Showing posts with label Schofield. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Schofield. Show all posts

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Lieutenant-General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, August 3, 1867

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,        
MADISON, WIS., Aug. 3, 1867.
Dear Brother:

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

As I expected, I am on the detail,1 and have official notice that I shall be required in St. Louis, Tuesday, August 6th.

I got your message from Napoleon. He sent me a similar message by Schofield, but I would hardly venture to France as the representative of our military system, as it would subject me to heavy expense and much trouble.

Grant told me he would not accept a nomination for President, and if he departs from this, his natural conclusion, it will be by side influence, and because no good candidate has thus far been brought forward by the ruling party. I don't think he has clearly defined political opinions, but would let Congress and the departments work out the problem of the future, which is probably better than to form a theory and force matters to conform to it.

Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.
_______________

1 The Indian Commission.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 292

Monday, June 14, 2021

Major Charles Wright Wills: March 12, 1865

Fayetteville, N. C., March 12, 1865.

We are camped a couple of miles from town. Marched about 13 miles to-day. Had to put down pontoons at both branches of Rockfish creek. At the town of Rockfish, the 17th A. C. burned a factory, throwing about 150 women out of employment. One of our gunboats came up to this place to-day with dispatches for Sherman. It went back before our division got in and took a lot of mail.

The 14th A. C. is garrisoning this place, but the 17th got in first. The 97th Indiana boys, who were captured back at Lynch's Creek, all got away from the enemy and back to us to-day, five of them. Sherman said yesterday that the campaign ends only with the war. Hear that Hampton whipped Kilpatrick splendidly. Don't think that is any credit to him. Also hear that Bragg whipped Schofield at Kingston, that Thomas has Lynchburg, and 30,000 other rumors. In the last 23 days the commissary has issued only two and one half days' of bread. I lost my sword to-day. Left it where we stopped for dinner. We have lost so much sleep of late that at every halt half the command is asleep in a minute. I lay down and told them not to wake me for dinner nor until the regiment moved. The regiment had started when Frank woke me, and I got on my horse too stupid to think of anything. Did not miss my sword for five miles, when I went back for it, but no use. Foragers for the last week have been counting on rich spoils in the town, and many of them have not reported to their regiments within six or eight days, camping every night with the extreme advance. The day before the place was taken, five men who were 15 miles ahead of the column ventured into town. They were gobbled and one of them killed. Next morning 100 foragers hovered around town until the column was within about six miles, when the foragers deployed as skirmishers, and went for the town.

There were about 1,000 Rebel cavalry herein who fell back before our boys skirmishing lively, clear through the town, when they suddenly charged our fellows and scooped them. Our loss in killed, wounded and captured is 25 or 30. They killed several after they captured them, and one they hung up by the heels and cut his throat. Our boys retreated about a mile from town, and went in again in more solid order. They were too scattered the first time. They were successful and routed Johnny, who left six dead in the streets.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 360-1

Major Charles Wright Wills: March 20, 1865

One and one-half miles from Neuse River,
March 20, 1865.

We moved about a mile north and then west for five miles. Pushed some Rebel cavalry before us all the time. Our brigade was in advance and lost about 25 men.

We are about two miles east of where the battle was fought yesterday by the 14th and 20th corps, and right where the Rebel hospital was. The Rebels are now due west of us, our line running north and south, and I think there can be no difficulty in communicating with Schofield. Goldsboro is undoubtedly evacuated. In the fight yesterday one division of the 14th was worsted at first and driven some distance, but rallied, repulsed the enemy, and the corps getting into line, charged four to six times, and slaughtered the Rebels awfully. Their loss was far greater than ours.

Ten p. m. — A Pennsylvania man, who was wounded in the fight yesterday, and carried in by the Rebels who took off his leg above the ankle, came in to us a few minutes ago. He crawled nearly half a mile, part of the way through a swamp. It seems that the Rebels had a hospital there they evacuated and left him and a half dozen other wounded, two of whom the man saw killed by the skirmish firing. We are on the skirmish line to-night. I suppose it is 400 yards to the Rebel skirmishers, and not a very dangerous line.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 364-5

Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Major Charles Wright Wills: March 5, 1865

March 5, 1865.

The 17th and all our corps, except our division, have crossed the river. We follow in the morning. The enemy did not attempt to oppose us. The boys say that an intercepted dispatch from Hampton to General Butler reads: “Do not attempt to delay Sherman's march by destroying bridges, or any other means. For God's sake let him get out of the country as quickly as possible.” Were I one of the S. C. chivalry I'd be in favor of turning out en masse and building up roads for him,

We will get out of S. C. to-morrow. I have not been in a house in the State occupied by a citizen. Everything in Cheraw of any value to the enemy, including cotton and business houses, is going up in smoke. Hear to-day that Schofield is in Goldsboro or Fayetteville, N. C.

General Wood says we have 120 miles yet to make. You may give the credit of Wilmington, Charleston and Georgetown to whom you please, we know Sherman deserves it. We hear that that miserable Foster is claiming the glory over his capture of Charleston. We are yet pretty short of breadstuffs, but have plenty of meat. Sherman has been heard to say that this army can live on fresh meat alone for 30 days. I'd like to see it tried on him. We think to-day that Goldsboro is our resting place. You must understand that we don't know anything at all about anything. Our foragers all went across the river this morning and got plenty of flour, meal and meat. They were out 11 miles and saw a few Rebels. The Rebels left seven cannon on the other side of the river, and burned a very large amount of commissary and ordnance stores.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 357

Monday, May 3, 2021

Major Charles Wright Wills: March 7, 1865

Goodwin's Mills, 16 miles northwest of Cheraw,
March 7, 1865.

About 11 miles to-day and in camp at noon. The 14th and 20th had come down and cross at Cheraw. We are waiting on them. That expedition to Florence was a failure. Men got the town but were driven out before they destroyed a thing. I am inclined to think the officers did not do their whole duty. They should have succeeded or lost more blood. Our loss amounted to nothing. One of the best foraging days of the whole trip. Our foragers to-day captured some negroes and horses. The negroes say they were running them over here to get away from General “Schofield's company.” We are about on the State line now, and will leave S. C. to-morrow. I think she has her "rights” now. I don't hate her any more.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 358

Wednesday, July 15, 2020

William Hicks Jackson

JACKSON, William Hicks, soldier and capitalist, was born at Paris, Tenn., Oct. 1, 1835, son of Dr. Alexander and Mary W. (Hurt) Jackson. His parents early removed from Halifax county, Va., to Paris, and thence to Jackson, Tenn. They belonged to the best stock of Virginia, and bequeathed to their sons, Howell Edmunds and William Hicks, the high qualities which made them both eminent men. Descended from such ancestors and trained by such parents, William Hicks Jackson displayed in early life the strong impulses, and acquired the complete self-control, which have so distinguished his manhood. His preparatory education was received in the best schools of Jackson, and at West Tennessee College, where he evinced strong intellectual powers. He gained reputation among his schoolmates as the stout defender of the weak against the strong. In 1852 he was appointed a cadet to West Point. Although hard study and severe regulations were irksome to his fiery spirit, he was guided by his firm resolve to gratify the wishes of his father, and was graduated in 1856 with credit to himself. In his career at West Point he displayed the same traits that marked his boyhood, and was recognized as a leader among his comrades. After the usual furlough and some mouths spent at the barracks at Carlisle, Pa., he was sent, in 1857, to Fort Union, New Mexico, where, as an officer in the regiment of mounted rifles, he took an active part in the principal Indian fights in that territory with such men as Kit Carson, La Rue, and others as his guides. The adventurous character of this service was well suited to the bold and ardent temperament of tile young soldier. He was frequently complimented in orders from headquarters of both department and army for his gallantry and good judgment. Although not an advocate of secession, his intense loyalty to his native state induced him, when the first shot was tired in the civil war, to resign his commission in the U. S. regular army, and to offer his services to the Confederate States. After an adventurous journey in running the blockade at Galveston, he finally arrived in Tennessee, was appointed a captain of artillery by Gov. Harris, and summoned before the state military board at Nashville, which retained him two weeks in consultation on the subject of the equipment of cavalry and artillery. He then reported to Gen. Pillow at Memphis, and served on his staff in the campaigns of Missouri and Kentucky. He was assigned to the duty of organizing a light battery at Columbus, Ky., with which he reported to Gen. Pillow. On Nov. 7, 1861, followed the battle of Belmont, in which he performed the exploit of conducting three regiments of infantry to the rear of Grant's army, routing it until securing a Confederate triumph. For this service he was promoted to the rank of colonel. In this battle his horse was shot under him, and he received a minie-ball in the right side, which, inflicting a wound at the time supposed to be fatal, has never been extracted. He was placed by Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston in command of all the cavalry in western Tennessee, and was engaged in many severe minor battles there and in northern Mississippi. He led the brilliant dash on Holly Springs, Miss., Dec. 20, 1862, that resulted in the capture of 1,800 infantry, many cavalry, millions of dollars' worth of stores, and Gen. Grant's private papers. The loss of this secondary base of supplies compelled Gen. Grant to abandon his campaign by land against Vicksburg, caused him to return to Memphis and organize his river campaign. This brilliant service gained him promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, and the unique distinction of being mentioned in Gen. Grant's “Memoirs” as the only man who came near capturing him. Gen. Jackson was next assigned to the command of the second division of cavalry under Gen. Van Dorn, in Tennessee, the first division being commanded by Gen. Forrest, and soon after participated in the battle of Thompson's Station, which resulted in the capture of Col. Coburn's Federal brigade of 1.600 infantry. In the autumn, at the request of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Gen. Jackson joined him at Canton, Miss., and commanded the cavalry of his army in the movement for the relief of Vicksburg. Later, at Johnston's request, he was transferred with him to the army of Tennessee, and during the Georgia campaign commanded the cavalry on the left wing. Among the gallant exploits during this period were the defeat of Kilpatrick at Lovejoy Station, and in connection with Gen. Wheeler, the capture at Newnan, Ga., of 1,500 Federal cavalrv. Gen. Jackson was selected by Gen. Hood to join him in the invasion of Tennessee. His division led the advance in pursuing Gen. Schofield's retreating forces, held them at bay for an entire night at Spring Hill, participated in the battle of Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864, and led the Confederate advance to a point only a few miles from the fortified city of Nashville. At Murfreesboro, Jackson defeated the Federals and drove them back to their intrenchments, and after the battle of Nashville, his division covered the retreat of Hood's army. He was now placed in command of Forrest's cavalry troop, and the Texas brigade, and was recommended for promotion by Gens. Dick Taylor, N. B. Forrest, Joseph E. Johnston, and previously by Polk and Hardee; but having incurred the displeasure of Pres. Davis on account of arresting a friend of the president's brother, Joseph, he failed to receive the promotion. Gen. Jackson next served in the Alabama campaign, defeating Gens. Croxton and McCook, and arrived at Marion Junction, where he learned of Forrest's defeat at Selma. Then came the final surrender at Gainesville, Ala., May 9, 1865. Gen. Jackson performed his last military service as Confederate commissioner in association with Gen. Dennis, Federal commissioner, for the parole of the troops at Gainesville and other points. Returning to his home at Jackson, Tenn., the retired soldier entered upon his peaceful career as a cotton planter. On Dec 15, 1868, he was married to Selene, daughter of Gen. W. G. Harding, a highly accomplished and lovely woman. She died Dec. 18, 1892, leaving three children: Eunice, wife of Albert D. Marks, a son of ex-Gov. Marks, and a prominent attorney of Nashville; Selene Harding, wife of William R. Elliston, and William Harding Jackson, who succeeds his father in the management of “Belle Meade,” and gives promise of emulating his father's usefulness. At the request of Gen. Harding, Gen. Jackson became his assistant in the management of the vast stock farm, “Belle Meade,” comprising 5,500 acres, where he found opportunity not only to indulge the tastes so firmly implanted in him as a boy on his father's plantation, but also to devote his mind to the development of scientific agriculture. He was the projector and moving spirit of the agricultural journal known as the “Rural Sun,” which was long the most popular agricultural publication in the South. He was president of the company with Col. J. B. Killebrew as chief editor. In his own language, “Agricultural journals, like almanacs, should be calculated for the latitudes they are designed to serve. . . . My observation has taught me that many young men of the South, in their efforts to apply the teachings of the northern journals to the conditions of the South, have led them into disastrous errors.” Refusing the highest political offices which his fellow-citizens desired to thrust upon him. preferring rather to be the power behind the throne than the shadow upon it, he has proved his public spirit and shown the highest attributes of citizenship by devoting his energies to contributing to the material development of the country, and has accepted positions tending to promote the public welfare. He has been president of the state association of farmers; was organizer and for many years president of the national agricultural congress, and state bureau of agriculture of Tennessee. In the latter capacity he was influential in creating the office of state commissioner of agriculture, and in promoting the publication of that notable work, "The Resources of Tennessee," of which the secretary of the board, Col. J. B. Killebrew, was editor. This work has been published in many different languages and scattered abroad, and, according to leading authorities, was the most eminent agency in first attracting immigration to Tennessee. As president and fiscal agent of the state bureau of agriculture, no money could be spent without his signature. So well was this duty discharged, that the whole work of the department was completed, including the publication of the “Resources of Tennessee” (1874), at a total cost of $13,500, leaving $6,500 out of an appropriation of $20,000 to be returned to the state treasury. In recognition of this distinguished service and economical expenditure, he was complimented by a vote of thanks by the general assembly of Tennessee. In addition to his work as an agriculturist, Gen. Jackson has been an active promoter of various public enterprises: as president of the Safe Deposit Trust Co., of Nashville, of the Nashville Gas Light Co., and of the Nashville street railway, which he took over when in the hands of a receiver in a disordered condition, and reorganized and rehabilitated, financially and materially. In no instance has his genius been more conspicuously displayed than in the perfection of the great “Belle Meade,” celebrated in poetry and song, which experts from England pronounce to be the best managed and most complete stock farm in the world. It is the home of Iroquois, the most famous race-horse, and now one of the most valuable stallions in the world, who won on the English turf an unequaled triumph. Here are also Luke Blackburn (imp.), Great Tom, Tremont, Loyalist (imp.), Clarendon, and other “kings of the turf”; as well as extensive herds of thoroughbred Jersey cattle, Shetland ponies, and the finest deer park in America. “Belle Meade” is a typical southern home, the frequent scene of true southern hospitality, and here Gen. Jackson has entertained Pres. and Mrs. Cleveland, cabinet officers, statesmen, authors, poets, and many foreigners, including members of the nobility from different countries. In many other ways, also, he has contributed to the material prosperity, and stimulated the progress, of his native state. He has erected at Nashville the finest office and apartment building in Tennessee, a model of architecture. He was a moving spirit in promoting the great Tennessee Centennial exposition of 1896-97, and declining the presidency served as chairman of its executive committee. Since the close of the war he has been the advocate of sectional conciliation, and has exerted his powerful influence at all times and at all places, but especially in the Confederate Veteran Association, in which he has long held high rank. By promoting such public enterprises and exerting an influence so salutary and potent, Gen. Jackson furnishes an illustrious example of the private citizen of public spirit who, declining political office, “does more than armies for the commonweal.” The well-known author and scientist, Col. J. B. Killebrew, who has known him over a quarter of a century, has well said: “Gen. Jackson is a strong man, mentally, physically and morally. He never does anything by halves. He never rests as long as there is an improvement to be made. Whatever he puts his hands on, prospers. He has an intuitive knowledge of men, and therefore his agents are always the best for accomplishing the purposes for which he selects them. In the organization and conduct of the many large enterprises with which his name is associated, he has acquired the habits of thought peculiar to all successful men. He goes directly to the point, and he has all the precision of a martinet, with the power of a conqueror. Broad, but accurate; diligent, but deliberate; patient, but prompt; kind, but firm; fearing no weight of responsibility, yet not careless of it, he always meets and overcomes difficulties.”

SOURCE: The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Volume 9, p. 212-3

Friday, April 10, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General George H. Thomas, October 20, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 20, 1864.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland:

GENERAL: I think I have thought over the whole field of the future, and being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months: Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz, Generals Davis and Slocum. I propose to remain along the Coosa watching Hood until all my preparations are made, viz, until I have repaired the railroad, sent back all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson to report to you. If you send me 5,000 or 6,000 new conscripts I may also send back one of General Slocum's or Davis' divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations. I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, &c., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach these points, but to divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, that at the same time Canby act vigorously up the Alabama River. I do not fear that the Southern army will again make a lodgment on the Mississippi, for past events demonstrate how rapidly armies can be raised in the Northwest on that question and how easily handled and supplied. The only hope of a Southern success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now a good entering wedge and should drive it home. It will take some time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a large amount of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object.

I am, &c.,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 377-8

Thursday, April 9, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, November 6, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va.:

DEAR GENERAL: I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments. The taking of Atlanta broke upon Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and Columbia, S. C., he let out some of his thoughts which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the President of the Southern Confederacy but also its Commander-in-Chief, we are bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate. The whole burden of his song consisted in the statement that Sherman's communications must be broken and his army destroyed. Now, it is a well-settled principle that if we can prevent his succeeding in his threat we defeat him and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications with my base. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His losses at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number (his losses in men) ours at the block-houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skillful and rapid lodgment made on my railroad. The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle. But I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps and railroad guards back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled to do what is usually a mistake in war, divide my forces, send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance here. As I have heretofore informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from Gaylesville and Schofield from Rome, both of whom have reached their destinations, and thus far Hood, who had brought up at Florence, is farther from my communications than when he started, and I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized, so that I feel no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications. My last accounts from General Thomas are to 9.30 last night, when Hood's army was about Florence in great distress about provisions, as he well must be. But that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville and was making havoc among the gun-boats and transports. But Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville and a fleet of gun-boats reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble. But you know that that line of supplies was only opened for summer use when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis' threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure. Now as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army, and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta and a retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency or success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice and would slip out and escape to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the men to attack fortifications or meet me in battle, and it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats and maneuvers. These are the reasons which have determined my former movements. I have employed the last ten days in running to the rear the sick and wounded and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, aiming to organize this branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to 1,000 men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule teams, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the l0th instant this end will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid, the Presidential election over and out of our way, and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, What shall be done? On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis' boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship, nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power.

Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even without a battle, the result operating upon the minds of sensible men would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk. Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement per se be right, still there may be reasons why one route would be better than another. There are three from Atlanta, southeast, south, and southwest, all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining in the Confederacy, which would be destroyed and thereby sever the communications between the armies of Lee and Beauregard. Incidentally, I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta and reach the seashore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia. The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the valley of the Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future movements. The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile and occupation of the line of the Alabama. In my judgment the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia, the second would be the safest of execution, but the third would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy, Beauregard. If, therefore, I should start before I hear further from you or before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and then, if I feint on Columbus, will move, via Macon and Millen, to Savannah, or if I feint on Macon you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola. I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my departure. General Steedman is here to clear the railroad back to Chattanooga, and I will see that the road is broken completely between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, including their bridges, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed.

I am, with respect,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 658-61

Monday, January 27, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: August 31, 1864

Near Jonesboro, August 31, 1864.

We were afraid we would have no battle this month, but our fears were disappointed in a very summary manner this p. m. Hardee, in command of his own and Hood's old corps, attacked the Army of the Tennessee again, the weight of the assault being on our corps. The second division, M. L. Smith's, had the hardest of the fighting. The position our regiment held was unluckily too strong. They did not dare attack us. But we had a splendid view of the fight, both on our right and left.

Six Johnnie lines of battle debouched from the woods on our left, and swept right across our front on open ground, within long musket range, say 600 or 700 yards. This was 2:30 p. m. They were coming over to attack the 16th Corps. A five-gun battery on the right of our regiment and two guns on our left opened on them with spherical case, and threw some canister. They had hardly fired two shots when a Rebel 10-pound Parrott opened on them in front, and a Napoleon battery on our left flank. The Rebels shot admirably and you may imagine our regiment was in a pretty warm position, though our works and traverses made the danger but little.

In ten minutes from the time we first saw the Rebels they struck the 16th Corps, and after a right heavy fight of near an hour they came back flying. Our boys, though not near enough to do much effective shooting, put in 40 or 50 rounds apiece, just to keep our hands in. About the same time they struck Morgan L. they struck our first brigade and the left of our brigade. Our division repulsed them easily and Morgan L. slaughtered them awfully, but he had a hard fight. They charged up close to the left of our regiment, but owing to the direction of our lines not where we could fight them. Our brigade took one colonel, one major, three captains, one lieutenant and 30 men prisoners. The 2d division took several hundred. I can't guess what their loss is, though it is not as heavy as on the 22d or 28th of July, for they did not fight nearly as well. Besides losing a host of men in this campaign, the Rebel Army has lost a large meaure of vim, which counts a good deal in soldiering. Our loss in this fight is comparatively nothing. Say 30 men in our brigade; we have four or five scratched in our regiment, but only one much hurt. A spent 12-pound solid shot rolled on him. Kilpatrick started for the railroad south this morning. He has had a big fight with Cleyburn's division, but don't know much about it. During our fight to-day Schofield and Stanley, 23d and 4th, took the railroad and are destroying it. Hood, with Polk's old corps, are above him and cut off from Hardee.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 294-5

Tuesday, October 29, 2019

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 179. Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division, of operations November 29, 1864--January 13, 1865.

No. 179.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding Provisional Division,
of operations November 29, 1864—January 13, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL DIVISION,             
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 
Chattanooga, Tenn., January 20, 1865.

The following report of the recent campaign is respectfully submitted: I had been ordered by Major-General Thomas to organize the troops belonging to Major-General Sherman's field command within this department and report them to Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah. On the 29th day of November, 1864, while on the above duty at Chattanooga, Tenn., an order was received from Major-General Steedman to move that day by rail all available force. A portion of the garrison at Tunnel Hill was withdrawn, and, with the Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers from this post, was added to my command. The following statement exhibits the number of officers and men comprising the command on leaving Chattanooga, and the formation of battalions and brigades, temporarily made, to wit:

Command.
Officers
Men
Aggregate
Total
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.
Col. J. G. MITCHELL, commanding.




First Battalion, Lieut. Col. F. W. Lister
8
526
534

Second Battalion, Lieut. Col. William O'Brien
4
256
260        
794





TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.
Col. BENJAMIN HARRISON, commanding.




First Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel McManus
8
399
407

Second Battalion, Major Hoskins
6
304
 310     
717





TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.
Lieutenant-Colonel BANNING, commanding.





Eighteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Captain Henderson.
9
316
325

Third Battalion, Fourteenth Army Corps, Major Roatch
8
311
319
644





SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.
Col. A. G. MALLOY, commanding.




Field and staff
3

3

Twentieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. C. C. Cox
1
126
127

Thirtieth Illinois Battalion, Capt. J. Kemnitzer
1
208
209

Thirteenth Iowa Infantry, Capt. C. H. Haskin
1
186
187

Third Battalion, Twentieth Army Corps, Captain Hulbert
6
290
296
822
Total
55
2,922
2,977


November 30, 1864, reached Cowan Station at 8 a.m., disembarked the command, and bivouacked.

December 1, shipped the command by rail during the night, and left Cowan about daylight. Reached Nashville at 5 p.m. and went into camp in the eastern suburbs of the city. December 2, moved to the hill near Rains' house and built a strong line of fortifications, and a redoubt for the Twentieth Indiana Battery (Captain Osborne commanding), which was upon service with my command this day. December 3, in compliance with orders from Major-General Steedman, abandoned the works built the day previous, and fell back to a line indicated nearer the city. In the new position the right rested at Judge Trimble's house, and the line extending northward across the Murfreesborough pike, the left rested near Major Lewis' house. A substantial line of earth-works, with a protecting line of palisades, and an abatis of brush in front, was speedily constructed. During the day the Eighteenth Ohio Battery (Captain Aleshire commanding) was assigned to me for duty. A strong redoubt was built for the artillery at a point where the line crossed the Murfreesborough turnpike. My command occupied this line until the general assault upon the enemy. The position was materially strengthened from day to day by the construction and raising of a dam across Brown's Creek, at the bridge below, on the Lebanon turnpike. The creek ran nearly parallel to the line of works and about 200 yards in front of the abatis. It became--as the depth of water increased--a material impediment in the way of an assault. My command performed about 4,500 days' work in the construction of this dam. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor principally superintended its construction, in obedience to orders from district headquarters. Major Roatch, commanding battalion Fourteenth Army Corps, was seriously wounded while superintending a fatigue party at the dam, and the services of this meritorious officer were thereby lost to his command during the residue of the campaign.

December 11. My command was increased on and after the 6th instant by the assignment of recruits arriving from the rear, amounting in the aggregate to 2,327 enlisted men, who were properly armed and distributed to their respective battalions and brigades. The Sixty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Espy commanding, was also added. These re-enforcements brought the effective strength of the division up to 5,249. This day orders were received directing a reconnaissance in force upon the enemy occupying our old line of works, near Rains' house. Col. J. G. Mitchell, commanding the brigade of detachments from Fourteenth Army Corps, was assigned to that duty. He moved his brigade on the Murfreesborough turnpike for about half a mile, then made a detour to the right, where he formed his lines behind a small ridge and sent his skirmishers to the front; drove in the skirmishers of the enemy, advanced upon his works, and thoroughly reconnoitered his position. The casualties of Colonel Mitchell's command were trifling, having none killed and but 3 or 4 slightly wounded.

December 12, the command was put in shape to move at 6 a.m. on the following morning. December 13, in obedience to orders another reconnaissance was made on the enemy's line near Rains' house. This duty was assigned to Col. A. G. Malloy, commanding brigade of detachment of Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps. Colonel Malloy, with 1,200 men of his command, advanced upon the enemy's line at the point indicated. Some sharp skirmishing ensued, but the objects of the reconnaissance were attained. Colonel Malloy's casualties were as follows: Killed, 1; wounded, 6; missing, 1; making a total of 8 enlisted men.

December 14, the effective force of the division was 5,359, as shown by the following statement:

Command.
Officers.
Men.
Aggregate.
Division headquarters :
6
20
26
First Brigade, Colonel Harrison
26
1,033
1,059
Second Brigade, Colonel Mitchell
24
1,104
1,128
Third Brigade, Colonel Grosvenor
39
852
891
Second Brigade (Army of the Tennessee), Colonel Malloy
22
1,925
1,947
Miscellaneous Camp, Captain Eaton
4
304
308
Total
121
5,238
5,359

Orders were again received to be ready to march at 6 a.m. of the next day. Arms were issued to the portion of troops that were unarmed, and command was put in readiness to comply with the order. In the evening orders were received from Major-General Steedman to detail one of the brigades to report for duty to Colonel Morgan, commanding colored brigade, on my left.. Lieut. Col, C. H. Grosvenor (who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Banning in command of the brigade) was ordered to report to Colonel Morgan. This order detached Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my immediate control during the operations before Nashville, and it did not again rejoin its command until it reached Murfreesborough, marching by way of Franklin, Tenn.

December 15, according to directions from the major-general commanding, the division moved at 4 a.m., and, abandoning its line of defenses, relieved a portion of the troops of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-General Wood commanding, and Twenty-third Army Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, and held their exterior line of works, picketing also the front from the Acklen place to a point north of Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, Franklin, Nolensville, and Murfreesborough turnpikes. Details were furnished to support the batteries of artillery in the lines and to garrison Fort Morton, and Redoubt Casino. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor (temporarily reporting to Colonel Morgan) was engaged during the day in the assault on the enemy's works near Rains' house, and was the only portion of the division in the fight. It suffered considerably in killed and wounded, and behaved creditably. The Twenty-fourth [Twenty-fifth?] Indiana Battery (Captain Sturm), in position on the right of the line, near the Acklen place, was ordered by me, near night-fall, to fire upon a retreating line of rebels which came in sight, passing parallel to my right, from left of the Fourth Corps. The fire was opened with good effect (though at long range) and the rebel line was dispersed in great confusion. Captain Sturm and his officers and artillerists deserve great credit for the precision with which they worked their guns and the good results that followed.

December 16, the command remained in position as of yesterday. The brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor was engaged on the left during the day and contributed its share in the work achieved by Major-General Steedman in that quarter. The assault made upon the enemy's lines and works in the afternoon of this day was under the immediate sight and direction of Major-General Steedman, and the brigade will, without doubt, receive due credit from him. All accounts that reach me speak well of the conduct of the troops in this action. During the afternoon Colonel Mitchell's brigade was moved rapidly out from the works and occupied the hills beyond Rains' house, in compliance with orders, pushing a strong line of skirmishers to Riddle's Hill beyond. The brigade held this position firmly and in shape to repel any attack on the part of the enemy's cavalry to turn the left of the general line, and protected all approaches from the east during the residue of the time this command remained at Nashville.

Monday, December 19, received orders to march to Murfreesborough; moved the command at 6.30 a.m., leaving behind those sick and unable to march, in all, say, 500. Reached La Vergne, fifteen miles, and encamped at night-fall. Tuesday, December 20, marched to Murfreesborough and encamped. Wednesday, December 21, shipped the command on cars, without rations, and started on the morning of 22d for Stevenson. Remained on cars four days. Sunday, December 25, reached Limestone Creek, eight miles beyond Huntsville, and bivouacked. Monday, December 26, marched to bayou near mouth of Limestone Creek, say ten miles, and bivouacked; sent back by train those sick and unable to march, say 400 men.

Tuesday, December 27, waded bayou at 4 a.m., and marched down on north side of Tennessee, nearly opposite mouth of Flint River, and awaited orders. The enemy shelled the transports sent to convey my command over, but no casualties resulted therefrom. Signaled General Steedman information of the enemy's strength, &c., at Decatur, obtained from Colonel Prosser and one of my staff officers. Crossed the river and lagoon beyond, and halted to receive rations from the transports at 4 p.m., as directed by Major-General Steedman. Soon received orders from him to move up to support Colonel Thompson's division, which had been advanced toward Decatur and had been engaged during the afternoon in skirmishing with the enemy. The command was brought up as rapidly as possible and formed in line on Colonel Thompson's right. The enemy opened fire with two pieces of artillery. Some of the shots fell near my line, but without damage. An advance was ordered, and both divisions moved rapidly on the town. The enemy ran away before we reached it, taking his two pieces of artillery, and our troops occupied the place. Marched back to the woodland near Decatur, and encamped for the night.

Wednesday, December 28, marched at 5 p.m., on Courtland road, to Moseley's farm, say three miles west of Decatur, and bivouacked, Thursday, December 29, marched thirteen miles and a half, to Swope's place, and bivouacked. Friday, December 30, marched at 7 a.m. to Courtland, four miles, and encamped. Remained at Courtland five days.

Wednesday, January 4, 1865, left Courtland at 2 p.m.; marched back to Swope's, and bivouacked. Thursday, January 5, marched at dawn of day; made thirteen miles and a half, and encamped at Moseley's. Here orders were received from Major-General Steedman, advising of his departure, by transports, with the artillery, and turning over the entire infantry command to me. Friday, January 6, crossed the Tennessee at the Decatur pontoon, and sent forward one division to Huntsville, which arrived about dark, the transportation doubling back for the other. It was designed to remain at Huntsville until 1 p.m. of the next day to bring up the residue of the command and to await transportation and the completion of the Paint Rock bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy. At an interview with Brigadier-General Wood, commanding Fourth Corps, then at Huntsville, he requested me strongly to press forward a brigade to Larkinsville, apprehending that the rebel General Lyon might be in the vicinity. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was sent forthwith (at 11.30 p.m.), with instructions to get over Paint Rock Creek in some manner, and reach Larkinsville by march, patrol the country thoroughly, and engage Lyon, if he could be found. Colonel Mitchell used every possible effort to carry out his instructions. He reached Larkinsville on the morning of the 7th, and made an extensive patrol of the surrounding country, and reported that he could hear nothing of Lyon. Saturday, January 7, General Wood advised, at an interview during the morning, that I should personally go to Larkinsville, with all the troops for which transportation could be had. The condition of the troops and the orders of General Steedman, &c., were explained to General Wood. In the emergency, however, I followed his advice. There could be but one train made up at Huntsville; on this Colonel Harrison's brigade was loaded at 12 m. and the train run to Paint Rock Station. Here the railway managers kept the troops until, say, 2 a.m., waiting on westward bound trains, and for repairs of the bridge. A telegraphic instrument was put in operation and communication had with Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman. Here an order from General Wood reached me by telegraph, based upon instructions from the department commander “to stop the return of Major-General Steedman's troops.” The telegraphic message directed me to “disembark the forces that are on the cars immediately, scour the country thoroughly, and find out, if possible, where Lyon is, and get in pursuit of him; he must be found, and either captured or driven across the Tennessee River. General Thomas' orders on this subject are emphatic, and he says you must not go on your way until this work is finished.” Here intelligence was received that all the troops on trains following me—Colonels Thompson's, Morgan's, and Salm's brigades—had been stopped and unloaded at Brownsborough, by orders from Brigadier-General Wood; that a portion of these were ordered to New Market by his direction; and that the arrangements for shipping Colonel Malloy's troops had not been carried out. The men were out of rations, the weather now cold, rainy, and disagreeable, and the roads well-nigh impassable for infantry. On reaching Larkinsville a telegraphic message was sent to Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding at Stevenson, asking a supply of rations; he promptly promised them. Owing to delays on the railways, however, they did not reach the troops in time. The garrison at Larkinsville consisted of Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry, Captain Givens commanding, numbering probably sixty men, and a sort of amateur gathering of mounted men, who styled themselves “Alabama Scouts,” under Captain Sparks, say thirty or forty in number. At 7 a.m. all the cavalry and the anomalous scouts were sent to patrol the roads in the direction of Winchester, New Nashville, Robinson's farm, &c., with instructions to keep a strong vedette post at Colonel Province's. Infantry patrols were sent out to watch the approaches leading through the coves, in the direction of Bellefonte, Scottsborough, and Larkinsville. The intelligence which reached my headquarters from all these parties, and from citizens during the day, showed that no enemy was in the vicinity, except the “bushwhacking gangs of Russell, Hayes, Mead, and Wilson, which constantly infest the mountains in the vicinity. Lyon could not be heard of. At 2.55 p.m. a dispatch was received from Colonel Krzyzanowski reciting a dispatch from Major-General Milroy, as follows:

General Lyon crossed the mountain last night, going toward Bellefonte. Has 500 men; many of them dressed in Federal overcoats. He has one howitzer.

Colonel Harrison's brigade was immediately loaded on the only train at Larkinsville and started before 4 p.m. to Bellefonte, with instructions to patrol the road from there west to Scottsborough and place a battalion at Bellefonte landing; engage Lyon, if possible, and pursue him at all hazards. He was directed to inform the officer commanding at Scottsborough of the intelligence received; to direct him to make stalwart resistance, and to re-enforce him if he heard firing at Scottsborough. The garrison at Scottsborough consisted of two lieutenants (whose names have been mislaid), and, say, fifty-four colored soldiers of the One hundred and tenth (unorganized) U.S. Colored Volunteers, supposed to be in a substantial earth-work at the place. At about 5.30 p.m. train arrived from the west, the last one bringing Colonel Halley's brigade. This was immediately sent forward to Scottsborough by rail, at, say, 8 p.m., as soon as the road was clear, with proper instructions. Shortly after Colonel Malloy left, a few single discharges of artillery were heard at long intervals in what citizens said was the direction of Bellefonte. It seemed possible that Harrison had fallen in with Lyon, or that the gun-boats were shelling his river detachment; however, as Colonel Malloy was rapidly nearing Scottsborough and the firing soon ceased, it seemed to demand no special attention. The commanding officer at Scottsborough erred in leaving the earth-works and betaking himself and command to the brick depot building; he made, however, from the latter place a sturdy resistance to the attack of the skirmishers and held out well (as the enemy's prisoners admit), and forced Lyon to dismount and form line of battle, bring up his artillery and use it, thus consuming considerable time. In the meanwhile the two sections preceding Colonel Malloy dashed past the troops on the trains, firing on the enemy, confusing him, and stopping his attack on the garrison. In this confusion and cessation of fire the garrison escaped and came to Colonel Malloy, who was unloading and forming his lines at the water-tank in the edge of the town. A re-enforcement from Colonel Harrison, at Bellefonte, arrived at this time on the east of the place, and the enemy ran away rapidly. Colonel Malloy sent back one of his sections, with one of the lieutenants of the colored troops, to report, reaching headquarters about midnight. This lieutenant was badly stampeded; his statements were miserably incongruous, childish, and improbable; a complete physical terror seemed to possess him, and nothing he stated could be relied on. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was immediately ordered from Larkinsville, in the direction of the river, to try and intercept Lyon at Perry's house, the junction of the Larkin's Ferry and Gunter's Landing roads. Colonel Mitchell moved at about 2 a.m. Colonel Thompson, arriving from west with his brigade, was sent forward to join Colonel Malloy and press on in pursuit. Colonel Salm's brigade, arriving in the night, was rationed, and soon after day left to follow up Colonel Mitchell by a line more to the right. At daylight the troops were disposed as follows: Colonel Malloy and Colonel Thompson in direct pursuit of Lyon and close on him; Colonel Harrison to his left, pressing down the river and feeling into Bellefonte, Sublett's, McGinn's, and Larkin's Landings, and preventing retreat up the river; Colonels Mitchell and Salm trying to cut him off, by shorter lines to the river, at Roman's and Law's Landings, and to strike the Gunter's Landing road below him. Colonel Mitchell pushed his column rapidly forward. Soon after dawn of day he came upon a detachment of the enemy attempting to burn the bridge across Santa Creek, while the main portion of his forces had swum the creek some three miles below and were passing the junction of the roads at Perry's, say four miles down the Gunter's Landing road. Colonel Mitchell drove off the enemy, extinguished the fire on the bridge, and pushed on after him. He was only about an hour behind him at Perry's Cross-Roads. Colonel Malloy was compelled to delay his pursuit at the creek below for some three hours to construct a crossing for his men. The streams were all flooded, the mud deep, the rain pouring down, and the men (except Colonels Mitchell's and Salm's commands) without rations. I accompanied Colonel Mitchell's column; Colonel Malloy joined this during the afternoon. Pursuit was made vigorously till near night-fall, when the troops were so exhausted that they were bivouacked as an act of humanity. I rode back to Larkinsville, and during [the] evening informed Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman by telegraph of the condition of affairs, and tried to get at Colonel Morgan's command, to send it from Woodville to strike the Tennessee at mouth of Paint Rock. It was impossible to reach Colonel Morgan, the telegraphic station having been removed from Brownsborough. He came up during the night with his own regiment and Colonel Shafter's. Colonel Morgan was unloaded at Larkinsville to get rations and rest, and Colonel Shafter sent on to Scottsborough to protect that place from guerrillas, who were reported to have been firing at the small guard there during the afternoon. Efforts were again made to have rations at Gunter's Landing by transport, and a message was received from Major-General Steedman announcing their shipment.

Tuesday, January 10, Colonels Mitchell, Malloy, Salm, and Thompson were in motion at 4.30 a.m., continuing the pursuit. I reached the column of Colonel Mitchell soon after dawn of day. Colonel Thompson's command was thrown off to the left to Law's Landing. About eight miles from Guntersville the head of Colonel Mitchell's column struck quite a force of the enemy; probably 100 were in sight. Two battalions were thrown into line, and with the small cavalry force (which was taken from Larkinsville) was pushed for them. They broke to small squads and ran away to the hills and woods on each side and down the road in great confusion; but few shots were fired. The gunboats on the river were at this time shelling the woods on the north side, near Gunter's Landing, and below. The enemy could be seen running about in small detachments in almost every direction and without any order, but, being well mounted, kept beyond musket-range. The column was pressed steadily toward Gunter's Landing, with patrol parties in every direction on the flanks, and the enemy chased in toward the river. They all, however, that were on the left of the road crossed it in advance of the column, and with those on the right, left rapidly by the roads running down the river. Some were driven into the riverbank, but being mounted could swim the lagoons in the bottom that could not be waded by infantry; here they encountered the gun-boats; a few abandoned their horses, and they were captured by the boats. General Lyon had reached Claysville, opposite Gunter's Landing, the evening before, with the greater portion of his command and the piece of artillery. Citizens reported that he had abandoned his command during the night, and had crossed the river by a scow with the piece of artillery and a portion of his staff. It is probable that about 200 of his command crossed during the night at Law's Landing, and at a point about one mile and a half above Claysville, in canoes and by swimming their horses. The rest of his command at Claysville was collected at the head of the island above on the 11th, attempting to cross, and was alarmed by the coming down of a gun-boat and dispersed; a portion of the command, under Colonel Chenoweth, left Claysville about 12 m. in direction of Deposit. My advance reached Claysville at 2 p.m. Colonel Salm, leaving his men who were barefooted, was sent on immediately toward Deposit, with instructions to make that point or the creek and beyond, if possible, by daylight. He marched his Command vigorously, pursuing the enemy retreating as squads, and making the points ordered. The ambulance wagon and artillery harness which General Lyon had with him were captured, as well as those wounded at Scottsborough, viz, 1 captain and 3 soldiers. Patrol parties were sent from Colonels Mitchell's, Malloy's, and Thompson's commands to scour the woods along the river and to watch the various ferrying places in the vicinity. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien's battalion of the Fourteenth Corps detachment was placed opposite Gunter's Landing. The few cattle and sheep the country afforded were collected by the commissary and distributed to the command. The gun-boats on the river had no co-operation with me. I was able to get on board but one of them, the U.S. Grant, I think. The commanding officer was informed of the nature of my dispositions and all the intelligence that had been obtained. By some mistake one of the gun-boats (as Colonel Thompson reported) threw some shells into his camp at Law's Landing, fortunately without hurting anybody. The rebels were much alarmed by the shells of the gun-boats, but there were no casualties from them that could be heard of. Being satisfied that none of the rebel squads had gone up the river Colonel Harrison was ordered to march to the railway, at the nearest point, and load his command for Chattanooga.

Wednesday, January 11, no rations arriving by river, Colonel Malloy's and Colonel Thompson's commands were ordered back to the railway at Larkinsville, by different routes, with instructions to subsist on the country. Colonel Mitchell remained at Claysville, patrolling the country in the vicinity. Colonel Salm pushed his march toward mouth of Paint Rock Creek. On arriving at Honey Comb Creek it was found to be impassable. The few mounted men of the Eleventh Indiana with the command swam the creek and patrolled the country to Paint Rock during the day. It was impossible, however, to catch the small parties of rebels to be seen without a cavalry force. The high waters and impossibility of procuring rations rendered it out of the question to push forward infantry farther. The pursuit was abandoned, therefore, toward night-fall, confirming the experience of all time that troops of the line cannot run down cavalry.

Thursday, January 12, orders were issued to Colonel Salm to march to the railway at Woodville by Honey Comb Valley, and to Colonel Mitchell to make the same point by the mountain road from Claysville. They reached Woodville at dark, obtained rations sent there for them, and were shipped in the night to their former camps at Bridgeport and Chattanooga. One captain (Murray) and 2 soldiers were captured, in addition to those mentioned heretofore, making a total of 2 captains and 5 soldiers. Friday, January 14, the residue of the troops along the railway were rationed, provided with transportation, and returned to the places indicated in Major-General Steedman's orders.

The total casualties of the division in battle on the entire campaign cannot be given with exact accuracy as to names and regiments at this time. It was impossible to prepare correct lists of the recruits received during the last few days at Nashville before starting upon the march, and in some instances, in the haste of arming and equipping the men, this important matter was improperly neglected. It is probable that a number of worthy men have fallen in battle and by disease of whom there is no record. The following statement is made up from the reports of commanding officers, to wit:

Command
Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Aggregate.
O
M
T
O
M
T
O
M
T
Colonel Malloy's brigade

4
4

7
7

6
6
17
Colonel Grosvenor's brigade.
3
25
28
5
108
113

33
33
174
Colonel Mitchell's brigade




4
4

3
3
7
Total
3
29
32
5
119
124

42
42
198

[O = Officers     M = Men]

Among the officers killed was Capt. E. Grosvenor and First Lieut. Samuel W. Thomas, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers. They fell gallantly leading their commands on the 15th of December, in the assault upon the enemy's works; they held high characters in the service for manly and soldierly qualities. A lieutenant of Second Battalion, Fourteenth Corps, was also killed, whose name and regiment have not yet been obtained. Among the officers wounded were Captains Benedict, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, Henderson, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteers, Brown, Twenty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, and J. B. Emery, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers.

The number of men who were left at Nashville by direction of the surgeon and from various points sent to hospitals in rear was large, owing to the material of the command reached 1,100 during the campaign. Those left at Nashville were reported at 500; the number sent back by trains from Limestone Creek reached 400, and those from Decatur, by transports, say 200. Several officers were sent back also from these points (and among them some of the best officers in the command), suffering from disease and former wounds. In addition to these a few men were left upon the march at houses, sick and unable to be moved. These were as well cared for as possible, and measures have since been taken to bring them up. The number of deaths from disease among the men since leaving Chattanooga is reported at eleven.

In closing this sketch of the late campaign it is due to the officers and troops of my command to bear unequivocal testimony to the patience, cheerfulness, and pluck with which they endured the fatigue of forty-six days continued field service in midwinter. The command was hastily thrown together; it consisted of detachments from more than 200 regiments; it was rapidly armed, and from its very composition could be but illy provided with the ordinary appliances which render field service endurable. About one-fourth of the command consisted of soldiers recently from hospital, scarcely convalescent, another fourth of soldiers returned from furlough, and the remaining half of raw recruits of every nationality, without drill or experience of any kind, but earnest and worthy men. The officers as a class were good, and perhaps superior to the average of the army, but they were separated from their regular commands, without their personal baggage, camp furniture, servants, change of clothing, stationery, &c., and many of them without money or time to procure any supply of these necessities. The command left without ambulances or wagons. The medical department had not adequate supplies. Measles, small-pox, and camp disorders were constantly appearing among the new men, and often at points beyond the reach of hospitals. The weather was bitter cold at times, and during the coldest days there was much suffering by transportation on the railway. In spite of all such difficulties, however, the division performed its share of military and fatigue duty during the campaign; it built its share of defenses at Nashville, and not only held them but participated to some extent in the general assault; it moved by rail 451 miles and marched 155 miles, wading streams and laboring through mud and rain; it was from necessity out of rations sometimes for days. These sufferings are incident to a soldier's life, but they are much lessened by experience and thorough organization, neither of which this division had. It is simple justice to both the soldiers and officers of this provisional division that the services they have rendered should be thoroughly understood, and that their individual reputations shall not suffer in their commands with charges of idleness or shirking during their absence.

The officers necessarily were compelled to become responsible for arms, equipments, ordnance stores, clothing, &c., and to issue them irregularly in the exigency to men of all regiments, and many who did not know their assignments. A liberal course of settlement should be adopted by the supervising authorities of the various departments with regard to these officers.

Hereto are appended the reports of Colonels Harrison, Mitchell, Malloy, and Grosvenor, commanding brigades of this division, also that of Colonel Salm (covering his services in pursuit of Lyon), marked, respectively, A, B, C, D, and E.* Reports from the other brigade commanders of the part taken by their brigades in the “tramp” after Lyon have not been as yet received.

It affords me pleasure to say of Colonels Harrison, Seventieth Indiana Volunteers, Mitchell, One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Malloy, Seventeenth Wisconsin Volunteers, who commanded, each, one of the brigades of the division, that throughout the campaign they performed their duties and handled their commands in a creditable and soldierly manner. They are brigade commanders of much experience and reputation in the army, and deserve well for long and faithful services and for their management of their respective commands on the recent campaign. Col. Felix Prince Salm, commanding Sixty-eighth New York, who served with me in command of a temporary brigade (after leaving Decatur), is an officer of experience in European armies, and is commended for the zeal, energy, and good sense which he brings to the service of the Government. Lieutenant-Colonels Banning, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio, and Grosvenor, of Eighteenth Ohio, each commanded for a short while a brigade of the division; they are good officers, and rendered the country service which should be remembered. Colonels Thompson, Twelfth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Morgan, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Infantry, commanded brigades' of colored soldiers for a short while with me. Their troops were disciplined and behaved uniformly well. These officers are entitled to the consideration of the Government for their personal efforts on the late campaign, and for the good results flowing from their labors in demonstration of the problem that colored men can be made soldiers. It is impossible to note all the deserving officers in command of battalions or companies of the division. The reports of the brigade commanders contain general and special notices of these officers, and the attention of the major-general commanding is directed particularly to them. The cheerful manner in which Captain Givens (Company M, Eleventh Indiana Cavalry)? commanding garrison at Larkinsville, responded to all orders from my headquarters, and the valuable service which his command rendered from thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, is entitled to creditable mention.

My staff consisted of the following officers, viz: Capt. John A. Wright, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. G. W. Marshall, assistant quartermaster; Capt. A. C. Ford (Thirty-first Indiana), acting commissary of subsistence; Capt. A. Vallendar (One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. L. S. Windle (One hundred and thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), ordnance officer; Surg. J. D. Cotton (Ninety-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry), medical director; First Lieut. I. N. Leonard (Ninth Indiana Volunteers), acting aide-de-camp. Each of these officers merits my thanks for the satisfactory manner in which he discharged his duties, and they are all worthy of higher positions than they hold.

With my regards to the major-general commanding district, I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

CHARLES CRUFT, 
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers.
Maj. S. B. MOE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Etowah.
______________

* See pp. 519, 524, 532, 532, 526, 801.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 509-19