Received dispatches to-day from Admiral Farragut confirming
intelligence received several days since through Rebel sources. The official
account confirms my own previous impressions in regard to operations. Secretary
Stanton in one of his bulletins represented that Fort Gaines had surrendered to
General Granger and the army. It is shown that the proposition of Colonel
Anderson, who commanded the fort, was to surrender to the fleet after the
monitors had made an assault, that Admiral Farragut consulted with General
Granger, that the terms were dictated from the squadron, that Colonel Anderson
and Major Brown went on board the Admiral's vessel when the arrangement was
consummated, etc.
Why should the Secretary of War try to deprive an officer
like Farragut and the naval force of what is honestly their due? It is only one
of many like occurrences during the War. I do not recollect a single instance
of generous award to the Navy by Stanton or Halleck. Some will doubtless get in
error by it, but I think the country mainly rightly appreciates it, and history
may put all right. Not the history of this day and period; a generation at
least must pass away before the errors, prejudices, and perversion of partisans
will be dissipated, and the true facts be developed. I have had but brief
opportunities to look into the so-called histories of the great events now
passing, but the cursory examination which I have given let me see mountains of
error, and much of it, I am sorry to say, was not unintentional on the part of
the writers. Facts were made or worked to suit the partialities or prejudices
of the person who professed to record them. Many in this day who read and hear
of the capture of New Orleans believe it was taken by General Butler and the
army, who were a hundred miles distant when the city surrendered, and it is
obviously the purpose of the Secretary of War to so spread such an impression
in regard to the capture of Fort Gaines, so that the Navy shall not have the
credit.
It does not surprise nor grieve me that another and
different class — the intense partisan - should wholly ignore the Navy
Department in all naval victories. No word of credit is awarded us by them for
the late achievement, yet I know the people are not wholly ignorant on the
subject. Some of the more thoughtful will appreciate the labor and
responsibility devolving on those who prepared the work, and furnished the means for the work in hand. Some
credit is due for the selection of Farragut in the first instance. Mervine had
been first assigned to command the blockade in the Gulf. I found when
organizing the squadron at the commencement of the Rebellion that there was
pressure and claim of usage for the senior officers. Many who were counted best
had seceded and proved traitors. My thoughts turned to Gregory for that
command, but Paulding, who was then the detailing officer, persuaded me to take
Mervine. It was a mistake. Gregory is infinitely the better man. A few months
satisfied me that Mervine, a worthy man doubtless, was good for nothing as an
officer for such duties as the times required, and he was detached. He and his
friends were greatly miffed and wanted a court of inquiry. Anxious to secure an
efficient man for his successor, I consulted many and scrutinized carefully.
The choice was eventually narrowed down to two, McKean and C. H. Bell. Foote,
whom I consulted with others, after much hesitation inclined me to McKean, of
whom I thought well from his promptness and patriotism immediately on his
return from Japan in the Niagara. He was certainly an improvement on Mervine,
but yet not the man, I was soon convinced, partly from ill health, — for the
work that was wanted.
When the expedition to New Orleans was determined upon, the
question as to who should have command of the naval forces became a subject of
grave and paramount importance. I had heard that Farragut resided in Norfolk at
the beginning of the troubles, but that he abandoned the place when Virginia
seceded and had taken up his residence in the city of New York. The fact
interested me. I had known something of him in Polk's administration, and his
early connection with Commodore Porter was in his favor. All that I heard of
him was to his credit as a capable, energetic, and determined officer, of
undoubted loyalty. Admirals Joe Smith and Shubrick spoke well of him. The
present Admiral D. D. Porter, who, with others, was consulted, expressed
confidence in him, and as Porter himself was to take a conspicuous part in the
expedition, it had an important influence. But among naval officers there was
not a united opinion. Most of them, I think, while speaking well of Farragut,
doubted if he was equal to the position, certainly not so well appointed a man
as others, - but yet no one would name the man for a great and active campaign
against Mobile or some other point. They knew not of New Orleans. After the
question was decided, and, I believe, after Fox and D.D. Porter both wrote
Farragut unofficially of his probable selection to command the new Gulf
Squadron, I was cautioned in regard to the step I was taking. Senator Hale,
when he learned the fact, asked me if I was certain of my man, — Southern born,
a Southern resident, with a Southern wife, etc. Several Members of Congress
questioned me closely; few knew Farragut, who had not then carved out a great
name, and there was, I became conscious, a general impression or doubt whether
I had not made a mistake. I will not follow the subject here. His works speak
for themselves, and I am satisfied the selection was a proper one, probably the
very best that could be made.
At that time Du Pont was in favor, almost a favorite. He had
sought to be, or his friends had sought to have him, transferred to Washington
to take the place of Paulding. Seward proposed it, and thought Paulding might
be otherwise provided for, suggesting the navy yard at Philadelphia or
Brooklyn, or a squadron. I did not assent to the arrangement, and the President,
who saw I had some feeling on the subject, concurred with me emphatically.
Seward said the subject had been brought to him by Winter Davis, — in other
words, Du Pont.
I did not then, as I do now, know thoroughly either Davis or
Du Pont. It was a skillful intrigue, yet it did not succeed. But the blockade,
requiring a close and minute hydrographical knowledge of the coast, brought me
in contact with Mr. Bache of the Coast Survey. Mr. Bache sought to make our
acquaintance personal and intimate, and but for my unremitting and ceaseless
devotion to pressing current duties I should have fully responded. But I had
not time. I think he saw and appreciated it, and he intimated, not exactly
proposed, a board to take up the subject of our Southern coast, its channels,
approaches, inlets, and defenses in detail, and report to me. It struck me
favorably, and Du Pont was put upon that board with him, was brought to
Washington, and commenced forming a clique while reporting on the surveys of the
coast. He moved with great skill, and I, being unsuspicious, was, I can
perceive, to some extent deceived. But I think the ill success of the intrigue
of H. Winter Davis and himself through Seward led Du Pont to the conclusion
that he would not be likely to make head against me during this administration.
He therefore changed his tactics, became greatly friendly and profoundly
respectful, designing, if he could, to use me. To some extent he did so. Old
Admiral Shubrick was his relative and patron. Mr. Fox was devoted to him, and I
listened much to Fox as well as to Shubrick. Admiral Paulding, then here, was
kindly disposed, as detailing officer, to second Du Pont, and Admiral Davis was
his shadow. Of course with such surroundings, and with Du Pont himself, who
became friendly, I think truly friendly, and almost deferential, I yielded much
to his wishes and recommendations. It was early arranged that he should have a
squadron to effect a lodgment at some port on the South Atlantic. Fernandina
was much thought of, but Port Royal and Bull's Bay were mentioned. A division
of the Atlantic Squadron, then commanded by Admiral Stringham, became
indispensable, and Stringham himself, having taken offense, unwisely, at some
order issued in my absence, proposed to resign just as the subject of dividing
the squadron was taken up, which made the way clear for Du Pont. He took the
Navy Register and made to a great extent his selection of officers. It was a Du
Pont squadron emphatically. Poor Mercer, who had been his devoted friend, was
detached from the Wabash, which was made Du Pont's flag-ship, and died of a
broken heart. But neither Farragut nor David D. Porter were within the charmed
circle. Du Pont had some jealousy, I saw, of Porter, but none of Farragut. I do
not remember to have ever heard a complimentary remark of F. from Du Pont, but
he evidently considered him a fair fighting officer, of ordinary standing, -
not one of the élite, not of the Du Pont Navy. Of Porter he entertained a
higher opinion, but he was no favorite, and, without any charge against him, I
was given to understand that he was a troublesome fellow. . . .
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the
Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866,
p. 114-9
