Edited by Steven E. Woodworth
and Charles D. Grear
Prologue:
During the Civil War
one of the first objectives in Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan” was control of
the Mississippi River. Confederate
control of the Mississippi River made shipping the crops of Midwestern farmer’s
to eastern markets more difficult and more expensive. If the Federal Government could gain control
of the River it would not only give farmers easier access to the markets by
making shipping cheaper, but it would also sever the Confederacy in two.
Starting on the last
day of February 1862, Union forces slowly made their way down the river, with
the capture of Island No. 10 on April 8th and Memphis, Tennessee surrendered to
Union forces on June 6, 1862. At the same time Union forces worked their way up
the river from the Gulf of Mexico. New
Orleans on surrendered to Union forces April 28th. At the end of 1862 much of the Mississippi River was under the
control of the Union. Only two strong holdouts remained in Confederate hands,
Port Hudson, Louisiana and Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Holding the
Mississippi river between Vicksburg and Port Hudson was a military necessity
for the Confederate government. It was the linchpin that held the two halves of
the Confederacy together. Vicksburg, on
high bluffs on the eastern bank of the river was the citadel that guarded
against a Yankee invasion from the river.
Major-General
Ulysses S. Grant of the Union Army of the Tennessee, after his victories of Forts
Henry & Donelson, Shiloh and Corinth set his sites on breaking the
Confederate stronghold, Vicksburg, Mississippi. Grant assigned his friend
Major-General William T. Sherman to work finding a route of attack from the
Mississippi River north of Vicksburg. In late December 1862 Sherman probed
Chickasaw Bayou but failed to defeat the Confederate forces there.
During the first
quarter of 1863 Grant continued to explore the option of a northern approach to
Vicksburg and an alternate route on the western side of the Mississippi River
to bypass the city’s strong
fortifications high up on the bluffs on the eastern side of the river. During the same period the Yazoo
Pass Expedition led by Brigadier-General Leonard F. Ross & Lieutenant
Commander Watson Smith continued to probe the probed Yazoo Pass from the north
but was repulsed by Confederate forces lead by Major-General William W. Loring at Fort Pemberton.
The Williams Canal
across De Soto Peninsula on the western side of the river offered a possibility
for Grant to bypass the Confederate guns and pass ships around Vicksburg to
approach the city from the south. In January 1863 Sherman’s men resumed digging
on the trench which was previously abandoned by Admiral Farragut and General
Williams the previous July. By late March work on the canal had to be abandoned
after the dam at the head of the canal burst and flooded the project.
Grant concurrently
ordered the Brigadier-General James B. McPherson to dig another canal from the
Mississippi River to Lake Providence north of the city which would allow
passage to the Red River and allow Grant’s forces to bypass the Vicksburg
defenses and join with Banks at Port Hudson.
Grant had run out of
options to reach Vicksburg from the North.
This is all prologue to Southern Illinois University Press’ “The
Vicksburg Campaign: March 29—May 18, 1863,” edited by Steven E Woodworth and
Charles D. Grear.
The Review:
“The Vicksburg
Campaign,” the first of five projected volumes, starts with a brief seven page
introduction before diving into second phase of a multifaceted campaign to
capture the “Gibraltar of the South.”
Garry D. Joyner’s
essay “Running the Gauntlet,” explores the effectiveness of using a combined army
and navy force in the campaign. And detailing how Grant worked closely with
acting Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter on a “Hail Mary” attempt to run ships of
the “Brown Water Navy” down the Mississippi River and passed the Confederate
forces watching from above on the Vicksburg Bluffs on the eastern banks of the
river. Meanwhile Grant marched his troops south on the western side of the
river to meet up with the ships that passed by the gauntlet of Vicksburg guns. Joyner also chronicles Porter’s attack of the
Brown Water Navy on Confederate forces at Grand Gulf and the crossing of Grant’s
troops to the east bank of the river.
“Through the Heart
of Rebel Country,” by Charles D. Grear, is the second essay in the book and
highlights the contribution of Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson and his men’s diversionary
raid through middle Mississippi form the Grand Junction to Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
The third essay, “In
the Enemy’s Country,” penned by Jason M. Frawley, covers the battle of Port
Gibson which he names “the turning point of the Vicksburg Campaign.”
J. Parker Hills’
essay “Roads to Raymond,” covers the northeastern trajectory of Grant’s
Vicksburg Campaign and the Battle of Raymond.
In the fifth essay, “The
First Capture and Occupation of Jackson,” by Stephen E. Woodworth highlights
the Battle of Jackson & Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s evacuation
of the city, and the destruction of the railroads in and out of the city.
John R. Lundberg follows
that up with an essay entitled “I am too Late,” discussing Johnston’s
lackluster performance during Grant’s campaign.
“Grant, McClernand and
Vicksburg” by Michael B. Ballard covers the tempestuous relationship between
Grant and Major-General John A. McClernand and the events that lead up to
McClernand’s dismissal.
William B. Feis’
essay “Developed by Circumstances,” illuminates Grant’s use of Brigadier-General
Grenville M. Dodge’s developing intelligence network during the Vicksburg
Campaign.
The ninth essay in
the book, penned by Timothy B. Smith, is “A Victory Could Hardly Have Been More
Complete,” examines the Battle of Big Black River Bridge.
“The ‘Stealing Tour,’”
by Steven Nathaniel Dossman, discusses the not always chivalrous interactions
between the soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee and the Mississippi civilians
with which they came in contact.
In the final essay
of the book, “Politics, Policy and General Grant,” Paul L. Schmeltzer discusses
Grant’s war strategy and tactics in comparison with those of Prussian general Carl
von Clausewitz. Clausewitz was the
author of “On War,” an unfinished work edited and published by his wife in
1832. Originally published in German “On War” was largely unknown in the United
States during Grant’s time, and did not become widely available until its first
English translation in 1873. Though unfamiliar with Clausewitz, Schmeltzer states
Grant’s approach to the problem of Vicksburg was “intuitional and largely an
outgrowth of his common sense.”
I highly recommend “The
Vicksburg Campaign: March 29–May 18, 1863” as book for both those unfamiliar
with Grant’s campaign and those well read students of the campaign and the war
itself. Each essay is well written on
its own merit and could stand alone without the others in the volume, but arranged
together they present a multifaceted look at the most complicated campaigns of
the Civil War.
ISBN 978-0809332694,
Southern Illinois University Press, © 2013, Hardcover, 272 Pages, Photographs,
Maps, Chapter End Notes & Index. $32.50. To Purchase the book
click HERE.
