Disappointed in
the S.[upreme] C.[ourt] by the postponement of the School cases, I hastened to
C.[abinet] C.[ouncil] where we had a free consultation, which disclosed great
negligence, ignorance and lack of preparation and forethought. Nothing is
ready. McClellan is still sick, and nobody knows his plans, if he have any
(which with me is very doubtful). The expeditions for the South do not go19
— nobody knows why not — The boats and bomb-rafts at Cairo are not ready20
— not manned — Indeed we do not know that the mortars have reached there — Strange
enough, the boats are under the War Dept., and yet are commanded by naval
officers. Of course, they are neglected — no one knows any thing about them.
I advised the
Prest. to restore all the floating force to the command of the Navy Dept, with
orders to cooperate with the army, just as the Navy on the sea coast does.
Again, I urged
upon the Prest. to take and act out the powers of his place, to command the commanders
— and especially to order regular, periodical reports, shewing the exact state
of the army, every where. And to that end—
I renewed
formally, and asked that it be made a question before the Cabinet, — my
proposition, often made heretofore — that the President as “ Comm[an]der in Chief
of the Army and Navy ” do organize a Staff of his own, and assume to be in
fact, what he is in law, the Chief Commander. His aid[e]s could save him a world
of trouble and anxiety — collect and report to him all needed information, and
keep him constantly informed, at a moment’s warning — keep his military and
naval books and papers — conduct his military correspondence, — and do his
bidding generally “in all the works of war[.]”
It is objected (by both the Prest. and Sec of War) not that the thing is wrong
or undesirable in itself but that the Generals wd. get angry — quarrel &c!!
I answer — Of course the Genls — especially
the Chief21 —would object—. they
wish to give but not receive orders — If I were Prest, and I found them restive
under the command of a superior, they should soon have no inferiors to command.
All of them have been lately made of comparatively raw material, taken from the
lower grates [sic] of the army officers or from civil life. The very best of
them — McClellan, McDowell,22 Halleck23 &c until very
lately, never commanded more than a battallion [sic]. They have no experience in
the handling of large bodies of men, and are no more to be trusted in that
respect, than other men of good sense, lately their equals in rank and
position. If therefore, they presume to quarrel with the orders of their
superior — their constitutional commander — for that very reason, they ought to
be dismissed, and I would do, it in full confidence that I could fill their places
with quite as good men, chosen as they were chosen, from the lower grades of
officers, from the ranks of the army, or from civil life.
There can be no
lawful, just or honest cause of dissatisfaction because the President assumes,
in practise, the legitimate duties of his place — His powers are all duties — He
has no privileges, no powers granted to him for his own sake, and he has no
more right to refuse to exercise his constitutional powers than he has to
assume powers not granted. He (like us, his official inferiors) cannot evade
his responsibilities. He must shew to the nation and to posterity, how he has
discharged the duties of his Stewardship, in this great crisis. And if he will
only trust his own good judgment more, and defer less, to the opinions of his
subordinates, I have no doubt that the affairs of the war and the aspect of the
whole country, will be quickly and greatly changed for the better.
I think it unjust
to to [sic] those Genls. to impute to them such unsoldierly conduct. Very
probably, they would object and grumble in advance, in the hope of deterring the
President from that course, 24 but the resolve,
once taken, would work its own moral and peaceful triumph. For those generals
are, undoubtedly, men of sense, prudence and patriotism, and, for their own, as
well as their country’s good, would obey their official superior, as cheerfully
and heartily as they expect their inferiors to obey them. If, however, contrary
to professional duty, to the moral sense of right, and to sound logic, they
should act otherwise, that fact would be proof positive of unfitness to command,
and, for that cause, they ought to be instantly removed.
If a Major Genl.
may be allowed to complain because the President has about him a staff — the
means and m[a]chinery of knowledge and of action — why may not a Brigadier
complain that his Major Genl. is so accom[m]odated? The idea seems to me
absurd. The very thought is insubordinate, and smacks of mutiny.
My proposition
assumes that the President is, in fact as well as theory, commander in chief
(not in detail) of the army and navy; and that he is bound to exercise the
powers of that high post, as legal duties. And that he cannot perform those
duties intelligently and efficiently, by his own unassisted, personal powers — He
must have aides, by whatever names you call them; for they are as necessary to
the proper exercise of those official functions, as the bodily senses are to
the proper perception and action of the individual man. If it be the duty of
the President, as I do not doubt that it is, to command, it would seem to
follow, of necessity, that he must have, constantly at hand and under his personal
orders, the usual means and machinery for the performance of that duty, with
knowledge and with effect.
In at least one
important sense, I consider the Departments of War and Navy as constituting the
Staff of the Commander in chief, and it does seem to me highly important that
he should have, always near him, intelligent and confidential persons, to
facilitate his intercourse with that multitudinous staff.
If it be not the President’s duty to command, then it is not his right, and prudence
would seem to require him to renounce all control of the affairs of war, and
cast all the responsibility upon those who are entrusted with the actual
command — But this he cannot do, because the constitution forbids it, in
declaring that he “shall be Commander in chief.”
I see not the slightest use for A General in chief of the army. When we had
peace with all the world, and a little nucleous of an army, of about 15.000
men, and had the veteran Lieut. General Scott as our first officer, perhaps it
was well enough to give him that honorary title. But now, that we have a war
spreading over half a continent, and have many armies, reaching, in the
aggregate to over 600.000 men, it is simply impossible for any one general,
usefully and well, to command all those armies. The army of the Potomac alone is
quite enough for any one man to command in detail, and more than almost any one
can do, with assurance of good success.
The President
being a Civil Magistrate and not a military chief, and being the lawful
commander in chief of the army, needs, more than any well-trained general can
need, in his intercourse with and his control of the army, the assistance of
skillful and active aid[e]s, always near his person. And I indulge the hope
that he will find it right to appoint and organize just such and so many as his
exigencies may seem to require; and I say all this in the confident belief, that
his own reputation, now and hereafter, and the present and permanent good of
the Country, do require such an organization.25
__________
19 “Butler’s and Burnside’s. See supra, Dec.
31, 1861.
20 “They were being collected for the attack
on Fort Henry which took place in early February.
21 George B. McClellan.
22 Supra, Nov. 16, 1861, note 53.
23 Supra, Nov. 13, 1861, note 37.
24 Inserted later in the margin.
25 See supra, Dec. 31, 1861, note 64.
SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward
Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American
Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 243-6
