Showing posts with label James R Doolittle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James R Doolittle. Show all posts

Thursday, October 31, 2024

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 15, 1866

Nothing special at Cabinet. On Tuesday Seward submitted a correspondence between Schenck and Romero, the Mexican Minister. It was a very improper proceeding, and R. evidently thought it wrong in giving a copy to the Secretary of State. Seward mentioned it as of little moment, — a sort of irregularity. Stanton said there was nothing wrong so far as Schenck was concerned, but that it was a questionable proceeding on the part of Romero. I declared my entire disapproval of the whole transaction and that it was one of the many indications of ignoring and crowding on the Executive.

The others were silent, but, after a little earnest talk, Seward said he would give the subject further consideration. To-day he brought forward the correspondence with an indorsement disapproving it and said he should communicate it to Romero.

Senator Doolittle took breakfast with me this morning. We went over the political questions and discussed what had best be done. Both were satisfied that the time had arrived when the Administration must take a stand. The game of the Radicals and of certain conspicuously professed friends of the President, that the Republican Party must be sustained and kept united at any sacrifice, even the surrender of the Constitution in some of its important features, and to the jeopardy of the Union itself, must be checked, and the opposition to any such policy made clearly manifest. We called on the President and made known our opinions. He concurred and thought a prompt call for a national convention of friends of the Union should be issued. Doolittle agreed to undertake to draw up such a call, but desired that I would also place on paper my views. He proposed that the call should be signed by the members of the Cabinet, or such of them as approved the measure. I told them that I, personally, had no objection, but I questioned its propriety and effect.

McCulloch, with whom I had a brief interview after Cabinet-meeting, told me that the elder Blair was preparing the call. I saw Judge Blair this evening and found him much engaged, yet not altogether satisfied. He expresses apprehension that Seward has control of the President and has so interwoven himself into the mind and course of the President as not to be shaken off, and if so that the Democrats must go forward independent of both President and Congress. Says the Democratic leaders, many of whom he has seen, such as Dean Richmond, Dawson, and others, say they will go in under the President's lead provided he will rid himself of Seward, but they have no confidence in him, would rather give up Johnson than retain Seward. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts takes a similar view. B. says his father has had a talk with the President; that he himself has written him fully; that he advised the President not to dismiss Harlan unless Seward also went; that the President expressed doubts whether the Senate would confirm two Cabinet officers; that he was told there would be no difficulty; if there were, he would let the assistants carry on the Departments, and assign General Grant ad interim to the War; that Grant had been consulted and assented to the arrangement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 527-9

Saturday, June 29, 2024

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 14, 1866

Mr. Smythe, Collector in New York, called at my house yesterday with Senator Doolittle, and both were much interested in the election of Senator in Connecticut. I remarked to them that the subject had been greatly mismanaged, and I doubted, knowing the men and their management, or mismanagement, whether anything could now be done; that Foster and his friends had been sanguine and full of confidence, — so much so that they had taken no precautionary measures, and he and his friends could not, in good faith, make farther move for him, and yet they would do nothing for any one else.

Mr. Smythe said that from information which he had there was no doubt that Ferry would be defeated and a true man elected. There were, he said, three candidates spoken of, myself, Foster, and Cleveland; that they could do better with me than with either, Foster next, and Cleveland last.

I repeated that I could not well see how Foster could now be taken up, and yet so intense were he and his friends that they would engage for no others. Smythe said he would leave this evening and would go on to-morrow to New Haven, confident he could do something.

But all will be labor lost. I have little doubt that if the matter were taken up sensibly the election of a true man could be secured. But Babcock, Sperry, Starkweather, and others, who had managed things at New Haven, would interest themselves for no one but Foster, while his chances are the worst after what has been done, and to now be a candidate would be dishonorable.

The Democrats, who would securely control this, would probably unite on me sooner than any one named, but the Republican friends of Johnson have been manipulated by Foster's friends and taught to stand by their party until they have no independence or strength. The weak and simple conduct of Babcock and the Republican Johnson men, is disgusting. They have resolved and re-resolved that they will not divide the Republican Party. Consequently they must go with it in all its wrongdoing and mischief, because the Radicals, being a majority, will control what is called the Republican Party. This is the light, frivolous training and results of Connecticut Whiggery. While preferring to be Johnson men and to support the Administration, they are aiding the election of a Radical, anti-Johnson, anti-Administration man to the Senate, — all, as they claim, to preserve the party, but certainly without regard as to consistency or principle.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 507-8

Saturday, April 6, 2024

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, April 16, 1866

Senator Doolittle came yesterday. I told him I had seen the President on Saturday and learned from him that he (D.) had been at the Mansion on Friday evening. I made known to him the feelings of the President and that he was not prepared for an open rupture, but Doolittle said that would not do. The President must act promptly. We were losing by delay. Wanted to know how Dennison stood and asked me to go with him and call on Dennison.

But the Governor was not in, and we went on to the President's, whose carriage was standing at the door. I said we must not deter the President from his ride, he took so little exercise. Patterson, his son-in-law, we met at the top of the stairs, who told us the President had company through the day, that Smythe had been there and it was, he thought, definitely settled that S. should be Collector at New York. Smythe, from what I hear of him, is better than some of the candidates, perhaps better than any. It has occurred to me that certain New York gentlemen were selecting for themselves, rather than the Administration.

Passing Montgomery Blair's with a view of calling on his father, the former came to the door and asked me in, while he sent for his father. As usual, the Judge was strong in his opinions against Seward, Stanton, and others. He predicts another revolution or rebellion as the inevitable consequence of measures now being pursued. Says there will be two governments organized here in Washington.

Maynard of Tennessee made a similar suggestion at my house two or three evenings since. He believes that the Senators and Representatives of the next Congress will appear from all the States, that those from the Rebel States will, with the Democratic Members from the loyal States, constitute a majority, that they will organize and by resolution dispense with the test oath and have things their own way. The extreme and reprehensible course of the Radicals is undoubtedly hurrying on a crisis, which will overwhelm them, if it does not embroil, perhaps subvert, the government, but the South is too exhausted and the Northern Democrats too timid, narrow-minded, and tired for such a step.

The Fenians are reported to be gathering in some force at Eastport in Maine. The Winooski, gunboat, was sent thither last week with orders to wait instructions. Seward advised that no instructions should, for the present, be sent, but on Saturday I forwarded general orders to preserve neutrality. This evening Seward called at my house and wanted instructions sent by telegraph. Told him I had already sent by mail, but would send a telegram also.

Sperry, Postmaster at New Haven, was at my house last evening, and is very full of Connecticut parties and Connecticut politics, with a professed desire to sustain the Administration, and the usual wish to make the Party in Connecticut and the Administration identical, a work which more distinguished men than he are laboring in vain to effect, not only in that State but elsewhere. What is irreconcilable cannot be made to harmonize. The organization, or those who control the organization, of the Union Party, are studiously, designedly opposed to the Administration, and it is their purpose to break it down, provided they cannot control it and compel unconstitutional action. They have no thought for the country, but are all for party. Sperry is for himself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 483-5

Thursday, February 29, 2024

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, April 7, 1866

Senator Doolittle informs me that, had Morgan held true, Dixon would, though still quite sick, have gone to the Senate, and the veto would have been sustained; but D. considered it too much in his feeble health to go there and give an unavailing vote. Doolittle says Morgan informed him early in the day of his course, but assigned no reasons for this unexpected stand.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 478-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 13, 1866

I do not get well. But little of interest. British fund agents and brokers show great impudence in regard to Rebel debts and cotton loans. McHenry, Richardson, and others present plans and schemes which are deserving such a rebuke as should be felt by them and their countrymen.

Stanton made some crude suggestions for national quarantine, not very explicit, and beset with difficulties. I asked if anything of the kind had ever been attempted, if it was not a matter for State or municipal, rather than federal, regulation. He admitted it was, but the other members had not given the subject a thought and did not like to come athwart Stanton.

Doolittle called on me last night full of exceeding great trouble. Insists the President has not as yet taken so firm and decided a stand as duty requires. Wishes me to counsel and urge upon him the necessity of doing something positive. Says the impression is getting pretty universal that the President can do nothing for himself, etc., etc. There is some truth in all this; not that the President lacks courage, but he dislikes to break with those who elected him.

Doolittle wishes Speed to leave, and Stanton also. Says the first has no stamina, nor power, nor character as a lawyer. That he is the laughing-stock of the court and of the first lawyers. Does not and cannot strengthen the President. Suggests that Stanton should be turned out and that Grant should be assigned, temporarily, to the Department. Doolittle earnestly desires me to counsel the President. I told him it would be delicate for me to do so, even if invited by the President, but I would not obtrude upon him in such a matter concerning my colleagues.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 480

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, April 14, 1866

This being the anniversary of the assassination of President Lincoln, the several Departments were closed by order of the President.

Had an hour's talk with the President on several matters, but chiefly in relation to the policy of the Administration, which was brought about by my referring to the interview which I had had with Senator Doolittle on Thursday evening, and his urgent request that I would communicate with the President on the subject-matter of our consultation. I remarked that there were certain suggestions, which delicacy forbade me to mention, unsolicited, but that there was an apprehension that the Radicals were strengthening themselves by the non-action, or limited actions, of the Executive and by conceding to Members of Congress almost all opportunities [for placing] their Radical friends.

The President said it was exceedingly annoying and discouraging to witness so good a man as Doolittle desponding, and especially on the subject of removals and appointments, when Doolittle himself was not prepared to take or recommend action, even in his own State. It was true that his Cabinet was not in all respects what he wished; but he had taken it as he found it. Harlan, to be sure, came in later, but it was understood he sought and desired the position, although he had since obtained an election to the Senate. He supposed Harlan was not in accord with the policy of the Administration, and delicacy and propriety would seem to prompt him to resign. But he had, as yet, shown no disposition to give up his place. Speed, he said, certainly added no strength to the Administration, was manifestly in harmony with the Radicals, advising with and encouraging them. Delicacy should cause him, feeling as he did, to retire, but he had made no advance in that direction, nor would he, probably, uninvited. Stanton, he remarked, was claimed by the Radicals to be in their interst, and probably such was the fact, yet he had given him no intimation of that character, except in some general criticism on one or two measures in which he finally yielded and acquiesced. His Department had been an absorbing one during the War and still was formidable. To have an open rupture with him in the present condition of affairs would be embarrassing certainly, yet Stanton held on.

The delicacies and proprieties which should govern the relations that are supposed to exist between a President and his Cabinet associates—his political family, as it were—would indicate to men of proper sensibility the course which they should pursue, if they did not agree with the person whom they were expected to advise in the administration of affairs. If these three men did not approve his general policy, the President said they had not, as he was aware, disapproved of it. Statements were made in some of the Radical papers that the persons named were opposed to the Administration of which they were a part. Rumors to that effect had come to him in such a way and from such sources that he was not at liberty to doubt it. "Still they hold on here, and some of them likely report our proceedings. I do not, however, know the fact. What, then, can I do? Are these men to whom I give my confidence hypocrites, faithless, insincere, treacherous? The time has not arrived for a decisive stand. With mischievous Radical leaders, who appear to have little regard for the country, it is not a proper time to take upon ourselves other quarrels nearer home."

The President said he had borne, as well as he could, the malicious war which had been waged upon him for doing his duty, administering the Government for the whole country, not for a faction. If the schemes of the Radical managers to control the Executive had sometimes annoyed him, they had not caused him to deviate from what he was satisfied was right and for the best interest of the country. But it did grieve and wound him to witness such men as Doolittle desponding and giving way. Cowan, an intelligent, sensible, and good Senator, he said, was also complaining, and it was hard to be under the necessity of holding these men up, while compelled to encounter the whole opposition. Their discouragement afflicted him more than all that the Radicals had done or would do.

Only a day or two since Cowan had, with others, pressed earnestly for some changes in Pennsylvania which they said ought by all means to be made, and on their representations he had finally agreed to make some changes. But just as they were being ordered, Cowan began to show and have doubt, asked a suspension, and finally backed down and would consent to but two of the same changes he had urged. "These men take upon themselves no responsibility while goading me on to move, when I am breasting this storm." This he said he was ready to do. It was a duty and he could meet it, but it pained him to have good and true friends waver.

At the proper time he should be ready to act, but his friends must permit him to judge when to act. It would be pleasanter to him to have more cordiality, a more free interchange of opinions, more unity and earnestness on the part of all his Cabinet, for there was obvious distrust among them,—distrust of each other, and that on topics where the Administration was most interested.

I have given the substance and, so far as I can recall, the words. There was much desultory conversation intermixed.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 481-3

Monday, February 12, 2024

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, March 26, 1866

Senator Doolittle called at my house last evening on the subject of the Civil Rights Bill, which it is now well understood, outside, will meet an Executive veto. Doolittle has an elaborate bill of his own which he proposes to submit. Something, he thinks, must be done. His bill is, perhaps, somewhat less offensive than the one which has been passed by both houses, but the whole thing is wrong and his plan has the same objectionable machinery as the other. I frankly told him that the kind of legislation proposed, and which Congress was greedy to enact, was not in my view correct, was sapping the foundation of the government and must be calamitous in its results. We went together to Senator Morgan's and talked over the subject an hour or more with him.

The President convened the Cabinet this A.M. at ten and read his message returning the Civil Rights Bill with his veto. Before reading it he desired the members to express their opinions. Seward said he had carefully studied the bill and thought it might be well to pass a law declaring negroes were citizens, because there had been some questions raised on that point, though there never was a doubt in his own mind. The rest of the bill he considered unconstitutional in many respects, and having the mischievous machinery of the Fugitive Slave Law did not help commend it.

McCulloch waived remark; had not closely scrutinized the bill, and would defer comment to Stanton, merely remarking that he should be gratified if the President could see his way clear to sign the bill.

Stanton made a long argument, showing that he had devoted much time to the bill. His principal point was to overcome the obnoxious features of the second section, which he thought should be construed favorably. He did not think judges and marshals, or sheriffs and local officers should be fined and imprisoned; did not think it was intended to apply to officers, but merely to persons. The bill was not such a one as he would have drawn or recommended, but he advised that under the circumstances it should be approved.

The President having previously been put in possession of my views, I briefly remarked that my objections were against the whole design, purpose, and scope of the bill, that it was mischievous and subversive.

Mr. Dennison thought that, though there might be some objection to parts, he, on the whole, would advise that the bill should receive Executive approval.

Mr. Harlan had not closely read the bill, but had met difficulties in the second section, and in one or two others which had been measurably removed by Stanton's argument. He thought it very desirable that the President and Congress should act in concert if possible.

Speed was ill and not present.

The Senate to-day deprived Stockton of New Jersey of his seat. It was a high-handed, partisan proceeding, in which Sumner, Fessenden, Morrill, and others exhibited a spirit and feeling wholly unworthy of their official position. While I have no special regard for Stockton and his party in New Jersey, I am compelled to believe they have in this instance certainly been improperly treated and for a factious purpose, and I apprehend that I can never think so well of some of the gentlemen who have been conspicuous in this proceeding. Had Stockton acted with Sumner and Fessenden against the veto, he never would have been ousted from his seat. Of this I have no doubt whatever, and I am ashamed to confess it, or say it. I am passing no judgment on his election, for I know not the exact facts, but the indecent, unfair, arbitrary conduct of the few master spirits is most reprehensible.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 463-5

Saturday, October 7, 2023

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, February 21, 1866

Took the President the executive order for the trial of Semmes. Found that he hesitated. Told him I had no feeling whatever in regard to it. That I was not willing nor did I believe we could legally try him for treason or piracy by a military commission, for those crimes were cognizable by the civil courts, but a violation of the laws of war required, perhaps, a commission and could be reached in no other way. He assented to these views, but thought it would be better to get an opinion from the Attorney-General. Moreover, he thought delay rather advisable at this time. I told him I thought it a good opportunity to show that he was ready to bring criminals to trial when the duty devolved on him.

Senators Doolittle and Cowan were with the President when I called on him this morning. Doolittle had the rough plan of a bill to modify and terminate the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. I prefer non-action. So does Cowan, and I think the President also. Doolittle thinks something will be advisable to satisfy the public, whose sympathies have been excited by cunning appeals. This is Seward.

Whiting, Solicitor, or late Solicitor, of the War Department, came to see me. It was amusing to see how self-satisfied he was in weaving a pleasant web on the subject of negro suffrage and the questions at issue. He is writing and publishing a series of numbers in the Republican, which, he says, were penned at my suggestion some months since, doubtless in part at least for my benefit. In the midst of our talk Montgomery Blair came in, and Whiting left with great speed. Blair is gratified with the stirring-up of the waters of controversy, and anticipates, I doubt not, that Stanton, who still occupies an ambiguous attitude, may be brought to a plain development of his true position. He insists that Stanton is playing false to the President. No doubt of it in my mind, yet he and Seward are in accord, but Seward is not treacherous.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 436-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, February 26, 1866

Senator Doolittle called to have a conversation with me on existing topics and consult as to the propriety of his attending a public meeting and speaking at Baltimore. Governor Dennison came in with Governor Cox of Ohio while we were conversing, and spent the evening with us. The great questions before the country were canvassed freely, and Governor Cox displayed intelligence and decision that pleased me. He has quick perception and a right appreciation of what is taking place, and a pretty correct estimate of the actors.

In the Senate, Sherman has been speaking against the declaratory resolution, which passed the House under the lash of Stevens from the Directory Committee, asserting that eleven States are out of the Union and must not be represented until Congress shall permit them. This resolution is fulminated in spite, because the President put his veto on the Freedmen's Bill. Such legislation is characteristic of Stevens and his colaborers.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 440

Saturday, July 18, 2020

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 30, 1864

All were surprised to-day with the resignation of Secretary Chase and the nomination of Governor David Tod as his successor. I knew nothing of it till the fact was told me by Senator Doolittle, who came to see and advise with me, supposing I knew something of the circumstances. But I was wholly ignorant. Chase had not thought proper to consult me as to his resignation, nor had the President as to his action upon it, or the selection. My first impression was that he had consulted Seward and perhaps Blair. I learn, however, he advised with none of his Cabinet, but acted from his own impulses. I have doubts of Tod's ability for this position, though he has good common sense and was trained in the right school, being a hard-money man. Not having seen the President since this movement took place, I do not comprehend his policy. It can hardly be his intention to reverse the action of Chase entirely without consulting those who are associated with him in the Government. And yet the selection of Tod indicates that, if there be any system in the movement. The President has given but little attention to finance and the currency, but yet he can hardly be ignorant of the fact that Chase and Tod are opposites. The selection of Tod is a move in the right direction if he has made the subject a sufficient study to wield the vast machine. On this point I have my doubts. His nomination will disturb the “Bubbles,” — the paper-money men, — and the question was not acted upon but referred to the Finance Committee, who have been with the Senate. I have no doubt their astonishment at the obtrusion of a hard-money man upon them was made manifest.

Blair and Bates both called at my house this evening and gave me to understand they were as much taken by surprise as myself. Mr. Bates says he knows nothing of T. Blair expresses more apprehensions even than myself, who have my doubts.

The retirement of Chase, so far as I hear opinions expressed, — and they are generally freely given, — appears to give relief rather than otherwise, which surprises me. I had thought it might create a shock for a brief period, though I did not fear that it would be lasting. I look upon it as a blessing. The country could not go on a great while longer under his management, which has been one of expedients and of no fixed principles, or profound and correct financial knowledge.

It is given out that a disagreement between himself and the President in relation to the appointment of Assistant Treasurer at New York was the cause of his leaving. I think likely that was the occasion of his tendering his resignation, and I have little doubt he was greatly surprised that it was accepted. He may not admit this, but it is none the less true, I apprehend. Yet there were some circumstances to favor his going, — there is a financial gulf ahead.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 62-3

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

To The Supporters Of The Government.

We have read without surprise, but not without indignation, the Proclamation of the President of the 8th of July, 1864.

The supporters of the Administration are responsible to the country for its conduct: and it is their right and duty to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.

It is impossible to pass in silence this Proclamation without neglecting that duty; and, having taken as much responsibility as any others in supporting the Administration, we are not disposed to fail in the other duty of asserting the rights of Congress.

The President did not sign the bill “to guarantee to certain States whose Governments have been usurped, a Republican form of Government”—passed by the supporters of his Administration in both Houses of Congress after mature deliberation.

The bill did not therefore become a law: and it is therefore nothing.

The proclamation is neither an approval nor a veto of the bill; it is therefore a document unknown to the laws of the Constitution of the United States.

So far as it contains an apology for not signing the bill, it is a political manifesto against the friends of the Government.

So far as it proposes to execute the bill which is not a law, it is a grave Executive usurpation.

It is fitting that the facts necessary to enable the friends of the Administration to appreciate the apology and usurpation be spread before them.

The Proclamation says:

“And whereas the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than an hour before the sine die adjournment of said session and was not signed by him—”

If that be accurate, still this bill was presented with other bills which were signed.

Within that hour, the time of the sine die adjournment was three times postponed by the votes of both Houses; and the least intimation of a desire for more time by the President to consider this bill would have secured a further postponement.

Yet the Committee sent to ascertain if the President had any further communication for the House of Representatives reported that he had none; and the friends of the bill, who had anxiously waited on him to ascertain its fate, had already been informed that the President had resolved not to sign it.

The time of presentation, therefore, had nothing to do with his failure to approve it.

The Bill had been discussed and considered for more than a month in the House of Representatives, which it passed on the 4th of May; it was reported to the Senate on the 27th of May without material amendment, and passed the senate absolutely as it came from the House on the 2nd of July.

Ignorance of its contents is out of the question.

Indeed, at his request, a draft of a bill substantially the same in all material points, and identical in the points objected to by the Proclamation, had been laid before him for his consideration in the Winter of 1862-63.

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose the provisions of the bill took the President by surprise.

On the contrary, we have reason to believe them to have been so well known that this method of preventing the bill from becoming a law without the constitutional responsibility of a veto, had been resolved on long before the bill passed the Senate.

We are informed by a gentleman entitled to the entire confidence, that before the 22d of June in New-Orleans it was stated by a member of Gen. Banks’s staff, in the presence of other gentlemen in official position, that Senator Doolittle had written a letter to the department that the House Reconstruction bill would be staved off in the Senate to a period too late in the session to require the President to veto it in order to defeat it, and that Mr. Lincoln would retained the bill, of necessary, and thereby defeat it.

The experience of Senator Wade, in his various efforts to get the bill considered in the Senate, was quite in accordance with that plan; and the fate of the bill was accurately predicted by letters received from New-Orleans before it passed the Senate.

Had the Proclamation stopped there, it would have been only one other defeat of the will of the people by an Executive perversion of the Constitution.

But it goes further.  The President says:

“And whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration—”

By what authority of the Constitution?  In what forms?  The result to be declared by whom?  With what effect when ascertained?

Is it to be a law by the approval of the people without the approval of Congress at the will of the President?

Will the President, on his opinion of the popular approval, execute it as law?

Or is this merely a device to avoid the serious responsibility of defeating a law on which so many loyal hearts reposed for security?

But the reasons now assigned for not approving the bill are full of ominous significance.

The President proceeds:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration—”

That is to say, the President is resolved that the people shall not by law take any securities from the Rebel States against a renewal of the Rebellion, before restoring their power to govern us.

His wisdom and prudence are to be our sufficient Guarantees!

He further says:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration—”

That is to say, the President persists in recognizing those shadows of Governments in Arkansas and Louisiana, which Congress formally declared should not be recognized—whose Representatives and Senators were repelled by formal votes of both Houses of Congress—which it was declared formally should have no electoral vote for President and Vice President.

They are more creatures of his will. They cannot live a day without his support.  They are mere oligarchies, imposed on the people by military orders under the forms of elections, at which generals, provost-marshals, soldiers and camp-followers where the chief actors, assisted by a handful of resident citizens, and urged on to premature action by private letters from the President.

In neither Louisiana nor Arkansas, before Banks’s defeat, did the United States control half the territory or half the population.  In Louisiana, Gen. Banks’s proclamation candidly declared: “the fundamental law of the State is martial law.

On that foundation of freedom, he erected what the President calls “the free Constitution and Government of Louisiana.”

But of this State, whose fundamental law was martial law, only sixteen parishes of forty-eight parishes were held by the United States; and in five of the sixteen we held only our camps.

The eleven parishes we substantially held had 233,185 inhabitants; the residue of the State not held by us, 575,617.

At the farce called an election, the officers of Gen. Banks returned that 11,346 ballots were cast; but whether any or by whom the people of the United States have no legal assurance but it is probable that 4,000 were cast by soldiers or employees of the United States military or municipal, but none according to any law, State or National, and 7,000 ballots represent the State of Louisiana.

Such is the free Constitution and Government of Louisiana; and like it is that of Arkansas.  Nothing but the failure of a military expedition deprived as of a like once on the swamps of Florida; and before the Presidential election, like ones may be organized in ever Rebel State where the United states have a camp.

The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the Rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition.

If those votes turn the balance in his favor, is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce?

If the Rebel majority assert their supremacy in those States, and send votes which elect an enemy of the Government, will we not repel his claims?

And is not that civil war for the Presidency, inaugurated by the votes of the Rebel States.

Seriously impressed with these dangers, Congress, “the proper and constitutional authority,” formally declared that there are no State Governments in the Rebel States, and provided for their erection at a proper time; and both the Senate and the House of Representatives rejected the Senators and Representatives chosen under the authority of what the President calls the Free Constitution and Government of Arkansas.

The President’s Proclamation “holds for naught” this judgment, and discards the authority of the Supreme Court, and strides headlong toward the anarchy his Proclamation of the8th of December inaugurated.

If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President to “hold for naught” the will of Congress rather than his Government in Louisiana and Arkansas.

The judgment of Congress which the President defies was the exercise of an authority exclusively vested in Congress by the Constitution to determine what is the established Government in a State, and in its own nature and by the highest judicial authority binding on all other departments of the Government.

The supreme Court has formally declared that under the 4th section of the IVth article of the Constitution, requiring the United States to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, “it rests with Congress to decide what Government is the established one in a State;” and “when Senators and Representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the Government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character is recognized by the proper constitutional authority, and its decision is binding on ever other department of the Government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.  It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and, as no Senators or Representatives were elected under the authority of the Government of which Mr. Door was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy.  Yet the right to decide is placed there.”

Even the President’s proclamation of the 8th of December, formally declares that “Whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats, constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive.”

And that is not the less true because wholly inconsistent with the President’s assumption in that proclamation of a right to institute and recognize State Governments in the Rebels States, nor because the President is unable to perceive that his recognition is a nullity if it be not conclusive on Congress.

Under the Constitution, the right to Senators and Representatives is inseparable from a State Government.

If there be a State Government, the right is absolute.

If there be no State Government, there can be no Senators or Representatives chosen.

The two Houses of Congress are expressly declared to be the sole judges of their own members.

When, therefore, Senators and Representatives are admitted, the State Government, under whose authority they were chosen, is conclusively established; when they are rejected, its existence is as conclusively rejected and denied; and to this [judgment] the President is bound to submit.

The President proceeds to express his unwillingness “to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish Slavery in States” as another reason for not signing the bill.

But the bill nowhere proposes to abolish Slavery in States.

The bill did provide that all slaves in the Rebel states should be manumitted.

But as the President had already signed three bills manumitting several classes of slaves in States, it is not conceived possible that he entertained any scruples touching that provision of the bill which he is silent.

He had already himself assumed a right by proclamation to free much the larger number of slaves in the Rebel States, under the authority given him a discretion it could not exercise itself.

It is more unintelligible from the fact that, except in respect to a small part of Virginia and Louisiana, the bill covered only what the Proclamation covered—added a Congressional title and judicial remedies by law to the disputed title under the Proclamation, and perfected the work the President professed to be so anxious to accomplish.

Slavery as an institution can be abolished only by a charge of the Constitution of the United States or of the law of the State; and this is the principle of the bill.

It required the new Constitution of the State to provide for that prohibition; and the President, in the face of his own proclamation, does not venture to object to insisting on that condition.  Nor will the country tolerate its abandonment—yet he defeated the only provision imposing it!!

But when he describes himself, in spite of this great blow at emancipation, as “sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing Slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, we curiously inquire on what his expectation rests, after the vote of the House of Representatives at the recent session, and in the face of the political complexion of more than enough of the States to prevent the possibility of its adoption within any reasonable time; and why he did not indulge his sincere hopes with so large an installment of the blessing as his approval of the bill would have secured.

After this assignment of his reasons for preventing the bill from becoming a law, the President proceeds to declare his purpose to execute it as a law by his plenary dictatorial power.

He says:

“Nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military Governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.”

A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated.

Congress passed a bill; the President refused to approve it, and then by a proclamation puts as much of it in force as he sees fit, and proposes to execute those parts by officers unknown to the laws of the United States and not subject to the confirmation of the Senate!

The bill directed the appointment of Provisional Governors by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The President, after defeating the law, proposes to appoint without law, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, Military Governors for the Rebel States!

He has already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and he defeated the bill to prevent its limitation.

Henceforth we must regard the following precedent as the Presidential law of the Rebel States:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,               
WASHINGTON, March 15, 1864

His Excellency MICHAEL HAHN, Governor of Louisiana,

Until further orders you are hereby invested with the power expressed hitherto by the Military Governor of Louisiana.

Yours,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This Michael Hahn is no officer of the United States; the President, without law, without the advice and consent of the Senate, by a private note not even countersigned by the Secretary of State, makes him dictator of Louisiana!

The bill provided for the civil administration of the laws of the State—till it should be in a fit of temper to govern itself—repealing all laws recognizing Slavery, and making all men equal before the law.

These beneficent provisions the President has annulled.  People will die, and marry and transfer property, and buy and sell; and to these acts of civil life courts and officers of the law are necessary, Congress legislated for these necessary things, and the President deprives them of the protection of the law!

The President’s purpose to instruct his Military Governors “to proceed according to the bill”—a makeshift to calm the disappointment its defeat has occasional—if not merely a grave usurpation but a transparent delusion.

He cannot “proceed according to the bill” after preventing it from becoming a law.

Whatever is done will be at his will and pleasure, but persons responsible to no law, and more interested to secure the interests and execute the will of the President than of the people; and the will of Congress is to be “held for naught,” “unless the loyal people of the Rebel States choose to adopt it.”

If they should graciously prefer the stringent bill to the easy proclamation, still the registration will be made under no legal sanction; it will give no assurance that a majority of the people of the States have taken the oath; if administered, it will be without legal authority, and void; no indictment will lie for false swearing at the election, or for admitting bad or rejecting good votes; it will be a farce of Louisiana and Arkansas acted over again, under the forms of this bill, but not by authority of law.

But when we come to the guarantees of future peace which Congress meant to enact, the forms, as well as the substance of the bill, must yield to the President’s will that none should be imposed.

It was the solemn resolve of Congress to protect the loyal men of the nation against three great dangers, (1) the return to power of the guilty leaders of the Rebellion, (2) the continuance of Slavery, and (3) the burden of the Rebel debt.

Congress required assent to those provision by the convention of the State; and if refused it was to be dissolved.

The President “holds for naught” that resolve of Congress, because he is unwilling “to be inflexibly committed to any one plan of restoration,” and the people of the United States are not to be allowed to protect themselves unless their enemies agree to it.

The order to proceed according to the bill is therefore merely at the bill of the Rebel States; and they have the option to reject it, accept the proclamations of the 8th of December, and demand the President’s recognition!

Mark the Contrast!  The bill requires a majority, the proclamation is satisfied with one-tenth; the bill requires one oath, the proclamation another; the bill ascertains voters by registering; the proclamation by guess; the bill exacts adherence to existing territorial limits, the proclamation admits of others; the bill governs the Rebel States by law, equalizing all before it, the proclamation commits them to the lawless discretion of military Governors and Provost-Marshals; the bill forbids electors for President, the Proclamation and defeat of the bill threatens us with civil war for the admission or exclusion of such votes; the bill exacted exclusion of dangerous enemies from power and the relief of the nation from the Rebel debt, and the prohibition of Slavery forever, so that the suppression of the Rebellion will double our resources to bear or pay the national debt, free the masses from the old domination of the Rebel leaders, and eradicate the cause of the war; the proclamation secures neither of these guaranties.

It is silent respecting the Rebel debt and the political exclusion of rebel leaders; leaving Slavery exactly where it was by law at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and adds no guaranty even of the freedom of the slaves he undertook to manumit.

It is summed up in an illegal oath, without a sanction, and therefore void.

The oath is to support all proclamations of the President during the Rebellion having reference to slaves.

Any Government is to be accepted at the hands of one-tenth of the people not contravening that oath.

Now that oath neither secures the abolition of Slavery, nor adds any security to the freedom of the slaves the President declared free.

It does not secure the abolition of Slavery; for the proclamation of freedom merely professed to free certain slaves while it recognized the institution.

Every Constitution of the Rebel States at the outbreak of the Rebellion may be adopted without the change of a letter, for none of them contravene that Proclamation, none of them establish slavery.

It adds no security to the freedom of the slaves.

For their title is the Proclamation of Freedom.

If it be unconstitutional, an oath to support it is void.  Whether constitutional or not, the oath is without authority of law, and therefore void.

If it be valid and observed, it exacts no enactment by the State, either in law or Constitution, to add a State guaranty to the proclamation title and the right of a slave to freedom is an open question before the State courts on the relative authority of the State law and the Proclamation.

If the oath binds the one-tenth who take it, it is not exacted of the other nine-tenths who succeed to the control of the State Government; so that it is annulled instantly by the act of recognition.

What the State courts would say of the Proclamation, who can doubt?

But the master would not go into court—he would seize his slave.

What the Supreme Court would say, who can tell?

When and how is the question to get there?

No habeas corpus lies for him in a United States Court; and the President defeated with this bill its extension of that writ to this case.

Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President—a blow at the friends of his Administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government.

The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supports of his Administration have so long practiced, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents.

But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishers our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed Rebellion, and leave political rëorganization to Congress.

If the supporters of the Government fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and security committed to their keeping, they sacrifice.

Let them consider the remedy for these usurpations, and having found it, fearlessly execute it.

B. F. WADE, Chairman Senate Committee.

H. WINTER DAVIS, Chairman Committee House
of Representatives on the Rebellious States.

SOURCE: New York Daily Tribune, New York, New York, Friday August 5, 1864, p. 5

Friday, January 10, 2020

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 16, 1864

I yesterday took a steamer with a small company, consisting among others of Postmaster-General Blair, Senators Doolittle and Grimes, Messrs. Rice and Griswold of the Naval Committee, Count Rosen of the Swedish Navy, Mr. Hale (the newly selected Consul-General to Egypt), G. W. Blunt and Assistant Secretary Fox, Commander Wise, Dr. Horwitz, and two or three others, and went down the Potomac to Belle Plain. The day was pleasant and the sail charming. We reached Belle Plain about two P.M. and left a little past five. Is a rough place with no dwelling, — an extemporized plank-way from the shore some twenty or thirty rods in the rear. Some forty or fifty steamers and barges, most of them crowded with persons, were there. Recruits going forward to reinforce Grant's army, or the wounded and maimed returning from battle. Rows of stretchers, on each of which was a maimed or wounded Union soldier, were wending towards the steamers which were to bear them to Washington, while from the newly arrived boats were emerging the fresh soldiers going forward to the field. Working our way along the new and rough-made road, through teams of mules and horses, we arrived at the base of a hill some two or three hundred feet in height, and went up a narrow broken footpath to the summit, on which were the headquarters of General Abercrombie and staff. The ascent was steep and laborious. We had expected to find the prisoners here, but were told they were beyond, about one and a half miles. The majority were disposed to proceed thither, and, though tired and reluctant, I acquiesced. The prisoners, said to be about 7000 in number, were encamped in a valley surrounded by steep hills, the circumference of the basin being some two or three miles. Returning, we passed through the centre of this valley or basin. The prisoners were rough, sturdy-looking men, good and effective soldiers, I should judge. Most of them were quiet and well-behaved, but some few of them were boisterous and inclined to be insolent.

One of the prisoners, a young man of some twenty-five, joined me and inquired if I resided in the neighborhood. I told him at a little distance. He wished to exchange some money, Rebel for greenbacks. When I told him that his was worthless, he claimed it was better than greenbacks though not current here. I asked him if they had not enough of fighting, opposing the Union and lawful authority. He said no, there was much more fighting yet to be done. Claimed that Lee would be in Fredericksburg before the Union army could get to Richmond. Would not believe that J. E. B. Stuart was killed, news of which I received just as I came on board the boat this morning. He was earnest, though uninformed, and said he was from western North Carolina. Returning, we reached Washington at 9 P.M.

To-day I have been busy in preparing two or three letters and matters for Congress.

Governor Morgan called on me relative to abuses in cotton speculations, and malconduct of Treasury agents and others. Some of the malpractices which are demoralizing the army and the officials and disgusting the whole people in the lower Mississippi are becoming known, and will, I trust, lead to legislative correction. As Morgan introduced the subject and thought proper to consult me, I freely gave him facts and my views, which conflict with Chase and the Treasury management. A bill which Morgan showed me is crudely drawn but introduces, or makes, an entire change. It is not, in some of its features, what I should have proposed, but it will improve on the present system.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 31-3

Sunday, June 3, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, February 12, 1864

Incessant employment early and late has prevented me from making entries, and there has been little of public interest to engage me. On Monday evening I attended a party at Admiral Shubrick's which could not be avoided, and was detained later than I intended, but also went at 11 P.M. to Tassara's, the Spanish Minister. Both were very dull, the latter crowded.

Committees and resolutions of inquiry from Congress have flocked in upon the Department. Many of the latter were frivolous, and most of them for mischievous purposes. How little do the outside public know of the intrigues of Congressional demagogues, who, under the guise of great public economists, are engaged in speculating schemes and fraudulent contrivances to benefit themselves, pecuniarily! John P. Hale, who is eminently conspicuous in this class of professed servants and guardians of the public treasury, has been whitewashed for his three-thousand-dollar retainer. The committee excuse him, but propose a law which shall inflict ten thousand dollars' fine and two years' imprisonment on any one who shall again commit the offense.

Little of particular interest in the Cabinet-meeting. Seward left early, and Chase soon followed. I to-day wrote the latter, expressing pretty deliberately and effectually my opinion in regard to permits for cutting ship-timber in North Carolina. It may give offense, but I could do no less than in a mild form object to the favoritism and monopoly that the system engendered.

Blair, who, with Senator Doolittle, was at my house this evening, avers I am a fortunate man above others. He says my opponents are making me great, and that I am fortunate in the attacks and abuses that are bestowed, and repeats an aphorism of Colonel Benton, that "a man is made great by his enemies, and not by his friends." There is doubtless some truth in the remark, but not, I apprehend, as regards myself.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 521-2

Saturday, March 17, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, December 28, 1863

Senator Doolittle came and had an hour's conversation with me. Wanted, I soon saw, to ascertain my views without my being aware of his object; hence his first conversation related to permits for trade, getting out cotton, and other matters connected with the Treasury. I frankly gave him my opinion, stated my unequivocal opposition to the whole system of trade-permits — these schemes to fight and feed the enemy — and to all favoritism. If there is to be trade with the Rebels, let all participate. There were plans to make the Navy a convenience to certain parties, and subject to certain regulations of the Treasury Department, which I disapproved and resisted in all its stages.

On the subject of the Presidency, which he says is opening, the public mind seems settling on the President as the proper candidate. D. says, however, that there is an active, zealous, and somewhat formidable movement for Chase, and that Chase clubs are being organized in all the cities to control the nominating convention.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 497-8

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 18, 1863

Sumner called this evening and read to me a letter he had received from Mr. Cobden and also one from Mr. Bright, — both in good tone and of right feeling. These two men are statesmen and patriots in the true sense of the word, such as do honor to England and give vigor to the Government. They and Sumner have done much to preserve the peace of the two countries.

Senator Doolittle came to see me to-day. Has faith, he says, but fears that General Hooker has no religious faith, laments the infirmities of that officer, and attributes our late misfortune to the want of godliness in the commanding general.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 305-6

Monday, March 13, 2017

Diary of John Hay: Monday, December 23, 1863

I took to the Senate to-day the nomination of Schofield as Major General. The President had previously spoken to some of the Senators about it. He is anxious that Schofield should be confirmed so as to arrange this Missouri matter promptly. I told Sherman, Wilson, Harris and Doolittle. Senator Foote also agreed to do all he could to put the matter properly through. But on the nomination being read in Executive Session, Howard of Michigan objected to its consideration and it was postponed. Sherman and Doolittle tell me it will certainly go through when it is regularly taken up.

Lane came up to the President about it, and told him this. Lane is very anxious to have the Kansas part of the plan at once carried out.

Morgan says that Gratz Brown gave to Sumner to present to the Senate the radical protest against Schoflied’s confirmation, and that Sumner presented it to-day. The President sent for Sumner, but he was not at his lodgings.

The President is very much disappointed at Brown. After three interviews with him he understood that Brown would not oppose the confirmation. It is rather a mean dodge to get Sumner to do it in his stead

The President to-night had a dream: — He was in a party of plain people, and, as it became known who he was, they began to comment on his appearance. One of them said: — “He is a very common-looking man.” The President replied: — “The Lord prefers common-looking people. That is the reason he makes so many of them.”

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 141-3; Michael Burlingame, Editor, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 139-43.

Saturday, January 7, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, February 10, 1863

Presented Colonel Hawley's name to the President for Brigadier-General with expressions of my regard. Was kindly received but no assurance given. Informed the President I should put Preble's case in his hands to be disposed of. The nomination of Mark Howard for Collector of the Hartford District has been suspended in the Senate. Howard is a very faithful, competent, and excellent man for the office, but he and Senator Dixon, neighbors and formerly intimate friends, have latterly had some differences. Dixon takes advantage of his position as Senator to stab Howard in secret session, where H. can have no opportunity for selfdefense. Senator Sumner, whom I met this evening, says Dixon came to him and asked, if a personal enemy, who abused, slandered, and defied him were before the Senate, would he vote for him. Sumner replied, No. Senator Doolittle admits he was in like manner approached; says it was embarrassing, for there is an implied understanding — a courtesy among Senators — that they will yield to the personal appeals of a Senator in appointments to office in his own town. I asked if it was possible that the Senate prostituted itself to gratify private animosities, — made itself a party to the personal quarrels of one of its members and gave him the means to wreak his vengeance on a worthy person without cause or justification? Doolittle attempted no defense; evidently did not like the attitude in which he was placed. Thurlow Weed is in town. He has been sent for, but my informant knows not for what purpose. It is, I learn, to consult in regard to a scheme of Seward to influence the New Hampshire and Connecticut elections. Some days since, Seward handed me a dispatch as I entered the President's office on Cabinet day, from Mr. Dayton at Paris, stating the French Government was pressing friendly mediation. I handed it back after reading, with the remark that it was wholly inadmissible. Seward made no reply, but handed the dispatch to others to read as they came in. There was, I think, a response similar to mine from each. When I heard that Seward's factotum, Weed, had been called here I thought at once of Dayton's dispatch and schemes of adjustment. Nous verrons. [In the lower House of Congress] after a violent attack by Calvert, Washburne, and a few others [on the subject of appointment of midshipmen], I was sustained by a vote of two to one, to the great chagrin of the clique, who, I am told, did not conceal their vexation.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 235-6