An intense and anxious feeling on all hands respecting
Charleston. Went early to the Department. About 11 A.M. a dispatch from the
Navy Yard that the Flambeau had not arrived. The President and Stanton came in
a little after noon and waited half an hour, but it was then reported the
Flambeau was not yet in sight. I came home much dejected. Between 2 and 3 P.M. Commander
Rhind of the Keokuk, Upshur, and Lieutenant Forrest called at my house with
dispatches from Du Pont. They were not very full or satisfactory, — contained
no details. He has no idea of taking Charleston by the Navy. In this I am not
disappointed. He has been coming to that conclusion for months, though he has
not said so. The result of this demonstration, though not a success, is not
conclusive. The monitor vessels have proved their resisting power, and, but for
the submarine obstructions, would have passed the forts and gone to the wharves
of Charleston. This in itself is a great achievement.
Went to the Executive Mansion. Read the dispatches to and
had full conversation with the President. Sumner came in and participated.
Rhind, an impulsive but brave and rash man, has lost all
confidence in armored vessels. When he took command of the Keokuk his
confidence was unbounded. His repulse and the loss of his vessel have entirely
changed his views. It was, I apprehend, because of this change and his new
appointment to armored vessels that he was sent forward with dispatches. He
has, I see, been tutored. Thinks wooden vessels with great speed would do as
well as ironclads. I agreed that speed was valuable, but the monitors were
formidable. In this great fight the accounts speak of but a single man killed
and some ten or twelve wounded. What wooden or unarmored vessels could have
come out of such a fight with so few disasters. No serious injury happened to
the flagship, the Ironsides, which, from some accident, did not get into the
fight. We had expected Du Pont and the ironclads would pass Sumter and the
forts and receive their fire, but not stop to encounter them.
Du Pont has been allowed to decide for himself in regard to
proceedings, has selected, and had, the best officers and vessels in the
service, and his force is in every respect picked and chosen. Perhaps I have
erred in not giving him orders. Possibly the fact that he was assured all was
confided to him depressed and oppressed him with the responsibility, and has prevented
him from telling me freely and without reserve his doubts, apprehensions. I
have for some time felt that he wanted the confidence that is essential to
success. His constant call for more ironclads — for aid — has been a trial. He
has been long, very long, getting ready, and finally seems to have come to a
standstill, so far as I can learn from Rhind, who is, if not stampeded,
disgusted, demoralized, and wholly upset. It is not fear, for he has courage, —
to daring, to rashness, — and his zeal, temperament, and ardor are by nature
enthusiastic. But these qualities are gone. Why Du Pont should have sent him
home to howl, or with a howl, I do not exactly understand. If it was to
strengthen faith in himself and impair faith in the monitors the selection was
well made. Rhind had too much confidence in his vessel before entering the
harbor, and has too little in any vessel now.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30,
1864, p. 267-9
