that he saw much of him then; that he was of great force; full of expedients, and thoroughly loyal. Finally, he agreed to the whole thing; and promised to go with me, to talk with the President about it, to-morrow. Just at this point, Cameron came in, with a letter from the President, proposing his nomination to Russia, in the morning. He was quite offended; supposing the letter intended as a dismissal; and, therefore, discourteous. We both assured him it could not be so. Finally, he concluded to retain the letter till morning; and then go and see the President. Seward was expecting General Butler; and Cameron said he ought to be sent off immediately. I said, “Well, let's leave Seward to order him off at once.” C. laughed; and we went off together, I taking him to his house. Before parting, I told him what had passed between me and Seward concerning Stanton, with which he was gratified. I advised him to go to the President in the morning, express his thanks for the consideration with which his wishes, made known through me, as well as by himself orally, had been treated, and tell him frankly, how desirable it was to him that his successor should be a Pennsylvanian, and should be Stanton. I said I thought that his wish, supported as it would be by Seward and myself, would certainly be gratified, and told him that the President had already mentioned Stanton, in a way which indicated that no objection on his part would be made. I said, also, that, if he wished, I would see Seward, and would go to the President, after he had left him, and urge the point. He asked, why not come in when we should be there; and I assented to this. We parted, and I came home. A day which may have — and, seemingly, must have — great bearing on affairs. I fear Mr. Seward may think Cameron's coming into his house pre-arranged, and that I was not dealing frankly. I feel satisfied, however, that I have acted right, and with just deference to all concerned, and have in no respect deviated from the truth.*
_______________

* Warden’s “Private Life and Public Services of Salmon P. Chase.”

SOURCES: Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, p. 44-5; John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 1: Journals, 1828-1872, p. 324-6

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

Major-General George G. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, May 4, 1862 – 9 a.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 4, 1862 9 a.m. (Received 4.15 p.m.)
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:

We have the ramparts; have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, &c. Hold the entire line of his works, which the engineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and horse artillery in pursuit, supported by infantry. I move Franklin and as much more as I can transport by water up to West Point to-day. No time shall be lost. Gunboats have gone up York River. I omitted to state that Gloucester is also in our possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-general.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 11, Part 3 (Serial No. 14), p. 134

Monday, September 25, 2017

Salmon P. Chase to John Townsend Trowbridge of Somerville, Massachusetts, March 21, 1864

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1864.

. . . . IMMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet, the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, “Shall he be relieved?” General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt, both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send provisions to the garrison.

Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of Washington was to be accomplished by this force.

I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done, and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond. The notion proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk, except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops, and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin. After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16 were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.

The object I had in view in all this was — as there was no law authorizing the raising of the force required — to prepare to make a regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were promulgated in May, 1861.

There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view — beyond the simple provision of force — which were, order and system, and through these efficiency and accountability.

During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their success. The President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri. When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two. They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.

While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed very early that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters, General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or require.

It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. Hc was not to interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States, keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from Congress. . . .

SOURCES: Jacob William Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 418-20; see John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 4: Correspondence, April 1863-1864, p. 335-50 for the entire letter.

Friday, June 23, 2017

Diary of John Hay: Sunday, September 25, 1864

Yesterday Nicolay who has been several days in New York telegraphed to the President that Thurlow Weed had gone to Canada, and asking if he (N.) had better return. I answered he had better amuse himself there for a day or two. This morning a letter came in the same sense. The President, when I showed it to him, said, — “I think I know where Mr. W. has gone. I think he has gone to Vermont not Canada. I will tell you what he is trying to do. I have not as yet told anybody.

“Some time ago, the Governor of Vermont came to me ‘on business of importance’ he said. I fixed an hour and he came. His name is Smith. He is, though you wouldn't think it, a cousin of Baldy Smith. Baldy is large, blonde, florid. The Governor is a little, dark sort of man. This is the story he told me, giving General Baldy Smith as his authority.

“When General McClellan was here at Washington, Baldy Smith was very intimate with him. They had been together at West Point, and friends. McClellan had asked for promotion for Baldy from the President, and got it. They were close and confidential friends. When they went down to the peninsula, their same intimate relations continued, the General talking freely with Smith about all his plans and prospects; until one day Fernando Wood and one other politician from New York appeared in camp and passed some days with McClellan. From the day that this took place Smith saw, or thought he saw, that McClellan was treating him with unusual coolness and reserve. After a little while he mentioned this to McC. who, after some talk, told Baldy he had something to show him. He told him that these people who had recently visited him, had been urging him to stand as an opposition candidate for President; that he had thought the thing over, and had concluded to accept their propositions. and had written them a letter (which he had not yet sent) giving his idea of the proper way of conducting the war, so as to conciliate and impress the people of the South with the idea that our armies were intended merely to execute the laws and protect their property, etc., and pledging himself to conduct the war in that inefficient, conciliatory style. This letter he read to Baldy, who, after the reading was finished, said earnestly:— ‘General, do you not see that looks like treason? and that it will ruin you and all of us.’ After some further talk, the General destroyed the letter in Baldy’s presence, and thanked him heartily for his frank and friendly counsel. After this he was again taken into the intimate confidence of McClellan. Immediately after the battle of Antietam, Wood and his familiar came again and saw the General, and again Baldy saw an immediate estrangement on the part of McClellan. He seemed to be anxious to get his intimate friends out of the way, and to avoid opportunities of private conversation with them. Baldy he particularly kept employed on reconnoissances and such work. One night Smith was returning from some duty he had been performing, and seeing a light in McClellan’s tent, he went in to report. Several persons were there. He reported and was about to withdraw when the General requested him to remain. After everyone was gone, he told him those men had been there again and had renewed their proposition about the Presidency:— that this time he had agreed to their proposition, and had written them a letter acceding to their terms, and pledging himself to carry on the war in the sense already indicated. This letter he read then and there to Baldy Smith.

“Immediately thereafter Baldy Smith applied to be transferred from that army.

“At very nearly the same time, other prominent men asked the same; Franklin, Burnside and others.

“Now that letter must be in the possession of Fernando Wood, and it will not be impossible to get it. Mr. Weed has, I think, gone to Vermont to see the Smith’s about it.”

I was very much surprised at the story and expressed my surprise. I said I had always thought that McClellan’s fault was a constitutional weakness and timidity which prevented him from active and timely exertion, instead of any such deep-laid scheme of treachery and ambition.

The President replied:— “After the battle of Antietam I went up to the field to try to get him to move, and came back thinking he would move at once. But when I got home he began to argue why he ought not to move. I peremptorily ordered him to advance. It was nineteen days before he put a man over the river. It was nine days longer before he got his army across, and then he stopped again, delaying on little pretexts of wanting this and that. I began to fear he was playing false, — that he did not want to hurt the enemy. I saw how he could intercept the enemy on the way to Richmond. I determined to make that the test. If he let them get away, I would remove him. He did so, and I relieved him.

“I dismissed Major Key for his silly, treasonable talk because I feared it was staff-talk, and I wanted an example.

"The letter of Buell furnishes another evidence in support of that theory. And the story you have heard Neill tell about Seymour’s first visit to McClellan, all tallies with this story.”

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 224-8; Michael Burlingame and John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln’s White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 230-3.

Monday, January 23, 2017

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: February 1, 1863

The Virginia Legislature, now in session, has a bill under discussion for the suppression of extortion. One of the members, Mr. Anderson, read the following table of the prices of

AGRICULTURE PRODUCE.
Before the War.
Now.
White wheat, per bushel
$1.50
White wheat, per bushel
$4.50
Flour, per barrel
7.50
Flour, per barrel
22.00
Corn, per bushel
.70
Corn, per bushel
3.50
Hay, per hundred
1.00
Hay, per hundred
3.50
Hides, per pound
.07
Hides, per pound
.40
Beef, per pound
.08
Beef, per pound
.50
Bacon, per pound
.13
Bacon, per pound
.60
Lard, per pound
.15
Lard, per pound
1.00
Butter, per pound
.30
Butter, per pound
1.50
Irish potatoes
1.00
Irish potatoes
5.00
Sweet potatoes
1.00
Sweet potatoes
6.00
Apple brandy
1.00
Apple brandy
15.00
Wool, per pound
.30
Wool, per pound
2.00

MANUFACTURERS
Bar iron, per pound
.04
Bar iron, per pound
.20
Nails, per pound
.04
Nails, per pound
.60
Leather, sole, per pound
.25
Leather, sole, per pound
2.50
Leather, upper, per pound
.33
Leather, upper, per pound
3.50

COTTON GOODS.
Osnaburgs, per yard
.10
Osnaburgs, per yard
.75
Brown cotton, per yard
.10
Brown cotton, per yard
.75
Sheeting, per yard
.15
Sheeting, per yard
1.25

WOOLEN GOODS.
Coarse jeans
.45
Coarse jeans
4.00
Crenshaw’s gray
2.00
Crenshaw’s gray
28.00

MISCELLANEOUS.
Coarse shoes
$1.50
Coarse shoes
15.00
High-quartered shoes
3.50
High-quartered shoes
25.00
Boots
7.50
Boots
60.00
Wool hats, per dozen
7.00
Wool hats, per dozen
50.00

STOCKS.
Dividends on stocks in cotton companies, worth in May, 1861, $25 to $50 per share, now from $112 to $140

It is doubtful whether the bill will pass, as most of the members are agriculturists.

It is said and believed that several citizens from Illinois and Indiana, now in this city, have been sent hither by influential parties, to consult our government on the best means of terminating the war; or, that failing, to propose some mode of adjustment between the Northwestern States and the Confederacy, and new combination against the Yankee States and the Federal administration.

Burnside has at last been removed; and Franklin and Sumner have resigned. Gen. Hooker now commands the Federal Army of the Potomac — if it may be still called an army. Gen. R——, who knows Hooker well, says he is deficient in talent and character; and many years ago gentlemen refused to associate with him. He resigned from the army, in California, and worked a potatoe patch, Yankee like, on speculation — and failed.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 252-3

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Diary of John Hay: September 1, 1862

Saturday morning, the 30th of August, I rode out into the country and turned in at the Soldiers' Home. The President’s horse was standing by the door, and in a moment the President appeared, and we rode into town together.

We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope’s prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan’s present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to “leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.” He spoke also of McC’s dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin’s Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck’s order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck’s sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army.

The President, on my asking if Halleck had any prejudices, rejoined: — “No! Halleck is wholly for the service. He does not care who succeeds or who fails, so the service is benefited.”

Later in the day we were in Halleck’s room. Halleck was at dinner and Stanton came in while we were waiting for him, and carried us off to dinner. A pleasant little dinner and a pretty wife as white and cold and motionless as marble, whose rare smiles seemed to pain her. Stanton was loud about the McC. business. He was unqualifiedly severe upon McClellan. He said that after these battles there should be one court-martial, if never any more. He said that nothing but foul play could lose us this battle, and that it rested with McC. and his friends. Stanton seemed to believe very strongly in Pope. So did the President, for that matter. We went back to the Headquarters and found General Halleck. He seemed quiet and somewhat confident. He said the greatest battle of the century was now being fought. He said he had sent every man that could go to the field. At the War Department we found that Mr Stanton had sent a vast army of volunteer nurses out to the field, probably utterly useless, over which he gave Genl Wadsworth command.

Everything seemed to be going well and hilarious on Saturday, and we went to bed expecting glad tidings at sunrise. But about eight o'clock the President came to my room as I was dressing, and calling me out, said: — “Well, John, we are whipped again, I am afraid. The enemy reinforced on Pope and drove back his left wing, and he has retired to Centreville where he says he will be able to hold his men. I don't like that expression. I don't like to hear him admit that his men need holding.”

After awhile, however, things began to look better, and, people's spirits rose as the heavens cleared. The President was in a singularly defiant tone of mind. He often repeated, “We must hurt this enemy before it gets away.” And this morning, Monday, (September 1), he said to me, when I made a remark in regard to the bad look of things: — “No, Mr. Hay, we must whip these people now. Pope must fight them; if they are too strong for him he can gradually retire to these fortifications. If this be not so, — if we are really whipped, and to be whipped, we may as well stop fighting.”

It is due in great measure to his indomitable will that army movements have been characterized by such energy and celerity for the last few days. There is one man who seems thoroughly to reflect and satisfy him in everything he undertakes. This is Haupt, the Railroad man at Alexandria. He has, as Chase says, a Major General's head on his shoulders. The President is particularly struck with the business-like character of his despatch, telling in the fewest words the information most sought for, which contrasted so strongly with the weak, whining, and incorrect despatches of the whilom General-in-Chief. If heads or shoulder straps could be exchanged, it would be a good thing, in either case, here. A good railroader would be spoiled, but the General gained would compensate. The corps of Haupt starting from Alexandria, have acted as pioneers, advance-guard, voltigeurs, and every other light infantry arm of the service.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 60-4;  Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War: in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 44-7.

Saturday, August 13, 2016

Major-General Philip Kearny to Oliver S. Halsted Jr., August 4, 1862

HARRISON’S LANDING, 4th August, 1862.

DEAR PET: I thank you for your kind, long letter. You extend me hope.  You suggest withdrawing me and my division out of this ignoble position.  With Pope’s army I would breathe again.

We have no generals.  McClellan is the failure I ever proclaimed him.  He has been punished, just as I at once comprehended the moves of the parties. He will only get us in more follies, more waste of blood, fighting by driblets.  He has lost the confidence of all.  Nor has he a single officer about him capable of bettering us.  Sumner is a “bull in a china shop,” and a sure enough blunderer.  ––– lost his corps gratuitously at Fair Oaks.  He is not now in his right place, and will be much worse.  ––– is a small brain, ossified in a ‘4 company’ garrison on the frontier.  He was not ‘of us’ in Mexico, but in a rear column once saw a distant flash in a guerilla fight.  His skill is a myth, a poetical version of his own part at Bull’s Run. Porter is good in nature, but weak as water – the apparent of all this disaster for his want of generalship on the Chickahominy. ––– and Franklin are talented engineers.  They might make good generals if they understood the value of elements in their calculations; as it is, they are dangerous failures.

When ––– was drunk, he had some few men drowned before Yorktown.  I know of no other feat of his.  Franklin’s battle of West Point was a most runaway picket fight of our.  His part on the Chickahominy was unpardonable.  He sent over a division, (his own,) was present on that side out of fire, and never interfered to prevent them from being sacrificed by driblets and rendered prey to their false position.  I was horrified at it, as described by Gen. Taylor, and all others.  Is it surprising that I want to get out of this mess?  Besides, they have sent me a major generalship, like all these others, dating from 4th July, muddled in a batch of new and very ordinary junior officers.  Do they forget that I was appointed twelfth on the original list?  That I, on the heels of Bull’s Run, faced the enemy with a Jersey brigade in advance of all others, McClellan, McDowell, et id omne genus, nearly forcing me to come back of the “Seminary.”  Do they forget me at Manassas?  My Jersey brigade, that infected with panic the retiring enemy?  Has Williamsburg never come to their ears?  Oh, no!  I really feel aggravated beyond endurance.  Discipline becomes degradation if not wielded with justice.  Patriotism cannot amid all her sacrifices, claim that of self respect.  Generals, victorious in the past are not called on to expose their troops, unless those brave men are acknowledged.  Their identity in their chief’s promotion, claims a date of their own high acts.  Oh, No, I am nearer returning to the home I have given up, to the interests I have sacrificed, to my cherished wife, whose anxiety oppresses me, than I ever dreamt of in a war for the union.  But if the infatuated North are weak enough to let this crisis be managed by ‘small men of small motives,’ I am not willing to be their puppet.

My dear Pet, I am too lazy, and too little interested, to give into the future of this ‘little box of heresies,’ so do tell me – what do the people at the North look forward to in the future?  I fear lest the war will die out in rapid imbecility.

For McClellan, he is burnt out.  Never once on a battlefield, you have nothing to hope from him as a leader of a column.  How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson?  But these are episodes.  We deceive ourselves.  There was a people of old – it was the warrior Spartan, with his Helot of the field.  The South have realized it.  There was an ambitious people of recent times, and a conscription pandered to her invasions .  At this moment the South exemplifies them both.  “Peace, peace,” but there is no peace.  No, not even with a disruptured Union.  Let the North cast away that delusion.

Draft we must, or the disciplined THOUSANDS of the South will redeem scrip in Philadelphia, and yet the true North must accept it, and quickly, to a man, or the moment it draggles in debate, Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky will cast past victories to the winds and rise with their nearly allied rebel kin.  My dear Pet, I shall be delighted when Henry can come on.  As to Col. Halstead, I think that his case is a type of the insane and unnecessary despotism introduced into the army, under the auspices of McClellan and his very weak aids.  It is now too late, but why was not the cavalry put in my charge at the commencement?  Two nights ago the rebel batteries fired across the river, and killed and wounded some thirty men.  Last night Hooker started out on a crude expedition to Malvern Hills.  He went out four miles and came back again.  Still a “false fuss” injures the whole army.  McClellan is dangerous, from the want of digesting his plans.  He positively has no talents.  Adieu.  Get me and my “fighting division” with Pope.  With best regards,

Yours,
KEARNY.
To Mr. O. S. HALSTEAD, JR., Newark, N. J.

SOURCES: George Congdon Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Volume 2, p. 21; Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 172-4; “A Letter from Gen. Kearney,” National Republican, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 16, 1862, p. 2; “Letter From General Kearny,” The Liberator, Boston, Massachusetts, Friday, October 24, 1862, p. 1; “Letter From General Kearney,” Alexandria Gazette, Alexandria, Virginia, October 16, 1862, p. 4; “The Famous Criticism of the late General Kearny on M'Clellan,” Richmond Times Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, October 21, 1862;

Friday, August 28, 2015

Major-General John Sedgwick to Major Samuel Breck, January 27, 1864

Headquarters 6th Army Corps,
Near Brandy Stat1on,
January 27, 1864.
Major Samuel Breck,
Assistant Adjutant-General,
Washington.

Major:

In reply to circular from War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, dated January 7, I have the honour to state that on the fourth day of March, 1861, I was Major of the 1st Cavalry, stationed at Fort Wise, on the upper Arkansas. Was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel same regiment April 25. Received orders from headquarters Department of the West, June 20, to repair to Fort Leavenworth and there await further orders. After reaching Fort Leavenworth and waiting several days, the Department of the West having been broken up, I repaired to Washington and reported to the headquarters of the army. July 18, was ordered to report to Brigadier-General Mansfield, and was by him assigned to inspecting duty. On the 18th of August I was assigned to the command of a brigade then stationed near Alexandria. Appointed Brigadier-General August 31. During this and subsequent month was a member of a court of inquiry that investigated the accusations against Colonel Miles. The court met at Alexandria about the 15th of August, and continued meeting there and in camp until its last two sittings, which were in Washington: Major-General W. B. Franklin, President; Brigadier-General Charles Griffin, Recorder.

February 20, 1862, was relieved from command of brigade and assigned to the division of Brigadier-General Stone, stationed at Poolesville, Maryland.

February 25 was ordered to report with the division at Harper's Ferry to Major-General Banks.

The latter part of March received orders to proceed with my division to Washington; embarked immediately for Old Point, forming part of the Army of the Potomac; was with it until its evacuation of the Peninsula. Was slightly wounded at Glendale, June 29; appointed Major-General July 4, 1862; severely wounded at Antietam, September 17; reported for duty December 22, and was assigned to the command of the 9th Army Corps by the General commanding the Army of the Potomac; was relieved February 5, 1863, and assigned to the command of the 6th Army Corps. Have served with that corps since. Have been on no courts martial; have had no leave of absence.

I was actively engaged in the following battles:

In Command of Division, 2nd Corps.

Fair Oaks,
Peach Orchard,
Savage's Station,
Glendale, or Charles City Road,
Antietam,

Commanding the 6th Corps.

2nd Fredericksburg, May 3, 1863,
Salem Heights, May 3, 4, 1863,
Gettysburg, July 2, 3, 4, 1863,

Commanding 6th and 5th Corps.

Rappahannock Station,

The following is a list of staff-officers, on my personal staff, all of whom are now serving, with the exception of Captain Church Howe, who resigned April 10, 1863:

E. B. Beaumont, 1st Lieutenant 4th Cavalry, U.S.A., appointed A.D.C. August 27, 1861, relieved August 7, 1862, and assigned to duty as A.D.C. to General Halleck; reappointed A.D.C. May 9, 1863.

Church Howe, Captain 15th Massachusetts Volunteers, appointed A.D.C. March, 1862, resigned April 10, 1863.

Charles A. Whittier, 1st Lieutenant 20th Massachusetts Volunteers, appointed A.D.C. August 30, 1862.

R. F. Halsted, Captain 42nd New York Volunteers, appointed A.D.C. December 26, 1862.

Arthur McClellan, Captain and A.D.C., assigned to duty August 7, 1863.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
John Sedgwick,
Major-General.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 171-4

Saturday, July 18, 2015

Captain Richard F. Halstead to Miss Sedgwick, May 13, 1863

Headquarters 6th Corps,
Camp Near White Oak Church,
May 13, 1863.
My dear Miss Sedgwick:

The General has just informed me that you were quite anxious to learn some of the particulars of our late movement on the other side of the Rappahannock, and asked me if I would like to make the attempt to give you an idea of what the 6th Corps had done. I am sure that I feel a great pleasure in doing anything I can to give you all that I know, but I am also sure that, however hearty my efforts may be, I shall fall far short of reality, very far short, I fear, of making the matter interesting. It requires one of two things to be able to do this well, neither of which do I possess, namely, long experience or genius. I am neither a Russell nor a Smalley. Do you remember the latter's remarkable description of the battle of Antietam, published in the “Tribune,” and so very extensively copied?

When this late campaign began the General — I mean your brother — had quite a little army under his command. General Hooker sent about four corps to cross the river at United States Ford, leaving the General in command of three corps, the 1st, 3rd, and his own, amounting to about fifty thousand men. The general plan was that we, i.e., these three corps under the General, should make a strong demonstration just below Fredericksburg, at and below the place where Franklin made his crossing under Burnside, while Hooker was to make the main attack, if possible, on their rear and left flank. Our action depended entirely on the movements of the enemy. He might force us to convert our feigned attack into a real one, and for this reason a strong force was left here. The previous movements of our cavalry under Stoneman were, as you will have already learned from the newspapers, to prepare for the total defeat of the army under Lee by cutting or interrupting his communications.

It was, I think, on the 28th of April (dates have been so confused in my mind lately that I shall have to trust to you to make obvious corrections) that the order — the final order — to move came to us. Generals Sickles (3rd Corps) and Reynolds (1st) were to report to the General. It was a dismally rainy day. One large brigade, known as the “Light Division,” was sent to the pontoon train to carry the boats about two miles to the bank of the river, a most fatiguing and, some of us thought, a very unnecessary proceeding.

The ground on this side of the river is for about a third of a mile a perfect flat, evidently an old water bottom. Then comes a range of low hills, cut here and there by ravines — just the ground in and by which to conceal large numbers of men. Behind and quite near were woods, in and behind which the corps encamped the first night. The pontoon train was moved up as far by the teams as was safe from observation by the enemy. Luckily there was something of a fog, which increased as night came on. At eleven P.M. the men detailed for the purpose were to begin carrying the pontoons to the place of crossing. At a given point other men from General Brooks's division (the 1st of our corps) were to meet the boats in parties of sixty to each boat, to cross the river and take possession of the opposite bank. I do not know how many men it required to carry each boat; it was so dark I could not see, although many times close to them. I should think not less than twenty-five. Poor devils! they had a hard task. The approach to the river was very slow. Before daylight about twenty boats had been placed in the water. Everything on the other side was perfectly quiet; nothing unusual was observed. The fog was quite dense, but before the boats began to arrive the enemy's pickets were occasionally heard talking among themselves or singing. The boats were carried with as little noise as possible, but the distance to the other side — about four hundred feet — was too small to prevent some noise being heard. At the last, however, it became useless to attempt a longer concealment of the mere noise. Then matters were rushed through with a will. All this time the dense fog continued. Finally, at the first dawn of light, the boats, about fifteen in number, I think, — I could not see them well enough to count them, — were manned by the engineer soldiers who were to row them and were filled by the designated troops, which were of General Russell's brigade, and, as nearly as possible, they all pushed off together. Not a sound was heard from the other side. Officers on our side and some in the boats were giving orders and directions in loud tones. The boats moved on in the dim light, and in a very few seconds faded away into faint, uncertain shadows. We could hear the oars, we could even hear the beaching of the boats on the opposite bank; the noise became a little fainter, and we felt sure that they must have landed; another moment of suspense, and then there shone out through the fog just one bright spark of fire, followed instantly by the report of a musket, and then succeeded a volley, a rattling volley, from about a regiment of men in the rifle-pits near the bank. But their firing was wild. The most of the bullets came whistling over the heads of the men on the bluff on this side, not less than fifty feet above the level of the water. Very few men in the boats were injured, one killed and eight wounded. After the, first volley by the enemy there was no further interference with our possession of the position occupied. The boats were at once brought back, refilled with men, and sent to the other side, until two brigades were on that bank. Then the work of constructing two bridges was at once begun. Artillery was posted on this side in such manner as to support the troops thrown over. The bridges being completed, the rest of General Brooks's division passed over and strengthened their position as soon as possible by means of rifle-pits.

Meanwhile General Reynolds, who was to effect a crossing about half a mile below, had been unsuccessful in making lodgment on the south bank. I think that it was not till the afternoon that he effected his purpose, with a loss considerably heavier than at the crossing of the 6th Corps. He also began to put himself in a position to hold the ground, and by his making rifle-pits finally drew upon himself the fire from a strong, well-posted battery within good range. To this fire our heavy batteries on this side replied, though without apparent effect, the distance being too great. General Reynolds lost a few men, less than half a dozen, I think, by this fire.

Having effected our lodgment on that side of the river, and finding that the enemy was disposed not to try to drive us back, General Hooker took from us the 3rd Corps, and the following day, if I remember rightly, ordered General Reynolds also to join him near Chancellorsville. This left the 6th Corps alone in its glory. Reynolds's bridges were taken up, and we awaited orders. These came to us so irregularly from defects in the telegraph that it was impossible to execute some of them. General Brooks's men had made themselves comfortable on the other side. His skirmishers were within little more than pistol-shot of those of the enemy. Their line of battle was distinctly visible in the line of the railroad, and the only disposition they had shown to be at all disagreeable was by a harmless artillery fire at intervals, entirely unprovoked on our part.

Lying thus in suspense, an order came to us to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green Road (south from Fredericksburg), that they were flying, routed to Richmond. Then came another order to march to Chancellorsville, to unite with Hooker, crushing and destroying any force which we might find opposed to us. This was Saturday night. At about one o'clock A.M. the head of the column was in motion toward Fredericksburg. We had information from Butterfield, Hooker's Chief of Staff, that there were but three regiments in front of us, in the works on the heights. The road was bad for artillery, and our progress was slow. At daybreak the head of the column was halted at the entrance to the town, General Newton not wishing to run the risk of anything like a panic through a surprise. About sunrise the General and his staff came up to where the first troops were halted. There had been, I should have said, some skirmishing nearly all the way to the town, losses not large. A movement upon the enemy's works was at once ordered. The regiments sent up could not see a sign of a rebel. They were quite near the first line of works when they were saluted by a heavy musketry and artillery fire, and repulsed; i.e., they did not gain the works, but they remained on the ground, lying down, protected by a slight elevation. Immediately batteries were ordered into position to shell the works; but it was all, or nearly all, uphill work, and not much damage could have been done. All it did accomplish was to make the enemy keep his head out of sight. One or two of our regiments were sent into the town, to prevent anything like a surprise on our flank. We then found that our engineers had already commenced a bridge directly opposite the town, over which, as soon as completed, General Gibbon of the 2nd Corps was to march his division. An hour or so elapsed before his men came into the town, and then he reported to the General, who directed him to move to the right, to try to obtain a position that would command the works directly in front of us. General Gibbon moved his men up, crossed a canal in rear of the town, but found his further progress impeded by a second canal, over which there was no bridge or other means of crossing. The rifle-pits in front of him were also well manned, and his movements unsuccessful, as they were not made without loss. Finding this plan fail, as did also an attempt to make a similar attack on the left, in front of General Howe, commanding our 2nd Division, and for a similar reason, the General finally organized a strong attack at about the centre of the works. In front of this point — which, by the way, can scarcely be called a point, for it was not less than three to four hundred yards in extent — was a slope almost entirely free from obstructions, and therefore completely under the enemy's fire, both of artillery and infantry. Then came a sunken road, lined on each side by a stone wall about four feet high, thus forming a strong and effective covering for the defenders. Beyond this was a short but somewhat steep slope to the crest of the heights, in which were the batteries. All these works were commanded and protected by each other, so that the position was a very strong one. The storming columns were formed, partly in column and partly in line, and ordered to move up at double-quick without firing a shot. Our artillery was ordered to open the hottest kind of a fire the instant our storming party should move. This fire was directed from each flank, and kept up as long as possible with safety to our own men. General Howe was directed to move upon the position in front of him, on the extreme left, in conjunction with the attack at the centre. At last everything was arranged, and the storming party began at a given signal to move from the streets where the different regiments were formed. The artillery opened a tremendous fire. As soon as the head of the columns made their appearance on the long slope, the enemy's fire opened upon them very heavily, both from guns and infantry, and, with the exception of one regiment, the whole force moved on steadily, magnificently, without firing a shot, the men dropping like leaves in autumn. Their approach to the works seemed, from where we stood watching, terribly slow. Every second that the dreadful fire continued diminished the strength of the attacking party by scores. One portion of the force almost seemed to come to a halt just on the edge of the sunken road of which I spoke. It was a very anxious moment; but it was only a moment, for the very next saw our men climbing the steep slope beyond the road, directly in front of the batteries. One single color (that of the 6th Maine) never for one second faltered until the very crest of the heights was gained, and it became a sign of victory and a rallying-point for the men who had met more obstacles in their way. There were only a few of us gathered about the General at this moment, but a cheer, weak as it was, could not be refused. The entire line of the works on those fearful heights was gained. General Howe had watched his opportunity, and carried the rifle-pits and batteries in his front in a very spirited manner. General Gibbon, at the earliest moment, brought his men through the town to our support, following the approach we had made.

The enemy fled in large numbers from his works, leaving many dead and wounded, fifteen pieces of artillery, and a considerable number of small arms. Our loss was, I think, about one thousand. The three rebel regiments which Butterfield told us occupied the position were found to be, upon inquiry of prisoners, five brigades. We captured between three and four hundred men; but of the fifteen guns taken, there were unfortunately but nine sent in. The others were retaken on the following day. This was no fault of the 6th Corps, which, in order to execute the order received to march to join General Hooker, could spare not a man or horse to send in the guns. General Gibbon, whose division remained in the town, should have attended to the matter, and, indeed, if he could have foreseen the events of the following day would, no doubt, have brought in all captured property of any value.

The heights once gained, our force moved on very steadily to a line of hills still higher, and distant about half or three quarters of a mile. Our broken line was reformed, our batteries brought up, and everything prepared to move forward. Our line of march was the plank road leading from Fredericksburg nearly due west to Chancellorsville, where, as Hooker informed the General, we would find the enemy's right flank entirely exposed to our attack. We moved on cautiously, skirmishers well in the advance. The enemy had succeeded in carrying off a couple of guns, by means of which he caused us not a little annoyance. He would take advantage of every good position, which was by no means seldom, to throw a few shells at our advancing column. Then it became necessary to dislodge them, which could be done only by artillery, which had first to be brought into proper position to reply. Artillery cannot march across country as infantry can, prepared at any moment to deliver its fire. All this took time, valuable time. The ground was undulating, and here and there slightly wooded. We went on slowly but carefully, so as not to be drawn into any trap. At last we approached a wood which covered the whole of the ground over which we were to advance. There we met their infantry in force, and there we had a very hard fight. Some of our regiments were broken into the merest fragments. Our approach had been slow enough to allow them, the enemy, to bring up reinforcements from Banks's Ford, distant from our right flank only about a mile, and also from the force in front of Hooker. At all events, wherever it came from, the force was sufficient to check us effectively until night came on. Thus finished Sunday. At daybreak on the morning of Monday the General sent me in to see General Butterfield, to tell him the position we were in, and to try to get communication with General Hooker, then not more than five or six miles distant from us. If we could only crash through, if Hooker would only cooperate with us, all might be well. I heard all Butterfield had to say, and rode on, crossed the river, passed through Fredericksburg, and had gone about half a mile beyond the town when I found a very serious obstacle to my further progress, in the shape of quite a large force of the enemy coming from the southwest directly toward the town, thus placing themselves between the town and the rear of our corps. I was thus prevented from joining the General, and turned back to try to make my way to him by way of Banks's Ford, but getting astray, did not succeed until about eleven at night, so that of the operations of our corps on that day (Monday) I can give you only what I have heard from those who were on the ground. The General had early notice of the movement of the enemy upon his rear, and he quickly made the necessary preparation to meet an attack from that direction. After taking possession of the very heights we had captured, the evident intention of the enemy was to cut the corps off from its only remaining line of retreat, namely, Banks's Ford. For this purpose a very heavy force was led by General Lee in person from the position in front of Hooker around our left, to fall upon what he supposed would be our rear and right flank. But the General had already established a portion of the corps in a new line of battle facing to the rear, and although the attack made by Lee was, according to all the accounts of those who saw it, the most furious of the war, it was most gallantly met and repulsed by a far inferior force.

It has been estimated that the force which Lee brought in this attack was not less than twenty thousand. Even supposing the number to have been no more than twelve to thirteen thousand, it was brought to bear upon very little more than two brigades of ours — not more than six to seven thousand men. This attack took place late in the afternoon, and, like the action of the previous day, was brought to a close by night setting in. During the evening the corps was moved to a position near to the bridges which had been laid at Banks's Ford, and before daylight the whole command had recrossed the river, and the bridges were taken up, the crossing and removal of the bridges being effected under an annoying but harmless artillery fire.

Several men — I heard of two or three — died from mere exhaustion before the corps recrossed the river. The day had been very hot, and the night even was unseasonably warm. It is by no means a pleasant thing for us — of the 6th Corps, I mean—to look back at the results of our short campaign; to think of the will with which the troops went to their work, and the fruitless results. I say fruitless; just look at it. Here we are just where we started from; we have lost nearly five thousand men, and what have we gained? Nothing, surely, in our position. We took about fifteen hundred prisoners and fifteen guns minus six, and we inflicted upon the enemy a loss in killed and wounded certainly not less than that sustained by ourselves; it is estimated by every one as greater, for our artillery made sad havoc in their dense attacking masses on Monday afternoon.

How different everything might, nay, would have been, if we had had the cooperation of even a small part of the immense force with Fighting Joe Hooker! Why did he not keep Lee occupied so that he would not have dared to turn his back to Chancellorsville, to fall upon us? Or if, finding that he had so left him, why did he not know it and act accordingly; fall upon the rear of his column as it came down upon us? What was Hooker there for? To entrench himself, with six corps under his command, and expect and even order one single corps to march right through the enemy, to “crush and destroy,” were the words of his order to the General, “any force which might oppose itself to” our march? Would it not have been quite as reasonable an undertaking for him to have marched with his force to join us, say, upon the heights of Fredericksburg, which we could so easily have held? You never saw a more bitter set of men than we were when we saw the way things were going. I saw General Hooker myself on Monday afternoon. I took considerable trouble to see him, thinking it might be some satisfaction to him to communicate with some staff-officer of the General's; but when I told him of the hard fight the corps had had the previous day, he said, in a very disagreeable way, that he had heard of it, and then added: “There were very few troops in front of you, however.” My reply was very short, and I left him. And now look at the order he issues congratulating the army on its achievements:

"If it [the army] has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resource.” Indeed, the “reasons” are very well known to the army. And if he had not sufficient sagacity to meet and overcome greater obstacles than he found, the best thing he can do is to resign. He says: “We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners captured and brought off seven pieces of artillery,” etc., when the only artillery taken was by our corps, a command so disconnected from him that he wrote to the General: “You are too far for me to direct.” He says nothing of all the artillery which he lost; and the “splendid achievements” of which he boasts in a previous order are as yet quite unknown to us. If he had but left us either one of the two corps — the 1st or 3rd — which were under the General's command when we first began operations, we could have gone through anything. If the rest of the army had fought as this corps did, we should have been in Richmond before this time.

After we returned to our old camps, and the pickets had resumed their old positions on the banks of the river, the rebel pickets called out to ours, saying that none of our army could ever cross that river again except “the fellows who took those heights.”

General Hooker was at first disposed to make this corps the scapegoat for his failure, but he soon found that he stood alone in his estimate of what had really been accomplished by it. The army — so far as we could learn, the whole army — stood to endorse the General, and to uphold him even against Hooker. It has, take it all together, been a magnificent opportunity thrown away — such an one as we can scarcely ever hope to have again. At no time did Hooker have more than one single corps engaged. Two of the corps with him did not fire a shot. Corps commanders begged for permission to attack, but were kept back. Hooker seemed to have just lost his head entirely.

I wish I could tell you of the thousand incidents of our short campaign. One sees so much that it is impossible to remember. In such times one lives on excitement. Eating and drinking is too insignificant a matter to think about. As for sleep, a few minutes thrown in here and there seem to be quite sufficient for the needs of nature, although, of course, such a state of things cannot last many days.

One of our staff, a volunteer aide, Mr. Farrar of Maine, was captured. Lieutenant-Colonel Kent, our Inspector-General, was slightly wounded. These are our only accidents.

I am very respectfully yours,
R. F. Halsted.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 110-29