On the above day and date commenced one of the great battles of the "War Between the States," generally known as the "Battle of Shiloh."
Finding a very full description of said battle in the History of Forrest's Campaigns, from the pen of General Thomas Jordan (than whom, perhaps, no other was better qualified to describe said battle, as he was at the time A. S. Johnston's Adjutant-General), I will copy at length, though I shall somewhat abridge without using marks of ellipsis or quotation points:
The Confederate forces that had abandoned Kentucky and Middle Tennessee were assembled by railroad from Huntsville and Decatur at Corinth, in North Mississippi.
Major-General Polk's forces, from Columbus, Kentucky, and West Tennessee, had likewise been concentrated at the same place, as well as a splendid corps under General Bragg, drawn from Pensacola and New Orleans, with the addition of some newly-enrolled Mississippi regiments. This force was reorganized during the last week of March into three army corps: The First, commanded by Major-General Polk; the Second, by Major-General Bragg, and the Third, by Major-General Hardee. The cavalry had a separate organization of about four thousand five hundred. The whole was under the chief command of Albert Sidney Johnston, with Beauregard as second in command.
While the Confederates were thus occupied their adversary had not been dilatory. General Grant, under orders from his superior, had proceeded, with his force engaged in the operations ending in the fall of Fort Donelson, and established himself at a point upon the west bank of the Tennessee River known as Pittsburg Landing. Here, too, he had been followed soon by three other divisions, commanded by W. T. Sherman, Hurlburt and Prentiss.
Moreover, after diverting one of his divisions (Mitchell's) toward Huntsville, Alabama, General Buell, with his other four divisions, was known to be rapidly converging to the same theater of operations.
Thus matters stood on the evening of the 2d of April: Two considerable hostile armies had been brought within eighteen miles of each other, with no physical barrier, such as a large river or mountain, between them.
Being satisfied the time had come to spring upon, if possible, surprise and crush General Grant's army before Buell had come up, General Johnston, about eleven o'clock on the night of the 2d, decided to put his army in movement the following day, and trust its fortunes to the "iron dice" of battle. Accordingly the orders to that end, issued at once by his Adjutant-General, were received by his several corps commanders by forty minutes past one on the morning of the 3d of April, while a reserve was organized at the same time of three brigades, under Breckinridge, to move directly from Burnsville and join the main body at a petty cross-road village called Monterey. By noon (the 3d) the whole Confederate army was under arms and ready to begin the march. But from untoward causes the First (Polk's) Corps did not get in motion so soon as had been expected, and did not bivouac as far in advance as was desirable.
Moreover, the badness of the roads, caused by a heavy rainfall the night of the 3d, so retarded the movement that Bragg's Corps was not able the second day to advance further than Monterey, whereas it had been confidently anticipated that by the night of the 4th the whole army would have assembled in the vicinity of their antagonist. Instead of being able to attack Saturday morning, as anticipated, General Polk's Corps did not reach the vicinity of the designated point of concentration until quite as late as two o'clock Saturday afternoon, 5th of April.
Though General Johnston, through his staff, had made every effort to get his troops in position for an attack that day.
Supremely chagrined that he had been balked in his just expectations, it was now evidently too late for a decisive engagement that afternoon, so General Johnston called his corps and reserve commanders together, and a council of war was held within less than two miles of Shiloh Chapel, the headquarters of the Federal General Sherman.1 General Beauregard earnestly advised the idea of attacking the enemy should be abandoned, and that the whole force should return to Corinth, inasmuch as it was now scarcely possible they would be able to take the Federals unawares after such delay and noisy demonstrations which had been made meanwhile.
It did seem that the Federals had had ample warning of the impending tempest, for a force of Confederate cavalry that had been sent forward mainly to procure topographical information which hitherto the Confederate generals had been unable to acquire of that region, had been pushed up, and somewhat injudiciously though boldly landed in the immediate front of the Federal position. During that day (Saturday) one regiment of cavalry (Colonel N. B. Forrest's) had had some lively skirmishing on the left of the Federal position.
Therefore, Beauregard urged the enemy would be now found formidably intrenched and ready for the attack; that success had depended on the power to assail them unexpectedly, for they were superior in numbers, and in large part had been under fire. On the other hand, few comparatively of the Confederates had that advantage, while a large part were too raw and recently enrolled to make it proper to venture them in an assault upon breastworks which would now be thrown up. And this unquestionably was the view of almost all present.
General Johnston, having listened with grave attention to the views and opinions advanced, then remarked in substance that he recognized the weight of the objections to an attack under the circumstances involved by the unfortunate loss of time on the road. But, nevertheless, he still hoped the enemy was not looking for offensive operations, and that he would yet be able to surprise them. And that, having put his army in motion for a battle, he would venture the hazard.
This decision being announced, the officers rapidly dispersed to their respective posts in high and hopeful spirits, notwithstanding the probabilities that all previous expectations of a surprise would fail of accomplishment.
Here a topographical sketch of the theater of war may serve to make more intelligible the occurrences and vicissitudes of the battle.
Two streams, Lick and Owl Creeks, taking their rise very near each other, just westward of Monterey, flowing (a little east of north) nearly parallel with each other, the former empties into the Tennessee about three miles above Pittsburg Landing, the latter, after mingling its waters with Snake Creek, empties into the Tennessee about one mile below said landing. In other words, Owl Creek empties into Snake Creek about three or four miles (in a direct line, nearly west), from the mouth of the latter. Intersected by various ravines, drainage is into Owl Creek, as the land rises highest and ridgelike near Lick Creek.
Recent heavy rains had rendered the soil boggy, especially along those small streams, and hence difficult for artillery and cavalry. A primeval forest, cumbered with a great deal of undergrowth, covered the region, except a few small farms of fifty or seventy acres scattered occasionally here and there. Two roads leading from Corinth, crossing Lick Creek about a mile apart, converge together about two miles from Pittsburg Landing. Other roads also approach from all directions: one from Purdy crosses Owl Creek by a bridge before its junction with Snake Creek; one from Crump's Landing, six miles below Pittsburg, crosses Snake Creek by a bridge, and one from Hamburg Landing, about four miles above, crosses Lick Creek by a bridge, about one and a half miles from its mouth.
A Federal force of five2 strong divisions, thirty-seven thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and artillery, and eighty-four guns, forty thousand of all arms, occupied the space we have described, between Owl and Lick Creeks, in front of Pittsburg, and were thus disposed:
The first Federal line, extending from the crossing of Owl Creek, on the Purdy road, to the crossing of Lick Creek on the Hamburg road, was composed of Sherman's and Prentiss' Divisions. The headquarters of the former were at a rustic log "meeting-house," called Shiloh, while the latter was to the left. A third division, that of McClernand, was in supporting distance. of Sherman at the confluence of the two Corinth roads.
A second line to the rearward was composed of Hurlbut's and W. H. L. (not Lew) Wallace's Divisions, the first of which was stretched across the Corinth road, and the other extended to the leftward along the Hamburg road.
By three o'clock Sunday morning the Confederate army was all astir, and, after a hasty, scanty breakfast, the lines were formed as follows:
Hardee's corps, augmented by Gladden's Brigade from Bragg's corps, constituted the first line, deployed in battle order on the grounds upon which they had bivouacked.
The second line, five hundred yards rearward, was formed of Ruggles' Division and two brigades (the other was in the first line) of Withers' Division, under Major-General Bragg. The artillery of both corps followed their respective lines by the Pittsburg road.
The First Corps (Clark's and Cheatham's Divisions) under Major-General Polk, drawn up in a column of brigades, deployed in line about eight hundred yards to the rear of Bragg, constituted a third line.
Three brigades under Brigadier-General Breckinridge constituted a special reserve3 for the support of the attacking lines as might be needed on either flank.
The cavalry, about 4,300 strong, was distributed, for the most part, to guard the flanks. The cavalry, with the exception of Forrest's and Wharton's regiments, being lately regimented, insufficiently armed, and wholly without drill, together with the nature of the scene of operations, was rendered almost valueless, and only the two regiments mentioned took any material part in the actions of either day.
About sunrise some thirty-four thousand infantry, with about fifty guns, were in movement, with a bearing never surpassed, to fall upon their enemy-an enemy as yet undeveloped, but known to be ensconced near at hand in the fog and forest, superior in numbers and equipments, for their many drums the evening before had plainly told their formidable strength.
That the Federals did not take even the ordinary precautions which habitually hedge an army in the field is passing strange. Instead of that, in sooth, there was no line of infantry pickets in advance of the ordinary chain of sentinels, apparently no cavalry exterior either to Sherman or Prentiss, and that invading army lay drowsily in its cosy encampments, as if supremely confident no harm were threatening and no disaster could befall it. Many as yet were in their blankets, fast asleep, many others washing and dressing, others cooking their morning meal, while the arms and accoutrements of all were spread around in the orderless fashion of holiday soldiers.
Meanwhile, swiftly forward through the woods strode the Confederates. With an elastic tread they surged onward and forward until, the mist gradually lifting, the white tents might be seen through the trees.
On poured the living current of the Confederates. By an anomalous arrangement Hildebrand's Brigade of Sherman's Division was on the left of Prentiss' Division. Sherman, with his other three brigades, was on the right.
By a mischance the Confederates' left had not been thrown sufficiently near to Owl Creek, so when the collision came it was only with the left (Hildebrand's) brigade; but it soon fell with overwhelming force upon Prentiss from flank to flank. Their sentinels, taken by surprise, were run in with barely time to discharge their pieces. Just at their heels came the Confederates, cheering heartily; and so complete a surprise of an army has not the like in history. Officers and men were killed or wounded in their beds, and large numbers had not time to clutch up either arms or accoutrements. Nevertheless, few prisoners were taken, nor were many either killed or wounded in the first stage of the battle. Hildebrand's Brigade of Ohioans, swept by the violence of the onslaught from their encampment, scattered and was heard of no more as a belligerent organization on that field! Prentiss' Division, rallying, was formed in good time on a neighboring ridge, but, little able to stand the torrent that streamed after it, was swept further back. Meanwhile Sherman's rightward brigades, which had escaped collision with Hardee, he had time to form, and with them right manfully did he strive to make head against Ruggles' Division of Bragg's Corps, that by this time had come upon the scene and bore down vehemently upon them.
The position held by Sherman was one of natural strength; with a small watercourse in front, it afforded a converging fire upon the Confederates. Such, however, was the vigor of the assault that Sherman, with the loss of five or six guns, was forced back just as McClernand came to his support. They were both then swept rearward near the line of the cross-road from Hamburg to Purdy. There Sherman, with McClernand, gained a foothold, and, with several batteries favorably posted, made another stand on a thickly-wooded ridge with a ravine in front. But, speedily assailed by Ruggles' and some of Polk's Brigades with a fury not to be withstood, the Federal line again yielded, losing several pieces of artillery and receding to the position of McClernand's encampment.
About forty minutes past seven A. M., hearing the uproar in front, Hurlbut also sent Veach's Brigade of his division to support Sherman, and with his other two brigades moved swiftly to the succor of Prentiss', who had called for aid. After Prentiss' Division had filtered through his lines he formed in the edge of an old field, sheltered by timber and thick undergrowth, near the Hamburg road, south (to the left) of the position taken by Sherman and McClernand. There Hurlbut also was speedily assailed by the Confederates, now reenforced in that quarter by Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades of Bragg's Corps, and was soon swept back, with the loss of some artillery. Thus the whole front line of Federal encampments was left in the hands of the adversary, filled with equipage and baggage, the most abundant and luxurious that encumbered any except an oriental army.
Meanwhile Sherman was making able, desperate efforts to redeem the losses of the morning. However, the Confederates, now re-enforced in that quarter by Cheatham's and Clark's Divisions, Polk's Corps, still drove their enemy nearer the river.
W. H. L. Wallace had also been attacked, and the Federal line of battle was pushed back to within a mile of the Landing. There were massed what remained of their artillery and the fragments of their five divisions.
General Johnston, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief, was now in the very front of the battle. Assured of a great victory after the marvelous success of his planned surprise, he now stimulated the onslaught by his personal presence on the right, where the press was fiercest, the resistance the most effective. More than once brigades that faltered under the inspiration of his leading bore back the enemy and wrested the position fought for. As far as can be ascertained, General Grant was not upon the immediate field earlier than midday. On Saturday afternoon he had gone to Savannah and slept there. The sound of many cannon at Shiloh was his first tidings of a hostile juncture at Pittsburg Landing. As he was leaving Savannah he ordered Nelson's Division of Buell's Corps, that lay at that place, to march to Pittsburg by the nearest road. When he reached Pittsburg it was to find his whole front line surprised, overwhelmed, routed, and the ravines and river bank adjacent packed with thousands of crouching fugitives. These could not be rallied nor incited to return. to the field to aid in recovering the fortunes of the day.
There was abundant intrepidity in leading everywhere, but, unfortunately for the Confederate cause, too little knowledge of the right way to handle regiments, brigades, divisions, even corps, to secure that massing of troops, those mighty blows which achieve decisive victories. Though, indeed, there were far to many stragglers who ignobly shrank from the victorious edge of battle, many going back to Corinth that night, yet everywhere there was the largest measure of sturdy fighting by regiments, brigades, and parts of divisions. For the most part, confident of the issue and bent on pressing toward the enemy, there was yet a lack of harmonious movement. Superior officers led with notable courage regiments or parts of brigades, and doubtless stimulated their men not a little by their example, but at the same time lost sight of the mass of their commands, which were thus not unfrequently left at a halt without orders and uncertain what to do. And this was the case with batteries also, which, moreover, were too often employed singly. There was no concerted concentration of these triumphant corps respectively, much less of the whole mass, for a well-timed, overwhelming blow at the now sorely crippled, dispirited enemy. And as a consequence, with Sherman among them doing all possible in the exigency, the Federals were enabled to protract their defense against the desultory onset with which they were assailed for the next hour or two.
Meanwhile, to the rightward the Confederate General-in-Chief, taking part at a critical juncture in the charge of a brigade, and by his intrepid presence giving a resistless momentum to the onset, received a rifle wound in the leg—a mortal wound, as it proved presently, for the want of timely surgical aid. The Governor of Tennessee (I. G. Harris), by his side when struck, caught the soldier in his arms as he fell from his saddle, exhausted by an apparently painless loss of blood. A moment after his aid-de-camp and brother-in-law, Colonel William Preston, of Kentucky, came up, and A. S. Johnston, with scarce a murmur, died in his arms. The scene of his untoward death was a wooded, secluded hollow, and the loss of their chief was not known to the Confederate army until that night, nor even generally then.
About the time of this calamity the reserves under Breckinridge were thrown vigorously into action. He was ordered to the support of Bragg, who had called for aid. In front was to be seen a camp without an inmate. This camp was in an open woods and just ahead was an open field bordered by a dense thicket.
Through the camp passed Breckinridge's Brigade and into the open field, and still there was silence; but not long, for a few steps beyond a hissing stream and flame of musketry burst at their breasts, mowing their ranks. fearfully and heaping the ground with dead and wounded. They gave back to the woods, but only for a little while did they recede. Closing their thinned ranks, and animated by their officers, they retook the advance, and their adversaries were forced back, yet with not a little. stubbornness and desperate fighting on fighting on favorable ground. By this time Withers' Division, of Bragg's Corps, as well as Breckinridge's reserves, mingled with portions of Hardee's men, were all massed on the Confederate right in the quarter of Lick Creek. General Bragg, assuming command of the whole, launched them with a resistless weight at the enemy, who now gave way, and on all sides were forced from the line of Wallace's and Hurlbut's encampments, leaving behind more of their artillery and three thousand prisoners, chiefly. of Prentiss' Division, in the hands of their assailants.
At the same time, on the center and left, Polk's Divisions, with Ruggles' Division of Bragg's Corps, and some of Hardee's also, made no less strenuous efforts to close the battle. Those of the routed Federals who were not killed or captured dropped back in great confusion toward the Landing. Some were rallied upon the ridge immediately overhanging the Landing, but large masses were added to the already dense mob of fugitives huddled below the bank.
But meanwhile Colonel Webster, chief of the Federal staff, an officer of the regulars who knew his profession, observing the mortal peril of his people, had gathered upon that ridge all the guns available, including some thirty-two pounders and a battery of twenty-pounder Parrotts, or in all, twenty-two pieces, which he manned with gunners from the least demoralized of the run-aways. Soon, too, the remains of the field batteries were added, and some fifty guns were massed upon this eminence about five P. M., with a field of fire sweeping all the approaches to the river. The position was strong; timber and undergrowth gave shelter for the artillery and their support, while a deep ravine separated it from the table-land over which it dominated; tangled brushwood obstructed its steep slopes, and on or behind this position, as we have said, took final refuge the entire Federal force except the remains of one of Sherman's brigades, which appear to have drifted off with their General to the vicinity of the bridge across Snake Creek, on the road to Crump's Landing, and not being followed, he established them there undisturbed, with the rear open for retreat in an emergency, northward.
The air now resounded with hearty shouts of natural exultation on part of the victorious Confederates.
General Beauregard, through his staff, urged the forward propulsion of the whole force upon the shattered fragments of the enemy. Unfortunately, however, from various causes, none of the divisions confronted in an embodied form the last position that remained between them and the deep, broad waters of the Tennessee. The superior officers present, howbeit, collected the men immediately around them, of whatever corps. Tired, hungry, and exhausted as were the Confederates, nevertheless a number of determined separate efforts were made by them during the remaining hour of daylight to wrench the last foothold from their elsewhere beaten adversary. But meanwhile, at five P. M., Ammen's Brigade of Nelson's Division had been thrown across the river and established by Buell as a support of Webster's powerful battery, and the Federals, like a rat brought to bay in a corner from which there is no escape, fought with all the desperation of that animal under similar circumstances, knowing, moreover, that night, with its shield of darkness, and ample succor were close at hand.
But in attempting to mount the last ridge, the Confederates were met by a fire from a whole line of batteries, protected by infantry, and assisted by shells from the gun-boats. They, however, stoutly persisted in storming the steep hillside despite the impediments with which it bristled, and made charge after charge without success until night closed hostilities.
General Beauregard, in the meantime, observing the exhausted, widely-scattered condition of his army, directed it to be brought out of battle, collected and restored to order as far as practicable, and to occupy for the night the captured encampments of the enemy.
All the encampments that had been occupied by the five Federal divisions were now in possession of their adversary. They were full of the rich, opportune spoils of war, including many thousand stands of arms, all the blankets and baggage of the whole force, their subsistence, their hospital stores, means of transportation to a great extent, and large stores of ammunition. But so great was the lassitude and fatigue of the Confederates that all which could be done was to glean food sufficient for their supper, for which, indeed, all were dependent upon what they could thus find.
The prisoners, however, were collected together during the night not far from Shiloh Church, where Generals Beauregard and Bragg established their headquarters. There, after a time, the former had an interview with his corps commanders and received brief oral reports of the operations of the day.
Among the prisoners was General Prentiss himself, who had much to say touching the ultimate issue of the affair, which he asserted was by no means terminated with the disaster of that untoward day; for Buell, he stated, would effect a junction that night, the fight would break out the next morning with renewed vigor, and all losses would be recovered. At the moment, however, this was regarded as idle talk, for an official telegraphic dispatch, addressed to General Johnston from near Florence, was forwarded to the field from Corinth, announcing that Buell was moving with his whole force upon Florence. Emanating from a reliable. officer placed there in observation, whose scouts had doubtless mistaken the movement of Mitchell's Division for the whole of Buell's army, it was credited, and Buell's timely junction with General Grant was accordingly deemed impossible. Therefore the capture of the latter was regarded at Confederate headquarters as inevitable the next day, as soon as all the scattered Confederate resources could be brought to bear for a concentrated effort. Such of the Confederate soldiery as could find shelter from a heavy rain slept undisturbed and hopeful of the fullest fruition of a great victory on the morrow.
After first finding food and forage for his men and horses, Colonel Forrest threw out a squadron as pickets, confronting, as close as possible, those of the enemy, on a stretch of a mile across to Owl Creek. He also dispatched Lieutenant Sheridan with other scouts clad in Federal cavalry overcoats, to reconnoiter within the precincts of the enemy's lines. Completely successful, in an hour Sheridan returned and reported that, reaching the Landing, he had seen heavy reinforcements coming rapidly by water. Also, in his opinion, such was the disorder prevailing that if an attack were made in full force at once, they might be readily pushed into the river. Forrest, ever a man of prompt action, mounted his horse instantly to convey this startling intelligence to the nearest corps commander, and soon coming upon Generals Hardee and Breckinridge, made known what his scouts announced. He also bluntly added his opinion that either the Confederates should immediately resume the battle or quit the field to avoid a damaging conflict with overwhelming odds. Hardee directed him. to communicate his information to General Beauregard, and with that object he rode forth again; but after a diligent search through the woods and darkness, unable to find that General, he became so deeply solicitous that he hurried back to his pickets. Finding all quiet he again dispatched his scouts within the Federal lines. It was two o'clock A. M. before they returned and reported the continued arrival of fresh troops. Again Forrest repaired and reported to General Hardee the state of affairs, but was instructed to return to his regiment, keep up a vigilant, strong picket line, and report all hostile movements. All the while, every few minutes through the night, two gun-boats had been sedulously throwing their dread "bolted thunder" directly over Forrest's bivouac, murdering sleep, weary and drowsy as all his men were.
By seven P. M. Nelson's other two brigades (Bruce's and Hazen's) had crossed the Tennessee, and, with the one (Ammen's) that so materially helped, with Webster's opportunely posted battery, to save the Federal army from utter overthrow, were at once thrown forward by General Buell as a shield between General Grant's army and the Confederates. Crittenden's Division likewise came up from Savannah by water not long after, and was promptly established in the same manner on Nelson's right. Moreover, Lew Wallace, one of Grant's divisions that was not in the first day's battle, came up by land from near Crump's Landing, crossed Snake Creek, and took a position there commanding the bridge, and by chance, too, in the neighborhood of Sherman. One of McCook's Brigades (Rousseau's) also reached the scene about sunrise and took a position on Crittenden's right. His other two brigades. (Johnson's and Kirk's) took position about ten a. M.
Thus were marshaled there or near at hand, ready to take the offensive against the victors of the day before, twenty-five thousand fresh Federal troops. On the Confederate side, to meet such an onset, there was not a man who had not fought steadfastly for the greater part of Sunday, and not more than twenty thousand Confederate infantry could have been found to answer to their names that morning, the 7th.
In haste to efface the tarnish of the arrant disaster inflicted on his army on Sunday, General Grant did not await the advent of Buell's other divisions, but directed the offensive to be assumed at dawn. His shattered forces on Sunday night had been reorganized into three divisions under Sherman, McClernand and Hurlbut.
To recapitulate: Six Federal divisions- Nelson's, Crittenden's, McClernand's, McCook's,4 Sherman's and Lew Wallace's-were in position in the order named, and ready to take the offensive Monday morning, with Hurlbut's Division held back near the river as a reserve. Hurlbut, bringing up his reserves about ten o'clock and fusing them with McClernand's command, repaired rearward again, at McClernand's request, to seek further support.
Chalmers' Brigade, with a part of J. K. Jackson's, under Wheeler, in advance, in front of Nelson, were the first to become engaged. Nelson came out with vigor, and the Confederates retired slowly to concentrate their strength. By eight o'clock, Hardee, however, had massed in that quarter a number of his own corps, as well as Withers' Division of Bragg's, and the combat began in earnest. Nelson now found a lion in his path, but Hazen's Brigade pushed forward with decided pluck, and the Confederates were driven from their position with the loss of a battery. A well-timed concentration, however, enabled the Confederates to hurl Hazen back from his prey, and in turn pressed Nelson so sorely that by nine A. M. he was calling lustily for aid. Nelson was reinforced by Terrell's Battery (regulars), and a portion of Crittenden's Division, and an obstinate struggle for the mastery of this part of the field raged until about one P. M. But neither party gained any material advantage, except Terrell's Battery was so cut up that he had to assist as a gunner at one of his pieces, and the battery narrowly escaped capture.
Crittenden by this time was likewise hotly engaged in the immediate center. The Confederates on his front, at first retiring to concentrate at his advance, finally rebounded, and he and Nelson were borne back by the same refluent wave. Polk's corps coming up from the rear, on the Confederate side, entered the battle in splendid order and spirit.
By the time Nelson was well at work on the Federal left, the Confederates opened a light fire upon Wallace and Sherman, who, encouraged by its feebleness, adventured the offensive. But their speedy greeting was a sheet of flame, lead and canister from the woods in their front, where portions of Ruggles' and Breckinridge's Divisions stood in wait. The Federals reeled and rushed rearward, followed nearly a mile by the Confederates; but here, reinforced by McCook, Sherman attempted to resume the advance. Now, the fight waxed obstinate, and the firing, says Sherman, was the "severest musketry" he had ever heard. Rousseau's Federal Brigade was pitted against Trabue's Kentuckians. Both fought with uncommon determination to win, but the Federals were repulsed, and Wallace was so pressed that his situation became extremely critical.
As the Confederates in that part of the field were confronted by more than double their number, the impetus of their attack was, therefore, slackened in the face of such odds. Yet several brilliant charges were made, in one of which, to the left of Shiloh, General Beauregard himself led in person, carrying the battle flag of a Louisiana regiment; and Trabue's Brigade, having carried earlier an eminence near Owl Creek, repulsing every effort to dislodge him, held his position until the retreat was ordered. Here, as on the right, the Confederate troops were animated by the greatest intrepidity on the part of their superior officers.
It was now after one o'clock. The battle had raged furiously from right to left for more than five hours, and, notwithstanding the odds of fresh troops brought up against them, despite their long-continued engagement, the Confederates had not receded from the ground upon which they had been concentrated as soon as it was apparent that the battle was on their hands. Beginning the combat with not more than twenty thousand men, exclusive of cavalry, less than fifteen thousand were now in the Confederate ranks. General Beauregard, seeing the unprofitable nature of the struggle, determined not to prolong it. Directing his Adjutant-General to select a position, and post such troops as were available to cover the retreat, he dispatched other staff officers to the corps commanders, with the order to retire simultaneously from their several positions, ready, however, to turn and fight should it become necessary. And, accordingly, about two o'clock the retrograde movement was inaugurated, and carried out with a steadiness never exceeded by veterans of a hundred fields. The retreat had now commenced in earnest, but so stunned and crippled was the enemy that no effort or pretense to pursue was made. The line established to cover the movement commanded the ground of Shiloh Church and some open fields in the neighborhood. Thence, keeping up a vigorous play of artillery on the woods beyond, there was no reply, nor did any enemy become visible. The next line, three-fourths of a mile to the rear, was abandoned, with no enemy in sight. Breckinridge, assigned to the duty of covering the retreat with his division, was ordered to bivouac for the night at a point not more than four and a half miles from Pittsburg Landing. The other corps were now en route for Corinth by a road which, that night, was made almost impracticable for wheels by a heavy rainfall.
On Tuesday morning, General Breckinridge fell back to a position only three miles beyond, and there remained undisturbed for some days, with the cavalry thrown forward in close proximity to the Federal lines. After Breckinridge had thus withdrawn, Colonel Forrest found himself with about three hundred and fifty troops on Tuesday morning (the 8th), on the road toward Monterey, in the presence of a heavy Federal infantry force, advancing in three lines of battle. The position, a ridge, was advantageous, and Forrest determined to attempt to hold it until re-enforcements could be brought up. Formed in line of battle, the Confederates boldly stood their ground as about two battalions of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were thrown forward to assail them. The infantry advanced handsomely at a charge, with their bayonets presented. There was some confusion, however, in the Federal ranks in crossing a small stream, and Forrest, with his characteristic quickness of sight and plans, his wonted hardihood, resolved to charge the Federals with his force, as small as it was. His bugler sounded the charge, and forward dashed the Confederates from their covert behind the crest of the ridge in superb order and spirit, and were almost upon the enemy before the nature of the movement was perceived or they had had time to prepare for it. At twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their shot-guns—a formidable weapon at that short distance-and rushed in with pistols and sabers. So sudden was the onset that, despite their numbers, the Federal cavalry broke in disorder and fled back through the woods, running over their own infantry in their panic, creating a scene of singular confusion and tumult for some moments. Many of the infantry were thus knocked down; many horses also were transfixed by the bayonets of their own infantry.
Scores of other horses fell and threw their riders, sprawling and bruised, upon the ground, and all around was a medley of cavalry and infantry, scattering and running to and fro, hither and thither, officers shouting and cursing and the hurt groaning. The flying infantry were closely pursued for several hundred yards by their eager, excited enemy. The loss inflicted was heavy, while seventy were captured.
In the ardency and exultation of the pursuit Forrest pressed on until he found himself alone within fifty yards of the main body of the Federal expeditionary force, and beyond, indeed, a large part of those whom he had just surprised and routed. Halting, he saw at a glance that his men, perceiving sooner the situation, had very properly halted, and were then falling back with their prisoners-which they were doing, however, unaware of the perilous position of their leader. Immediately observed by the enemy, now all around him, Forrest was fired at from all sides. One ball from an Austrian rifle, striking him on the right side, just above the point of the hip-bone, penetrated to the spine, and, ranging around, lodged in the left side- a severe if not, indeed, mortal wound, as his surgeon apprehended. His right leg, benumbed by the blow, was also left hanging useless in the stirrup. Turning his horse, however, he resolved to escape, surrounded as he was by hundreds bent on his death, and shouting, “Kill him!" "Shoot him!" "Stick him!" "Knock him off his horse!" all of which they literally sought to do. His horse, too, was wounded (mortally, as it proved); but still bore up under his daring rider as he dashed out of the throng of assailants, using his revolver with deadly aim to clear his path. In a moment more his path to the rear, at least, was clear of foes, but their marksmen, still within easy range, sent hundreds of balls after him as he galloped down the road and over the hill. Happily, he escaped without further hurt, and rejoined his command, halted behind the ridge. Giving orders to the officer next in rank to assume command, but to avoid further action with so large a force, Forrest went to Corinth that night, when the horse, which had borne him so stoutly and faithfully, dropped and died a few hours later. On the next day Colonel Forrest, furloughed for sixty days, repaired to Memphis.
The losses of the Confederates in the two days' combats are accurately and officially stated by General Beauregard at 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, 959 missing, or an aggregate of 10,699. The Federal commander, in his brief report of the battle, estimates his own losses at only 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded, an
evidently large understatement, for in the official reports of three of his division generals we find their losses foot up in killed and wounded as high as 4.614, with 1.832 reported missing, a number of whom must have been killed, as only 3,000 were captured, and most of them were Prentiss' Division. Furthermore, Swinton, who always writes in a fair spirit, estimates the Federal loss at 15,000. Of trophies the Confederates carried from the field some twenty-six stands of flags and colors, and about thirty of the guns captured on the 6th. The guns which figure in Federal subordinate reports as captured from the Confederates, with few exceptions, were those lost on Sunday by the Federals, which, for want of horses to draw them from the field, had been left by the Confederates where they had been taken.
COMMENTARIES.
The true reason why the battle of Sunday fell short of the most complete victory of modern war by the capture of the whole Federal army is simply this: First, General Johnston, not knowing the actual position occupied by the Federal front line, failed to extend his line of battle sufficiently near Owl Creek to force the Federal right (Sherman) back north-easterly into the cul de sac made above Pittsburg Landing by the junction of Lick Creek with the Tennessee River. As the attack was made, the shock of the onset only affected Sherman's left brigade (Hildebrand's). Had it fallen with full force upon his entire division, it is manifest that that which happened to Hildebrand's Brigade would have befallen it. The entire division must have been swept away as that brigade was, and been driven rearward so rapidly upon McClernand's, Hurlbut's, and Wallace's (W. H. L.) as to give them little or no time to form their divisions, and make the stand which Sherman's obstinate resistance with two brigades near Shiloh enabled them to do.
Second, after the combat was at its height, those superior officers who should have been occupied with the concentration and continuous projection of their troops in heavy masses upon the shattered Federal divisions, were at the very front and "perilous edge" of the battle, leading forward regiments, perchance brigades, into action with great individual intrepidity, and doing a great deal, no doubt, by their personal example to impel small bodies forward. But meanwhile, to their rear were left the masses of their respective commands without direction, and thus precious time was lost. The Confederates were not kept continuously massed and employed, either corps or divisions; mere piecemeal onsets were the general method of fighting after twelve o'clock, with this consequence: Sherman was enabled to make several obstinate, powerful stands, by which he protracted the battle some hours. Had the corps been held well in hand, massed and pressed continuously upon the tottering, demoralized foe, the battle assuredly would have closed at least by midday.
As our battalion was on outpost duty, on the extreme right
of Johnston's army (as my diary has shown), it was not in the Shiloh battle.
While we were sitting quietly in camp on Sunday, listening to a sermon from our
chaplain, we could hear the booming of artillery at Shiloh.
1 Grant, the Federal Commander-in-Chief, it appears, had gone that afternoon down the river to Savannah, some twelve miles distant.
2 Grant had six divisions, but one of them (Lew Wallace's) was about six miles below, near Crump's Landing, and consequently not in the first day's fight.
3 Statham's Brigade, to which McNairy's Battery formerly belonged, was in this reserve.—R. R. H.
4 Two of McCook's brigades, as before stated, did not take position until about ten A. M.
SOURCE: Richard R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, p. 140-64
