I came off guard
this morning. It rained very hard all the latter part of the night. Another
boat load of troops came down last night, making five or six in all. They are
from the Kansas Valley Division of Fremont's old forces.
SOURCE: Seth James
Wells, The Siege of Vicksburg: From the Diary of Seth J. Wells,
Including Weeks of Preparation and of Occupation After the Surrender, p. 27
8½ Oc we left the packet and formed in line on the levvy St Louis 10 Oc we started for Benton Barracks had a verry Dirty time 12 Oc we arrived had stoves put up & found every convenience we could ask in camp life & all agreed that Genl Fremont is worthy of great praise for the excellent arrangements of the Barracks. evening I spent with Friend LeeRoy Mayne at the head quarters & we had a fine oyster supper
SOURCE: Edgar R. Harlan, Currator, Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 15, No. 2, October 1925, p. 96
WILL McClellan
display unity in conception, and vigor in execution? That is the question. He
seems very energetic and active in organizing the army; but he ought to take
the field very soon. He ought to leave Washington, and have his headquarters in
the camp among the soldiers. The life in the tent will inspire him. It alone
inspired Frederick II and Napoleon. Too much organization may become as
mischievous as the no organization under Scott. Time, time is everything. The
levies will fight well; may only McClellan not be carried away by the notion
and the attempt to create what is called a perfect army on European pattern.
Such an attempt would be ruinous to the cause. It is altogether impossible to
create such an army on the European model, and no necessity exists for it. The rebel
army is no European one. Civil wars have altogether different military
exigencies, and the great tactics for a civil war are wholly different from the
tactics, etc., needed in a regular war. Napoleon differently fought the
Vendeans, and differently the Austrians, and the other coalesced armies. May
only McClellan not become intoxicated before he puts the cup to his lips.
Fremont disavowed by
Lincoln and the administration. This looks bad. I have no considerable
confidence in Fremont's high capacities, and believe that his head is turned a
little; but in this question he was right in principle, and right in legality.
A commander of an army operating separately has the exercise of full powers of
war.
The Blairs are not
to be accused; I read the letter from F. Blair to his brother. It is the letter
of a patriot, but not of an intriguer. Fremont establishes an absurd rule
concerning the breach of military discipline, and shows by it his ignorance and
narrow-mindedness. So Fremont, and other bungling martinets, assert that nobody
has the right to criticise the actions of his commander.
Fremont is ignorant
of history, and those around him who put in his head such absurd notions are a
pack of mean and servile spit-lickers. An officer ought to obey orders without
hesitation, and if he does not he is to be court-martialed and shot. But it is
perfectly allowable to criticise them; it is in human nature—it was, is, and
will be done in all armies; see in Curtius and other historians of Alexander of
Macedon. It was continually done under Napoleon. In Russia, in 1812, the
criticism made by almost all the officers forced Alexander I. to leave the
army, and to put Kutousoff over Barclay. In the last Italian campaign Austrian
officers criticised loudly Giulay, their commander, etc., etc.
Conspiracy to
destroy Fremont on account of his slave proclamation. The conspirators are the
Missouri slave-holders: Senator Brodhead, old Bates, Scott, McClellan, and
their staffs. Some jealousy against him in the Cabinet, but Seward rather on
Fremont's side.
McClellan makes his
father-in-law, a man of very secondary capacity, the chief of
the staff of the army. It seems that McClellan ignores what a highly
responsible position it is, and what a special and transcendent capacity must
be that of a chief of the staff—the more so when of an army of several hundreds
of thousands. I do not look for a Berthier, a Gneisenau, a Diebitsch, or
Gortschakoff, but a Marcy will not do.
Colonel Lebedeef,
from the staff of the Emperor Alexander II., and professor in the School of the
Staff at St. Petersburg, saw here everything, spoke with our generals, and his
conclusion is that in military capacity McDowell is by far superior to
McClellan. Strange, if true, and foreboding no good.
Mr. Lincoln begins
to call a demagogue any one who does not admire all the doings of his
administration. Are we already so far?
McClellan under
fatal influences of the rampant pro-slavery men, and of partisans of the South,
as is a Barlow. All the former associations of McClellan have been of the worst
kind—Breckinridgians. But perhaps he will throw them off. He is young, and the
elevation of his position, his standing before the civilized world, will
inspire and purify him, I hope. Nay, I ardently wish he may go to the camp, to
the camp.
McClellan published
a slave-catching order. Oh that he may discard those bad men around him!
Struggles with evils, above all with domestic, internal evils, absorb a great
part of every nation's life. Such struggles constitute its development, are the
landmarks of its progress and decline.
The like struggles
deserve more the attention of the observer, the philosopher, than all kinds of
external wars. And, besides, most of such external wars result from the
internal condition of a nation. At any rate, their success or unsuccess almost
wholly depends upon its capacity to overcome internal evils. A nation even
under a despotic rule may overcome and repel an invasion, as long as the
struggle against the internal evils has not broken the harmony between the
ruler and the nation. Here the internal evil has torn a part of the
constitutional structure; may only the necessary harmony between this high-minded
people and the representative of the transient constitutional formula not be
destroyed. The people move onward, the formula vacillates, and seems to fear to
make any bold step.
If the cause of the
freemen of the North succumbs, then humanity is humiliated. This high-spirited
exclamation belongs to Tassara, the Minister from Spain. Not the diplomat, but
the nobly inspired man uttered it.
But for the
authoritative influence of General Scott, and the absence of any foresight and
energy on the part of the administration, the rebels would be almost wholly
without military leaders, without naval officers. The Johnsons, Magruders,
Tatnalls, Buchanans, ought to have been arrested for treason the moment they
announced their intention to resign.
Mr. Seward has many
excellent personal qualities, besides his unquestionable eminent capacity for
business and argument; but why is he neutralizing so much good in him by the
passion to be all in all, to meddle with everything, to play the knowing one in
military affairs, he being in all such matters as innocent as a lamb? It is not
a field on which Seward's hazarded generalizations can be of any earthly use;
but they must confuse all.
Seward is free from
that coarse, semi-barbarous know-nothingism which rules paramount, not the
genuine people, but the would-be something, the half-civilized gentlemen.
Above all, know-nothingism pervades all around Scott, who is himself its grand
master, and it nestles there par excellence in more than
one way. It is, however, to be seen how far this pure American—Scott military
wisdom is something real, transcendent. Up to this day, the pure Americanism,
West Point schoolboy's conceit, have not produced much. The defences of
Washington, so much clarioned as being the product of a high conception and of
engineering skill,—these defences are very questionable when appreciated by a
genuine military eye. A Russian officer of the military engineers, one who was
in the Crimea and at Sebastopol, after having surveyed these defences here,
told me that the Russian soldiers who defended Sebastopol, and who learned what
ought to be defences, would prefer to fight outside than inside of the
Washington forts, bastions, defences, etc., etc., etc.
Doubtless many
foreigners coming to this country are not much, but the greatest number are
soldiers who saw service and fire, and could be of some use at the side of
Scott's West Point greenness and presumption.
If we are worsted,
then the fate of the men of faith in principles will be that of Sisyphus, and
the coming generation for half a century will have uphill work.
If not McClellan
himself, some intriguers around him already dream, nay, even attempt to form a
pure military, that is, a reckless, unprincipled, unpatriotic party. These men
foment the irritation between the arrogance of the thus-called regular army,
and the pure abnegation of the volunteers. Oh, for battles! Oh, for battles!
Fremont wished at
once to attack Fort Pillow and the city of Memphis. It was a bold move, but the
concerted civil and military wisdom grouped around the President opposed
this truly great military conception.
Mr. Lincoln is pulled
in all directions. His intentions are excellent, and he would have made an
excellent President for quiet times. But this civil war imperatively demands a
man of foresight, of prompt decision, of Jacksonian will and energy. These
qualities may be latent in Lincoln, but do not yet come to daylight. Mr.
Lincoln has no experience of men and events, and no knowledge of the past.
Seward's influence over Lincoln may be explained by the fact that Lincoln
considers Seward as the alpha and omega of every kind of knowledge and
information.
I still hope,
perhaps against hope, that if Lincoln is what the masses believe him to be, a
strong mind, then all may come out well. Strong minds, lifted by events into
elevated regions, expand more and more; their "mind's eye" pierces
through clouds, and even through rocks; they become inspired, and inspiration
compensates the deficiency or want of information acquired by studies. Weak
minds, when transported into higher regions, become confused and dizzy. Which
of the two will be Mr. Lincoln's fate?
The administration
hesitates to give to the struggle a character of emancipation; but the people
hesitate not, and take Fremont to their heart.
As the concrete
humanity, so single nations have epochs of gestation, and epochs of normal
activity, of growth, of full life, of manhood. Americans are now in the
stage of manhood.
Col. Romanoff, of
the Russian military engineer corps, who was in the Crimean war, saw here the
men and the army, saw and conversed with the generals. Col. R. is of opinion
that McDowell is by far superior to McClellan, and would make a better
commander.
It is said that
McClellan refuses to move until he has an army of 300,000 men and 600 guns. Has
he not studied Napoleon's wars? Napoleon scarcely ever had half such a number
in hand; and when at Wagram, where he had about 180,000 men, himself in the
centre, Davoust and Massena on the flanks, nevertheless the handling of such a
mass was too heavy even for his, Napoleon's, genius.
The country is—to
use an Americanism—in a pretty fix, if this McClellan turns out to be a
mistake. I hope for the best. 600 guns! But 100 guns in a line cover a mile.
What will he do with 600? Lose them in forests, marshes, and bad roads; whence
it is unhappily a fact that McClellan read only a little of military history,
misunderstood what he read, and now attempts to realize hallucinations, as a
boy attempts to imitate the exploits of an Orlando. It is dreadful to think of
it. I prefer to trust his assertion that, once organized, he soon, very soon,
will deal heavy and quick blows to the rebels.
I saw some
manœuvrings, and am astonished that no artillery is distributed among the
regiments of infantry. When the rank and file see the guns on their side, the
soldiers consider them as a part of themselves and of the regiment; they fight
better in the company of guns; they stand by them and defend them as they
defend their colors. Such a distribution of guns would strengthen the body of
the volunteers. But it seems that McClellan has no confidence in the volunteers.
Were this true, it would denote a small, very small mind. Let us hope it is not
so. One of his generals—a martinet of the first class—told me that McClellan
waits for the organization of the regulars, to have them for
the defence of the guns. If so, it is sheer nonsense. These narrow-minded West
Point martinets will become the ruin of McClellan.
McClellan could now
take the field. Oh, why has he established his headquarters in the city, among
flunkeys, wiseacres, and spit-lickers? Were he among the troops, he would be
already in Manassas. The people are uneasy and fretting about this inaction,
and the people see what is right and necessary.
Gen. Banks, a true
and devoted patriot, is sacrificed by the stupidity of what they call here the
staff of the great army, but which collectively, with its chief, is only a mass
of conceit and ignorance few, as General Williams, excepted. Banks is in the
face of the enemy, and has no cavalry and no artillery; and here are immense
reviews to amuse women and fools.
Mr. Mercier, the
French Minister, visited a considerable part of the free States, and his
opinions are now more clear and firm; above all, he is very friendly to
our side. He is sagacious and good.
Missouri is in great
confusion—three parts of it lost. Fremont is not to be accused of all the
mischief, but, from effect to cause, the accusation ascends to General Scott.
Gen. Scott insisted
to have Gen. Harney appointed to the command of Missouri, and hated Lyon. If,
even after Harney's recall, Lyon had been appointed, Lyon would be alive and
Missouri safe. But hatred, anxiety of rank, and stupidity, united their
efforts, and prevailed. Oh American people! to depend upon such inveterate
blunderers!
Were McClellan in
the camp, he would have no flatterers, no antechambers filled with flunkeys;
but the rebels would not so easily get news of his plans as they did in the
affair on Munson's Hill.
The Orleans are
here. I warned the government against admitting the Count de Paris, saying that
it would be a deliberate breach of good comity towards Louis
Napoleon, and towards the Bonapartes, who prove to be our friends; I told that
no European government would commit itself in such a manner, not even if
connected by ties of blood with the Orleans. At the start, Mr. Seward heeded a
little my advice, but finally he could not resist the vanity to display
untimely spread-eagleism, and the Orleans are in our service. Brave boys! It is
a noble, generous, high-minded, if not an altogether wise, action.
If a mind is not nobly
inspired and strong, then the exercise of power makes it crotchety and
dissimulative in contact with men.
To my disgust, I witness
this all around me.
The American people,
its institutions, the Union—all have lost their virginity, their political
innocence. A revolution in the institutions, in the mode of life, in notions
begun—it is going on, will grow and mature, either for good or evil. Civil war,
this most terrible but most maturing passion, has put an end to the boyhood and
to the youth of the American people. Whatever may be the end, one thing is sure
that the substance and the form will be modified; nay, perhaps, both wholly
changed. A new generation of citizens will grow and come out from this smoke of
the civil war.
The Potomac closed
by the rebels! Mischief and shame! Natural fruits of the dilatory war policy—Scott's
fault. Months ago the navy wished to prevent it, to shell out the rebels, to
keep our troops in the principal positions. Scott opposed; and still he has
almost paramount influence. McClellan complains against Scott, and Lincoln and
Seward flatter McClellan, but look up to Scott as to a supernatural military
wisdom. Oh, poor nation!
In Europe clouds
gather over Mexico. Whatever it eventually may come to, I suggested to Mr.
Seward to lay aside the Monroe doctrine, not to meddle for or against Mexico,
but to earnestly protest against any eventual European interference in the
internal condition of the political institutions of Mexico.
Continual secondary,
international complications, naturally growing out from the maritime question;
so with the Dutch cheesemongers, with Spain, with England - all easily to be
settled; they generate fuss and trouble, but will make no fire.
Gen. Scott's
partisans complain that McClellan is very disrespectful in his dealings with
Gen. Scott. I wonder not.. McClellan is probably hampered by the narrow routine
notions of Scott. McClellan feels that Scott prevents energetic and prompt
action; that he, McClellan, in every step is obliged to fight Gen. Scott's
inertia; and McClellan grows impatient, and shows it to Scott.
SOURCE: Adam
Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, pp. 92-103
No. 1.
Reports of Brig. Gen. U. S.
Grant, U. S. Army, commanding District of Southeast Missouri, and including operations
against Thompson's forces, with orders, &c.
GENERAL: The
following order was received from headquarters Western Department:
SAINT Louis, November 1, 1861.
You
are hereby directed to hold your whole command ready to march at an hour's
notice, until further orders, and you will take particular care to be amply
supplied with transportation and ammunition. You are also directed to make
demonstrations with your troops along both sides of the river towards
Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville, and to keep your columns constantly moving
back and forward against these places, without, however, attacking the enemy.
Very respectfully,
CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,
A.A.G.
General
GRANT,
Commanding at Cairo.
At the same time I
was notified that similar instructions had been sent to Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith,
commanding Paducah, Ky., and was directed to communicate with him freely as to
my movements, that his might be co-operative.
On the 2d of the
same month, and before it was possible for any considerable preparation to have
been made for the execution of this order, the following telegraphic dispatch
was received:
SAINT LOUIS, November 2, 1861.
Jeff.
Thompson is at Indian Ford of the Saint Francois River, 25 miles below
Greenville, with about 3,000 men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from
Pilot Knob. Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist Carlin
in driving Thompson into Arkansas.
By
order of Major-General Frémont:
C. McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Brigadier-General
GRANT.
The forces I
determined to send from Bird's Point were immediately designated, and Col. R.
J. Oglesby, Eighth Illinois Volunteers, assigned to the command, under the
following detailed instructions:
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,
Cairo, November 3, 1861.
You
will take command of an expedition, consisting of your regiment, four companies
of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three
companies of cavalry from Bird's Point (to be selected and notified by
yourself), and a section of Schwartz' battery, artillery, and proceed by
steamboats to Commerce, Mo. From Commerce you will strike for Sikeston, Mr.
Cropper acting as guide. From there you will go in pursuit of a rebel force,
understood to be 3,000 strong, under Jeff. Thompson, now at Indian Ford, on the
Saint Francois River.
An
expedition has already left Ironton. Mo., to attack this force. Should they
learn that they have left that place it will not be necessary for you to go
there, but pursue the enemy in any direction he may go, always being cautious
not to fall in with an unlooked-for foe too strong for the command under you.
The
object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the manner of doing it
is left largely at your discretion, believing it better not to trammel you with
instructions. Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' rations
and four or five days' forage. All you may require outside of this must be
furnished by the country through which you pass.
In
taking supplies you will be careful to select a proper officer to press them,
and require a receipt to be given, and the articles pressed accounted for in
the same manner as if purchased. You are particularly enjoined to allow no
foraging by your men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make
open enemies where they would not otherwise exist.
Yours, &c.,
U.S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.
Col.
R. J. OGLESBY,
Commanding, &c., Bird's Point, Mo.
Col. J. B. Plummer,
Eleventh Missouri Volunteers, commanding Cape Girardeau, was directed to send
one regiment in the direction of Bloomfield, with a view to attracting the
attention of the enemy.
The forces under
Colonel Oglesby were all got off on the evening of the 3d.
On the 5th a
telegram was received from headquarters Saint Louis, stating that the enemy was
re-enforcing Price's army from Columbus by way of White River, and directing
that the demonstration that had been ordered against Columbus be immediately
made. Orders were accordingly at once given to the troops under my command that
remained at Cairo, Bird's Point, and Fort Holt. A letter was also sent to
Brig-Gen. C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, requesting him to make a
demonstration at the same time against Columbus.
To more effectually
attain the object of the demonstration against the enemy at Belmont and
Columbus, I determined on the morning of the 6th to temporarily change the
direction of Colonel Oglesby's column towards New Madrid, and also to send a
small force under Col. W. H. L. Wallace, Eleventh Illinois Volunteers, to
Charleston, Mo., to ultimately join Colonel Oglesby. In accordance with this
determination I addressed Colonel Oglesby the following communication:
CAIRO, November 6, 1861
On
receipt of this turn your column towards New Madrid. When you arrive at the
nearest point to Columbus from which there is a road to that place, communicate
with me at Belmont.
U.S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.
Col.
R. J. OGLESBY,
Commanding Expedition.
which was sent to
Colonel Wallace with the following letter:
CAIRO, November 6, 1861.
Herewith
I send you an order to Colonel Oglesby to change the direction of his column
towards New Madrid, halting to communicate with me at Belmont from the nearest
point on his road.
I
desire you to get up the Charleston expedition ordered for to-morrow, to start
to-night, taking two days' rations with them. You will accompany them to
Charleston, and get Colonel Oglesby's instructions to him by a messenger, if
practicable, and when he is near enough you may join him. For this purpose you
may substitute the remainder of your regiment in place of an equal amount from
Colonel Marsh's. The two days' rations carried by your men in haversacks will
enable you to join Colonel Oglesby's command, and there you will find
rations enough for several days more should they be necessary. You may take a
limited number of tents, and at Charleston press wagons to carry
them to the main column. There you will find sufficient transportation to
release the pressed wagons.
U.S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.
Col.
W. H. L. WALLACE,
Bird's Point. Mo.
On the evening of
the 6th I left this place in steamers, with McClernand's Brigade, consisting of
Twenty-seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteers, Col. N. B. Buford; Thirtieth Regiment
Illinois Volunteers, Col. Philip B. Fouke; Thirty-first Regiment Illinois
Volunteers, Col. John A. Logan; Dollins' Company Independent Illinois Cavalry,
Capt. J. J. Dollins; Delano's Company Adams County Illinois Cavalry, Lieut. J.
K. Catlin; and Dougherty's Brigade, consisting of Twenty-second Regiment
Illinois Volunteers, Lieut. Col. H. E. Hart; Seventh Regiment Iowa Volunteers,
Col. J. G. Lauman, amounting to 3,114 men of all arms, to make the
demonstration against Columbus. I proceeded down the river to a point 9 miles
below here, where we lay until next morning, on the Kentucky shore, which
served to distract the enemy and led him to suppose that he was to be attacked
in his strongly fortified position at Columbus.
About 2 o'clock on
the morning of the 7th I received information from Col. W. H. L. Wallace at
Charleston (sent by a messenger on steamer W. H. B.) that he had learned from a
reliable Union man that the enemy had been crossing troops from Columbus to
Belmont the day before, for the purpose of following after and cutting off the
forces under Colonel Oglesby. Such a move on his part seemed to me more than
probable, and gave at once a twofold importance to my demonstration against the
enemy—namely, the prevention of reinforcements to General Price, and the
cutting off of the two small columns that I had sent, in pursuance of
directions, from this place and Cape Girardeau, in pursuit of Jeff. Thompson.
This information determined me to attack vigorously his forces at Belmont, knowing
that should we be repulsed, we would re-embark without difficulty under the
protection of the gunboats. The following order was given:
ON BOARD STEAMER BELLE MEMPHIS,
November 7, 1861—2 o'clock a.m.
The
troops composing the present expedition from this place will move promptly at 6
o'clock this morning. The gunboats will take the advance, and be followed by
the First Brigade, under command of Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, composed of
all the troops from Cairo and Fort Holt. The Second Brigade, comprising the
remainder of the troops of the expedition, commanded by Col. Henry Dougherty,
will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest point on the Missouri
shore where a landing can be effected in security from the rebel batteries. The
point of debarkation will be designated by Captain Walke, commanding naval
forces.
By
order of Brig. Gen. U.S. Grant:
JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Promptly at the hour
designated we proceeded down the river to point just out of range of the rebel
batteries at Columbus, and debarked on the Missouri shore. From here the troops
were marched, with skirmishers well in advance, by flank for about a mile
towards Belmont, and there formed in line of battle. One battalion had been
left as a reserve near the transports. Two companies from each regiment were
thrown forward as skirmishers, to ascertain the position of the enemy, and
about 9 o'clock met and engaged him. The balance of my force, with the
exception of the reserve, was promptly thrown forward, and drove the enemy foot
by foot, and from tree to tree, back to his encampment on the river bank, a
distance of over 2 miles. Here he had strengthened his position by felling the
timber for several hundred yards around his camp, making a sort of abatis. Our
men charged through this, driving the enemy under cover of the bank, and many
of them into their transports, in quick time, leaving us in possession of
everything not exceedingly portable.
Belmont is situated
on low ground, and every foot is commanded by the guns on the opposite shore,
and of course could not be held for a single hour after the enemy became aware
of the withdrawal of his troops. Having no wagons with me, I could move but
little of the captured property, consequently gave orders for the destruction
of everything that could not be moved and an immediate return to our
transports. Tents, blankets, &c., were set on fire and destroyed, and our
return march commenced, taking his artillery and a large number of captured
horses and prisoners with us. Three pieces of artillery being drawn by hand,
and one by an inefficient team, were spiked and left on the road; two were
brought to this place.
We had but fairly
got under way when the enemy, having received re-enforcements, rallied under
cover of the river bank and the woods on the point of land in the bend of the
river above us, and made his appearance between us and our transports,
evidently with a design of cutting off our return to them.
Our troops were not
in the least discouraged, but charged the enemy and again defeated him. We
then, with the exception of the Twenty-seventh Illinois, Col. N. B. Buford
commanding, reached our transports and embarked without further molestation.
While waiting for the arrival of this regiment, and to get some of our wounded
from a field hospital near by, the enemy, having crossed fresh troops from
Columbus, again made his appearance on the river bank, and commenced firing
upon our transports. The fire was returned by our men from the decks of the
steamers, and also by the gunboats with terrible effect, compelling him to
retire in the direction of Belmont. In the mean time Colonel Buford, although
he had received orders to return with the main force, took the Charleston road
from Belmont, and came in on the road leading to Bird's Point, where we had
formed the line of battle in the morning. At this point, to avoid the effect of
the shells from the gunboats that were beginning to fall among his men, he took
a blind path direct to the river, and followed a wood road up its bank, and
thereby avoided meeting the enemy, who were retiring by the main road. On his
appearance on the river bank a steamer was dropped down, and took his command
on board, without his having participated or lost a man in the enemy's attempt
to cut us off from our transports.
Notwithstanding the
crowded state of our transports, the only loss we sustained from the enemy's
fire upon them was three men wounded, one of whom belonged to one of the boats.
Our loss in killed
on the field was 85, 301 wounded (many of them, however, slightly), and 99
missing. Of the wounded, 125 fell into the hands of the enemy. Nearly all the
missing were from the Seventh Iowa Regiment, which suffered more severely than
any other. All the troops behaved with great gallantry, which was in a great
degree attributable to the coolness and presence of mind of their officers,
particularly the colonels commanding.
General McClernand
was in the midst of danger throughout the engagement, and displayed both
coolness and judgment. His horse was three times shot under him.
Colonel Dougherty,
Twenty-second Illinois Volunteers, commanding the Second Brigade, by his
coolness and bravery entitles himself to be named among the most competent of
officers for command of troops in battle. In our second engagement he was three
times wounded, and fell a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.
Among the killed was
Lieut. Col. A. Wentz, Seventh Iowa Volunteers, and among the wounded were Col.
J. G. Lauman and Maj. E. W. Rice, of the Seventh Iowa.
The reports of
subcommanders will detail more fully particulars of the engagement, and the
conduct of both officers and men.
To my staff, Capt.
John A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. C. B. Lagow and William S.
Hillyer, aides-de-camp, and Capt. R. B. Hatch, assistant quartermaster, I am
much indebted for the promptitude with which they discharged their several
duties.
Surg. J. H. Brinton,
U.S. volunteers, chief medical officer, was on the field during the entire
engagement, and displayed great ability and efficiency in providing for the
wounded, and in organizing the medical corps.
Maj. J. D. Webster,
acting chief engineer, also accompanied me on the field, and displayed
soldierly qualities of a high order.
My own horse was
shot under me during the engagement.
The gunboats Tyler,
Captain Walke, and Lexington, Captain Stembel, convoyed the expedition, and
rendered most efficient service. Immediately upon our landing they engaged the
enemy's batteries on the heights above Columbus, and protected our transports
throughout. For a detailed account of the part taken by them I refer with
pleasure to the accompanying report of Capt. H. Walke, senior officer [No. 3].
In pursuance of my
request, General Smith, commanding at Paducah, sent on the 7th instant a force
to Mayfield, Ky., and another in the direction of Columbus, with orders not to
approach nearer, however, than 12 or 15
miles of that place. I also sent a small force on the Kentucky side towards
Columbus, under Col. John Cook, Seventh Illinois Volunteers, with orders not to
go beyond Elliott's Mills, distant some 12 miles from Columbus. These forces
having marched to the points designated in their orders, returned without
having met serious resistance.
On the evening of
the 7th information of the result of the engagement at Belmont was sent to
Colonel Oglesby, commanding expedition against Jeff. Thompson, and orders to
return to Bird's Point by way of Charleston, Mo. Before these reached him,
however, he had learned that Jeff. Thompson had left the place where he was
reported to be when the expedition started (he having gone towards New Madrid
or Arkansas), and had determined to return. The same information was sent to
the commanding officer at Cape Girardeau, with directions for the troops to be brought
back that had gone out from that place.
From all the
information I have been able to obtain since the engagement, the enemy's loss
in killed and wounded was much greater than ours. We captured 175 prisoners,
all his artillery and transportation, and destroyed his entire camp and
garrison equipage. Independent of the injuries inflicted upon him, and the
prevention of his re-enforcing Price or sending a force to cut off the
expeditions against Jeff. Thompson, the confidence inspired in our troops in the
engagement will be of incalculable benefit to us in the future.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
GENERAL: Inclosed I
send you the report of Brig. Gen. J. A. McClernand, commanding First Brigade in
the late engagement at Belmont, Mo. Also the report of Surgeon Brinton, medical
director, who accompanied me on that occasion. [Nos. 2 and 4.]
The Seventh Iowa and
Twenty-second Illinois Volunteers were the only troops in the engagement not
included in General McClernand's command. Each of these lost their commanders,
wounded, and consequently I have no official report of them. Being on the field
myself during the entire engagement, I can answer for the gallantry of officers
and men of both these regiments.
The Seventh Iowa
lost their colonel (Lauman), wounded severely, and lieutenant-colonel (Wentz),
killed, and major (Rice), severely wounded. Lieutenants Dodge and Gardner and
23 rank and file were killed; wounded, Captains Gardner, Harper, and Parrott,
and Lieutenant Reams and 74 others.
Of the Twenty-second
Illinois, Colonel Dougherty was badly wounded and taken prisoner. Twenty-one
rank and file were killed. Captains Hubbard and McAdams and 74 men were
wounded. Information received since the engagement through the Southern press,
and from persons coming from the South since, show the enemy's force in the
field to have been over 9,000 men, and their loss in killed and wounded alone
not less than 600. My own impression is, their loss was much greater.
The city of Memphis
was thrown into mourning for the dead and wounded taken there. Great
apprehension is said to have prevailed lest the blow should be followed up with
an attack upon them.
The officers and
men, with rare exceptions, showed great personal courage, and I have every
reason to be satisfied with their conduct. The lesson, though severe, will be
of great advantage to the entire command. The object aimed at, to wit, to
prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Price in Missouri, and from cutting off two
small columns I had been directed to send towards the Saint Francois River, was
accomplished to the fullest extent. The enemy have entirely abandoned Belmont,
and have been receiving re-enforcements in Columbus continually since the
engagement.
I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
In pursuance of
directions from headquarters Western Department I have sent from here a force
of about 3,000 men, all armed, towards Indian Ford, on the Saint Francis River,
and also a force of one regiment from Cape Girardeau in the same direction. I
am now, under the same instructions, fitting out an expedition to menace
Belmont, and will take all the force proper to spare from here—probably not
more than 3,000 men. If you can make a demonstration towards Columbus at the
same time with a portion of your command, it would probably keep the enemy from
throwing over the river much more force than they now have there, and might
enable me to drive those they now have out of Missouri. The principal point to
gain is to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of those
now out from this command. I will leave here to-morrow night and land some 12
miles below.
On to-morrow I want
an infantry reconnaissance made out to Charleston, to return in the evening.
Take such number as can be accommodated by the cars, making one trip, not to
exceed, however, your regiment.
ORDERS, No. —
The general
commanding this military district returns his thanks to the troops under his
command at the battle of Belmont on yesterday. It has been his fortune to have
been in all the battles fought in Mexico by Generals Scott and Taylor save
Buena Vista, and he never saw one more hotly contested or where troops behaved
with more gallantry.
Such courage will
insure victory wherever our flag may be borne and protected by such a class of
men.
To the many brave
men who fell the sympathy of the country is due, and will be manifested in a
manner unmistakable.
THE truth about Bull Run will, perhaps, only reach the people when it becomes reduced to an historical use. I gather what I am sure is true.
About three weeks ago General McDowell took upon himself the responsibility to attack the enemy concentrated at Manassas. Deciding upon this step, McDowell showed the determination of a true soldier, and a cool, intelligent courage. According to rumors permeating the whole North; rumors originated by secessionists in and around Washington, and in various parts of the free States; rumors gulped by a part of the press, and never contradicted, but rather nursed, at headquarters, Manassas was a terrible, unknown, mysterious something; a bugbear, between a fortress made by art and a natural fastness, whose approaches were defended for miles by numberless masked batteries, and which was filled by countless thousands of the most ferocious warriors. Such was Manassas in public opinion when McDowell undertook to attack this formidable American Torres Vedras, and this with the scanty and almost unorganized means in men and artillery allotted to him by the senile wisdom of General Scott. General McDowell obtained the promise that Beauregard alone was to be before him. To fulfil this promise, General Scott was to order Patterson to keep Johnston, and a movement was to be made on the James River, so as to prevent troops coming from Richmond to Manassas. As it was already said, Patterson, a special favorite of General Scott, kindly allowed Johnston to save Beauregard, and Jeff. Davis with troops from Richmond likewise was on the spot. McDowell planned his plan very skilfully; no European general would have done better, and I am sure that such will be the verdict hereafter. Some second-rate mistakes in the execution did not virtually endanger its success; but, to say the truth, McDowell and his army were defeated by the imbecility of the supreme military authority. Imbecility stabbed them in the back.
One part of the press, stultified and stupefied, staggered under the blow; the other part showed its utter degradation by fawning on Scott and attacking the Congress, or its best part. The Evening Post staggered not; its editors are genuine, laborious students, and, above all, students of history. The editors of the other papers are politicians; some of them are little, others are big villains. All, intellectually, belong to the class called in America more or less well-read men; information acquired by reading, but which in itself is not much.
The brothers Blair, almost alone, receded not, and put the defeat where it belonged—at the feet of General Scott.
The rudis indigestaque moles, torn away from Scott's hands, already begins to acquire the shape of an army. Thanks to the youth, the vigor, and the activity of McClellan.
General Scott throws the whole disaster on politicians, and abuses them. How ungrateful. His too lofty pedestal is almost exclusively the work of politicians. I heard very, very few military men in America consider Scott a man of transcendent military capacity. Years ago, during the Crimean campaign, I spent some time at West Point in the society of Cols. Robert Lee, Walker, Hardee, then in the service of the United States, and now traitors; not one of them classed Scott much higher above what would be called a respectable capacity; and of which, as they said, there are many, many in every European army.
If one analyzes the Mexican campaign, it will be found that General Scott had, comparatively, more officers than soldiers; the officers young men, full of vigor, and in the first gush of youth, who therefore mightily facilitated the task of the commander. Their names resound to-day in both the camps.
Further, generals from the campaign in Mexico assert that three of the won battles were fought against orders, which signifies that in Mexico youth had the best of cautious senility. It was according to the law of nature, and for it was crowned with success.
Mr. Seward has a very active intellect, an excellent man for current business, easy and clear-headed for solving any second-rate complications; but as for his initiative, that is another question. Hitherto his initiative does not tell, but rather confuses. Then he sustains Scott, some say, for future political capital. If so it is bad; worse still if Mr. Seward sustains Scott on the ground of high military fitness, as it is impossible to admit that Mr. Seward knows anything about military affairs, or that he ever studied the description of any battle. At least, I so judge from his conversation.
Mr. Lincoln has already the fumes of greatness, and looks down on the press, reads no paper, that dirty traitor the New York Herald excepted. So, at least, it is generally stated.
The enemies of Seward maintain that he, Seward, drilled Lincoln into it, to make himself more necessary.
Early, even before the inauguration, McDowell suggested to General Scott to concentrate in Washington the small army, the depots scattered in Texas and New Mexico. Scott refused, and this is called a general! God preserve any cause, any people who have for a savior a Scott, together with his civil and military partisans.
If it is not direct, naked treason which prevails among the nurses, and the various advisers of the people, imbecility, narrow-mindedness, do the same work. Further, the way in which many leech, phlebotomize, cheat and steal the people's treasury, is even worse than rampant treason. I heard a Boston shipbuilder complain to Sumner that the ubiquitous lobbyist, Thurlow Weed, was in his, the builder's, way concerning some contracts to be made in the Navy Department, etc., etc. Will it turn out that the same men who are to-day at the head of affairs will be the men who shall bring to an end this revolt or revolution? It ought not to be, as it is contrary to logic, and to human events.
Lincoln alone must forcibly remain, he being one of the incarnated formulas of the Constitution, endowed with a specific, four years' lasting existence.
The Americans are nervous about foreign intervention. It is difficult to make them understand that no intervention is to be, and none can be made. Therein the press is as silly as the public at large. Certainly France does not intend any meddling or intervention; of this I am sure. Neither does England seriously.
Next, if these two powers should even thirst for such an injustice, they have no means to do it. If they break our blockades, we make war, and exclude them from the Northern ports, whose commerce is more valuable to them than that of the South. I do not believe the foreign powers to be forgetful of their interest; they know better their interests than the Americans.
The Congress adjourned, abandoning, with a confidence unparalleled in history, the affairs of the country in the hands of the not over far-sighted administration. The majority of the Congress are good, and fully and nobly represent the pure, clear and sure aspirations, instincts, nay, the clear-sightedness of the people. In the Senate, as in the House, are many, very many true men, and men of pure devotion, and of clear insight into the events; men superior to the administration; such are, above all, those senators and representatives who do not attempt or aim to sit on a pedestal before the public, before the people, but wish the thing to be done for the thing itself. But for the formula which chains their hands, feet, and intellect, the Congress contained several men who, if they could act, would finish the secession in a double-quick time. But the whole people move in the treadmill of formulas. It is a pity that they are not inspired by the axiom of the Roman legist, scire leges non est hoc verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem. Congress had positive notions of what ought to be done; the administration, Micawber—like, looks for that something which may turn up, and by expedients patches all from day to day.
What may turn up nobody can foresee; matter alone without mind cannot carry the day. The people have the mind, but the official legal leaders a very small portion of it. Come what will, I shall not break down; I shall not give up the holy principle. If crime, rebellion, sauvagerie, triumph, it will be, not because the people failed, but it will be because mediocrities were at the helm. Concessions, compromises, any patched-up peace, will for a century degrade the name of America. Of course, I cannot prevent it; but events have often broken but not bent me. I may be burned, but I cannot be melted; so if secesh succeeds, I throw in a cesspool my document of naturalization, and shall return to Europe, even if working my passage.
It is maddening to read all this ignoble clap-trap, written by European wiseacres concerning this country. Not one knows the people, not one knows the accidental agencies which neutralize what is grand and devoted in the people.
Some are praised here as statesmen and leaders. A statesman, a leader of such a people as are the Americans, and in such emergencies, must be a man in the fullest and loftiest comprehension. All the noblest criteria of moral and intellectual manhood ought to be vigorously and harmoniously developed in him. He ought to have a deep and lively moral sense, and the moral perception of events and of men around him. He ought to have large brains and a big heart,—an almost all-embracing comprehension of the inside and outside of events,—and when he has those qualities, then only the genius of foresight will dwell on his brow. He ought to forget himself wholly and unconditionally; his reason, his heart, his soul ought to merge in the principles which lifted him to the elevated station. Who around me approaches this ideal? So far as I know, perhaps Senator Wade.
I wait and wait for the eagle which may break out from the White House. Even the burning fire of the national disaster at Bull Run left the egg unhatched. Utinam sim falsus, but it looks as if the slowest brains were to deal with the greatest events of our epoch. Mr. Lincoln is a pure-souled, well-intentioned patriot, and this nobody doubts or contests. But is that all which is needed in these terrible emergencies?
Lyon is killed,—the only man of initiative hitherto generated by events. We have bad luck. I shall put on mourning for at least six weeks. They ought to weep all over the land for the loss of such a man; and he would not have been lost if the administration had put him long ago in command of the West. O General Scott! Lyon's death can be credited to you. Lyon was obnoxious to General Scott, but the General's influence maintains in the service all the doubtful capacities and characters. The War Department, as says Potter, bristles with secessionists, and with them the old, rotten, respectable relics, preserved by General Scott, depress and nip in the bud all the young, patriotic, and genuine capacities.
As the sea corrodes the rocks against which it impinges, so egotism, narrow-mindedness, and immorality corrode the best human institutions. For humanity's sake, Americans, beware!
Always the clouds of harpies around the White House and the Departments,—such a generous ferment in the people, and such impurities coming to the surface!
Patronage is the stumbling stone here to true political action. By patronage the Cabinet keeps in check Congressmen, Senators, etc.
I learn from very good authority that when Russell, with his shadow, Sam. Ward, went South, Mr. Seward told Ward that he, Seward, intends not to force the Union on the Southern people, if it should be positively ascertained that that people does not wish to live in the Union! I am sorry for Seward. Such is not the feeling of the Northern people, and such notions must necessarily confuse and make vacillating Mr. Seward's—that is, Mr. Lincoln's policy. Seward's patriotism and patriotic wishes and expectations prevent him from seeing things as they are.
The money men of Boston decided the conclusion of the first national loan. Bravo, my beloved Yankees! In finances as in war, as in all, not the financiering capacity of this or that individual, not any special masterly measures, etc., but the stern will of the people to succeed, provides funds and means, prevents bankruptcy, etc. The men who give money send an agent here to ascertain how many traitors are still kept in offices, and what are the prospects of energetic action by the administration.
McClellan is organizing, working hard. It is a pleasure to see him, so devoted and so young. After all, youth is promise. But already adulation begins, and may spoil him. It would be very, very saddening.
Prince Napoleon's visit stirs up all the stupidity of politicians in Europe and here. What a mass of absurdities are written on it in Europe, and even by Americans residing there. All this is more than equalled by the solemn and wise speculations of the Americans at home. Bar-room and coffee-house politicians are the same all over the world, the same, I am sure, in China and Japan. To suppose Prince Napoleon has any appetite whatever for any kind of American crown! Bah! He is brilliant and intelligent, and to suppose him to have such absurd plans is to offend him. But human and American gullibility are bottomless.
The Prince is a noble friend of the American cause, and freely speaks out his predilection. His sentiments are those of a true Frenchman, and not the sickly free-trade pro-slaveryism of Baroche with which he poisoned here the diplomatic atmosphere. Prince Napoleon's example will purify it.
As I was sure of it, the great Manassas fortifications are a humbug. It is scarcely a half-way fortified camp. So say the companions of the Prince, who, with him, visited Beauregard's army.
So much for the great Gen. Scott, whom the companions of the Prince call a magnificent ruin.
The Prince spoke with Beauregard, and the Prince's and his companions' opinion is, that McDowell planned well his attack, but failed in the execution; and Beauregard thought the same. The Prince saw McClellan, and does not prize him so high as we do. These foreign officers say that most probably, on both sides, the officers will make most correct plans, as do pupils in military schools, but the execution will depend upon accident.
Mr. Seward shows every day more and more capacity in dispatching the regular, current, diplomatical business affairs. In all such matters he is now at home, as if he had done it for years and years. He is no more spread-eagle in his diplomatic relations; is easy and prompt in all secondary questions relating to secondary interests, and daily emerging from international complications.
Hitherto the war policy of the administration, as inspired and directed by Scott, was rather to receive blows, and then to try to ward them off. I expect young McClellan to deal blows, and thus to upturn the Micawber policy. Perhaps Gen. Scott believed that his name and example would awe the rebels, and that they would come back after having made a little fuss and done some little mischief. But Scott's greatness was principally built up by the Whigs, and his hold on Democrats was not very great. Witness the events of Polk's and Pierce's administrations. His Mississippi-Atlantic strategy is a delirium of a softening brain. Seward's enemies say that he puts up and sustains Scott, because in the case of success Scott will not be in Seward's way for the future Presidency. Mr. Lincoln, an old Whig, has the Whig-worship for Scott; and as Mr. Lincoln, in 1851, stumped for Scott, the candidate for the Presidency, the many eulogies showered by Lincoln upon Scott still more strengthened the worship which, of course, Seward lively entertains in Lincoln's bosom. Thus the relics of Whigism direct now the destinies of the North. Mr. Lincoln, Gen. Scott, Mr. Seward, form a triad, with satellites like Bates and Smith in the Cabinet. But the Whigs have not the reputation of governmental vigor, decision, and promptitude.
The vitiated impulse and direction given by Gen. Scott at the start, still prevails, and it will be very difficult to bring it on the right track—to change the general as well as the war policy from the defensive, as it is now, to the offensive, as it ought to have been from the beginning. The North is five to one in men, and one hundred to one in material resources. Any one with brains and energy could suppress the rebellion in eight weeks from to-day.
Mr. Lincoln in some way has a slender historical resemblance to Louis XVI.—similar goodness, honesty, good intentions; but the size of events seems to be too much for him.
And so now Mr. Lincoln is wholly overshadowed by Seward. If by miracle the revolt may end in a short time, Mr. Seward will have most of the credit for it. In the long run the blame for eventual disasters will be put at Mr. Lincoln's door.
Thank heaven! the area for action and the powers of McClellan are extended and increased. The administration seems to understand the exigencies of the day.
I am told that the patriotic and brave Senator Wade, disgusted with the slowness and inanity of the administration, exclaimed, "I do not wonder that people desert to Jeff. Davis, as he shows brains; I may desert myself." And truly, Jeff. Davis and his gang make history.
Young McClellan seems to falter before the Medusa—ruin Scott, who is again at his tricks, and refuses officers to volunteers. To carry through in Washington any sensible scheme, more boldness is needed than on the bloodiest battle-field.
If Gen. Scott could have disappeared from the stage of events on the sixth of March, his name would have remained surrounded with that halo to which the people was accustomed; but now, when the smoke will blow over, it may turn differently. I am afraid that at some future time will be applied to Scott * * * quia turpe ducunt parere minoribus, et quæ imberbi didicere, sense perdenda fateri.
Not self-government is on trial, and not the genuine principle of democracy. It is not the genuine, virtual democracy which conspired against the republic, and which rebels, but an unprincipled, infamous oligarchy, risen in arms to destroy democracy. From Athens down to to-day, true democracies never betrayed any country, never leagued themselves with enemies. From the time of Hellas down to to-day, all over the world, and in all epochs, royalties, oligarchies, aristocracies, conspired against, betrayed, and sold their respective father-lands. (I said this years ago in America and Europe.)
Fremont as initiator; he emancipates the slaves of the disloyal Missourians. Takes the advance, but is justified in it by the slowness, nay, by the stagnancy of the administration.
Gen. Scott opposed to the expedition to Hatteras!
If it be true that Seward and Chase already lay the tracks for the Presidential succession, then I can only admire their short-sightedness, nay, utter and darkest blindness. The terrible events will be a schooling for the people; the future President will not be a schemer already shuffling the cards; most probably it will be a man who serves the country, forgetting himself.
Only two members in the Cabinet drive together, Blair and Welles, and both on the right side, both true men, impatient for action, action. Every day shows on what false principle this Cabinet was constructed, not for the emergency, not in view to suppress the rebellion, but to satisfy various party wranglings. Now the people's cause sticks in the mud.
SOURCE: Adam Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, p. 78-91
Northeast storm
badly affects weak men. I know of twenty who since yesterday have sunk to utter
helplessness; others have died within a few hours. Their clothes are besmeared
with wet sand and soaked with water. The sand where we lay is wet as dough. Our
rations are so insufficient that we are continually hungry. Got boiled rice
again at night, totally unfit to eat. Several bushels are poured into large
kettles, greasy and nasty, and cooked with less care than if it were hog feed.
I believe hogs would loathe it. If it is merely economy to feed us so, it is
crowding them down closely to the provision line. Rumors of the renomination of
Lincoln and the nomination of Fremont on a side line. It is a Rebel lie or a
Yankee blunder, much talked about. If it is so, the action of the Fremont wing
is disapproved. I never strongly believed in Fremont, but the cause he essayed
to represent, he will not see sacrificed for per
Northeast storm.
Badly affects weak ultra anti-slavery men add themselves to the pro-slavery
party North, and defeat the policy of the government? They cannot succeed; they
can only defeat. The feeling here is for Lincoln. Twelve men escape; it is
reported six guards are gone. Tunnels are found and being filled. Rice and meal
rations.
SOURCE: John Worrell
Northrop, Chronicles from the Diary of a War Prisoner in Andersonville
and Other Military Prisons of the South in 1864, p. 74-5
On the high land
overlooking the Potomac, about six or seven miles above the Navy Yard at
Washington, we have, since our arrival here, thrown up a small fort, formed
extensive abattis, and made redoubts and fortifications to command the turnpike
leading down the river, and the bridge over which any enemy must pass from any
direction above here to reach Washington. This looks like business. The
earthwork fort is small, but very strong, and its large siege guns, from twelve
to eighteen feet long, with their sullen faces watching up and down the road in
every direction, give it a most formidable appearance. A brigade (I have not
learned what one) has just advanced beyond us to commence another fort, about
two miles to the southwest of us. Neither fort has yet been officially named,
but the one just finished is called by the soldiers Fort Mott; the one about to
be built they will for the present distinguish by the name of Fort Ethan Allen.
In this manner we are closing on the enemy by slow approaches, or parallels.
Let Dupont and Butler, from North Carolina, advance to meet us, whilst Fremont
takes care of the Mississippi, and we shall have an early closing up of the
war. Every day's observation more and more satisfies me that the enemy will not
fight us here.
9 P. M.—Our fort is
completed, and we have just received orders to cook three days rations, and be
ready to move at a moment's notice.
I will here note,
once for all, the manner of the soldiers taking care of themselves in a storm,
when they have no tents. They all have "rubber blankets." Two forks
are set, and a pole laid from one to the other, some four or five feet from the
ground. A kind of lean-to roof is made by placing brush or poles against this,
one end resting on the ground, the other end resting on the pole. To make this
roof water-proof, the rubber blankets are stretched, like tiles on a roof, and
no water gets through. In moderate weather the men cuddle together under this,
and are reasonably comfortable. In cold weather they make large log fires in
front of these "bivouacs," and pass the nights without freezing.
An order was
received to-day from the War Department, that in future no labor shall be
required of soldiers on the Sabbath, except what is absolutely necessary for
our defence.
SOURCE: Alfred L.
Castleman, The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A Diary of
Unwritten History; From the Organization of the Army, by General George B.
McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia about the First Day
January, 1863, p. 25-6
Grand review before
President Lincoln, Gens. Scott and Fremont. Salutes were fired.
SOURCE: Theodore
Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First
Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery, p. 9
[BOYDTON, VA.],
April 20, 1850.
MY DEAR HUNTER: I
live five miles from our Post Office. The other day I despatched a letter to
Mason and the servant returning brought me your letter. I reply promptly,
because I have an interest or an object in doing so. Before I heard from you,
in my letter to Mason, I expressed my apprehensions as to the effect of Webster's
Speech, and I also gave it as my opinion, that if Eastern Virginia be not
fully represented in the Nashville Convention, Foote will have contributed
efficiently to such a result. At the opening of the Session I was greatly
pleased with his bearing. There was something in his notice of Mr.
Calhoun's speech, for which I found myself at a loss to account. I hope it
susceptible of explanation consistent with his own honor and the highest interest
of the South.
From Webster's
speech we gain at least the weight of his authority against the Abolitionists,
Free soilers and Agitators at the North. And we have his acknowledgment that
the South has suffered great wrong at the hands of the North. We have his
authority and influence also on [the] Fugitive Slave question, and on the
future admission of Texas States. These appear to me, to be objects, not
unworthy of consideration. But they are no equivalent for present, positive
legislation. They afford not present nor permanent relief for which we must
rely on our own virtue and which can only be secured by unanimity and concert
in the South. The Nashville Convention is the present available agency through
which to secure concert and unanimity, and my chief object in writing now; as
it was in writing to Mason, is to induce you to urge the Virginia Delegation at
Washington to stimulate their friends in their several Districts. The time is
short, and I fear it is almost too late, but much can be done. So far as I am
informed Amelia, Nottoway and Dinwiddie in Mr. Meade's district have taken no
action. He might procure it in time, or the District Convention might be
postponed long enough to afford time. The same remark may be made in nearly all
the Districts. I myself should have taken an active part long ago, but for
considerations which I would not hesitate to explain to you in a personal
interview. The chief injury to the South, resulting from Webster's speech, is
the hesitation it has occasioned. This has given courage to all who wavered in
their resolution or who were secretly opposed to the measure. And it is
possible that an opposition may rally in the South on the California issue
supported by the plausible popular arguments connected with that subject.
I have another
motive for this letter. I expect to attend a District Convention 8 May, suppose
a thin meeting, and suppose Virginia meagerly represented at Nashville. What
will be best? Consult with our most reliable and judicious friends and write me
fully and frankly.
I say nothing of the
death of our lamented friend. I know not what to say. It were impossible to
express what I feel.
(P. S.) I offered a
suggestion to Mason which I will repeat to you though I presume it had occurred
to both of you. I said to him that in my own opinion, even the compromise 36°
30' was almost disgraceful to us, but public opinion must be consulted and
something given up, for peace and tranquility. Suppose 36° 30′ can not be had.
Would it do to take or offer Sierra Nevada from 42 as Eastern boundary of
California down to near the Southern termination of the range as indicated on
Fremont's Map, thence right line to St. Barbara about 34° on Pacific? This
would give us a line to the Pacific and may be useful in the future. "The
State" of Deseret has asserted this boundary for herself according to a
writer for the Enquirer. And that fact may possibly aid to support an argument
for such a proposition. The suggested line would give to California, perhaps
the most beautiful geographical conformation in the Union. It's present
delineation is a hideous deformity. But all is a mere suggestion without
opinion.
Sunshine and
cloudy-warmer.
There is a calm in
military matters, but a storm is gathering in the Valley of Virginia. Both
sides are concentrating for a battle. If we should be defeated (not likely),
then our communications may be cut, and Grant be under no necessity of fighting
again to get possession of Richmond. Meantime it is possible Grant will retire,
and come again on the south side of the James River.
Congress is debating
a measure increasing the President's compensation—he cannot subsist on his
present salary. Nor can any of us. Mr. Seddon has a large private income, and
could well afford to set the patriotic example of working “for nothing.”
We have heard to-day
that Lincoln was nominated for re-election at Baltimore on the 7th inst., and
gold rose to $196. Fremont is now pledged to run also, thus dividing the
Republican party, and giving an opportunity for the Democrats to elect a
President. If we can only subsist till then, we may have
peace, and must have independence at all events.
But there is
discontent, in the Army of the West, with Gen. Johnston, and in the East with
Bragg, and among the croakers with the President.
New potatoes sold
to-day for $5 per quart, $160 per bushel!
Mr. Rhodes,
Commissioner of Patents, told me to-day that Gen. Forrest, at last accounts,
was at Tupelo, Miss., doing nothing,—Gen. Wheeler, his junior in years,
superior in rank, to whom he is again subordinated by the potency of Gen.
Cooper's red tape, having most of his men.
Robert Tyler has
been with the Departmental Battalion at Bottom's Bridge, doing service as a
private, though the head of a bureau.
This evening at 7
o'clock we heard artillery in the direction of Lee's army
NEWPORT NEWS.
I am now on the sacred soil of old Virginia, and my first care will be to seek an introduction to some of the F. F. V's. What this place derived its name from, or why it was named at all, I have not been able to learn. It was simply a plantation before its occupation by Federal troops, and perhaps the name is good as any to distinguish it by. Our camp is near the river, and only a few rods from us lie the wrecks of the frigates Cumberland and Congress, sunk by the rebel ram Merrimac. The Cumberland lies in deep water out of sight, but the deck of the Congress is seen and often visited by the boys at low water. Since the occupation of this place by Federal troops it has grown into what they call down this way a town, containing quite a collection of rough board store-houses, sutler's shops, negro shanties and horse sheds. A boat runs from here to Fortress Monroe every day, and three times a week to Norfolk; the distance to either place is about the same, some twelve miles.
For the first time since the war began, the oyster fishing is being prosecuted, and Hampton Roads are alive with oyster schooners. The oysters have had a chance to grow, and are now abundant and of good size and favor. Newport News was the first place in Virginia, except Washington, that was occupied by Federal troops, and it was from here that a part of old Ben's fàmous Big Bethel expedition started.
During my absence, this military department has gone all wrong. Gen. Foster has been ordered to Knoxville, Tenn., and Gen. Butler has superseded him to this command. I am not. pleased with the change. Gen. Foster was a splendid man and fine officer, and I would rather take my chances with a regular army officer than with an amateur. The first year of the war Gen. Butler was the busiest and most successful general we had, but since then he has kind o' taken to niggers and trading. As a military governor he is a nonesuch, and in that role has gained a great fame, especially in all the rebellious states.
He is a lawyer and a man of great executive ability, and can not only make laws but can see to it that they are observed, but as a commander of troops in the field, he is not just such a man as I should pick out. He had a review of our brigade the other day, and his style of soldiering caused considerable fun among the boys who had been used to seeing Gen. Foster. He rode on to the field with a great dash, followed by staff enough for two major-generals. He looks very awkward on a horse and wears a soft hat; when he salutes the colors he lifts his hat by the crown clear off his head instead of simply touching the rim. The boys think he is hardly up to their ideas of a general, but as they are not supposed to know anything, they will have to admit that he is a great general. He is full of orders and laws (regardless of army regulations) in the government of his department, and his recent order in relation to darkies fills two columns of newspaper print, and is all the most fastidious lovers of darkies in all New England could desire. Hunter and Fremont are the merest pigmies beside Ben in their care of darkies.
SOURCE: David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, p. 109-10
Wrote Gilpin, District Attorney at Philadelphia, in answer to his private letter as to prosecution for frauds in Philadelphia Navy Yard.
The papers are publishing the details of the expedition to Wilmington, and disclosing some confidential circumstances which ought not to be made public. One of the Philadelphia editors says the facts were ascertained and given to the press by Osborn of New York, a prowling mercenary correspondent of the newspapers who buys blackmail where he can, and sells intelligence surreptitiously obtained. I wrote to the Secretary of War, giving him the facts for such action as he may be disposed to take. He informed Fox that he would arrest and try by court martial.
Intelligence of the death of Mr. Dayton, our Minister to France, creates some commotion among public men. The event was sudden and his loss will be felt. . . . I had a light and pleasant acquaintance with him when in the Senate some fifteen or eighteen years ago, and we had some correspondence and one or two interviews in the Frémont campaign in 1856, when he was pleased to compliment me, on comparing Connecticut and New Jersey, with having done much to place my own State in a right position. We met again in the spring of 1861. He was a dignified and gentlemanly representative, not a trained diplomat, and unfortunately not acquainted with the language of the French Court. A numerous progeny has arisen at once to succeed him. John Bigelow, consul at Paris, has been appointed Chargé, and I doubt if any other person will be selected who is more fit. Raymond of the Times wants it, but Bigelow is infinitely his superior.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 205
 |
| Montgomery Blair |
I asked Blair what led to this step, for there must be a reason for it. He said he had no doubt he was a peace offering to Frémont and his friends. They wanted an offering, and he was the victim whose sacrifice would propitiate them. The resignation of Frémont and Cochrane was received yesterday, and the President, commenting on it, said F. had stated "the Administration was a failure, politically, militarily, and financially,” that this included the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Postmaster-General, and he thought the Interior, but not the Navy or the Attorney-General. As Blair and myself walked away together toward the western gate, I told him the suggestion of pacifying the partisans of Frémont might have been brought into consideration, but it was not the moving cause; that the President would never have yielded to that, except under the pressing advisement, or deceptive appeals and representations of some one to whom he had given his confidence. “Oh,” said Blair, “there is no doubt Seward was accessory to this, instigated and stimulated by Weed.” This was the view that presented itself to my mind, the moment he informed me he was to leave, but on reflection I am not certain that Chase has not been more influential than Seward in this matter. In parting with Blair the President parts with a true friend, and he leaves no adviser so able, bold, sagacious. Honest, truthful, and sincere, he has been wise, discriminating, and correct. Governor Dennison, who is to succeed him, is, I think, a good man, and I know of no better one to have selected.
Blair has just left me. I was writing and just closing the preceding page as he called. He says he has written his resignation and sent it in or rather handed it to the President. The letter from the President which he received this morning was to him entirely unexpected. But, though a surprise, he thinks it right and will eventuate well. That Seward has advised it he does not doubt, though the President does not intimate it. But the President tells him that Washburne recommended it. Strange if the President is influenced by so untruthful, unreliable, and mean a man as Washburne. But Washburne thinks it will help the President among the Germans. The President thinks it is necessary to conciliate Weed (he might have said Chase also) who, with his friends, defeated Wadsworth for Governor two years ago. Such are Blair's conclusions and, I may add, my own. Yet I cannot but think there must be something ulterior, for it is unlike the President to dismiss an acknowledged and true friend, a public officer who has, he says, discharged his duties well and against whom there is no complaint. Why, then, is he dismissed or asked to resign, when there is no cause? My impression is that the President does not intend to part with Blair, and I shall be disappointed if he is not recalled, perhaps to some other position in the Cabinet, perhaps to act in an important capacity for the restoration of the Union. But this is all speculative.1
1 At a subsequent period the President informed me that Mr. Chase had many friends who felt wounded that he should have left the Cabinet, and left alone. The Blairs had been his assailants, but they remained and were a part of the Administration. This Mr. C. and his friends thought invidious, and the public would consider it a condemnation of himself and an approval of the Blairs. If Montgomery Blair left the Cabinet, Chase and his friends would be satisfied, and this he (the President) thought would reconcile all parties, and rid the Administration of irritating bickerings. He considered both of them his friends, and thought it was well, as Chase had left, that Blair should go also. They were both in his confidence still, and he had great regard for each of them.
The relations of Stanton with Blair were such that it was difficult for the two to remain and preserve the unity and freedom necessary for good administration and social intercourse. It was not Seward's policy to advise the dismissal of Blair, but he would strenuously urge that Stanton, between whom and Blair there was hostility, should be retained. At this time the President was greatly embarrassed by contentions among his friends, by nominal Republicans, by intense radicals, and the strong front of the Democrats. — G. W.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 156-8
