We hear of the enemy daily, Colonel Kimball, on the mountain, and Colonel Wagner, up the valley, are both in hourly expectation of an attack. The enemy, encouraged by his successes at Manassas, will probably attempt to retrieve his losses in Western Virginia.
SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 43
The scouting party sent out this morning were conveyed by wagons six miles up the valley, and were to take to the mountains, half a mile beyond. I instructed Lieutenant Driscoll to exercise the utmost caution, and not take his men further than he thought reasonably safe. Of course perfect safety is not expected. Our object, however, is to get information, not to give it by losing the squad.
At eleven o'clock a courier came in hot haste from the front, to inform us that a flag of truce, borne by a Confederate major, with an escort of six dragoons, was on the way to camp. Colonel Wagner and I rode out to meet the party, and were introduced to Major Lee, the son, as I subsequently ascertained, of General Robert E. Lee, of Virginia. The Major informed us that his communication could only be imparted to our General, and a courier was at once dispatched to Huttonville.
At four o'clock General Reynolds arrived, accompanied by Colonel Sullivan and a company of cavalry. Wagner and I joined the General's party, and all galloped to the outpost, to interview the Confederate major. His letter contained a proposition to exchange prisoners captured by the rebels at Manassas for those taken at Rich mountain. The General appointed at day on which a definite answer should be returned, and Major Lee, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Owen and myself, rode to the outlying picket station, where his escort had been halted and detained.
Major Lee is near my own age, a heavy set, but well-proportioned man, somewhat inclined to boast, not overly profound, and thoroughly impregnated with the idea that he is a Virginian and a Lee withal. As I shook hands at parting with this scion of an illustrious house, he complimented me by saying that he hoped soon to have the honor of meeting me on the battlefield. I assured him that it would afford me pleasure, and I should make all reasonable efforts to gratify him in this regard. I did not desire to fight, of course, but I was bound not to be excelled in the matter of knightly courtesy.
SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 46-7
It seems to me that
the destinies of this admirable people are in strange hands. Mr. Lincoln,
honest man of nature, perhaps an empiric, doctoring with innocent juices from
herbs; but some others around him seem to be quacks of the first order. I wish
I may be mistaken.
The press, the thus
called good one, is vacillating. Best of all, and almost not vacillating, is
the New York Evening Post. I do not speak of principles; but the papers
vacillate, speaking of the measures and the slowness of the administration.
The President's
message; plenty of good, honest intentions; simple, unaffected wording, but a
confession that by the attack on Sumpter, and the uprising of Virginia, the
administration was, so to speak, caught napping. Further, up to that day the
administration did not take any, the slightest, measure of any kind for any
emergency; in a word, that it expected no attacks, no war, saw no fire, and did
not prepare to meet and quench one.
It were, perhaps,
better for Lincoln if he could muster courage and act by himself according to
his nature, rather than follow so many, or even any single adviser. Less and
less I understand Mr. Lincoln, but as his private secretary assures me that
Lincoln has great judgment and great energy, I suggested to the secretary to
say to Lincoln he should be more himself.
Being tete-a-tete
with McDowell, I saw him do things of details which in any, even half-way
organized army, belong to the speciality of a chief of the staff. I, of course,
wondered at it. McDowell, who commands what in Europe would be called a large
corps, told me that General Scott allowed him not to form a complete staff,
such a one as he, McDowell, wished.
And all this, so to
speak, on the eve of a battle, when the army faces the enemy. It seems that
genuine staff duties are something altogether unknown to the military senility
of the army. McDowell received this corps in the most chaotic state. Almost
with his own hands he organized, or rather put together, the artillery.
Brigades are scarcely formed; the commanders of brigades do not know their
commands, and the soldiers do not know their generals—and still they consider
Scott to be a great general!
The Congress,
well-intentioned, but entangled in formulas, slowly feels its way. The Congress
is composed of better elements than is the administration, and it is ludicrous to
see how the administration takes airs of hauteur with the Congress. This
Congress is in an abnormal condition for the task of directing a revolution; a
formula can be thrown in its face almost at every bold step. The administration
is virtually irresponsible, more so than the government of any constitutional
nation whatever. What great things this administration could carry out!
Congress will consecrate, legalize, sanction everything. Perhaps no harm would
have resulted if the Senate and the House had contained some new, fresher
elements directly from the boiling, popular cauldron. Such men would take a
position at once. Many of the leaders in both Houses were accustomed for many
years to make only opposition. But a long opposition influences and disorganizes
the judgment, forms not those genuine statesmen able to grasp great events. For
such emergencies as are now here, terrible energy is needed, and only a very
perfect mind resists the enervating influence of a protracted opposition.
Suggested to Mr. Seward
that the best diplomacy was to take possession of Virginia. Doing this, we will
find all the cabinets smooth and friendly.
I seldom saw a man
with greater facility of labor than Seward. When once he is at work, it runs
torrent-like from
his pen. His mind is elastic. His principal forte is argument on any given
case. But the question is how far he masters the variegated information so
necessary in a statesman, and the more now, when the country earnestly has such
dangerous questions with European cabinets. He is still cheerful, hopeful, and
prophesies a speedy end.
Seward has no
Know-Nothingism about him. He is easy, and may have many genuine generous
traits in his character, were they not compressed by the habits of the, not
lofty, politician. At present, Seward is a moral dictator; he has Lincoln in
his hand, and is all in all. Very likely he flatters him and imposes upon his
simple mind by his over-bold, dogmatic, but not over-correct and logical,
generalizations. Seward's finger is in all the other departments, but above all
in the army.
The opposition made
to Seward is not courageous, not open, not dignified. Such an opposition
betrays the weakness of the opposers, and does not inspire respect. It is
darkly surreptitious. These opponents call Seward hard names, but do this in a
corner, although most of them have their parliamentary chair wherefrom they can
speak. If he is bad and mischievous, then unite your forces and overthrow him;
if he is not bad, or if you are not strong enough against him, do not cover
yourself with ridicule, making a show of impotent malice. When the Senate
confirmed him, every one throughout the land knew his vacillating policy; knew
him to be for compromise, for concessions; knew that he disbelieved in the
terrible earnestness of the struggle, and always prophesied its very speedy
end. The Senate confirmed Seward with open eyes. Perhaps at the start his
imagination and his patriotism made him doubt and disbelieve in the enormity of
treason he could not realize that the traitors would go to the bitter end.
Seemingly, Seward still hopes that one day or another they may return as
forlorn sheep. Under the like impressions, he always believed, and perhaps
still believes, he shall be able to patch up the quarrel, and be the savior of the
Union. Very probably his imagination, his ardent wishes, carry him away, and
confuse that clear insight into events which alone constitutes the statesman.
Suggested to Sumner
to demand the reduction of the tariff on certain merchandises, on the plea of fraternity
of the working American people with their brethren the operatives all over
Europe; by it principally I wished to alleviate the condition of French
industry, as I have full confidence in Louis Napoleon, and in the
unsophisticated judgment of the genuine French people. The suggestion did not
take with the Senate.
When the July
telegraph brought the news of the victory at Romney (Western Virginia), it was
about midnight. Mr. Seward warmly congratulated the President that "the
secession was over." What a far-reaching policy!
When the struggle
will be over, England, at least her Tories, aristocrats, and politicians, will
find themselves baffled in their ardent wishes for the breaking of the Union.
The free States will look tidy and nice, as in the past. But more than one
generation will pass before ceases to bleed the wound inflicted by the lies,
the taunts, the vituperations, poured in England upon this noble, generous, and
high-minded people; upon the sacred cause defended by the freemen.
These freemen of
America, up to the present time, incarnate the loftiest principle in the
successive, progressive, and historical development of man. Nations,
communities, societies, institutions, stand and fall with that principle,
whatever it be, whereof they are the incarnation; so teaches us history. Woe to
these freemen if they will recede from the principle; if they abandon human
rights; if they do not crush human bondage, this sum of all infamies. Certainly
the question paramount to all is, to save and preserve pure self-government in
principle and in its direct application. But although the question of slavery
seems to be incidental and subordinate to the former, virtually the question of
slavery is twin to the former. Slavery serves as a basis, as a nurse, for the
most infamous and abject aristocracy or oligarchy that was ever built up in
history, and any, even the best, the mildest, and the most honest oligarchy or
aristocracy kills and destroys man and self-government.
From the purely
administrative point of view, the principle whose incarnation is the American
people, the principle begins to be perverted. The embodiment of self-government
fills dungeons, suppresses personal liberty, opens letters, and in the reckless
saturnalias of despotism it rivals many from among the European despots.
Europe, which does not see well the causes, shudders at this delirium tremens
of despotism in America.
Certainly, treason
being in ebullition, the holders of power could not stand by and look. But
instead of an energetic action, instead of exercising in full the existing
laws, they hesitated, and treason, emboldened, grew over their heads.
The law inflicted
the severest capital punishment on the chiefs of the revolt in Baltimore, but
all went off unharmed. The administration one day willingly allows the law to
slide from its lap, and the next moment grasps at an unnecessary arbitrary
power. Had the traitors of Baltimore been tried by courtmartial, as the law
allowed, and punished, few, if any, traitors would then have raised their heads
in the North.
Englishmen forget
that even after a secession, the North, to-day twenty millions, as large as the
whole Union eight years ago, will in ten years be thirty millions; a population
rich, industrious, and hating England with fury.
Seward, having
complete hold of the President, weakens Lincoln's mind by using it up in
hunting after comparatively paltry expedients. Seward-Scott's influence
neutralizes the energetic cry of the country, of the congressmen, and in the
Cabinet that of Blair, who is still a trump.
The emancipation of
slaves is spoken of as an expedient, but not as a sacred duty, even for the
maintenance of the Union. To emancipate through the war power is an offence to
reason, logic, and humanity; but better even so than not at all. War power is
in its nature violent, transient, established for a day; emancipation is the
highest social and economical solution to be given by law and reason, and ought
to result from a thorough and mature deliberation. When the Constitution was
framed, slavery was ashamed of itself, stood in the corner, had no paws.
Now-a-days, slavery has become a traitor, is arrogant, blood-thirsty, worse
than a jackal and a hyena; deliberately slavery is a matricide. And they still
talk of slavery as sheltered by the Constitution; and many once anti-slavery
men like Seward, etc., are ready to preserve it, to compromise with the crime.
The existence of
nations oscillates between epochs when the substance and when the form
prevails. The formation of America was the epoch when substance prevailed.
Afterward, for more than half a century, the form was paramount; the term of
substance again begins. The Constitution is substance and form. The substance
in it is perennial; but every form is transient, and must be expanded, changed,
re-cast.
Few, if any,
Americans are aware of the identity of laws ruling the universe with laws
ruling and prevailing in the historical development of man. Rarely has an
American patience enough to ascend the long chain from effect to cause, until
he reaches the first cause, the womb wherein was first generated the subsequent
distant effect. So, likewise, they cannot realize that at the start the
imperceptible deviation from the aim by and by widens to a bottomless gap until
the aim is missed. Then the greatest and the most devoted sacrifices are
useless. The legal conductors of the nation, since March 6th, ignore this law.
The foreign
ministers here in Washington were astonished at the politeness, when some time
ago the Department sent to the foreign ministers a circular announcing to them
that armed vessels of the neutrals will be allowed to enter at pleasure the
rebel blockaded ports. This favor was not asked, not hoped for, and was not
necessary. It was too late when I called the attention of the Department to the
fact that such favors were very seldom granted; that they are dangerous, and
can occasion complications. I observed that during the war between Mexico and
France, in 1838, Count Mole, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Premier of
Louis Philippe, instructed the admiral commanding the French navy in the
Mexican waters, to oppose, even by force, any attempt made by a neutral
man-of-war to enter a blockaded port. And it was not so dangerous then as it
may be in this civil war. But the chief clerk adviser of the Department found
out that President Polk's administration during the Mexican war granted a
similar permission, and, glad to have a precedent, his powerful brains could
not find out the difference between then and now.
The internal routine
of the ministry, and the manner in which our ministers are treated abroad by
the Chief at home, is very strange, humiliating to our agents in the eyes of
foreign Cabinets. Cassius Clay was instructed to propose to Russia our
accession to the convention of Paris, but was not informed from Washington that
our ministers at Paris, London, etc., were to make the same propositions. When
Prince Gortschakoff asked Cassius Clay if similar propositions were made to the
other cosigners of the Paris convention, our minister was obliged to confess
his utter ignorance about the whole proceeding. Prince Gortschakoff
good-naturedly inquired about it from his ministers at Paris and London, and
enlightened Cassius Clay.
No ministry of
foreign affairs in Europe would treat its agents in such a trifling manner,
and, if done, a minister would resent it.
This mistake, or
recklessness, is to be credited principally to the internal chief, or director
of the department, and not to the minister himself. By and by, the chief
clerks, these routinists in the former coarse traditions of the Democratic
administrations, will learn and acquire better diplomatic and bureaucratic
habits.
If one calls the
attention of influential Americans to the mismanagement in the organization of
the army; to the extraordinary way in which everything, as organization of
brigades, and the inner service, the quartermaster's duty, is done, the general
and inevitable answer is, "We are not military; we are young people; we
have to learn." Granted; but instead of learning from the best, the
latest, and most correct authorities, why stick to an obsolete, senile, musty,
rotten, mean, and now-a-days impracticable routine, which is all-powerful in all
relating to the army and to the war? The Americans may pay dear for thus
reversing the rules of common sense.
General Scott
directs from his sleeping room the movements of the two armies on the Potomac
and in the Shenandoah valley. General Scott has given the order to advance. At
least a strange way, to have the command of battle at a distance of thirty and
one hundred miles, and stretched on his fauteuil. Marshal de Saxe, although
deadly sick, was on the field at Fontenoy. What will be the result of this
experimentalization, so contrary to sound reason?
Fighting at Bull
Run. One o'clock, P. M. Good news. Gen. Scott says that although we were 40-100
in disadvantage, nevertheless his plans are successful—all goes as he arranged
it-all as he foresaw it. Bravo! old man! If so, I make amende honorable of all that I said up to this minute. Two o'clock,
P. M. General Scott, satisfied with the justness and success of his strategy
and tactics-takes a nap.
Evening. Battle
lost; rout, panic. The army almost disbanded, in full run. So say the
forerunners of the accursed news. Malediction! Malediction!
What a horrible
night and day! rain and cold; stragglers and disbanded soldiers in every
direction, and no order, nobody to gather the soldiers, or to take care of
them.
As if there existed
not any military or administrative authority in Washington! Under the eyes of
the two commanders-in-chief! Oh, senility, imbecility, ignominy! In Europe, a
commander of a city, or any other military authority whatever, who should
behave in such a way, would be dismissed, nay, expelled, from military service.
What I can gather is, that the enemy was in full retreat in the centre and on
one flank, when he was reinforced by fresh troops, who outflanked and turned
ours. If so, the panic can be explained. Even old veteran troops generally run
when they are outflanked.
Johnston, whom
Patterson permitted to slip, came to the rescue of Beauregard. So they say. It
is en petit Waterloo, with
Blucher-Johnston, and Grouchy-Patterson. But had Napoleon's power survived
after Waterloo, Grouchy, his chief of the staff, and even Ney,1 for
the fault at Quatre-bras, would have been court-martialed and shot. Here these
blind Americans will thank Scott and Patterson.
Others say that a
bold charge of cavalry arrived on our rear, and threw in disorder the wagons
and the baggage gang. That is nothing new; at the battle of Borodino some
Cossacks, pouncing upon the French baggage, created a panic, which for a moment
staggered Napoleon, and prevented him in time from reinforcing Ney and Davoust.
But McDowell committed a fault in putting his baggage train, the ambulances
excepted, on a road between the army and its reserves, which, in such a manner,
came not in action. By and by I shall learn more about it.
The Congress has
made a worse Bull Run than the soldiers. Not a single manly, heroic word to the
nation and the army. As if unsuccess always was dishonor. This body groped its
way, and was morally stunned by the blow; the would-be leaders more than the
mass.
Suggested to Sumner
to make, as the Romans did, a few stirring words on account of the defeat. Some
mean fellows in Congress, who never smelt powder, abused the soldiers. Those
fellows would have been the first to run. Others, still worse, to show their
abject flunkeyism to Scott, and to humbug the public at large about their
intimacy with this fetish, make speeches in his defence. Scott broadly prepared
the defeat, and now, through the mouths of flunkeys and spit-lickers,2
he attempts to throw the fault on the thus called politicians.
The President
telegraphed for McClellan, who in the West, showed rapidity of movement, the
first and most necessary capacity for a commander. Young blood will be infused,
and perhaps senility will be thrown overboard, or sent to the Museum of the
Smithsonian Institute.
At Bull Run the
foreign regiments ran not, but covered the retreat. And Scott, and worse than
he, Thomas, this black spot in the War Department, both are averse to, and when
they can they humiliate, the foreigners. A member of Congress, in search of a
friend, went for several miles up the stream of the fugitive army; great was
his astonishment to hear spoken by the fugitives only the unmixed, pure
Anglo-Saxon.
My friend, J.
Wadsworth, behaved cool, brave, on the field, and was devoted to the wounded.
Now, as always, he is the splendid type of a true man of the people.
During the days
Poor, unhappy
McDowell! when he prepared the army, he was well aware that an eventual success
would be altogether attributed to Scott; but that he, McDowell, would be the
scapegoat for the defeat. Already, when on Sunday morning the news of the first
successes was known, Scott swallowed incense, and took the whole credit of it
to himself. Now he accuses the politicians.
Once more. Scott
himself prepared the defeat. Subsequent elucidation will justify this
assertion. One thing is already certain: one of the reasons of the lost battle
is the exhaustion of troops which fought and the number here in Washington is more
than 50,000 men. Only an imbecile would divide the forces in such a way as to
throw half of it to attack a superior and entrenched enemy. But Scott wished to
shape the great events of the country in accordance with his narrow, ossified
brains, and with his peculiar patriotism; and he did the same in the conduct of
the war.
I am sure some day
or other it will come out that this immense fortification of Manassas is a
similar humbug to the masked batteries; and Scott was the first to aggrandize
these terrible national nightmares. Already many soldiers say that they did not
see any fortifications. Very likely only small earthworks; if so, Scott ought
to have known what was the position and the works of an enemy encamped about
thirty miles from him. If he, Scott, was ignorant, then it shows his utter
imbecility; if he knew that the fortifications were insignificant, and did not
tell it to the troops, then he is worse than an incapable chief. Up to the
present day, all the military leaders of ancient and modern times told their
troops before a battle that the enemy is not much after all, and that the
difficulties to overcome are rather insignificant. After the battle was won,
everything became aggrandized. Here everybody, beginning with Scott, ardently
rivalled how to scare and frighten the volunteers, by stories of the masked
batteries of Manassas, with its several tiers of fortifications, the terrible
superiority of the Southerners, etc., etc. In Europe such behavior would be
called treason.
The administration
and the influential men cannot realize that they must give up their old,
stupid, musty routine. McClellan ought to be altogether independent of Scott;
be untrammelled in his activity; have large powers; have direct action; and not
refer to Scott. What is this wheel within a wheel? Instead of it, Scott, as by
concession, cuts for McClellan a military department of six square miles. Oh,
human stupidity, how difficult thou art to lift!
Scott will paralyze
McClellan as he did Lyon and Butler. Scott always pushed on his spit-lickers,
or favorites, rotten by old age. But Scott has pushed aside such men as Wool
and Col. Smith; refused the services of many brave as Hooker and others,
because they never belonged to his flunkeys. Send to McClellan a plan for the
reorganization of the army.
1st. True mastership
consists in creating an army with extant elements, and not in clamoring for
what is altogether impossible to obtain.
2d. The idea is
preposterous to try to have a large thus-called regular army. A small number,
fifteen to twenty thousand men, divided among several hundreds of thousands of
volunteers, would be as a drop of water in a lake. Besides, this war is to be
decided by the great masses of the volunteers, and it is uncivic and
unpatriotic to in any way nourish the wickedly-assumed discrimination between
regulars and volunteers.
3d. Good
non-commissioned officers and corporals constitute the sole, sound, and easy
articulations of a regiment. Any one who ever was in action is aware of this
truth. With good non-commissioned officers, even ignorant lieutenants do very
little harm. The volunteer regiments ought to have as many good sergeants and
corporals as possible.
4th. To provide for
this want, and for reasons mentioned above, the relics of the regular army
ought to be dissolved. Let us have one army, as the enemy has.
5th. All the rank
and file of the army ought to be made at once corporals and sergeants, and be
distributed as much as possible among the volunteers.
6th. The
non-commissioned regulars ought to be made commissioned officers, and with
officers of all grades be distributed and merged in the one great army.
For the first time
since the armaments, I enjoyed a genuine military view. McClellan, surrounded
as a general ought to be, went to see the army. It looks martial. The city,
likewise, has a more martial look than it had all the time under Scott. It
seems that a young, strong hand holds the ribbons. God grant that McClellan may
preserve his western vigor and activity, and may not become softened and
dissolved by these Washington evaporations. If he does, if he follows the
routine, he will become as impotent as others before him. Young man, beware of
Washington's corrupt but flattering influences. To the camp to the camp! A tent
is better for you than a handsome house. The tent, the fumes of bivouacs,
inspired the Fredericks, the Napoleons, and Washingtons.
Up to this day they
make more history in Secessia than here. Jeff. Davis overshadows Lincoln. Jeff.
Davis and his gang of malefactors are pushed into the whirlpool of action by
the nature of their crime; here, our leaders dread action, and grope. The
rebels have a clear, decisive, almost palpable aim; but here * *
_______________
1 That such would have been the presumed fate
of Ney at the hands of Napoleon, I was afterwards assured by the old Duke of
Bassano, and by the Duchess Abrantes.
2 Foremost among them was the editor of the
New York Times, publishing a long article wherein he proved that he had been
admitted to General Scott's table, and that the General unfolded to him, the
editor, the great anaconda strategy. Exactly the thing to be admired and gulped
by a man of such variegated information as that individual.
That little
villianish "article" had a second object: it was to filch subscribers
from the Tribune, which broke down, not over courageously.
SOURCE: Adam
Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, p. 60
SHERWOOD FOREST, July 24, 1861.
You cannot think
what a happiness your letter was to me yesterday. I had also received that one
sent by express; but as I had written several times and you did not mention the
receipt of one of my letters, I thought I would wait until I heard from you
again before I trusted to any source. The notice you inclosed would avail me
nothing. It could transmit letters to the seceded States, but not from them. A
new advertisement has appeared in the papers of yesterday by which I see there
is a promise of certain communication between the two sections. I enclose it.
The President tells me to give you his best love, and say how much he admires
you for the bright and intellectual view you take of things-the only true view;
and all I have to say is, that those who take the opposite one have no
conscience, or have never informed themselves upon the question.
Dr. Donnavant may
talk now of the revival of feudal times, for never in the days of chivalry were
there such knights as this infamous Northern war has made of every Southern
man. Never was the thought of Union or of surrender farther removed from their
bosoms. Nothing but evil has yet come of this war, and nothing but evil will
come of it while it continues, unless it be of good to the South in uniting it
in its one great resolve more thoroughly. You need never trust to Northern
accounts of Southern defeat or conquest. Great conquest that of McClellan's to
boast of, truly-20,000 to 5,000; but I doubt whether another defeat against any
odds will occur again—where every man falls two will rise in his place. What a
brilliant victory for the South has been the battle at Manassas! I wish I could
send you a true account of it as it is given in the Richmond papers, and by
Gen. Jefferson Davis' dispatches. I see even the Northern account admits a terrible
defeat, aud great losses of all sorts. . . .
SOURCE: Lyon
Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers, Volume 2, p.
652-3
I attended services
at Manassas last Sunday, but before the meeting closed I was obliged to depart
for this city. For particulars see the New York daily papers.
I am now bolstered
up in bed, making my first attempt at writing. I am as happy as a clam in high
water. My regiment covered itself with glory. It was one of the first in, and
the last out. Not a man showed the white feather. They fought until all their
ammunition was expended, and when the stampede commenced, General McDowell
ordered the officers to form all the regiments in line so as to make another
stand, or, at least, make an orderly retreat. . . . Finally, he gave up the
attempt, and we were ordered to retreat.
After going a few
rods the General made another attempt to check the utter rout of our troops. He
again ordered the regiments to form in line, but ours was the only one that
could be formed again. The General then cried out in a loud voice,
"Soldiers, form on that noble regiment! We must make a stand.” . . . This
same attempt was repeated a third time, with the same result. A person told me
to-day that General McDowell reported all this to General Scott, with a high
encomium on the regiment.
All this may appear
singular in view of the accounts of the battle given in the New York papers,
wherein our regiment is not even mentioned. . . . But the truth is known in
quarters where I desire to have it known. It is all right.
I had almost
forgotten to tell you about my wound. It is doing well, and pains me but
little. I would agree to take another just like it if I could thereby secure as
good conduct on the part of my regiment when it takes the field again.
SOURCE: New York
(State). Monuments Commission for the Battlefields of Gettysburg and
Chattanooga, In Memoriam : Henry Warner
Slocum, 1826-1894, p. 70
We hear that General Cox has been beaten on the Kanawha; that our forces have been repulsed at Manassas Gap, and that our troops have been unsuccessful in Missouri. I trust the greater part, if not all, of this is untrue.
We have been expecting orders to march, but they have not come. The men are very anxious to be moving, and when moving, strange to say, always very anxious to stop.
SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 34
Officers and men are low-spirited to-night. The news of yesterday has been confirmed. Our army has been beaten at Manassas with terrible loss. General McClellan has left Beverly for Washington. General Rosecrans will assume command in Western Virginia. We are informed that twenty miles from us, in the direction of Staunton, some three thousand secessionists are in camp. We shall probably move against them.
SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 34
The Colonel left for Ohio to-day, to be gone two weeks.
I came from the quarters of Brigadier-General Schleich a few minutes ago. He is a three-months' brigadier, and a rampant demagogue. Schleich said that slaves who accompanied their masters to the field, when captured, should be sent to Cuba and sold to pay the expenses of the war. I suggested that it would be better to take them to Canada and liberate them, and that so soon as the Government began to sell negroes to pay the expenses of the war I would throw up my commission and go home. Schleich was a State Senator when the war began. He is what might be called a tremendous little man, swears terribly, and imagines that he thereby shows his snap. Snap, in his opinion, is indispensable to a military man. If snap is the only thing a soldier needs, and profanity is snap, Schleich is a second Napoleon. This General Snap will go home, at the expiration of his three-months' term, unregretted by officers and men. Major Hugh Ewing will return with him. Last night the Major became thoroughly elevated, and he is not quite sober yet. He thinks, when in his cups, that our generals are too careful of their men. "What are a th-thousand men," said he, "when (hic) principle is at stake? Men's lives (hic) shouldn't be thought of at such a time (hic). Amount to nothing (hic). Our generals are too d----d slow" (hic). The Major is a man of excellent natural capacity, the son of Hon. Thomas Ewing, of Lancaster, and brother-in-law of W. T. Sherman, now a colonel or brigadier-general in the army. W. T. Sherman is the brother of John Sherman.
The news from Manassas is very bad. The disgraceful flight of our troops will do us more injury, and is more to be regretted, than the loss of fifty thousand men. It will impart new life, courage, and confidence to our enemies. They will say to their troops: "You see how these scoundrels run when you stand up to them."
SOURCE: John Beatty, The Citizen-soldier: Or, Memoirs of a Volunteer, p. 35-6
The following
extract from a letter which I have just written to a friend, is the sum and
substance of my thoughts, journalized for to-day. "Major will not write
his mother whether an attack on Washington is expected. I will tell you what I
think: From the dome of the Capitol we can see the rebels throwing up works
just beyond Arlington. Every day or two we have picket skirmishing.
On Wednesday night
we had, within a short distance of Washington, seven men set as picket guards.
The next day I saw one of the seven wounded in the side by a musket ball. The
other six were killed. Almost everybody here is looking for an attack, but I do
not believe we shall have one. I have no doubt that Beauregard would like to
draw us out to attack him; that he would then retreat, with the hope of drawing
us into his nets as he did at Bull Run. But
he will not attack us here.
SOURCE: Alfred L.
Castleman, The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A Diary of
Unwritten History; From the Organization of the Army, by General George B.
McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia about the First Day
January, 1863, p. 20-1
I am still at
Barnum's, and having transferred my sick to the charge of Mr. S., I have a
little more time to think, and to journalize my thoughts. I have looked around
a little to-day, and my observations have almost made me wish I had no country.
When every right which freemen hold dear is at stake, to see men calculating
the pecuniary cost of preserving them, sickens the heart, and shakes our
confidence in human nature. When the poorer classes are laboring day and night,
and exposing their lives in the cause of that government on which the rich lean
for protection in the possession of their wealth, to see these loud mouthed
patriotic capitalists cheating them in the very clothes they wear to battle,
the soul revolts at the idea of human nature civilized into a great mass of
money-makers. May we not expect, ere long, that these same patriots will be
found opposing the war because it will require a tax on the riches which they
shall have amassed from it, to defray its expenses? We shall see.
* I assume that the
slave population are not of those against whom we fight.
SOURCE: Alfred L.
Castleman, The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A Diary of
Unwritten History; From the Organization of the Army, by General George B.
McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia about the First Day
January, 1863, p. 15-6
On the 19th of June,
1861, the 5th Regiment of Wisconsin Vols., being partially organized, went into
camp at Madison, Wis. Here it remained for a time, perfecting its organization,
drilling and preparing itself for the hardships, the dangers, and the
responsibilities to be encountered in the battle-field, against a people
warlike and chivalric; a people who are taught to regard physical courage, and
recklessness of physical danger, as the noblest qualities of the human race,
and a people whose chief pride was to win in fight, whether with individuals or
in masses; but a people, who, having entrusted their politics to professed
politicians, were misled to believe that, by their brothers of the Northern
States of this Union, their rights of property were invaded, and their homes
were coveted as a prize for distribution amongst the overgrown population of
the North. But to enter into a discussion of the merits of this rebellion, now
devastating the most beautiful country known to man, carrying in its march a
passover of beggary, of destitution, and of death, is not in accordance with
the object of this little book. It is therefore passed over, that the reader
may at once be permitted to enter into a detail of the subjects indicated in
our preface.
From the time of the
commencement of the rebellion, by actual war on Fort Sumter, in April of this
year, its settlement by rapid and decisive victories over the rebels was
subject of merriment, and looked on as matter of course. We were going to war
with a people of not half our numbers, without money, without munitions of war,
without navy, without anything in fine of those elements which go to make up
the ensemble of a people powerful in war, and we were entering into the strife
as a short interlude to the hum-drum vocations of life. "How could a
people thus situated hope to compete with the parent Government, rich in every
element which makes a great people?" This was the reasoning. In vain were
our people told of the character of the Southerners. In vain were they referred
to the results of our own rebellion and successful revolutionary war with
England. "Oh!" was the reply, "Steamships were not known in
those days, and England had to cross the ocean to fight us." "But Hungary,
with its population of only 3,000,000, and without revenue, withstood the whole
power of Austria, till the hordes of Russia had to be called in to aid in their
subjugation." "But Austria had become a superannuated and feeble
people." No reasoning would answer. The subjugation of the revolted States
was to be a pastime, and could be nothing but a pastime. Thus went on matters,
drilling as an amusement, preparatory to the enjoyment of a war, all the
results of which were to be on our side, and obtained without sacrifice or suffering.
*
* * * * *
On the afternoon of
the 21st July, 1861, the electric wires brought us the intelligence from Bull
Run that our army was whipped, was routed, was scattered in flight. The heart
of the whole North received a shock of sadness and of disappointment. Soldiers
in camp began to realize that war meant work and danger, and the Regiment of
which I was a member at once received orders to be in readiness to march at the
earliest possible moment, to hurry to the aid of its companions
in arms. It was in
sad plight for the exposures of camp life. ’Twas in the heat of summer, when
fevers and diarrhoea prevail in their worst forms. The measles had broken out
in camp, and one-third of the soldiers were suffering from disease of some
kind. Nevertheless, active preparation went on, and on the fourth day after the
receipt of the sad news the Regiment was on its way to battle.
On the 27th of July
we reached Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and went into Camp Curtin. For months this
had been a rendezvous for regiment after regiment. The grounds had not been
cleaned—the weather was intensely hot, without a leaf to intercept the
scorching rays of the sun. The stench of the camp was intolerable, and the sickness
of the troops rapidly increased.1
On the 29th of July,
at night, we received orders to be ready to march at 3 o'clock next morning.
Our destination was supposed to be Harper's Ferry, where we were at once to
engage the enemy and to "wind up the war." So great was the
excitement (these things were all new then) that very few laid down for rest
during the night. At 3 A. M., of the 30th, all tents were struck and rolled up;
mess chests were packed, and everyone ready for the order to move. But sunrise came
and found us sitting on our packages. The day wore on, I think the hottest I
ever experienced. The troops remained exposed to the broiling sun till 2
o'clock P. M., when we embarked on open platform cars, without seats, and
without covering. We ran down through the city, crossed the Susquehannah
Bridge, halted, and remained sitting or standing in the sun till evening. The
heat of the day, determining the circulation to the skin, had brought out the
eruption in many cases of measles, and the poor fellows had to sit and suffer,
without a place to lie down, or even a back to lean against. At dusk we found
ourselves again under way; ran down to York, Pa., about forty miles. It had now
commenced raining, and the cars were run out from the depot, and the suffering
men who had been all day washed with their own perspiration, were compelled to
sit all night in the rain. Sick or well, 'twas all the same. None were permitted
to leave the open cars and go back into the depot. Towards morning the rain
stopped; the wind shifted suddenly to the Northwest, and it was cold as
November. After the long tedious night of suffering, the morning came, and we
ran down to Baltimore, arriving there at 8 o'clock on the morning of July 31st.
We had anticipated
trouble here. We disembarked, marched with muskets loaded, and bayonets fixed,
from north to south through the entire length of the city, without molestation,
except from the scowls of secessionists, and the welcoming hurrahs of friends.2
At the Camden Street depot we remained in the most uncomfortable condition which
it is possible to conceive till sunset, when we were ordered for the twentieth
time during the day to "fall in." We disembarked, marched about two
and a half miles, and camped on an elevated ground to the north of, and
overlooking a large part of the city and bay. The regiment did not get settled
till midnight, and many were so exhausted that they threw themselves on the
ground, with their clothes still wet from the previous night's rain. The
medical department, however, succeeded by 10 o'clock in getting up tents to
protect the sick, and they were made as comfortable as the circumstances would
permit.
Here the regiment
remained till the 8th of August, without any occurrences worthy of note, except
that sickness continued to increase, and the knowledge I gained as to how
little some military commanders cared for the comfort of their sick men. After
we had been here five or six days, the Colonel was positively ignorant of the
fact that we had a hospital on the ground, though there were three within fifty
feet of his quarters, filled to their utmost capacity with the sick and
suffering. I was now receiving but little support in my efforts for their
health and comfort.
1 I made it my business to visit every tent
twice a day, to see that they were thoroughly cleaned, and that the sides of
the tent were raised so as freely to admit a current of air. But here the air
without was so foul as to improve the condition inside but little. I will here
say, however, that the Surgeon of a Regiment who does not visit every tent in
his encampment at least once a day, to satisfy himself by personal inspection
that it is thoroughly cleaned and ventilated, and that at least once a week the
tents are all struck, and the sun admitted for several hours to the ground on
which they stand, is not deserving of the position which he holds.
2 Only two companies were armed. They were
placed one in front, the other in the rear of the Regiment, and so marched
through the city.
SOURCE: Alfred L. Castleman, The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A Diary of Unwritten History; From the Organization of the Army, by General George B. McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia about the First Day January, 1863, p. 5-9
Battle of Manassas
Plains. This battle will always occupy a prominent place in the memory of every
man of the battery. They all expected to find a disorganized mob, that would
disperse at our mere appearance; while, to the general surprise, they not only
were better disciplined, but also better officered than our troops. We started
by two o'clock in the morning, but proceeded very slowly. Passed Centreville
before break-of-day. When the sun rose in all its glory, illuminating the
splendid scenery of the Blue Ridge mountains, though no sun of Austerlitz to
us, we crossed the bridge over the Cub Run. By this time, the report of the
30-pounder Parrott gun belonging to Schenck's command, who had met the enemy,
was heard. Our division turned off to the right, and marched some miles through
dense woodland, to the Warrenton road. Towards ten o'clock, nothing could be
seen of the enemy yet, and the belief found circulation that the enemy had
fallen back. Experience proved that, had we remained at Centreville, the rebel
army would undoubtedly have attacked us; but hearing of our advance they only
had to lay in ambush, ready to receive us. At the aforesaid time, the Second
Rhode Island infantry deployed as skirmishers. We advanced steadily, till
arriving at the Bull Run and Sudley's church, a halt was ordered to rest the
men and the horses. But it should not be; the brave Second R. I. Regiment,
coming up to the enemy, who was concealed in the woods, their situation was
getting critical. The report of cannon and musketry followed in rapid
succession. Our battery, after passing Sudley's church, commenced to trot in
great haste to the place of combat. At this moment Gen. McDowell rode up in
great excitement, shouting to Capt. Reynolds: "Forward with your light
battery." This was entirely needless, as we were going at high speed, for
all were anxious to come to the rescue of our Second regiment. In quick time we
arrived in the open space where the conflict was raging already in its greatest
fury. The guns were unlimbered, with or without command; no matter, it was
done, and never did better music sound to the ears of the Second Regiment, than
the quick reports of our guns, driving back the advancing foe. For nearly forty
minutes our battery and the Second Regiment, defended that ground before any
other troops were brought into action. Then the First Rhode Island, Seventy-first
New York, and Second New Hampshire, with two Dahlgren howitzers, appeared,
forming on the right and left. The enemy was driven successfully in our immediate
front. Our battery opened on one of the enemy's light batteries to our right,
which left after a short but spirited engagement, in a rather demoralized
state. Griffith's, Ayer's and Rickett's batteries coming up, prospects really
looked promising, and victory seemed certain. The rebel line gradually giving
way. Gen. McDowell, seeing the explosion of perhaps a magazine or a caisson,
raised his cap, shouting, "Soldiers, this is the great explosion of
Manassas," and seemed to be highly pleased with the work done by our
battery. Owing to different orders, the battery, towards afternoon, was split
into sections. Capt. Reynolds, with Lieuts. Tompkins and Weeden, off to the
right, while the two pieces of the left section, to the left; Lieuts. Vaughan
and Munroe remaining with the last mentioned. Firing was kept up incessantly,
until the arrival of confederate reinforcements, coming down from Manassas
Junction, unfurling the stars and stripes, whereby our officers were deceived
to such a degree as to give the order, "Cease firing." This cessation
of our artillery fire proved, no doubt, disastrous. It was the turning point of
the battle. Our lines began to waver after receiving the volleys of the
disguised columns. The setting sun found the fragments of our army not only in
full retreat but in a complete rout, leaving most of the artillery in the hands
of the enemy. Our battery happened to be the only six gun volunteer battery,
carrying all the guns off the battle-field, two pieces in a disabled condition.
A battery wagon and forge were lost on the field. Retreating the same road we
advanced on in the morning. All of a sudden the cry arose, “The Black Horse Cavalry
is coming." The alarm proved to be false; yet it had the effect upon many
soldiers to throw away their arms. But the fears of many soldiers that the
enemy would try to cut off our retreat, were partly realized. Our column having
reached Cub Run bridge, was at once furiously attacked on our right by
artillery and cavalry. Unfortunately, the bridge being blocked up, the
confusion increased. All discipline was gone. Here our battery was lost, all
but one gun, that of the second detachment, which was carried through the
creek. It is kept at the armory of the Marine Artillery, in Providence. At the
present time, guns, under such circumstances, would not be left to the enemy
without the most strenuous efforts being made to save them. We assembled at the
very same camp we left in the morning. Credit is due to Capt. Reynolds, for
doing everything possible for the comfort of his men. At midnight the defeated
army took up its retreat towards Washington. Our battery consisting of one gun,
and the six-horse team, drove by Samuel Warden.
Arrived at, and
effected our passage across the Long Bridge, by ten o'clock, and found
ourselves once more at Camp Clark, where we had a day of rest after our debut
on the battle-field yesterday, under the scorching sun of Virginia.
SOURCE: Theodore
Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light
Artillery, p. 15
Lieut. Albert Munroe
addressed the battery in regard to the battle, and attributed our defeat to the
want of discipline. The men felt very indignant at his remarks. "We had to
come down to regulations, the same as in the regular army, and should consider
ourselves almost as State prison convicts." We have since seen that he
meant no insult towards the battery; but have found out to our satisfaction
that he spoke the truth, for we have seen the time that put us almost on the
same level with convicts.
SOURCE: Theodore
Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light
Artillery, p. 15
Advance at daylight.
A part of the Union army, Gen. Tyler's troops, engaged. This conflict the
rebels call battle of Bull Run. While the contest was raging, our division
halted two miles to the left of Fairfax Court House, at a place called
Germantown. We could plainly hear the distant booming of artillery, and were
impatiently waiting for the order, "forward." Towards four o'clock P.
M., we advanced again; preparations were made to get in action; sponge buckets
filled with water, and equipments distributed among the cannoniers. But when we
approached Centreville, intelligence came that our troops got worsted and the
contest was given up. Our division went to camp within a mile and a half of
Centreville. Strong picket lines we drawn up.
SOURCE: Theodore
Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First
Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery, p. 10-1
