Showing posts with label David S Stanley. Show all posts
Showing posts with label David S Stanley. Show all posts

Saturday, July 4, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: October 17, 1864

October 17, 1864.

I incline to think that the raid and pursuit are both over, though we wish that Sherman would follow them until they get the punishment they deserve for their impudence. They tore up some 20 miles of railroad, killed and wounded not over 750 for us, and captured about 1,1OO. Their loss in wounded and killed, whom we have buried, is 1,900; prisoners, that I know of, 600; besides a lot of deserters who have come in. Eight hundred of the prisoners captured by them were negroes, who could not have been taken but for the cowardice of their Colonel, Johnson.

The tearing up of the railroad amounts to nothing. We have not had our rations cut down an ounce in anything.

The man that run that raid ought to be ashamed of himself, and I’ll venture he is.

In Snake Creek Gap, but for General Stanley's laziness, we would have got enough prisoners to make Hood howl. He rested his corps three hours, just as he did when entrusted with a critical piece of work at Jonesboro.

We have been having a gay time this morning. It is cold enough to make us sit close to the fire, and the negroes keep us in chestnuts.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 312

Friday, April 10, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General George H. Thomas, October 20, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 20, 1864.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland:

GENERAL: I think I have thought over the whole field of the future, and being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months: Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz, Generals Davis and Slocum. I propose to remain along the Coosa watching Hood until all my preparations are made, viz, until I have repaired the railroad, sent back all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson to report to you. If you send me 5,000 or 6,000 new conscripts I may also send back one of General Slocum's or Davis' divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations. I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, &c., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach these points, but to divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, that at the same time Canby act vigorously up the Alabama River. I do not fear that the Southern army will again make a lodgment on the Mississippi, for past events demonstrate how rapidly armies can be raised in the Northwest on that question and how easily handled and supplied. The only hope of a Southern success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now a good entering wedge and should drive it home. It will take some time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a large amount of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object.

I am, &c.,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 377-8

Thursday, April 9, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, November 6, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 6, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va.:

DEAR GENERAL: I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments. The taking of Atlanta broke upon Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and Columbia, S. C., he let out some of his thoughts which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the President of the Southern Confederacy but also its Commander-in-Chief, we are bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate. The whole burden of his song consisted in the statement that Sherman's communications must be broken and his army destroyed. Now, it is a well-settled principle that if we can prevent his succeeding in his threat we defeat him and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications with my base. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His losses at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number (his losses in men) ours at the block-houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skillful and rapid lodgment made on my railroad. The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle. But I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps and railroad guards back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled to do what is usually a mistake in war, divide my forces, send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance here. As I have heretofore informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from Gaylesville and Schofield from Rome, both of whom have reached their destinations, and thus far Hood, who had brought up at Florence, is farther from my communications than when he started, and I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized, so that I feel no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications. My last accounts from General Thomas are to 9.30 last night, when Hood's army was about Florence in great distress about provisions, as he well must be. But that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville and was making havoc among the gun-boats and transports. But Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville and a fleet of gun-boats reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble. But you know that that line of supplies was only opened for summer use when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis' threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure. Now as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army, and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta and a retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency or success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice and would slip out and escape to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the men to attack fortifications or meet me in battle, and it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats and maneuvers. These are the reasons which have determined my former movements. I have employed the last ten days in running to the rear the sick and wounded and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, aiming to organize this branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to 1,000 men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule teams, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the l0th instant this end will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid, the Presidential election over and out of our way, and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, What shall be done? On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis' boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship, nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power.

Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even without a battle, the result operating upon the minds of sensible men would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk. Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement per se be right, still there may be reasons why one route would be better than another. There are three from Atlanta, southeast, south, and southwest, all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining in the Confederacy, which would be destroyed and thereby sever the communications between the armies of Lee and Beauregard. Incidentally, I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta and reach the seashore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia. The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the valley of the Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future movements. The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile and occupation of the line of the Alabama. In my judgment the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia, the second would be the safest of execution, but the third would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy, Beauregard. If, therefore, I should start before I hear further from you or before further developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and then, if I feint on Columbus, will move, via Macon and Millen, to Savannah, or if I feint on Macon you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola. I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my departure. General Steedman is here to clear the railroad back to Chattanooga, and I will see that the road is broken completely between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, including their bridges, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed.

I am, with respect,
W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 658-61

Monday, January 27, 2020

Captain Charles Wright Wills: August 31, 1864

Near Jonesboro, August 31, 1864.

We were afraid we would have no battle this month, but our fears were disappointed in a very summary manner this p. m. Hardee, in command of his own and Hood's old corps, attacked the Army of the Tennessee again, the weight of the assault being on our corps. The second division, M. L. Smith's, had the hardest of the fighting. The position our regiment held was unluckily too strong. They did not dare attack us. But we had a splendid view of the fight, both on our right and left.

Six Johnnie lines of battle debouched from the woods on our left, and swept right across our front on open ground, within long musket range, say 600 or 700 yards. This was 2:30 p. m. They were coming over to attack the 16th Corps. A five-gun battery on the right of our regiment and two guns on our left opened on them with spherical case, and threw some canister. They had hardly fired two shots when a Rebel 10-pound Parrott opened on them in front, and a Napoleon battery on our left flank. The Rebels shot admirably and you may imagine our regiment was in a pretty warm position, though our works and traverses made the danger but little.

In ten minutes from the time we first saw the Rebels they struck the 16th Corps, and after a right heavy fight of near an hour they came back flying. Our boys, though not near enough to do much effective shooting, put in 40 or 50 rounds apiece, just to keep our hands in. About the same time they struck Morgan L. they struck our first brigade and the left of our brigade. Our division repulsed them easily and Morgan L. slaughtered them awfully, but he had a hard fight. They charged up close to the left of our regiment, but owing to the direction of our lines not where we could fight them. Our brigade took one colonel, one major, three captains, one lieutenant and 30 men prisoners. The 2d division took several hundred. I can't guess what their loss is, though it is not as heavy as on the 22d or 28th of July, for they did not fight nearly as well. Besides losing a host of men in this campaign, the Rebel Army has lost a large meaure of vim, which counts a good deal in soldiering. Our loss in this fight is comparatively nothing. Say 30 men in our brigade; we have four or five scratched in our regiment, but only one much hurt. A spent 12-pound solid shot rolled on him. Kilpatrick started for the railroad south this morning. He has had a big fight with Cleyburn's division, but don't know much about it. During our fight to-day Schofield and Stanley, 23d and 4th, took the railroad and are destroying it. Hood, with Polk's old corps, are above him and cut off from Hardee.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 294-5

Friday, June 29, 2018

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 97. — Reports of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U.S. Army, commanding Twenty-third Army Corps, of operations November 30, 1864.

No. 97

Reports of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U.S. Army, commanding Twenty-third Army Corps, of operations November 30, 1864.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,          
Nashville, Tenn., December 2, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following preliminary report of the battle of Franklin, fought on the 30th ultimo:

My division reached Franklin an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 30th of November, having marched from Columbia during the night and being in advance of the army from Thompson's Station. At daybreak I received orders from Major-General Schofield, commanding the army, to take command of both divisions of the Twenty-third Corps and put them in position covering the town and the passage of the army trains, &c., to the north bank of the Harpeth River. The Third Division was put in on the left of the Franklin pike, reaching from that road across the Lewisburg pike to the river, Reilly's brigade on the right: Casement's in the center, and Henderson's (Col. I. N. Stiles temporarily commanding) on the left. The Second Division occupied the ground from the Franklin pike toward the right, reaching to the Carter's Creek pike, Strickland's brigade on the left and Moore's on the right. About noon General Kimball, commanding First Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me, by order of the commanding general, and was put in on the right of the Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, covering the ground to the river on the right, having two brigades in line and one in reserve. At 1 o'clock General Wagner, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me, his division being then the rear guard of the army, two brigades (Bradley's and Lane's) being deployed across the Columbia pike on which the enemy were advancing, and one (Opdycke's) being in reserve in the town of Franklin. General Wagner informed me that he was already under orders to keep out the two brigades till the enemy should make an advance in line in force, when he was to retire skirmishing, and become a reserve for the line established by me.

The artillery of my division, under Captain Cockerill, Battery D, First Ohio Light Artillery, was in the fort on the north bank of the Harpeth, and Captain Bridges was ordered by the commanding general to report to me with three batteries of the Fourth Corps. These were stationed as follows: One section light 12's commanding the Lewisburg pike, one section light 12's and a battery of 3-inch ordnance guns on the left of the Columbia pike, and one battery light 12's on the right of the Columbia pike. One other battery light 12's was subsequently sent to the Carter's Creek pike and worked on that part of the line. At about 2 o'clock the enemy were seen advancing, deployed in three lines, which, as they passed the range of hills before the town and came into full view in the open ground, were plainly seen to extend from the river on their right nearly or quite to the Carter's Creek pike on their left. The fact was reported to the general commanding, as well as the dispositions of our own troops as they then were, and his orders received in reference to holding the position. At 3 o'clock the enemy engaged the two brigades of Wagner's division, which, in accordance with orders, fell leisurely back within our lines, and the action became general along the entire front. The left of Strickland's brigade, Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, was somewhat confused, some new troops there not understanding the movement of Wagner's division, and one or two regiments partially retiring with them. The enemy were at this time pressing vigorously in masses, and some of their troops reached and passed the parapet at that point. Opdycke's brigade, Second Division, Fourth Corps, was immediately ordered up and came gallantly on the charge, driving the enemy back and restoring the line. Major-General Stanley, who had been ill during the forenoon, came up with Opdycke's brigade and assumed command of the troops of the Fourth Corps. At every other point of the line the enemy were repulsed, though they renewed the charge again and again. They stubbornly persisted in assaulting after dark, and at intervals the firing was very hot till 10 o'clock in the evening. At midnight the command was quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the Harpeth without opposition.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,
 J. D. COX,    
 Brigadier-General, Commanding.
 Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio.
____________________

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,          
Clifton, Tenn., January 10, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Twenty-third Army Corps in the battle between the U.S. forces, under Major-General Schofield, and the rebel army, under General Hood, at Franklin, Tenn., on the 30th day of November, 1864:

My own division (Third Division, Twenty-third Army Corps) reached Franklin about an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 30th, having marched from Columbia, twenty-two miles, during the night. The division was halted and massed on the ground upon which the battle was fought, and the men were allowed to cook their breakfast whilst the trains which were following filed past into the town. General Schofield, being with the head of the column, after an examination of the means of crossing the army to the north side of the Harpeth River, informed me that the means were so inadequate as to demand his immediate personal attention, and ordered that I assume command of the corps and put it in position to cover the crossing of the remainder of the army to the north bank of the river. The whole command was moving in from Columbia and Spring Hill by the turnpike leading from those places to Franklin, and the enemy was known to be following with his infantry by the same route, his cavalry being chiefly upon the turnpike leading from Lewisburg to Franklin. A reconnaissance of the position as soon as it was light showed that the ground immediately south of the village was almost level and without any cover from woods or orchards for a distance of nearly a mile from the outskirts of the village, and even for a considerably longer distance on the Columbia pike.

A brick dwelling, belonging to a Mr. Carter, the southernmost one of town, stands on the west side of the turnpike upon a slight knoll over which the road runs as it leaves the village. This knoll has an elevation of about ten feet above the lower ground around it, and even less above that directly south, the slope then being so slight as to be scarcely perceptible to one approaching from that direction. The crest of this elevation is about 200 yards in length from right to left, and is divided nearly equally by the Columbia pike. Two other turnpikes diverge from the village going southward, the Lewisburg pike on the left (east) and the Carter's Creek pike on the right (west). A curved line intersecting these two last-mentioned roads at the edge of the village crossed each of them upon slight elevations of ground, similar to that at Carter's house on the Columbia pike. This being the only line apparently tenable near the outskirts of the town, and sufficiently short to be occupied in reasonable strength by the two divisions of the corps (the Second being weakened by the absence of the strongest brigade), and it being also substantially the line indicated by the major-general commanding upon our approach to the town, I ordered the troops into position upon it, and directed that they throw up breastworks immediately. To completely understand the nature of the field it is, however, necessary to notice that the railroad also passes out of the town toward the southeast, and a little to the left of the Lewisburg pike, and that the Harpeth River, running northwestwardly, is nearly parallel to the railroad and quite near to it for some distance, whilst on our right it opens a considerable space between it and the Carter's Creek pike. Upon the north bank of the Harpeth and near the left of our line, as indicated, is a fort, erected some two years since (Fort Granger), which commands a stretch of the river to the left, and also a cut of the railroad, through which troops might advance under cover toward the left of our line. Reilly's brigade (First), of my own division, was placed with its right resting upon the Columbia pike, its front line consisting of the One hundredth Ohio and One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteers, its second line of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Kentucky and the Eighth Tennessee Volunteers. Its left extended somewhat beyond a cotton gin, which stood in a slight angle of the line about 100 yards from the Columbia turnpike. The Second Brigade (Col. J. S. Casement, One hundred and third Ohio, commanding) extended the line from Reilly's left to the Lewisburg pike, the Sixty-fifth Indiana, Sixty-fifth Illinois, and One hundred and twenty-fourth Indiana Volunteers forming his first line, and the Fifth Tennessee Volunteers in the second line. The Third Brigade (Col. I. N. Stiles, Sixty-third Indiana, temporarily commanding) continued the line from Casement's left to the Harpeth River, the One hundred and twenty-eighth Indiana, Sixty-third Indiana, and One hundred and twentieth Indiana Volunteers in the first line, and One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers in the second line.

Upon the right of the pike I directed Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Army Corps, to put his division upon the line indicated, reaching as far to the right as he could firmly hold the line. He accordingly placed Strickland's brigade (Third) upon his left, being immediately on the right of the Columbia pike, the Fiftieth Ohio and Seventy-second Illinois Volunteers in the first line, and the One hundred and eighty-third Ohio and Forty-fourth Missouri Volunteers in the second line. Moore's brigade (Second) was placed on the right of Strickland's, and in order to cover the Carter's Creek pike was deployed in one line in the following order: Eightieth Indiana, Twenty-third Michigan, One hundred and twenty-ninth Indiana, and One hundred and eleventh Ohio Volunteers, numbering from right to left, as in the cases of all the other brigades mentioned above. Moore's line being still weak on account of its extent, General Ruger ordered fifty men of the One hundred and eighty-third Ohio (Strickland's second line) to report to him, and they were placed by Colonel Moore between the One hundred and twenty-ninth Indiana and Twenty-third Michigan. By noon a tolerably good line of breastworks had been erected along the front described, and in a portion of the line a slight abatis had been constructed. A small locust grove and some fruit trees in front of Ruger's division had been used for this purpose, and some Osage orange hedges about a small inclosure in front of Stiles' brigade on the left had also been made good use of. One line of this hedge parallel to Stiles' left front wan slightly thinned out and left standing and in the end proved most useful. The remainder of the hedge was used along the front of the Third Division, but there was not sufficient material near at hand to make the line continuous, nor was there time to stake it down, so that it amounted simply to a slight obstruction of small branches and twigs that could offer no serious obstacle to an advancing enemy, except as the thorny nature of the Osage orange made it an unexpectedly troublesome thing to handle or remove under fire. The artillery of the corps had been moved to the north side of the river early in the morning, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield, chief of artillery, and a portion of it placed in the fort.

As the troops of the Fourth Corps came in, later in the forenoon, four* batteries from that corps were ordered to report to me, and I assigned them positions as follows: First Kentucky Light Artillery, four guns, on the left of the Columbia pike, in the line of the One hundredth Ohio Infantry; Sixth Ohio Light Artillery, four guns, on the right of the Columbia pike, just west of Carter's house; and Battery B, Pennsylvania Volunteers, at the Carter's Creek pike. Although not strictly in the order of occurrence, it will tend to greater clearness to add that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when an attack by the enemy in force had become more immediate, other batteries of the Fourth Corps were placed in position by Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield and Captain Bridges, chiefs of artillery of the Twenty-third and Fourth Corps, respectively, viz: Battery M, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Battery G, First Ohio Light Artillery, were thus placed near the left of Stiles' brigade, Third Division, Twenty-third Army Corps; Battery A, First Ohio Light Artillery, was placed in reserve near the Columbia pike; and Bridges' Battery Illinois Light Artillery, was placed near the center of Strickland's brigade, Second Division, Twenty-third Corps. About noon, some appearance of the enemy's cavalry being reported on the Carter's Creek pike, I called the attention of the commanding general to the fact that Ruger's division could not reach any secure point at which to rest on the right, and shortly after Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding First Division, Fourth Corps, reported to me by order, and I directed him to go into position on General Ruger's right, filling the space between the Carter's Creek pike and the river.

At 2 o'clock I received orders to withdraw the command to the north bank of the river at 6 o'clock, in case there should be no attack by the enemy. At this time nearly the whole of the trains and Wood's (Third) division, of the Fourth Corps, had crossed the Harpeth. Shortly after, Brigadier-General Wagner, commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, presented in person his orders to report to me and act under my orders. He informed me that one brigade (Opdycke's) of his division was already within the lines, and that the other two, with a section of artillery, had been acting as rear guard for the army and were then some two miles at the rear, where the Columbia pike passes through a high range of hills before reaching the plateau on which the village stands; that his orders then were to hold the enemy back until they developed a heavy force manifestly superior to his own, and then slowly retire within my lines. I directed Opdycke's brigade to be placed on the right of the Columbia pike, about 200 yards in rear of our center, as a general reserve; that the orders under which General Wagner was then acting as to the two brigades serving as rear guard should be carried out, and that when the troops were withdrawn within the lines they should be placed in position near Opdycke's brigade and held in reserve awaiting further orders, and in readiness to support any part of the line. At 3 o'clock the two brigades of Wagner's division in front had fallen back to a position about half a mile in front of the lines and reported the enemy developing in force in their front, whilst they opened upon the rebels with the section of artillery which was with them. The order was then reiterated to General Wagner to withdraw the brigades whenever the enemy appeared to be advancing in decidedly superior force, without allowing his troops to become seriously engaged. General Wagner was at that time in person upon the Columbia pike near the Carter house, where my headquarters had been during the day.

A slight depression beyond the lines held by Wagner's advanced brigades prevented the enemy from being seen from our lines till about 4 o'clock, when the officers on the skirmish line reported him advancing in several lines and in very great force. Almost simultaneously with this report the two brigades of Wagner's division in front opened a brisk musketry fire, and part of them were seen making a barricade of rails, &c., apparently with a view of endeavoring to make a stand there, though the section of artillery retired leisurely within our lines. Before an order could reach them they were so hotly engaged that they could not be withdrawn in order. The enemy wasted no time in firing, but charged them, and being enveloped on the flanks, the two brigades, after a short and brave, though useless, struggle, broke to the rear in confusion. The momentary check at the center brought the right wing of the enemy farther forward, and they came on at a double-quick with trailed arms, some pieces of artillery advancing and firing between brigade intervals. As soon as they were seen the batteries on our left opened upon them, as well as the guns in Fort Granger, and as they advanced into rifle range of our infantry, Stiles' and Casement's brigades opened fire also. The rebel lines could now be plainly seen, as well as the general disposition and apparent purpose of their movement. Their heaviest masses were advancing on the line of the Columbia pike, reaching quite to the river on our left, the two points of assault at that time being apparently our center and our extreme left, the latter being the point nearest to our bridges, which were necessarily much nearer that flank (one of them being the railroad bridge), and that being the line of movement by which they would most rapidly have cut us off from crossing the river had our lines been broken. The extreme left was the portion of our main line first warmly engaged. The enemy endeavored to pass up the railroad cut above mentioned, but were enfiladed not only by the guns in Fort Granger but by Battery M, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and driven from that shelter. Their lines on either side, however, advanced steadily. On reaching the Osage orange hedge in front of Stiles' left, they first endeavored to force their way through it and pull it aside. The tough and thorny nature of the shrub foiled them in this, and they attempted to file around the hedge by the flank, and under a terrible, withering fire from Stiles' and Casement's brigades and the batteries on that flank. They soon abandoned this effort, and most of those remaining unhurt lay down behind the bridge [hedge], and after keeping up a desultory fire for a time straggled to the rear, singly and in small squads.

In front of Stiles' right and Casement's left, the obstructions being fewer and more insignificant, the enemy advanced rapidly and in good order, though suffering very severely, up to the breast-works and made desperate efforts to carry them. Their officers showed the most heroic example and self-sacrifice, riding up to our lines in advance of the men, cheering them on. One general officer (Adams) was shot down upon the parapet itself, his horse falling across the breast-work. In all this part of the line our men stood steadily without flinching, and repulsed the enemy, inflicting terrible loss upon him and suffering but little in return. Meanwhile, in the center, the enemy gained some temporary advantage. When the two brigades of Wagner's division, Fourth Corps, broke, the enemy were close upon them and followed them in, overtaking and capturing considerable numbers of the fugitives. Our own men in the lines along the center were restrained from firing, in order not to injure those who were retreating, and the enemy were thus enabled to come up to the breast-works pell-mell with Wagner's men, without suffering loss or being seriously exposed to fire. Immediately upon the pike the crowd of the retreating troops and the advancing enemy overwhelmed the men at the breast-works there, and a portion of the right of Reilly's brigade (Third Division) and most of Strickland's brigade (Second Division) broke from the first line. This was not due altogether to the pressure upon their immediate front, but partly also to the fact that the orders given by their officers to the rear of Wagner's division coming in from the front to rally at the rear were supposed by many of the men in the lines to apply to them also. When the two brigades of Wagner's were first seen to be compromised by getting seriously engaged, as a provision against danger in the center I had ordered Opdycke's brigade to be ready to charge up to the lines instantly, if there should be any confusion there. This brigade was now ordered up, and came up the turnpike in the most gallant manner; Reilly's rushed forward at the same moment.

Major-General Stanley, commanding Fourth Corps, who had been ill during the prior part of the day, came on the field on hearing the sound of battle, and arrived in time to take an active part in the effort to rally Wagner's men, but was soon wounded and his horse shot under him. The most strenuous efforts were made by all officers along that part of the line to rally the men, and were so far successful that the line was quickly restored on the left of the turnpike, and after a sharp struggle on the right of Strickland's brigade also, though the enemy continued to occupy in some force a portion of the outside of the parapet on Strickland's left for a distance of about one regimental front. Opdycke's brigade occupied the second line which at that point was not over twen-ty-five yards rear of the first, and under cover of the smoke strengthened a barricade and breastwork which had been before there. The One-hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers, a new regiment, unassigned to a brigade, had reported early in the afternoon by direction of the commanding general, and was by me temporarily assigned to Reilly's brigade and placed in reserve. It also advanced with the rest of the supporting troops and did good service, behaving with great steadiness and courage. The attack extended toward our right to the Carter's Creek pike. The enemy, being apparently satisfied of the impracticability of advancing again upon our left for the reason before stated, pressed farther to our right, and especially after they had seemed to have gained some advantage in the center, their efforts there and upon their own left were redoubled. Colonel Moore's brigade held its ground firmly, and although it was in imminent danger at the moment when the center wavered, repulsed a determined assault, and preserved its line intact throughout the battle. The condition of the atmosphere was such that the smoke settled upon the field without drifting off, and after the first half hour's fighting it became almost impossible to discern any object along the line at a few yards' distance. This state of things appeared to have deceived Colonel Strickland in regard to his line, as he reported the first line completely reoccupied along his entire front after the repulse of the enemy's first assault, whilst in fact a portion of it at his left was not filled by our troops, and Colonel Opdycke, not being personally acquainted with the lines, was not aware for some time that he had not reached the first line in Colonel Strickland's front, when the outbuildings of Carter's house prevented the line from being distinctly seen from the turnpike even if the smoke had not formed so dark a covering.

After a short lull the attack was resumed by the enemy with the same audacity and determination as before, and Strickland's [brigade] suffering considerably, and being reported by him a good deal weakened, I withdrew the One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers from the second line of Stiles' brigade on the extreme left and ordered it to report to Colonel Strickland and to aid in re-establishing the line in his front. It was led forward very gallantly by Lieutenant-Colonel Bond commanding, who was wounded in the advance. The smoke and growing darkness deceived also the enemy, who apparently supposed they had gained full possession of our lines in the center and continued to push in fresh masses of troops, only to be destroyed or captured, for very few went back, insomuch that prisoners captured continually expressed the utmost surprise, declaring that they supposed and had been informed that our lines were occupied by their troops, which had assaulted before, and of whom nothing since had been seen. The ditches in front of the whole line of the corps, and particularly in the center, contained many of the enemy who were unable to get back, and who, at the first opportunity, surrendered and came over the breast-works as prisoners. The assaults on the center extending considerably to the right of the Columbia pike and involving Moore's brigade more or less, were obstinately repeated until night-fall, and even as late as 9 o'clock attacks were made, which were, however, easily repulsed, and the enemy withdrew the remnants of his shattered lines to the position occupied at the opening of the battle by Wagner's division, in advance of our lines about 800 yards, Alarms occurred frequently until 11 o'clock, and frequently caused a general musketry fire on both sides from our center toward the right, but I found no evidence that any real attack was made at so late an hour, the demonstrations being manifestly made by the rebels to discover whether our lines were being abandoned during the evening.

At midnight, all being quiet in the front, in accordance with orders from the commanding general, I withdrew my command to the north bank of the river, leaving a skirmish line in the earth-works an hour later, when they also were withdrawn. The whole movement was made without interruption or molestation from the enemy, the Third Division moving by the left flank and crossing the river upon the railroad bridge, which had been planked, and the Second Division (with Opdycke's brigade of the Fourth Corps) moving through the town and crossing by a wagon bridge a little below the railroad crossing. Upon making the north bank I took up the line of march with my own division for Brentwood in advance of the army, by command of General Schofield. General Wagner rallied the two brigades of his division at the river, but they were not again brought into action. Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, was to some extent engaged upon its extreme left in the late attacks, which reached to and somewhat beyond the Carter's Creek pike, and that command also suffered somewhat from the diagonal fire of the enemy upon Ruger's division of this corps. This, however, I state from my own casual observation alone, as I took no control of the troops of the Fourth Corps (except Opdycke's brigade) after General Stanley came upon the field, and have no official report of their part in the engagement. The casualties of the corps during the engagement are reported to me as follows:

Command
Killed
Wounded
Missing
Total
Aggregate
O
M
O
M
O
M
O
M
Second Division









   Moore’s Brigade
3
18
8
81
0
12
11
111
122
   Strickland’s Brigade
6
67
19
159
2
278
27
504
531
      Total
9
85
27
240
2
290
38
615
653










Third Division









   Reilly’s Brigade
6
27
7
123
1
69
14
219
233
   Casement’s Brigade
0
3
1
15
0
0
1
18
19
   Stiles’ Brigade
3
9
5
46
1
20
9
75
84
   Staff
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
      Total
10
39
13
184
2
89
25
312
337










Total in corps
19
124
40
424
4
379
63
927
990

[O = Officers, M = Men]

These lists were made up soon after the engagement, and I am convinced that corrected ones, when procured, will show a considerable diminution in the list of the missing. The loss of the enemy we are enabled to approximate with some accuracy from the public admissions from their commander as well as from the statements of prisoners, our own examination of the field after it again came into our possession, and the statements of citizens and hospital attendants remaining in Franklin. From all these sources the testimony is abundant that the rebels lost 6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured; that they buried 1,800 men on the field, and that 3,800 were wounded. The number of prisoners captured by this corps was 702. Thus, without estimating the prisoners taken by any part of the Fourth Corps, or the stragglers and deserters, who are known to have been numerous, the enemy's loss was not less than 6,300. The attack was made by Stewart's and Cheatham's corps of Hood's army, Lee's corps being in reserve, and it is only repeating what is proven by the concurrent testimony of all officers and men of the rebel army who were captured, when I assert that the two assaulting corps were so weakened in numbers and broken in morale in this engagement as to lose for the rest of the campaign the formidable character as opponents which these veteran soldiers had before maintained. Their remarkable loss in general officers attests sufficiently the desperate efforts to break our lines and the heroic bravery of our own troops, who repulsed their repeated assaults.

1 beg leave to refer to the brigade and division reports, forwarded herewith, for special mention of officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves. I will here notice, however, the gallant conduct of Col. Thomas J. Henderson, of the One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers, commander of the Third Brigade, Third Division, who, although so ill in the morning as to be obliged to transfer the brigade command to Colonel Stiles, could not remain absent from the field and was particularly noticeable by his efforts to encourage the men and direct their fire throughout the heat of the engagement. Lieut. James Coughlan, of the Twenty-fourth Kentucky Volunteers, my aide-de-camp, was instantly killed while assisting to rally the men at the center during the confusion incident to the first assault. He was a young officer of peculiar promise, his intelligence and zeal being rarely matched; his loss is a severe one to the army as well as to me personally. I beg leave also to make special mention of Maj. T. T. Dow, acting assistant inspector-general, upon my staff, and Lieuts. E. E. Tracy and D. C. Bradley, my aides, whose activity and courage were conspicuous in rallying the troops at the critical time referred to.

Among the trophies of the battle are twenty-two battle-flags captured from the enemy, of which eighteen were taken by Reilly's brigade, of the Third Division.

The transmission of this report has been delayed by reason of waiting for reports of subordinate commanders, and the whole are now submitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,     
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
 Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio.
_______________

* Only three mentioned in the context. But Bridges’ report (p. 320) adds the Twentieth Ohio.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 348-56