Received mail from Admiral Farragut. Among his dispatches
one confidential, inclosing a letter from General Canby, who had received a
singular order signed by the President, directing that one A. J. Hamilton
should be permitted to export cotton from Sabine Pass, Galveston, etc.,
himself, and that Hamilton's written order should be a permit for others to
export. As General Canby, to whom this document was directed, has no control
over the squadron, he had inclosed the President's order to Admiral Farragut.
The Admiral had transmitted it to the senior officer off Galveston, and
communicated copies of the whole correspondence to me, remarking that it would
lead to immense swindling.
I submitted this extraordinary document to the President,
and remarked as I did so, that in the discussions that had taken place on this
subject on two or three occasions within the last six weeks, and since this
order (dated, I think, the 9th of August) was issued, no allusion had been made
to it, that it conflicted with the blockade which the Department was obliged to
enforce, and that I was surprised on receiving the information. The President
seemed embarrassed but said he believed it was all right. “How right?” I
inquired. He said it was one of Seward's arrangements, that he guessed would come
out well enough; but evidently did not himself know, or, if he knew, was
unwilling or unable to explain.
This is another specimen of the maladministration and
improper interference of the Secretary of State. Commencing with the first
expedition sent out to supply Sumter, which he took measures to defeat, there
has been on his part a constant succession of wrong acts, impertinent intrigues
in the affairs of other Departments, blunders and worse than blunders, that
disgrace the Administration. There is unmistakable rascality in this cotton
order. Thurlow Weed was here about the time it was issued, and it will not
surprise me if he has an interest in it.
Seward thinks to keep his own name out of the transaction.
The President has been made to believe that the order was essential; the
Secretary of State has so presented the subject to him that he probably thought
it a duty. There are times when I can hardly persuade myself that the
President's natural sagacity has been so duped, but his confidence in Seward is
great, although he must know him to be, I will not say a trickster, because of
his position and our association, but over-cunning to be strictly honest. And
when I say this, I do not apply to him dishonesty in money transactions when
dealing with men, or the government perhaps, but political cheating, deceiving,
wrong administration. He knows this scheme to bring out cotton was a fraud, and
hence, instead of coming directly to me, who have charge of the blockade, or
bringing the question before the Cabinet in a frank and honorable manner, there
is this secret, roundabout proceeding, so characteristic of the Secretary of
State.
He insisted on a blockade at the beginning. Would not listen
to closing the ports. Would make it an international, not permit it to be a
domestic, question. Now, in violation of international law and of fair and
honorable blockade, he and his friends are secretly bringing out cotton from
Texas. This is not in good faith, but is prostituting the government and its
action. I regret that Farragut did not disregard the order until it came to him
legitimately through the proper channel.
Had a call from my old friend the elder Blair. It was not
unexpected. Detaching Lee from the North Atlantic Squadron I supposed would
cause dissatisfaction to Lee, who would, through his wife, stimulate her father
to make an effort in his behalf. The old man got word to-day that Lee was
detached and hastened to me. He thought himself hard used in the blows that
fell upon his children. Frank had been smitten for exposing Frémont and Chase.
Montgomery had been dismissed from the Cabinet, and simultaneously Lee had been
detached from his command after two years' faithful service. I told him the
case appeared a hard one as he presented it; that I felt the removal of
Montgomery from our counsels as the greatest misfortune that had befallen the
Cabinet, but my consolation was that it would only be temporary and he would
certainly soon have as honorable a position; that Frank had done and was doing
great service, which the country would, if it did not already, appreciate; that
Lee was not degraded in being assigned to another command. I knew him to be
cautious and vigilant, but not, perhaps, the man for an immediate
demonstration, an assault requiring prompt action. He had labored well, and in
a pecuniary point of view been better paid than any man in the Navy.
The old man wanted me to recommend him for promotion to a
full commission as rear-admiral, but that, I told him, followed deserving
action. It must be earned.
Acting Admiral Lee has acquitted himself very well, has
discharged his duties intelligently and firmly. But he can never be a great
commander. While he has administered the affairs of his squadron safely, he has
failed to devise and execute any important act. The same opportunities in the
hands of Porter, or Foote, or Farragut, and, I think, of John Rodgers, would
have shown vastly more important results. His caution runs into timidity. He is
avaricious and ambitious, I fear ungenerous and illiberal; is destitute of
heroic daring.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 —
December 31, 1866, p. 159-62