George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 26, 1863

(Private)

New Orleans, January 26th, 1863.

Dear Sir: The situation is the same as when I last wrote. There is no movement of troops, so far as I am informed, and there appears to be no probability of an advance in any direction.

The New York papers will state that the “Harriet Lane” has escaped from Galveston and gone to sea. This is not true. She is still in the harbor according to official advices just received here.

It is rumored here that the “Ovieto” has been captured. Admiral Farragut does not believe it. When she escaped from Mobile the “Cuyler” went in pursuit and neither vessel has yet been heard from.

Three days ago a steamer supposed to be the Alabama appeared at the mouth of the river, and then steered off in a southwest direction. The Admiral sent a vessel from here (The Mississippi) to follow her. As the “Alabama” is the faster vessel and had a start of 100 miles, and the Mississippi started from here 24 hours after the Rebel vessel was seen — it is not probable that anything will be effected.

It should not be forgotten that here is the place to make the proclamation effective. I am afraid Gen. Banks will never do it. He decides and moves too slowly and is too much afraid of responsibilities. He does not seem to regard with favor the three fine regiments already raised, and declines putting them in the field. I told you that they had sent him a petition to be put in the front rank at Port Hudson, that they might remove from their race the stigma of cowardice, etc. In all the regiments Gen. Banks brought with him, three cannot be selected so efficient as these three colored regiments, and in my opinion, they would be worth any five of the raw regiments Gen. Banks brought with him. I see Gen. Banks almost every day, but am perfectly ignorant of his plans and intentions. I do not wish to retract or qualify any statement in my late letters to you — nor in a letter to Mr. Flanders which I asked him to show you.

If my letters are uninteresting or too frequent, please inform me.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 350-1

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 8, 1863

(Private)

New Orleans, January 8th, 1863.

Dear Sir: A disaster has occurred at Galveston, similar to that near Fortress Monroe when the Cumberland and Congress were destroyed.

The rebels under Magruder, came down from Houston with four boats (steam) protected by cotton bales. At the same time, a land force, estimated from 3,000 to 7,000 crossed the bridge to the Island and occupied Galveston. This occurred about one or two o'clock on the morning of Jan. 1st. About 3 o'clock an attack was made by land and water on the Gunboats —which were in the narrow channel within musket shot of the shore. The “Harriet Lane” run into a rebel boat and sunk her, but became entangled in the wreck and could not get off. She was carried by boarding and captured. Less than twenty of her men are supposed to survive (out of 130). The Westfield (Flag Ship) was aground. Commodore Renshaw sent off to the other vessels all the men and officers except eight or ten, and then blew up the vessel and himself with her. He did not intend to destroy himself, but the magazine took fire unexpectedly, just as he was escaping. Two hundred and fifty men of a Massachusetts regiment (infantry only) were posted in the town, and were all captured or killed. The Gunboats had previous notice of the attack, and there must have been negligence on the part of the officers. Our loss is — “Harriet Lane” captured, but believed to be too much injured to be fit for sea for some time. The “Westfield” blown up.

Two sailing vessels loaded with coal for the navy.

About 400 men killed or taken prisoners.

All the other vessels (two were Gunboats) escaped. The fight lasted from three o'clock until 10 A. M.

Admiral Farragut, on receipt of the news, immediately dispatched several vessels to Galveston, which will set things right again, I hope. The 1st. Texas Reg't., Col. Davis, arrived, after the capture, on the S. Ship “Cumbria,” and narrowly escaped capture. The reg't. numbers about 200 men, who have all returned here.

The condition of things here does not seem to me to be very satisfactory — but Gen. Banks has not been here long enough to determine the prospect of improvement.

I think Gen. Banks lacks decision. With one or two exceptions, his staff are not men of ability. He seems to favor the policy of conciliation — which policy is weak and will always be unsuccessful. I can hardly get him to express an opinion — or if he does, it does not seem to be an earnest conviction. Secessionists grow more defiant and Union men despondent. This, I hope, and think, will be changed. I believe he is thoroughly honest, and he already has effected much good by putting down swindlers and army speculators. Gen. Butler's military commission (Gen. Orders No. 91) did an immense amount of mischief and injustice. Gen. Butler is an extraordinary man, but did very wrong in all things connected with internal trade. I have frequently heard Union men say they wished he was President, for though he would make millions for himself during the first three months, he would finish the war in three months more.

Gen. Banks has a very difficult position, for he comes here a stranger and four weeks at least are necessary for him to become informed of the situation.

The Government can finish this war in twelve months — in one way and in only one. Arm the negroes. I am perfectly satisfied it must be done. Why delay it? It can be done here without throwing the border states into a fever. Here and in S. Carolina and not well elsewhere. I called upon Gen. Banks this morning and urged the matter on his attention, as I have often done before. He agreed with me that the war could be finished in that way, but seems afraid of taking the responsibility. I wish I could assume the responsibility for him. I would suggest that you write me a letter to be shown to Gen. Banks, giving your opinion of the expediency of raising negro troops, and stating how such a step will be regarded by the Administration. If he is assured in this manner that the Government will approve, perhaps he will enlist the negroes. There are at least 20,000 black men within our lines who will make good and willing soldiers, 50,000 more can be raised west of the Mississippi as our army advances.

The three colored regiments already organized, have petitioned Gen. Banks to be put in the front rank at Port Hudson, that they may have a chance of removing the stigma of alleged cowardice from their race, and vindicate their rights and abilities as soldiers. I urge him to grant their request, but do not know what he will do about it. The negroes all say they can finish the war if the Gov't. will give them a chance. By no other means is success certain. Why delay it?

If it had not been for speculations in the sugar crops, Gen. Butler would have raised more regiments, but the men were wanted on the plantations to take off the crops.

Our last dates from the North are of the 20th. December. It is rumored that Gen. Butler may go into the Cabinet. I almost wish he would. He is a man of wonderful energy, will, and ability, and will always be admired by the Union men of New Orleans, even though he is believed by some to have acquired great wealth here.

Military affairs remain in the same condition as when I last wrote. Port Hudson has not been attacked and I don't know when it will be. The rebels are said to be receiving re-inforcements there.

P. S. Gen. Hamilton is still here.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 345-7

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, December 17, 1862

(Private)

New Orleans, December 17th.

Dear Sir: Gen. Banks and staff arrived here on the evening of Sunday the 14th, and he assumed command of the Department of the Gulf yesterday. Enclosed is Gen. Butler's final order — and Gen. Banks' order on assuming command.

I endeavor to ascertain how this change is received here and the result of my inquiries and observations is very satisfactory. Probably those most intimately connected with Gen. Butler, regret the change, and many of the loyal citizens express a fear that the new administration of affairs, will lack the vigor and ability of the former. Some also, think that injustice has been done Gen. Butler in removing him from a command where he has succeeded so admirably. But the general expression is one of satisfaction. The fact is, that the extensive commercial proceedings which were tolerated (to say the least) by the former Commanding General, have created a general disgust. The public opinion was fixed, that these transactions were for Gen. Butler's own benefit, and the dissatisfaction on this account was intense. Gen. Butler has always been very kind to me, and assisted me whenever asked & I feel very grateful to him. But yet I believe the change is a good one. I was intending to write to you by this mail, giving considerable information about speculations here, but it is now unnecessary — & I suppose all such evils will be speedily corrected.

I have seen Gen. Banks but once, but by his invitation am to meet him to-day or to-morrow, for the purpose of giving him all the information in my possession. I shall endeavor to keep you promptly informed of everything transpiring here. Gen. Banks' troops have arrived in large numbers. I do not know whether all have come. It is not certainly known why Gen. Butler was removed. Some say it is on account of demands of France — others that it is on account of speculations — others that it is owing to representations of Admiral Farragut.

I have learned that little more in regard to the Schooner “L. L. Davis” which run into Pontchitoula. Gen. Butler believes that I am satisfied that Col. Butler had nothing to do with it. I am not so satisfied. Gen. Butler says he has ascertained that a prominent officer (I suspect he refers to Col. French — Pro. Marshal) loaded the vessel in good faith for Matamoras and that the captain ran away from him. I do not now know whether the evidence taken down will be sent to Washington. 1 think 1 shall lay-the whole matter before General Banks.

I want some money. Three hundred Dollars in gold, which I brought with me, and a few hundred dollars since received by your order, have been sufficient to pay my expenses but is now consumed. I transmit to-day an official receipt for $25,000 legal tender notes, which have just arrived to pay expenses of the office. About my own pay I wrote to you Oct. 10th. I shall not pay myself out of the $25,000. for the fact is, I never really understood what my compensation is.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 339-40

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, December 10, 1862

(Unofficial)

New Orleans, December 10th, 1862.

Dear Sir: I send this letter by Mr. Flanders who leaves to-day for Washington, and suggest that you talk fully with him concerning affairs here. I mean military and political affairs, with which he is quite familiar. You can rely perfectly on the integrity of Mr. F. An occurrence has just taken place which causes me to feel much indignation and some chagrin.

Col. Butler has three or four men in his employ who manage his business for him. The principal one is a Mr. Wyer. Some days ago Wyer loaded a vessel for Matamoras. She was loaded in the New Basin, and when she got into the Lake, ran into Pontchitoula.

This information reached me two days ago and since then I have been investigating the matter and am satisfied that it was a predetermined plan to take the cargo to Pontchitoula for the rebels, instead of going to Matamoras. I am also satisfied that Col. Butler was the sole owner of the cargo.

The vessel was the Schooner “L. L. Davis”, 95 tons burden, and 500 sacks salt was the greater portion of her cargo. This is worth in Rebeldom the astonishing price of $150. per sack. Cotton could be bought there at not more than 15 cts. per pound and delivered at some point on the Mississippi whence it could be brought hither. Near Matamoras, salt is abundant and cheap. I expressed astonishment to Wyer when he cleared the vessel, that he should send salt to that port, but he pretended to have information that he could get a good price for it.

I have just been to see Gen. Butler and laid the whole matter before him with statement of proof that the “Davis” was loaded with intention to run the blockade. I cannot give this statement in one letter, but it is sufficient to say that Gen. Butler expressed himself perfectly satisfied that such was the intention. I then told him I believed Col. Butler was the owner of the cargo — & gave my reasons.

Gen. Butler assures me he will immediately investigate the matter thoroughly & if Col. Butler or those associated with him, are interested in the operation, he & they shall instantly leave the Department of the Gulf. He manifested great indignation which I cannot believe feigned, judging from his appearance. I am confident I can bring forward sufficient proof to convince any honest Jury that the vessel is Col. Butler's and that he intended to take the cargo to Rebels. This statement I intend to make to Gen. Butler to-morrow morning, so that, if he please, he can permit me to collect and present the evidence.

Yesterday I had a long conversation with Admiral Farragut who holds the same opinion regarding this matter as myself.

The Gunboat at the mouth of New Canal, is the “New London,” commanded by Capt. Read (Lieut. Commanding). I am afraid he will be made to suffer — but it would be very unjust, for he was not deficient in vigilance, and is an honest and faithful officer. I am more in fault than he is, for I allowed myself to be deceived — though any man however vigilant, would have been deceived in the same manner.

I shall report to you promptly this progress and result of the investigation. Please excuse the hasty manner in which I am obliged to write.

P. S. Pontchitoula is in the northern part of Lake Pontchartrain — somewhat inland.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 338-9

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, September 24, 1862

(Private and Unofficial)

New Orleans, Sept. 24th, 1862.

Dear Sir: Your kind letter of the 8th. inst. reached me yesterday. I showed it to Gen. Butler, as you gave me permission to do. The General requests me to present to you his kindest regards. He is satisfied that Slavery must be abolished, and he will do his part at such time as he thinks proper. He humorously remarked that his colored Brigade was of about the complexion, (upon the average) of the Vice President. He says that after properly organizing and drilling them, he believes they can march triumphantly from here to Kentucky. To-morrow the first Reg't. receives arms and joins the army. The second is fully enlisted and is being drilled. A third will be organized, but the General has arms for no more. His order says none are to be received but those who have received freedom through some recognized legal channel — but these are of three classes, viz: — Those who have received freedom from their owners.  2nd. Those who are made free by the present military courts.  3rd. All who come in from the enemy's lines. You see this includes almost all colored people. Gen. Butler will manage this matter wisely and well.

Gen. Butler does more work than any other man in Louisiana. Every thought seems to be given to the interest of the Government, and his powers of endurance are remarkable. No other man could fill his place here. His popularity among Union men is great and increasing. As I told you in a former letter, it is to be regretted that his brother does business here, but I do not think the General is interested in his speculations. He learns everything and forgets nothing. He comes in contact with the best minds in the State, and is equal, or superior, to them till.

During the week ending last night, the number of people who have taken the oath of allegiance, is very great. Every place where the oath was administered, was thronged. Secessionists can be tamed and Gen. Butler can do it. I should say three-fourths, at least, of the citizens have taken the oath, and yet not a threat was made against such as should not take it. I have reason to believe the General will be very severe toward those who persist in calling themselves loyal to the Southern Confederacy. I think he will confiscate their property and remove them beyond the lines.

Notwithstanding Federal reverses, the Union feeling develops itself satisfactorily, and many have realty ceased to be secessionists

The Prussian Ship “Essex” has on board many cases of plate and bullion shipped by rebels. Gen. Butler directed me to grant no clearance to the ship until the cases were landed. The ship has been waiting for a clearance three days, but will (probably) land the cases soon, when there will be no more trouble.

Since I have been here, two small vessels have cleared for Pensacola with Gen. B.’s permit. Admiral Farragut may perhaps complain of these vessels, for one or both, ran into rebel ports or were captured by the enemy. At any rate, they did not reach Pensacola. The Navy seized the Prize Schooner “Emma”¹ at Ship Island, sent by me to New York. I had put iron on her to complete cargo. She was released and continued her voyage.

The business of the Custom House goes on very satisfactorily. The Mr. Flanders² I spoke of is not the one you know, but his brother, and is not perhaps a proper person for Surveyor. He is a proper person for Clerk to perform the duties of Deputy Surveyor and for this office I have nominated him the office of Surveyor being included, I suppose, in my position as Special Agent and Acting Collector.

_______________

¹ In the next letter this name is given as "Elma."

² Mr. B. F. Flanders is frequently mentioned (June 23, 1862, etc.) and, except toward the close of the period, with approval. The second Mr. Flanders is not elsewhere mentioned, either in these letters or in the important printed sources bearing on the period.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 315-7

Commandant Samuel F. Dupont to Gustavus V. Fox, September 24, 1861

Private

Astor House 24 Sep. 61.

My Dear Mr. Fox,

I closed up things yesterday at Philad^a — where Turner is doing remarkably well; I took leave of the master workmen and held up the importance of economy to them.

To-day I have been around with Pook, Mr. Morgan, Bell and Drayton, hurrying up all I could. Pook is in advance of the Yard. Some of the steamers are getting along — the Alabama and Augusta will be ready by Saturday. I think however that Com. Breese should be informed that the Dept is anxious to have as many ships as possible ready by 10. Oct.

The Isaac Smith (Swiftsure line) will be a most formidable vessel, possibly the most efficient and powerful for certain purposes that has been purchased, but the cost is considerable. The second one is so light, that the alterations must be much less, and the third the Western World, had better be kept for a troop ship. She will carry two thousand five hd. A rifle gun forward and one gun on each broadside will be a suitable armament.

I have concluded to have two ferry-boats, and a Tug as tender with a rifle gun, Mr. Morgan to write about it, if you approve.

I wish The Adger could remain here and commence the nucleus of the expedition. They should anchor off the battery and after getting everything on board and their crews stationed I would send them to Sandy Hook to withdraw attention. Drayton would go down and put them through an exercise and see to their magazines and ammunition &c &c. With these new arms and rifle guns, &c, I am satisfied that one of the best things you did was to give me Drayton as ordnance officer — he is very au fait and he and Bell chimed right in. Bell is very earnest and feels the importance of exertion.

The Gunboats are well forward and Cap. Gregory and Comstock are also very active. I am going to try one of them tomorrow. They seem desirous I should go with them, and I thought it, though I feel the loss of a few hours even.

May I ask you to form the Expedition for me as soon as you can by giving these officers orders to report as soon as ready, that is that Com B. should do so. I told the latter I wished the Wabash not to come to the Yard but to lay off the battery, which pleased him much.

The Bienville is pretty well on. We had better let Lee have her, as the DeSoto is far behind her — the danger here is being top heavy — the guns sh^d have been on the middle deck.

Now for a little very private chat.

You have a rare party at that Yard just now — that Court of retired old gentlemen — and then the regular retiring board — a hot place for me to get into. Com. Paulding was cordial and hearty in the extreme. Farragut a little constrained. The others, I did not see — but Breese who was very cordial told me the theory which had been got up—

“That the younger officers had prevailed on the Dept. to adopt its course about the flag officers — and this was done in connivance with and in order to act upon the retiring board, that they would feel compelled to retire all above the flag officers!! Of course I am looked upon as the arch conspirator of the younger officers. I spoke right out to Breese, first in emphatic defence of the Dept; secondly in utter defiance and utter contempt of any aspersions upon me. He gave me to understand that Bell (C. H.) was the most sore. I said he had had a big Navy Yard and a Meditⁿ Squadron, and while feeling respect for him, as the Dept did, I could see nothing in his history that shd make him preferred to me, who had served as long and as faithfully as he ever had. Do not understand that Breese was sympathising in these complaints, not at all — he was disgusted I think with Stringham coming North.

I have seen Howell, he will be able to take a gun boat and will be a fine appt. All seemed delighted when I told them the Dept would probably give Crosby a gun boat, as a reward for his activity and zeal.

Send for Goldsboro and post him up, if you choose. I will meet him in Washington — perhaps it would be well we should arrange some things together. Sands speaks in highest terms of his industry and constant attention to duty. Sands seemed delighted with his appointment and mine and said he would be ready to come at any time and help us give those fellows a lick.

I return about Thursday to Philad — attend to my private affairs, pack up everything, make my will, and on Monday commence here and work to the end — by that time I hope Wabash will be in.

I have written more than you can read.

Truly Yr friend

S. F. DP.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 52-55

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, February 3, 1864

Had a brief talk to-day with Chase on financial matters. He seems embarrassed how to proceed, but, being fertile in resources, listening to others still more fertile, and having resorted to expedients in one instance, he will probably experience little difficulty in finding another. There will, however, come a day of reckoning, and the nation will have to pay for all these expedients. In departing from the specie standard and making irredeemable paper its equivalent, I think a great error was committed. By inflating the currency, loans have been more easily taken, but the artificial prices are ruinous. I do not gather from Chase that he has any system or fixed principles to govern him in his management of the Treasury. He craves even beyond most others a victory, for the success of our arms inspires capitalists with confidence. He inquired about Charleston; regretted that Farragut had not been ordered there. I asked what F. could do beyond Dahlgren at that point. Well, he said, he knew not that he could do more, but he was brave and had a name which inspired confidence. I admitted he had a reputation which Dahlgren had not, but no one had questioned D.'s courage or capacity and the President favored him. The moral effect of taking Charleston was not to be questioned; beyond that I knew not anything could be gained. The port was closed.

The conversation turned upon army and naval operations. He lamented the President's want of energy and force, which he said paralyzed everything. His weakness was crushing us. I did not respond to this distinct feeler, and the conversation changed.

Almost daily we have some indications of Presidential aspirations and incipient operations for the campaign. The President does not conceal the interest he takes, and yet I perceive nothing unfair or intrusive. He is sometimes, but not often, deceived by heartless intriguers who impose upon him. Some appointments have been secured by mischievous men, which would never have been made had he known the facts. In some respects he is a singular man and not fully understood. He has great sagacity and shrewdness, but sometimes his assertion or management is astray. When he relies on his own right intentions and good common sense, he is strongest. So in regard to friends whom he distrusts, and mercenary opponents, in some of whom he confides. A great and almost inexcusable error for a man in his position.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 520-1

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, October 31, 1863

My time has been so occupied that I was unable to note down daily current events, which, however, have not been of special importance. It has been my practice to make a minute of transactions on the day they occurred, usually after my family had retired for the night, but for some days I have been occupied until near midnight with matters that cannot be dispensed with. I was getting materials and preparing the outlines for my Annual Report, when I received a communication from Du Pont, deliberately prepared, and with evident malicious intent, at his home “near Wilmington,” complaining of “harsh language,” “wounding words,” and “injurious imputations” in my letters and dispatches relative to his failure on the 7th of April. I am conscious of no such wrong as he attributes to me. Though grieved and disappointed in what took place, I felt no resentment, expressed none, to call out such denunciations, nor could he have had any such opinion in the day and time of those occurrences, as he would then have made his complaint. But the correspondence closed last June; he has been for months in Delaware, nursing discontent and chafing under disappointed ambition. His mind, as Drayton reports, has become morbid. He was for a time the great naval hero, but Farragut has eclipsed him. He has seen Farragut toasted and complimented, dined and extolled by our countrymen and by foreigners, until his envy and vexation could no longer be repressed. He therefore reviews the past, and, too proud to acknowledge or admit errors, faults, or infirmities, he assails me, who have been his friend, and declares he must again place on the files of the Department his indignant refutation of my charges. He specifies no charges, quotes no language, mentions no exceptional remark. I have treated him gently, for I respect his acquirements, though I dislike his intrigues. He doubtless thought I should refuse to receive and place on file his unjust complaint, and I at first hesitated whether to do so.

Du Pont has ability, pride, and intrigue, but he has not the great essentials of a naval commander, — heroic valor, unselfish energy, and devotion to the country. Thinks of himself more than of the country and the service. No more accomplished officer could command our European Squadron, but he is not made for such terrific encounters as that of Farragut at Mobile and New Orleans, and as are necessary to resist Sumter and capture Charleston. He has too much pride to be a coward, — would sooner die than show the white feather, — but the innate, fearless moral courage of Farragut or John Rodgers is not his. He feels his infirmity, and knows that I perceive it. But it is a weakness for which I did not reproach him, or use harsh language. I pitied him.

In this communication art and literary skill, on which he prides himself, are exhibited, but not true wisdom. He tries to be impudent, and, wishing to give offense, thereby lessens his dignity. Were I to return his jeremiad, it would be published, and his grief would excite sympathy. I must, therefore, in justice to myself, to him, and to truth reply. I have no doubt he has skillful advisers. H. Winter Davis, one of the most talented and ingenious men in Congress, has been his friend and adviser, and is, if I am not mistaken, his counselor now.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 476-8

Edwin M. Stanton to Charles Ellet Jr., April 27, 1862

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, D C., April 27, 1862.

CHARLES ELLET, Jr.,

Pittsburg, Pa.:

We have certain intelligence that New Orleans has been captured — there appears to be no doubt of the fact. Commodore Farragut has orders to push up immediately to Memphis, and join Commodore Foote, without waiting at New Orleans. You should lose no time in starting your fleet to the same point. Our squadron was at New Orleans two days ago, Sunday, 8 p.m.*

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

_______________

* For Ellet’s reply, see Vol. X Part II, p. 138.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 52, Part 1 (Serial No. 109), p. 243

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, September 22, 1863

But little additional intelligence from Rosecrans and the South. We have information of a failure on our part at Sabine Pass, where an attempt was made to capture formidable batteries with frail boats, the army as spectators. The expedition appears to have been badly conceived, planned, and executed. A large military force was sent to take these batteries. Neither General Halleck nor the Secretary of War consulted the Navy in this matter. General Banks appears to have originated it, and made a requisition on Commodore Bell, who readily responded, in the absence of Farragut, with light boats built for transporting passengers in Northern rivers. Admiral Farragut was at the Navy Department when dispatches were received from Commodore Bell, stating that application for cooperation and aid had been made on him, and how he had answered the call. When Farragut read the dispatch, he laid down the paper and said to me: “The expedition will be a failure. The army officers have an impression that naval vessels can do anything; this call is made for boats to accompany an army expedition; it is expected the Navy will capture the batteries, and, the army being there in force with a general in command, they will take the credit. But there will be no credit in the case, and you may expect to hear of disaster. These boats which Bell has given them cannot encounter batteries; they might cooperate with and assist the army, but that is evidently not the object. The soldiers should land and attack in the rear, and the vessels aid them in front. But that is not the army plan. The soldiers are not to land until the Navy had done an impossibility, with such boats. Therefore there will be disaster.” The news of to-day verifies his prediction. This Sabine expedition was substituted, I suppose, for that of Indianola, which I suggested, and we may now have the promised word of General Halleck. He will have heard from Banks.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 441-2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, September 21, 1863

A battle was fought on Saturday near Chattanooga and resumed yesterday. Am apprehensive our troops have suffered and perhaps are in danger. As yet the news is not sufficiently definite.

The President came to me this afternoon with the latest news. He was feeling badly. Tells me a dispatch was sent to him at the Soldiers' Home shortly after he got asleep, and so disturbed him that he had no more rest, but arose and came to the city and passed the remainder of the night awake and watchful. He has a telegram this P.M. which he brings me that is more encouraging. Our men stood well their ground and fought like Union heroes for their country and cause. We conclude the Rebels have concentrated a large force to overpower Rosecrans and recapture Chattanooga. While this has been doing, Halleek has frittered away time and dispersed our forces. Most of Grant's effective force appears to have been sent across the Mississippi, where a large force is not needed. Burnside is in northeastern Tennessee, two hundred miles away from Chattanooga. While our men are thus scattered, a large division from Lee's army in our front has been sent under Longstreet to Bragg; and Hill's and Ewell's corps, it is reported, are there also. I trust this account is exaggerated, though the President gives it credence. I do not learn, nor can I ascertain, that General Halleck was apprised of, or even suspected, what was being done; certainly he has made no preparation. The President is, I perceive, not satisfied, but yet he does not censure or complain. Better, perhaps, if he did.

I expressed surprise to the President at the management and his forbearance, and it touched him. I asked what Meadewas doing with his immense army and Lee's skeleton and depleted show in front. He said he could not learn that Meade was doing anything, or wanted to do anything. “It is,” said he, “the same old story of this Army of the Potomac. Imbecility, inefficiency — don't want to do — is defending the Capital. I inquired of Meade,” said he, “what force was in front. Meade replied he thought there were 40,000 infantry. I replied he might have said 50,000, and if Lee with 50,000 could defend their capital against our 90,000, — and if defense is all our armies are to do, — we might, I thought, detach 50,000 from his command, and thus leave him with 40,000 to defend us. Oh,” groaned the President, “it is terrible, terrible, this weakness, this indifference of our Potomac generals, with such armies of good and brave men.”

“Why,” said I, “not rid yourself of Meade, who may be a good man and a good officer but is not a great general, has not breadth or strength, certainly is not the man for the position he occupies? The escape of Lee with his army across the Potomac has distressed me almost beyond any occurrence of the War. And the impression made upon me in the personal interview shortly after was not what I wished, had inspired no confidence, though he is faithful and will obey orders; but he can't originate.”

The President assented to all I said, but “What can I do,” he asked, “with such generals as we have? Who among them is any better than Meade? To sweep away the whole of them from the chief command and substitute a new man would cause a shock, and be likely to lead to combinations and troubles greater than we now have. I see all the difficulties as you do. They oppress me.”

Alluding to the failures of the generals, particularly those who commanded the armies of the Potomac, he thought the selections, if unfortunate, were not imputable entirely to him. The Generals-in-Chief and the Secretary of War should, he said, know the men better than he. The Navy Department had given him no trouble in this respect; perhaps naval training was more uniform and equal than the military. I thought not; said we had our troubles, but they were less conspicuous. In the selection of Farragut and Porter, I thought we had been particularly fortunate; and Du Pont had merit also. He thought there had not been, take it all in all, so good an appointment in either branch of the service as Farragut, whom he did not know or recollect when I gave him command. Du Pont he classed, and has often, with McClellan, but Porter he considers a busy schemer, bold but not of high qualities as a chief. For some reason he has not so high an appreciation of Porter as I think he deserves, but no man surpasses Farragut in his estimation.

In returning to Secretary Seward a dispatch of Minister Dayton at Paris, in relation to the predatory Rebel Florida, asking one or more fast steamers to intercept that vessel, which is now at Brest, I took a different view from the two gentlemen. To blockade Brest would require not less than five vessels. If we could spare five such vessels, whence would they get supply of fuel, etc.? England and France allow only sufficient to take the vessel home; and for three months thereafter our vessels receiving supplies are excluded from their ports. As England and France have recognized the Rebels, who have no commerce, no navy, no nationality, as the equals of the United States, with whom they have treaties, and, professedly, amicable relations, I deem it best under the circumstances to abstain from proceedings which would be likely to complicate and embroil us, and would leave those countries to develop the policy which shall govern themselves and nations in the future. They must abide the consequences.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 438-41

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, September 12, 1863

Exceedingly busy in bringing up and disposing of matters which accumulated during my absence. Admiral Farragut and a few friends to dine with me. The more I see and know of Farragut, the better I like him. He has the qualities I supposed when he was selected. The ardor and sincerity which struck me during the Mexican War when he wished to take Vera Cruz, with the unassuming and the unpresuming gentleness of a true hero.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 431

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, September 11, 1863

I left Washington on the 31st ult. on an official visit to the several navy yards. Have a good report of affairs during my absence. Met the members of the Cabinet with the exception of Stanton at the regular meeting. All glad to see me, — none more so than the President, who cordially and earnestly greeted me. I have been less absent than any other member and was therefore perhaps more missed. Had a call from Admiral Farragut of a most cheerful and friendly character. Also from Commodore Pennock from Cairo.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 431

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, August 11, 1863

Admiral Farragut has arrived in New York and telegraphs me he will report in person when I direct. I congratulated him on his safe return but advised repose with his family and friends during this heated term and to report when it should suit his convenience.

At the Cabinet council the President read another letter from Governor Seymour. I have little respect for him. It may be politic for the President to treat him with respect in consequence of his position.

The draft makes an inroad on the clerical force of the Departments and on the experts in the public service. The law authorizing the draft is crude, and loose, and wrong in many respects; was never matter of Cabinet consultation, but was got up in the War Department in consultation with the Military Committees, or Wilson, and submitted to no one of the Secretaries, who all, except Stanton, were ignorant of its extraordinary provisions. Some sixty men, many of them experts whose places can hardly be supplied, are drafted as common soldiers from the ordnance works. I have striven to get some action in regard to these men, whose services are indispensable for military purposes, whose labors are of ten times the importance to the government and country in their present employment that they would be were they bearing arms in camp, but as yet without success. I proposed to Chase, who is much annoyed and vexed with the operation of the law in his Department, that we should have the subject considered in the Cabinet to-day; but he declined, said he had no favors to ask of the War Department and nothing to do with it. If the law and that Department in its construction of the law would take the clerks from the Treasury desks, so as to interrupt its business and destroy their capacity, he should be relieved and glad of it. He was bitter toward the War Department, which he has heretofore assiduously courted.

I brought up the subject, but Chase had left. Stanton said he had not yet decided what rule would govern him, but promised he would do as well by the employees of the Navy as of the War Department. He thought, however, he should exact the $200, a substitute, or the military service in all cases, when the conscript was not relieved by physical disabilities. All present acquiesced in this view, Chase being absent, but Attorney-General Bates, who agreed with me.

A singular telegram from General Halleck to his partner in California in relation to the Almaden mines (quicksilver) was brought forward by Mr. Bates and Mr. Usher. In the opinion of these gentlemen it did not exhibit a pure mind, right intentions, or high integrity on the part of the General-in-Chief. The President, who had been apprised of the facts, thought Halleck had been hasty and indiscreet but he hoped nothing worse. Stanton said, with some asperity and emphasis, that the press and distinguished men had abused him on these matters, — had lied about him and knew they were lies. He turned away from Blair as he poured out these denunciations, yet there was no mistaking for whom these invectives were intended.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 396-8

Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, June 9, 1863

Navy Department,

9 June, 1863.

Sir,

In acknowledging the receipt of the copy of despatch No. 51, from the Vice Consul at Havana, transmitted to me with your letter of the 6th inst., I have the honor to state that the suggestions therein contained are worthy of consideration. It is, in every point of view, important that early and effective measures should be taken, not only to interdict the traffic carried on with the rebels on the Rio Grande, but to afford protection to loyal citizens in Western Texas. I shall send a copy of the Vice Consul's despatch to Rear Admiral Farragut and direct his attention to the subject; but without a military occupation of Brownsville, I apprehend the naval force alone will be insufficient to either blockade, or protect our interests in that quarter. The navigation of the Rio Grande must be left unobstructed and until the left bank of the river shall be occupied by our troops, a large portion of the cargoes that are formally cleared for Matamoras have a contingent destination for Texas. Most of the shipments to Matamoras will, until such occupancy, pass into the rebel region. The subject is one demanding the attention of the Government at the earliest available moment.

I am, respectfully,

Your Obd't Serv't

Gideon Welles,

Secty. of Navy.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward,

Secty. of State.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 387-8

1st Lieutenant Charles Wright Wills: May 19, 1862

Near Corinth, Miss., May 19 ,1862.

Our regiment now is acting as a kind of rear guard for Pope's division. The enemy's cavalry in bodies of from 1,000 down have been running around our left flank and threatening to interfere with our trains. Every day we send out six companies to patrol between here and the river and forward. Yesterday (Sunday) I was out. We went to Red Sulphur Springs, one of the most romantic, beautiful places I have ever seen. There are about 40 double cottages for families, and stables, kennels and quarters for the servants, hounds and horses. The buildings are in good repair, though the place has not been frequented much for the last three or four years. White Sulphur Springs are four miles from the Red and more fashionable. I am going there to-morrow. There were about a dozen real ladies at the springs yesterday, and they were quite sociable and so interesting that I could not help staying an hour after the column left We were the first of our soldiers that the party had seen and they were much surprised that our boys behaved so well. None of them had ever been North, and they occupied about all the time I was with them in asking questions, principally though, about the conduct of our army. About a mile before we got to the springs we passed a house where there were as many as six young ladies in full dress. The major sent me to make some inquiries of the man of the house, and I noticed the party were in something of a flurry but ascribed it to the presence of our men. Of course Sunday was an excuse for the finery and there being so many together. After we had advanced a little way one of our captains took a squad, went ahead and passed himself for a Rebel officer just from Corinth. By his figuring he found out that at this house I have spoken of they were expecting some Rebel officers and men, 14 in all, from Corinth to dinner and a visit. We set a trap for them, but they heard of us through the citizens and sloped. They came within a mile of us and then their tracks showed they had gone off through the woods and a swamp on a run. We got one of their horses, a beauty, fully equipped. It being a hot day the owner had strapped his coat on his valise and not having time to take it off we got it. A dozen of our boys went back and ate the dinner, but without the company of the ladies who had flown. Our line has now closed to within two and one-half miles around the north and east sides of Corinth. Our men have thrown up breastworks within that distance along nearly the whole line. The cannons play on each other occasionally, say as an average four times a day, a half hour each time. Our line is, I think, nine or ten miles long; am not sure. The Rebels are suffering for rations, not more than half rations having been served for the last ten days. Hundreds are deserting from them. One battalion that was raised in this county, over 500 men, have all deserted but about 90. The commander himself ran off. Of a 100 men that deserted from them probably five come within our lines. The rest all go to their homes. If Porter takes Mobile, and Farragut and Davis get Memphis, I think in ten days afterward there will not be enough Rebels left in Corinth to oppose our regiment. There is no doubt that they have more men now than we have but they lack discipline. Success at the points above named will leave them without any railroad communication whatever or telegraph either. I'm afraid that our gunboats got the worst of that little affair at Pillow the other day. An army is the slowest moving animal. Here we've been over a month making 20 miles. I think I shall run off to McClernand's division this p. m. and see some of the 17th and 8th boys.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 90-1

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 6, 1863

There was a special Cabinet-meeting at 9 A.M. on the subject of A. H. Stephens's mission. Seward came prepared with a brief telegram, which the President had advised, to the effect that Stephens's request to come to W. was inadmissible, but any military communication should be made through the prescribed military channel. A copy of this answer was to be sent to the military officer in command at Fortress Monroe by the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy was to send a copy to Admiral Lee. The President directed Mr. Seward to go to the telegraph office and see that they were correctly transmitted. All this was plainly prearranged by Seward, who has twice changed his ground, differing with the President when Chase and Stanton differed, but he is finally commissioned to carry out the little details which could be done by an errand boy or clerk.

The army news continues to be favorable. Lee is on the retreat, and Meade in hot pursuit, each striving to get possession of the passes of the Potomac.

A note from Wilkes stating he had reached home, and would have reported in person but had received an injury. A letter is published in one of the papers, purporting to be from him at Havana, written by himself or at his instigation, expressing a hope that Lardner, his successor, will be furnished with men and more efficient vessels. I hope so too. Wilkes has not had so large a force as I wished; he could not under any circumstances have had so large a squadron as he desired. To say nothing of the extensive blockade, Farragut's detention through the winter and spring before Vicksburg was unexpected, and the operations before Charleston have been long and protracted.

The papers this evening bring us the speeches of the two Seymours, Horatio and Thomas Henry, on the Fourth at New York. A couple of partisan patriots, neither of whom is elated by Meade's success, and whose regrets are over Rebel reverses.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 362-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, May 27, 1863

No decisive news from Vicksburg. The public mind is uneasy at the delay, yet I am glad to see blame attaches to no one because the place was not taken at once. There have been strange evidences of an unreasonable people on many occasions during the War. Had Halleck shown half the earnestness and ability of Farragut, we should have had Vicksburg in our possession a year ago.

Admiral Foote handed me a letter from Thomas Turner, in command of the Ironsides off Charleston. Turner anticipates the withdrawal of Du Pont from the command, and thinks Foote or Dahlgren will succeed him. Is willing to continue under Foote, but not under D., who is his junior and has been promoted for his scientific attainments, and not for nautical experience or ability. These views are natural and proper enough to an old naval and social companion. But he proceeds to comment on the ironclads; speaks of the “miserable monitors,” though he admits they are admirably adapted for harbor defense; is astonished the Department should build so many; says it is to fill the pockets of the speculators. These are Du Pont's tactics. If true, the Secretary is a knave, or a blockhead the tool of knaves, and so of others connected with the Department. But the fact is, Tom Turner is a simple dupe, and merely echoes the insinuations of another, who moulds him at pleasure and is demoralizing that entire command.

Had some talk with Admiral Foote respecting Charleston. He believes the place may be taken, but does not express himself with confidence. Has great respect for Du Pont, who, I fear, will exercise a bad influence upon him, should he be given the command. Admiral Gregory is too old and has some ailments. I have great faith in the old man, but the country would not forgive me the experiment, were he selected and to fail. There would be bitter opposition to Dahlgren from some good officers as well as the Tom Turners, were he given the squadron. Could he and Foote act together, it would be the best arrangement I could make.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 314-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, May 25, 1863

Received a long dispatch from Admiral Porter at Haines Bluff, Yazoo River, giving details of successful fights and operations for several preceding days in that vicinity.

Am anxious in relation to the South Atlantic Squadron and feel daily the necessity of selecting a new commander. Du Pont is determined Charleston shall not be captured by the Navy, and that the Navy shall not attempt it; thinks it dangerous for the vessels to remain in Charleston Harbor, and prefers to occupy his palace ship, the Wabash, at Port Royal to roughing it in a smaller vessel off the port. His prize money would doubtless be greater without any risk. All officers under him are becoming affected by his feelings, adopt his tone, think inactivity best, — that the ironclads are mere batteries, not naval vessels, and that outside blockade is the true and only policy. Du Pont feels that he is strong in the Navy, strong in Congress, and strong in the country, and not without reason. There is not a more accomplished or shrewder gentleman in the service. Since Barron and others left, no officer has gathered a formidable clique in the Navy. He has studied with some effect to create one for himself, and has in his personal interest a number of excellent officers who I had hoped would not be inveigled. Good officers have warned me against him as a shrewd intriguer, but I have hoped to get along with him, for I valued his general intelligence, critical abilities, and advice. But I perceive that in all things he never forgets Du Pont. His success at Port Royal has made him feel that he is indispensable to the service. The modern changes in naval warfare and in naval vessels are repugnant to him; and to the turret vessels he has a declared aversion. He has been active in schemes to retire officers; he is now at work to retire ironclads and impair confidence in them. As yet he professes respect and high regard for me personally, but he is not an admirer of the President, and has got greatly out with Fox, who has been his too partial friend. An attack is, however, to be made on the Department by opposing its policy and condemning its vessels. This will raise a party to attack and a party to defend. The monitors are to be pronounced failures, and the Department, which introduced, adopted, and patronized them, is to be held responsible, and not Du Pont, for the abortive attempt to reach Charleston. Drayton, who is his best friend, says to me in confidence that Du Pont has been too long confined on shipboard, that his system, mentally and physically, is affected, and I have no doubt thinks, but does not say, he ought to be relieved for his own good as well as that of the service. Du Pont is proud and will not willingly relinquish his command, although he has in a half-defiant way said if his course was not approved I must find another.

I look upon it, however, as a fixed fact that he will leave that squadron, but he is a favorite and I am at a loss as to his successor. Farragut, if not employed elsewhere, would be the man, and the country would accept the change with favor. The age and standing of D. D. Porter would be deemed objectionable by many, yet he has some good points for that duty. Foote would be a good man for the place in many respects, but he is somewhat overshadowed by Du Pont, with whom he has been associated and to whom he greatly defers. Dahlgren earnestly wants the position, and is the choice of the President, but there would be general discontent were he selected. Older officers who have had vastly greater sea service would feel aggrieved at the selection of Dahlgren and find ready sympathizers among the juniors. I have thought of Admiral Gregory, whom I was originally inclined to designate as commander of the Gulf Blockading Squadron at the beginning of the war, but was overpersuaded by Paulding to take Mervine. A mistake but a lesson. It taught me not to yield my deliberate convictions in appointments and matters of this kind to the mere advice and opinion of another without a reason. Both Fox and Foote indorse Gregory. His age is against him for such active service, and would give the partisans of Du Pont opportunity to cavil.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 311-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 17, 1863

No reports from Charleston. Am in hopes that side issues and by-play on the Mississippi are about over and that there will be some concentrated action. Porter should go below Vicksburg and not remain above, thereby detaining Farragut, who is below, from great and responsible duties at New Orleans and on the Gulf. The weak and sensitive feeling of being outranked and made subordinate in command should never influence an officer in such an emergency. Porter has great vanity and great jealousy but knows his duty, and I am surprised he does not perform it. Wrote him a fortnight since a letter which he cannot misunderstand, and which will not, I hope, wound his pride.

But little was before the Cabinet, which of late can hardly be called a council. Each Department conducts and manages its own affairs, informing the President to the extent it pleases. Seward encourages this state of things. He has less active duties than others, and watches and waits on the President daily, and gathers from him the doings of his associates and often influences indirectly and not always advantageously their measures and movements, while he communicates very little, especially of that which he does not wish them to know.

Blair walked over with me from the White House to the Navy Department, and I showed him the correspondence which had taken place respecting captured mails. Understanding Seward thoroughly, as he does, he detected the sly management by which Seward first got himself in difficulty and is now striving to get out of it. My course he pronounced correct, and he declared that the President must not be entrapped into any false step to extricate Seward, who, he says, is the least of a statesman and knows less of public law and of administrative duties than any man who ever held a seat in the Cabinet. This is a strong statement, but not so overstated as would be generally supposed. I have been surprised to find him so unpractical, so erratic, so little acquainted with the books, — he has told me more than once that he never opened them, that he was too old to study. He has, with all his bustle and activity, but little application; relies on Hunter and his clerk, Smith, perhaps Gushing also, to sustain him and hunt up his authorities; commits himself, as in the case of the mails, without knowing what he is about.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 274-5