Senator Grimes, after an interview this A.M. on naval
matters, got on to the subject of our public affairs generally, and
particularly the differences between the President and the party in Congress.
He disclaims Stevens and Sumner, and spoke of each in severe and denunciatory
terms, the former as a pretty unscrupulous old fellow, unfit to lead any party,
Sumner as a cold-blooded, selfish, dangerous man. When I spoke of him as honest
but theoretical and yet, I believe, truthful, Grimes was disinclined to award
him these traits, and I perceive has a strong prejudice—perhaps I should better
define it by saying hate of the Massachusetts Senator, who, though a student
learned in books, Grimes asserts is not a statesman or wise legislator.
With very respectable talents, Grimes is of a suspicious and
somewhat jealous nature, inclining to be misanthropic. He must be classed as of
the Radical school, but recognizes no Radical leader, has no respect for them;
abhors Stevens as a debauchee in morals and politics. He is intimate with
Fessenden, who is dyspeptic and has similar traits, and the two hunt in
couples. They were both former admirers of Seward, but now and for some time
past they dislike him, think his influence on Johnson pernicious.
When I saw during the fall that the extremists were gathering
up their strength against the President, it was a question with me how these
two Senators would go. Their natural tendency would, I knew, incline them to
the opposition. They are both intense on the negro. But neither of them liked
Sumner or Stevens, who were in the extreme advance. The President was
originally of a different school of politics, and there is not, therefore, that
intimacy between them which begets zeal, but during the War they have been
bound by a common interest. They had no personal opposition to the President
and, I think, no feeling against him except that which minds like theirs would
have against the elevation above them of an old associate Senator whom they had
regarded as an equal rather than a superior. Though differing with him in
fundamental principles of our government, they respected his honesty.
Grimes says he came here at the commencement of the present
session kindly disposed to the President and not very hostile to his policy.
But he soon found that certain obnoxious Democrats had free access to the White
House, and that pardoned Rebels hung around there. He was not satisfied with
this state of things, and spoke of it, and was asked why he and others remained
away. Soon after he was invited to breakfast with the President, and spent two
hours with him discussing all subjects in full and most satisfactorily.
Allusion was made to Fessenden, and he expressed a wish that the two should
come together and interchange opinions. The President requested him to speak to
Fessenden and invite an interview. As the next day was Sunday, Grimes inquired
if it would be agreeable for the President to see him on the Sabbath. The
President assented, and F. spent several hours most satisfactorily at the White
House and went over general measures now prominent.
On the following day appeared the celebrated letter of
"a conversation of the President with a distinguished Senator."
Grimes says on reading it he asked Fessenden if that was his conversation. F.
after reading the letter said he had had no such conversation, and they soon
ascertained that Dixon was the Senator. The two, finding that they were not the
only confidants of the President, thereupon left him, and allied themselves to
the Radicals. They had ascertained that the President conversed freely with
others, was not likely to commit himself to their keeping exclusively, and
therefore should have their opposition or at all events could not rely on their
support.
I inquired of Grimes what there was offensive in the letter,
or the President's policy, or wherein he was inconsistent; said that doubtless
many, who, like him and Fessenden, had peculiar views of their own, had called
on the President and he had frankly conversed with each of them, notwithstanding
their different shades of opinion, and each, perhaps, had construed the
friendly courtesy and kindly greeting as favoring his tenet, while the aim had
been to commit himself to none, but to be friendly and conciliatory with all.
I asked Grimes where all this was to end; what we were to
expect when Members of Congress made it a point to disagree, organized a joint
committee of the two houses to get round constitutional difficulty, which
committee was to establish a policy for Congress and the country, arrogated to
itself and stimulated Congress to arrogate or usurp executive powers, were
passing declaratory resolutions which had no force, but were designed to
irritate and be offensive, with other extraordinary proceedings. I told him the
country had a present and a future before it, and its fate was to some extent
in the hands of men in responsible positions and for which they were
accountable. The country, I said, appeared to me to be in peril; that we must
either reunite or diverge still farther soon. We cannot remain inactive, must
either advance or recede.
I could perceive he was disturbed, but soon remarked that
the Southern people were a damned set of traitors, as bad now as at any time
during the Rebellion, and he had no confidence in them.
I admitted they were bad, malignant, foolish to a great
extent, but asked when they would be better, and if no better, were we to be
forever a disunited country. Their indebtedness in various forms under their
sham organization could not be less than twenty-five hundred millions; the
property in slaves which was extinguished by emancipation could not be less
than twenty-five hundred millions more; other individual losses were immense.
To all this they were compelled to submit, and besides this they were to pay
their proportion of our debt incurred in whipping them. Now was it strange that
they were sore and complaining, and were we doing right in excluding them from
all participation in the government, to which they were entitled under the
Constitution? We must adopt conciliatory measures or national calamities would
soon be upon us, and we ought not to shut our eyes to the facts.
He admitted something must be done, but said that he had
confidence that all would come right. He guessed we were nearer now than some
apprehended. This he said with a smile and manner that impressed me as coming
from one who thinks he and his associates have the reins in their hands and
intend to guide the government car safely. But the subject should not be
trifled with.
McCulloch inquired of Stanton if he had reached a solution
of the difficulty in regard to the oath. Stanton replied that he had given it
considerable thought and come to the conclusion that it would be best for
McCulloch to prepare a letter setting forth the difficulties of the case. This
letter, I remarked, had better be addressed to the President. Stanton did not
respond favorably to this suggestion. He thought it would do as well to send it
to one of the committee. This was also Harlan's view. Dennison took very
decided ground with me.
The rumors that the Fenians had seized Navy Island and that
ten thousand volunteers had been called out by the Canadian authorities were
current this morning. Seward was unwell and not at the Cabinet-meeting. The
British and Canadian Governments were each much excited. The last arrival
brings information that the habeas corpus is suspended in Ireland and the
propriety of some governmental action here was discussed.
Stanton thought a proclamation should be issued and decisive
measures taken, as was done by Van Buren in his day. Regretted Seward was not
present, for we knew not what appeals had been made by the British Government.
The propriety of taking some action was generally concurred in, and Stanton
rather pressed it. I proposed that General Grant should be consulted, sent to
the frontiers, and perhaps it would be well to address a communication on the
subject which would form the basis of government action. Stanton could see no
necessity for bringing Grant out; a proclamation from the President to put down
these Fenian organizations was what was required. I assented, but stated that
the occasion and condition of the country and of our public affairs were such
that I thought it would be wise to have the public authorities fully heard, and
all of them. The Irish element, I stated, was a strong one and clannish, and if
a movement against an organization of theirs was to be made, I wished to see
others besides the President moving, and especially did I desire, under
existing circumstances, when the militia might be called to act, that General
Grant should be consulted. Harlan thought a circular from the Attorney-General
exhorting vigilance on the part of attorneys and marshals would be sufficient;
the circular could be got into print. While I did not object to that process, I
expressed my conviction that it would be wise to have General Grant identified
with the Administration in these movements. Dennison and McCulloch concurred with me.
After the others left, the President expressed his
satisfaction with the direction I had indicated and the bearing it seemed to
have on others.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 —
December 31, 1866, p. 447-51