Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: March 18, 1865

Bright and windy. The following telegram was received this morning from Gen. R. E. Lee: "Gen. Johnston reports that on the 16th Gen. Hardee was repeatedly attacked by four divisions of the enemy a few miles south of Averysborough, but always (cipher). The enemy was reported at night to have crossed Black River, to the east of Varina Point, with the rest of the army. Gen. Hardee is moving to a point twelve miles from Smithfield. Scofield's troops reported at Kinston, repairing railroad. Cheatham's corps not yet up. North Carolina Railroad, with its enormous amount of rolling stock, only conveys about 500 men a day."

There has always been corruption—if not treason—among those having charge of transportation.

Yesterday the President vetoed another bill—to pay certain arrears to the army and navy; but the House resented this by passing it over his head by more than a two-thirds vote. The Senate will probably do the same. We have a spectacle of war among the politicians as well as in the field!

Gen. Whiting, captured at Wilmington, died of his wounds. The government would never listen to his plans for saving Wilmington, and rebuked him for his pertinacity.

It is now said Sheridan has crossed the Pamunky, and is returning toward the Rappahannock, instead of forming a junction with Grant. Senator Hunter's place in Essex will probably be visited, and all that region of country ravaged.

It is rumored that RALEIGH has fallen!

By consulting the map, I perceive that after the battle of Thursday (day before yesterday), Hardee fell back and Sherman advanced, and was within less than thirty miles of Raleigh.

The President, it is understood, favors a great and decisive battle.

Judge Campbell said to-day that Mr. Wigfall had sent him Mr. Dejarnette's speech (advocating the Monroe doctrine and alliance with the United States), with a message that he (Mr. W.) intended to read it between his sentence and execution, thinking it would tend to reconcile him to death. The judge said, for his own part, he would postpone reading it until after execution.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 452

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 9. — Report of Maj. Gen. U S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

No. 9.

Report of Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations November 14—December 1, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,        

Huntsville, Ala., February 25, 1865.*

On the 14th [November] Major-General Schofield arrived and assumed command, by direction of Major-General Thomas. On the 21st it became positively known, from a dispatch intercepted by General Hatch's pickets and from other sources, that the enemy were moving north and in the direction of Columbia The roads, however, off the pikes were very bad, it having rained very heavily for some days, and then frozen, but not hard enough to bear wagons. It was believed the enemy could make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of the 23d. The corps marched to Lynnville that night, to which place the Second Division (General Wagner) had moved the day before. During the night it was learned that the enemy had made good use of his time, notwithstanding the bad roads, and that Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant; it was believed by an infantry force. This information was received about 1 o'clock at night, and the troops were immediately waked up and put in motion for Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marching at the same hour as ourselves he arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from annihilation and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture. Turning west at a point three miles south of Columbia, on the Pulaski pike, General Cox, by a cross road, reached the Mount Pleasant pike, and immediately attacking the advancing rebels, drove them back. As fast as the divisions of the Fourth Corps arrived they were placed in line of battle and immediately intrenched themselves. The First Division, Brigadier-General Whitaker, did not get into position until after night. The enemy's cavalry made some demonstrations upon our left flank during the march, but were easily driven off by a regiment of infantry commanded by Colonel Knefler. During the 24th and 25th a very strong and complete set of earth-works were constructed, but the line being very long, and leaving no disposable troops after properly occupying it, two divisions of the corps were withdrawn from it on the night of the 25th to occupy a short and interior line, leaving General Wood's division to hold the front, formerly held by the entire corps. Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, at the same time crossed to the north of Duck River, and General Ruger commenced the construction of a bridge-head.

The enemy undoubtedly deployed their whole force upon our front, and they made several attacks upon our pickets; but it became evident very soon that Hood was moving to the east, and most likely with a view of crossing Duck River above us. The intentions of the enemy became so apparent that it was determined to cross the entire of our force to the north bank of Duck River. The night of the 26th orders were given accordingly, but the night was so dark and the rain poured down so that no progress could be made crossing the artillery, and at midnight the movement was given up and the artillery replaced in position. During the night of the 27th the withdrawal to the north side of Duck River was made very successfully, the pickets leaving the outside line and falling back to the first line of works at 7 o'clock and remaining one hour, when they fell back to the interior line abandoned by the troops, holding that line until near daylight. The fort and magazine were fired, but the destruction was not very complete. The morning of the 28th we occupied the high ground immediately north of Duck River, from below the railroad bridge to about a mile above Columbia. The railroad and pontoon bridges had been destroyed. The enemy could be seen in full view across the river. The troops were employed on the 28th in strengthening their position on the north bank of Duck River; one brigade, Whitaker's, was sent back to Rutherford's Creek to protect all the trains of the army parked near the crossing on the Franklin pike. About 3 p.m. it was learned that Forrest's cavalry had driven Colonel Capron's brigade of cavalry to the north bank of Duck River, eleven miles above, and that the rebel cavalry had effected a crossing to the same side. Later in the evening the pickets of Wood's division reported the enemy crossing cavalry at Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia. A reconnaissance sent after dark failed to find the enemy, but early on the morning of the 29th General Wilson sent word that the enemy had laid a pontoon bridge at Huey's Mills.

At 8 a.m. on the 29th I started to Spring Hill with the First and Second Divisions, all the artillery that could be spared, and all trains and ambulances to follow; at the same time a reconnaissance, consisting of Colonel Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up the river, and soon sent back word that the enemy was crossing infantry and wagons and moving off rapidly to the north and parallel to the turnpike. It being apprehended that the enemy might make a flank attack upon the position of our force between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, the First Division, General Kimball commanding, was halted, and took up position to cover the crossing of the creek. At 11.30 o'clock the head of the Second Division was within two miles of Spring Hill. A cavalry soldier, who seemed badly scared, was met here, who stated that a scout had come in from the direction of Raleigh [Rally] Hill, and reported that Buford's division of rebel cavalry was all way between Raleigh [Rally] Hill and Spring Hill, and on the march to the latter place. The Second Division was pushed on, and, attracted by the firing east of the village, double-quicked into the place and deployed the leading brigade as they advanced, drove off a force of the enemy's cavalry which was driving our small force of cavalry and infantry and would very soon have occupied the town. General Wagner was ordered to deploy his division at once; Opdycke's and Lane's brigades to cover as much space about the village as would serve for room to park the trains; General Bradley's brigade was sent to occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile east of the pike, and which commanded the approaches from that direction.

Up to this time it was thought we had only cavalry to contend with, but a general officer and his staff, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, were seen reconnoitering our position, and very soon afterward General Bradley was assailed by a force which the men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry. I received General Schofield's dispatch about the same time, telling me that the rebels had been crossing the river, and leaving no doubt but that we now confronted a superior force of rebel infantry. About the same time an attack was made upon a small wagon train, composed of some pressed wagons which had passed on, by rebel cavalry, at Reynolds' [Thompson's] Station, three miles toward Franklin, and simultaneously the rebel cavalry appeared west of us and threatened the railroad station of Spring Hill. Thus we were threatened and attacked from every direction, and it was impossible to send any re-enforcements to Bradley's brigade, which had become quite severely engaged, lest in so doing we should expose the train and artillery park to destruction. The enemy made two assaults on Bradley's position, and were severely handled and repulsed; but finding his flank the third time they overlapped him on his right,. and the general at the time receiving a severe wound whilst encouraging his men, his brigade was driven back to the outskirts of the village, where we rallied them and again formed them in line. The enemy attempted to follow up his advantage, but coming across the corn-field toward the village they fell under the fire of at least eight pieces of artillery, at good range for spherical case-shot, and received a fire in flank from a section of a battery which had been placed on the pike south of the village. A part of the rebel force making the charge fled to their rear, and a portion ran down into a ravine between their own and our lines and concealed themselves in the bed of the small stream, neither able to crawl forward or go back until night-fall. This was the condition of affairs when night fell. General Bradley's brigade had lost about 150 men in killed, wounded, and missing. We now know that the enemy lost, according to the statement of one of their surgeons who was on the field, 500 men. Our greatest loss was in the disabling of so intrepid an officer as General Bradley.

As night closed we could see the enemy rapidly extending his lines, and by 8 o'clock it was evident that at least a corps of Hood's army was formed in line of battle, facing the turnpike, and at a near distance of but little more than a half a mile from it. General Schofield arrived from Columbia at 7 o'clock in the evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy on the pike, and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing east of our position as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division to ascertain the condition of affairs. He found that the enemy did not attempt to hold the road. It was now 11 o'clock at night, and Cox's division had just arrived from in front of Columbia; the division pushed on at once for Franklin. From a rebel officer, captain and adjutant-general of Cleburne's division, we learned that it was his division of the rebel army we had been fighting. Wood's division, of the Fourth Corps, arrived just after Cox. The enemy's skirmishers fired into the column frequently, and stampeded a new regiment which had just joined the day before; but instructions were sent to push on and not get into a fight if the enemy kept off the road, and in half an hour after General Wood's division arrived I had the satisfaction of meeting the head of General Kimball's column, which got through with some skirmishing. So close were the enemy on our flank that, when a column was not passing, it was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road. General Cox's division was out of the way, and the train commenced to pull out at 1 o'clock the morning of the 30th. The number of wagons, including artillery and ambulances, was about 800. At the very starting point they had to pass singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done, and the corps put in motion, we were sure of being attacked at daylight and of being compelled to fight under every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train, and move on with the troops and such wagons as could be saved, but I determined to make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily employed hurrying up teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson's Station, and that the whole train had stopped.

It was now 3 o'clock in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the First Division and clear the road. General Wood's division, which had deployed in the night north of Spring Hill and, facing the east, had covered the road, was directed to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train, and General Wagner's division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before, was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball's division could reach the point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The trains moved on again, and at about 5 o'clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight. The rebel cavalry was in possession of all the hills to our right, and made numerous demonstrations upon our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers, and when finally a section of Canby's battery unlimbered and threw a few shells into them the rebel cavalrymen disappeared and troubled us no more. Colonel Opdycke's brigade formed the rear guard, and rendered excellent service, skirmishing all the way with the rebel force following us and forcing our stragglers and lame men, of whom there were many, to make a final effort to reach Franklin. General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon after 9 o'clock and took up position on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, the right flank of the division resting on the Harpeth below Franklin. The line selected by General Schofield was about a mile and a half in length, and inclosed Franklin, resting the flanks upon the river above and below the town. The trains were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth; Wood's division was also crossed and posted to watch the fords below the place. Colonel Opdycke reached the heights two miles south of Franklin at 12 m. He was directed to halt on the hills to observe the enemy. Croxton's brigade of cavalry was steadily pushed back by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike, and at 1 o'clock General Wagner reported heavy columns of infantry approaching on the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing them. About the same time word was received that the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes' Ford, two miles above Franklin.

From 1 o'clock until 4 in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and persistent assault, which, upon a part of the line, lasted about forty minutes. When Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin, Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve in rear of our main line, on the Columbia pike. Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed--the former on the right, the other the left of the pike--about 300 yards in front of the main line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw up a barricade of rails. By whose mistake I cannot tell, it certainly was never a part of my instructions, but these brigades had orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy. The consequence was that the brigades stood their ground until the charging rebels were almost crossing bayonets with them, but the line then broke--Conrad's brigade first, then Lane's--and men and officers made the quickest time they could to our main lines. The old soldiers all escaped, but the conscripts being afraid to run under fire, many of them were captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line near the Columbia pike, Colonel Lane's several hundred yards to the right of the pike. A large proportion of Lane's men came back with loaded muskets, and turning at the breastworks, they fired a volley into the pressing rebels now not ten steps from them. The part of the Twenty-third Corps stationed in the works for a distance of about three [hundred] or four [hundred] yards to the right of the Columbia pike, and which space took in the First Kentucky and Sixth Ohio Batteries, broke and ran to the rear with the fugitives from Conrad's brigade. To add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries galloped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on the breast-works and in possession of the two batteries, which they commenced to turn upon us. It was at this moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town on the Columbia pike; the moment was critical beyond ally I have known in any battle--could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer to our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's brigade was lying down about 100 yards in rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge; at the same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line urging his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, viz, to get possession of our line again. The retreating men of Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe, the men of the Twenty-third Corps, seeing the line of Opdycke's brigade start for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the old soldiers call out, "Come on, men, we Call go wherever the general can," and making a rush, our men immediately retook all the line, excepting a small portion just in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of the rebels held out at this point, and for fifteen or twenty minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards to the rear, poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was this fire that it was only by the most strenuous exertions of the officers that our men could be kept to the line; our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty minutes our front was comparatively clear of rebels, who fell back to the position formerly held by the two brigades of the Second Division in the commencement of the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until midnight, when we withdrew. Just after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was passing toward the left to General Cox's position, my horse was killed, and no sooner had I regained my feet than I received a musket-ball through the back of my neck. My wound, however, did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox kindly furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the firing made it very difficult to keep up the ammunition, the train being some two miles distant on the road to Nashville when the battle commenced, and our greatest danger at one period of the battle was that we would exhaust our ammunition. One hundred wagon-loads of ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were expended in this short battle, belonging to the ordnance train of the Fourth Army Corps; this train, however, supplied in great part the wants of the Twenty-third Corps.

After the first great attack and repulse the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and until 9 o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagement word came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes' Ford, and calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that our cavalry had driven the rebels back and the re-enforcements would not be needed. General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy thing of this fight; being well posted behind breast-works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley, and this was a very effective one, at a rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread, and the prospect was that a large fire would occur, which, lighting up objects, would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood's found an old fire engine, and getting it at work, the flames were soon subdued and the darkness was found to be increased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy discovered it and followed our pickets up closely.

General Wood's division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the morning as rear guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. In the fight of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire fight.

The march was continued to Nashville without interruption; the troops made a short halt at Brentwood to get breakfast and allow the trains to move on. Our men were more exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion. From November the 23d, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville we had been constantly in the immediate presence of an enemy we knew to be vastly superior to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and the constant use of intrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining the advantage he sought of us--the first was when Cox drove back his advance, just about entering Columbia; the second and greatest escape for us was at Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the line within 600 yards of the road, they allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's division, which had fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the Fourth Corps over to Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of leave of absence on account of my wounds.

Before closing this report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some of the officers of my command. To Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood I am under more than ordinary obligations for advice, and for his success in selecting every position we occupied from Pulaski to Franklin. To General Whitaker, who commanded the First Division up to Columbia; to General Kimball, who succeeded him, and to General Wagner, commanding the Second Division, I am under many obligations for the zeal in carrying out my plans and orders.

To the members of my staff much is due for the cheerful and thorough manner in which they discharged their constant and severe duties during the campaign. Col. J. S. Fullerton, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Col. W. H. Greenwood, inspector of the corps; Maj. William H. Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. W. Steele, aide-de-camp; Capt. S. J. Firestone, acting aide-de-camp, and Capt. L. L. Taylor, aide-de-camp---all were most zealous in the discharge of their duties. Colonel Greenwood's duties were particularly important and thoroughly attended to.

To Capt. Lyman Bridges, chief of artillery; to Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster; to Surg. J. T. Heard, medical director; Captain Hodgdon, chief commissary, and to Captain Tousley, chief of ambulance corps, and Lieutenant Laubach, quartermaster at corps headquarters, I am much indebted for the efficient manner in which they discharged their respective duties.

Before closing this report I will mention the names of Colonel Opdycke, One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Colonel Conrad, Fifteenth Missouri Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. Arthur MacArthur, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Volunteers; Captain Morgan, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Tinney, of General Wagner's staff, as some of the officers whom I knew and whom I saw behave most gallantly at the battle of Franklin. Colonel Opdycke's gallant services on that occasion I have before noticed in a communication to department headquarters.

Although Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to him my thanks for his gallant help at that time.

A list of casualties has already been furnished. A recommendation for promotion will be forwarded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,        

Major-general.

Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Chief of Staff.

_______________

Report of casualties in Fourth Army Corps, at the battle of Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864.

	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.
First Division	....	5	5	3	34	37	1	17	18	4	56	60
Second Division	5	47	52	31	488	519	13	657	670	49	1,192	1,241
Third Division	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Artillery Brigade	....	10	10	3	48	51	....	6	6	3	64	67
Total	5	62	67	37	570	607	14	680	694	56	1,312	1,368

NASHVILLE, TENN., December 6, 1864.

ADDENDA.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS., December 17, 1866.

Bvt. Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the Tennessee:

My report of the battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864, was, from unavoidable circumstances, not written until the 25th of February ensuing. In the notice of the services of my staff on the day of battle I omitted mentioning the name of Capt. John D. Moxley, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, one of my aides-de-camp. I take this opportunity, though late, to correct my report. Captain Moxley did his duty gallantly and well on that day, and was busy throughout the fight encouraging and rallying our troops.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,        

Colonel Twenty-second Infantry, Brevet Major-General.

_______________

* For portion of report here omitted, relating to operations in North Georgia and North Alabama, see Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 907.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 112-9

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Daniel L. Ambrose: March 21, 1865

This morning the armies are menacing each other face to face, each remaining behind their works. The design of Sherman is to hold him there until Schofield and Terry can advance from Kingston, North Carolina. Skirmishing has been going on all day. In the evening the Seventh is ordered forward on the skirmish line, and moving forward under the command of Major Johnson, into a creek bottom, we provoked a fierce fire from the enemy stationed on the opposite side. In this encounter Privates Jacob Groch and Gotleib Burkhardt, of Company H, were wounded. Other noble men were also wounded, but we have been unable to obtain their names.

It is now raining and night has let her curtains fall. We are ordered to dig rifle-pits and remain on the line all night. It is a dark night, a cold March rain is falling upon the tired soldiers. The chilling winds make mournful music through the branches of the tall pines. The rebels are entrenched close to our lines and until three o'clock in the morning there is a continual firing. The Seventh pumped the death dealing elements from their sixteen-shooters with such a vim that it made the enemy think that the whole army was on the line of battle. Three o'clock in the morning the firing ceased, and at the first gray dawn of morning light the enemy is discovered to be gone and on the retreat. Thus ends our battle near Bentonville, North Carolina, which proves to be our last encounter with the rebel army in the war for the Union.

After the battles around and in the vicinity of Bentonville, we move towards Goldsboro, where we arrive March 20th. As we move into Goldsboro we are reviewed by General Sherman, thus ending our campaign in the Carolinas,—a campaign that will furnish history with many startling events—events that will tell of privations endured, and of a fortitude developed in Sherman's seventy thousand that had never been developed before by the world in all its martial history.

This evening some of the soldiers who were wounded at Allatoona, join the regiment, having been at Goldsboro waiting our arrival for some days. We are glad to see our genial friend and boon companion, the gallant Captain Hackney, lately commissioned for his bravery at Allatoona. We notice that he has a beautiful mark on his beautiful face, the compliment of a rebel's whizzing minie. But as Grace Greenwood says, this will be his patent of nobility. While here three companies lately recruited for the Seventh join the regiment from Illinois, which are lettered and officered as follows: Company B, Captain Hugh J. Cosgrove, First Lieutenant George H. Martin, Second Lieutenant M. D. F. Wilder; Company D, Captain William A. Hubbard, First Lieutenant John H. Gay, Second Lieutenant William M. Athey; Company G, Captain S. W. Hoyt, First Lieutenant Andrew J. Moore, Second Lieutenant W. J. Hamlin.

To make room for these new companies orders are issued to consolidate old Company B with Company A, Captain Sweeny commanding; old Company D with Company C, Captain Roberts commanding; old Company G, with Company I, Captain Norton commanding.

SOURCE: abstracted from Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 300-2

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 1. — Report of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Cumberland

No. 1.

Report of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Cumberland.

COLONEL:¹

On the 12th of November communication with General Sherman was severed, the last dispatch from him leaving Cartersville, Ga., at 2.25 p.m. on that date. He had started on his great expedition from Atlanta to the seaboard, leaving me to guard Tennessee or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It was therefore with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence, to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in Tennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama.

The enemy's position at Florence remained unchanged up to the 17th of November, when he moved Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river, with Stewart's corps preparing to follow. The same day part of the enemy's infantry, said to be Lee's corps, moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's Mill, on Shoal Creek, skirmishing at that point with Hatch's cavalry, and then fell back a short distance to some bluffs, where it went into camp.

The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman was now at an end, and I quietly took measures to act on the defensive. Two divisions of infantry, under Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me, from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck River, but Hood commenced his advance on the 19th, moving on parallel roads from Florence toward Waynesborough, and shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d. My only resource then was to retire slowly toward my re-enforcements, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for re-enforcements to arrive and concentrate.

General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back toward Columbia. Two divisions of Stanley's corps had already reached Lynnville, a point fifteen miles north of Pulaski, to cover the passage of the wagons and protect the railroad. Capron's brigade of cavalry was at Mount Pleasant, covering the approach to Columbia from that direction; and, in addition to the regular garrison, there was at Columbia a brigade of Ruger's division, Twenty-third Army Corps. I directed the two remaining brigades of Ruger’s division, then at Johnsonville, to move—one by railroad around through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road via Waverly to Centerville—and occupy the crossings of Duck River near Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's Ferry, and Centerville.

Since the departure of General Sherman about 7,000 men belonging to his column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning to their commands and men returning from furlough. These men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might be needed. My command had also been re-enforced by twenty new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired.

On the 23d, in accordance with directions previously given him, General Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Ala., and moved off toward Stevenson, sending five new regiments of that force to Murfreesborough, and retaining at Stevenson the original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly made by railroad, without opposition on the part of the enemy. That same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski and moved toward Columbia, reporting himself in position at that place on the 24th. The commanding officer at Johnsonville was directed to evacuate that post, after removing all public property, and retire to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, and thence to Clarksville. During the 24th and 25th the enemy skirmished with General Schofield's troops at Columbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry until the morning of the 26th, when his infantry came up and pressed our line strongly during that day and the 27th, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted intention to cross above or below the town, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of Duck River during the night of the 27th and took up a new position, where the command remained during the 28th, undisturbed. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should make to force a crossing; the cavalry, under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry. About 2 a.m. on the 29th the enemy succeeded in pressing back General Wilson's cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike; at a later hour part of his infantry crossed at Huey's Mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cavalry having been interrupted and the line of retreat toward Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to Franklin. General Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force, and dispositions were made preparatory to a withdrawal and to meet any attack coming from the direction of Huey's Mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by the enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who engaged him heavily and nearly succeeded in dislodging him from the position, the engagement lasting until dark. Although not attacked from the direction of Huey's Mills, General Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck River, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many times, with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill, and when near that place he came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within 800 yards of the road. Posting a brigade to hold the pike at this point, General Schofield with Ruger's division, pushed on to Thompson's Station, three mile's beyond, where he found the enemy's campfires still burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark, but had disappeared on the arrival of our troops. General Ruger then quietly took possession of the cross-roads.

The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th; Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight, and making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th; the cavalry moved on the Lewisburg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.

At Franklin General Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of the town to await the coming of the enemy, and in the meanwhile hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth River.

On the evacuation of Columbia orders were sent to Major-General Milroy, at Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesborough, joining forces with General Rousseau at the latter place. General Milroy was instructed, however, to maintain the garrison in the block-house at Elk River bridge. Nashville was placed in a state of defense and the fortifications manned by the garrison, re-enforced by a volunteer force, which had been previously organized into a division, under Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. L. Donaldson, from the employés of the quartermaster's and commissary departments. This latter force, aided by railroad employés, the whole under the direction of Brigadier-General Tower, worked assiduously to construct additional defenses. Major-General Steedman, with a command numbering 5,000, composed of detachments belonging to General Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga (of which mention has heretofore been made), and also a brigade of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by rail on the 29th of November, and reached Cowan on the morning of the 30th, where orders were sent him to proceed direct to Nashville. At an early hour on the morning of the 30th the advance of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's command reached Nashville by transports from Saint Louis. My infantry force was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, although he still outnumbered me very greatly in effective cavalry; but as soon as a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted I should be in a condition to take the field offensively and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army.

The enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear guard in the retreat to Franklin, and upon coming up with the main force, formed rapidly and advanced to assault our works, repeating attack after attack during the entire afternoon, and as late as 10 p.m. his efforts to break our line were continued. General Schofield's position was excellently chosen, with both flanks resting upon the river, and the men firmly held their ground against an overwhelming enemy, who was repulsed in every assault along the whole line. Our loss, as given by General Schofield in his report transmitted herewith (and to which I respectfully refer), is, 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing, making an aggregate of 2,326. We captured and sent to Nashville 702 prisoners, including 1 general officer, and 33 stand of colors. Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, commanding Fourth Corps, was severely wounded at Franklin whilst engaged in rallying a portion of his command which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. At the time of the battle the enemy's loss was known to be severe, and was estimated at 5,000. The exact figures were only obtained, however, on the reoccupation of Franklin by our forces, after the battles of December 15 and 16, at Brentwood Hills, near Nashville, and are given as follows: Buried upon the field, 1,750; disabled and placed in hospital at Franklin, 3,800, which, with the 702 prisoners already reported, makes an aggregate loss to Hood's army of 6,252, among whom were 6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. The important results of the signal victory cannot be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously checked the enemy's advance, and gave General Schofield time to remove his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements.

Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations, viz, to cover the withdrawal of his trains, General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during the night to Nashville, in front of which city line of battle was formed by noon of the 1st of December, on the heights immediately surrounding Nashville, with Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's command occupying the right, his right resting on the Cumberland River, below the city; the Fourth Corps (Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood temporarily in command) in the center; and General Schofield's troops (Twenty-third Army Corps) on the left, extending to Nolensville pike. The cavalry, under General Wilson, was directed to take post on the left of General Schofield, which would make secure the interval between his left and the river above the city.

General Steedman's troops reached Nashville about dark on the evening of the 1st of December, taking up a position about a mile in advance of the left center of the main line, and on the left of the Nolensville pike. This position being regarded as too much exposed, was changed on the 3d, when, the cavalry having been directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, General Steedman occupied the space on the left of the line vacated by its withdrawal. During the afternoon of the 2d the enemy's cavalry, in small parties, engaged our skirmishers, but it was only on the afternoon of the 3d that his infantry made its appearance, when, crowding in our skirmishers, he commenced to establish his main line, which, on the morning of the 4th, we found he had succeeded in doing, with his salient on the summit of Montgomery Hill, within 600 yards of our center, his main line occupying the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike—his extreme right—across the Franklin and Granny White pikes, in a westerly direction, to the hills south and southwest of Richland Creek, and down that creek to the Hillsborough pike, with cavalry extending from both his flanks to the river. Artillery was opened on him from several points on the line, without eliciting any response.

The block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek, five miles north of Murfreesborough, was attacked by Bate's division, of Cheatham's corps, on the 4th, but held out until assistance reached it from the garrison at Murfreesborough. The enemy used artillery to reduce the block-house, but although seventy-four shots were fired at it, no material injury was done. General Milroy coming up with three regiments of infantry, four companies of the Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, and a section of artillery, attacked the enemy and drove him off. During the 5th, 6th, and 7th Bate's division, re-enforced by a division from Lee's corps and 2,500 of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesborough, garrisoned by about 8,000 men, under command of General Rousseau. The enemy showing an unwillingness to make a direct assault, General Milroy, with seven regiments of infantry, was sent out on the 8th [7th] to engage him. He was found a short distance from the place on the Wilkinson pike, posted behind rail breast-works, was attacked and routed, our troops capturing 207 prisoners and two guns, with a loss of 30 killed and 175 wounded. On the same day Buford's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesborough, after having shelled it vigorously, but he was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery.

On retiring from before Murfreesborough the enemy's cavalry moved northward to Lebanon and along the bank of the Cumberland in that vicinity, threatening to cross to the north side of the river and interrupt our railroad communication with Louisville, at that time our only source of supplies, the enemy having blockaded the river below Nashville by batteries along the shore. The Navy Department was requested to patrol the Cumberland above and below Nashville with the gun-boats then in the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing, which request was cordially and effectually complied with by Lieut. Commander Le Roy Fitch, commanding Eleventh Division, Mississippi Squadron. At the same time General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin to guard the country in that vicinity.

The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and, with the exception of occasional picket-firing, nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to the 15th of December. In the meanwhile I was preparing to take the offensive without delay; the cavalry was being remounted, under the direction of General Wilson, as rapidly as possible, and new transportation furnished where it was required.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee the enemy, under Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn, was operating in the eastern portion of the State against Generals Ammen and Gillem. On the 13th of November, at midnight, Breckinridge, with a force estimated at 3,000, attacked General Gillem near Morristown, routing him and capturing his artillery, besides taking several hundred prisoners; the remainder of the command, about 1,000 in number, escaped to Strawberry Plains, and thence to Knoxville. General Gillem's force consisted of 1,500 men, comprising three regiments of Tennessee cavalry, and six guns, belonging formerly to the Fourth Division of Cavalry, Army of the Cumberland, but had been detached from my command at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson, and were then operating independently under Brigadier-General Gillem. From a want of cooperation between the officers directly under my control and General Gillem may be attributed, in a great measure, the cause of the latter's misfortune.

Following up his success, Breckinridge continued moving southward through Strawberry Plains to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the 18th withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced. General Am-men's troops, re-enforced by 1,500 men from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains on that day.

About that period Major-General Stoneman (left at Louisville by General Schofield to take charge of the Department of the Ohio during his absence with the army in the field) started for Knoxville, to take general direction of affairs in that section, having previously ordered Brevet Major-General Burbridge to march with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap, to Gillem's relief. On his way through Nashville General Stoneman received instructions from me to concentrate as large a force as he could get in East Tennessee against Breckinridge, and either destroy his force or drive it into Virginia, and, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville and the railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command. November 23, General Stoneman telegraphed from Knoxville that the main force of the enemy was at New Market, eight miles north of Strawberry Plains, and General Burbridge was moving on Cumberland Gap from the interior of Kentucky, his advance expecting to reach Barboursville that night. On the 6th of December, having received information from East Tennessee that Breckinridge was falling back toward Virginia, General Stoneman was again directed to pursue him, and destroy the railroad as far across the State line as possible—say, twenty-five miles.

Leaving him to carry out these instructions, I will return to the position at Nashville.

Both armies were ice-bound for a week previous to the 14th of December, when the weather moderated. Being prepared to move, I called a meeting of the corps commanders on the afternoon of that day, and having discussed the plan of attack until thoroughly understood, the following Special Field Order, No. 342, was issued:

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Paragraph IV. As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive operations the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:

Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Hardin pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.

Major-General Wilson, commanding the Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting, as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major-General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force.

Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood, commanding the Fourth Army Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens' Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsborough pike, to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on the Montgomery Hill.

Major-General Schofield, commanding Twenty-third Army Corps, will replace Brigadier-General Kimball's division, of the Fourth Corps, with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens' Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move with² the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.

Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland River to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations.

Brigadier-General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on Hill 210 to the extreme right, including the inclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road.

The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on Hill 210.

The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the operations around the city.

Should the weather permit the troops will be formed [in time] to commence operations at 6 a.m. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

On the morning of the 15th of December, the weather being favorable, the army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle promulgated in the special field order of the 14th. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog, which only lifted toward noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more especially did he seem not to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert his attention still further from our real intentions, Major-General Steedman had, on the evening of the 14th, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, which he accomplished with great success and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his lines, and inducing him to draw re-enforcements from toward his center and left. As soon as General Steedman had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Hardin pike and commenced the grand movement of the day, by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across the Hardin and Hillsborough pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson's) was sent at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland River at Bell's Landing, eight miles below Nashville. General Johnson did not get into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction with the gun-boats under Lieut. Commander Le Roy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged until after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated on the morning of the 16th. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland Creek, near Hardin's house, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, &c., and continuing to advance, whilst slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault, at 1 p.m., by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking 4 more guns and about 300 prisoners. The infantry, McArthur's division, of General A. J. Smith's command, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the assaults; and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.

Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the Twenty-third Corps) from the position in reserve to which it had been assigned over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely on the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.

The Fourth Corps, Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood commanding, formed on the left of General A, J. Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at 1 p.m., which was most gallantly executed by the Third [Second] Brigade, Second [Third] Division, Col: P. Sidney Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops (Brigadier-General Garrard's division), the Fourth Corps continued to advance, and carried by assault the enemy's entire line in its front and captured several pieces of artillery, about 500 prisoners, some stands of colors, and other material. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin—by the main pike, through Brentwood, and by the Granny White pike. Our line at night-fall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of the Hillsborough pike—Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the center, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield; Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning.

The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and 1,200 prisoners, besides several hundred stand of small-arms and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points, with heavy loss; our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to.

The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

At 6 a.m. on the 16th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him until he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the night, on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of the Fourth Corps (Wood's), and establishing connection with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsborough pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of his two outlets toward Franklin.

As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within 600 yards of the enemy's at all points. His center was weak, as compared with either his right, at Overton's Hill, or his left, on the hills bordering the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin. About 3 p.m. Post's brigade, of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade, of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan, Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops,³ to co-operate in the movement. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew re-enforcements from his left and center to the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right.

The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape and canister and musketry; our men moved steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserve of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded—black and white indiscriminately mingled—lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.

Immediately following the effort of the Fourth Corps, Generals Smith's and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his line in a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of Brentwood and Harpeth Hills.

General Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

Wood's and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the Fourth Corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the troops rested from their labors.

As the Fourth Corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of his command, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White pike and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry, under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged by the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel Spalding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brig. Gen. E. W. Rucker.

During the two days' operations there were 4,462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades from that of major-general, 53 pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all his dead and wounded.

Leaving directions for the collection of the captured property and for the care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the 17th. The Fourth Corps pushed on toward Franklin by the direct pike, whilst the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike to its intersection with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance.

Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by General Wilson direct to Harpeth River, on the Hillsborough pike, with directions to cross and move rapidly toward Franklin. The main cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came up with the enemy's rear guard strongly posted at Hollow Tree Gap, four miles north of Franklin; the position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried, capturing 413 prisoners and 3 colors. The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossing of Harpeth River at that place; but Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river-bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, capturing the enemy's hospital, containing over 2,000 wounded, of whom about 200 were our own men.

The pursuit was immediately continued, by Wilson, toward Columbia, the enemy's rear guard slowly retiring before him to a distance of about five miles south of Franklin, where the enemy made a stand in some open fields just north of West Harpeth River, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson ordered his body guard—the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding—to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command charged, with sabers drawn, breaking the enemy's center, whilst Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back the flanks, scattering the whole command and causing them to abandon their artillery. Darkness coming on during the engagement enabled a great many to escape, and put an end to the day's operations.

The Fourth Corps, under General Wood, followed immediately in rear of the cavalry as far as Harpeth River, where it found the bridges destroyed and too much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available before night-fall. General Steedman's command moved in rear of General Wood, and camped near him on the banks of the Harpeth. Generals Smith and Schofield marched with their corps along the Granny White pike, and camped for the night at the intersection with the Franklin pike. The trains moved with their respective commands, carrying ten days' supplies and 100 rounds of ammunition.

On the 18th the pursuit of the enemy was continued by General Wilson, who pushed on as far as Rutherford's Creek, three miles from Columbia. Wood's corps crossed to the south side of Harpeth River and closed up with the cavalry. The enemy did not offer to make a stand during the day. On arriving at Rutherford's Creek the stream was found to be impassable on account of high water, and running a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, together with the incompleteness of the train itself, had retarded its arrived. I would here remark that the splendid pontoon train properly belonging to my command, with its trained corps of pontoniers, was absent with General Sherman.

During the 19th several unsuccessful efforts were made by the advanced troops to cross Rutherford's Creek, although General Hatch succeeded in lodging a few skirmishers on the south bank. The heavy rains of the preceding few days had inundated the whole country and rendered the roads almost impassable. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south side of Harpeth River, General Smith advancing to Spring Hill, whilst General Schofield encamped at Franklin. On the morning of the 20th General Hatch constructed a floating bridge from the debris of the old railroad bridge over Rutherford's Creek, and crossing his entire division pushed out for Columbia, but found, on reaching Duck River, the enemy had succeeded the night before in getting everything across, and had already removed his pontoon bridge; Duck River was very much swollen and impassable without a bridge. During the day General Wood improvised a foot bridge over Rutherford's Creek, at the old road bridge, and by night-fall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire, and one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck River.

The pontoon train coming up to Rutherford's Creek about noon of the 21st, a bridge was laid during the afternoon and General Smith's troops were enabled to cross. The weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, very materially retarding the work in laying the bridge, as the regiment of colored troops to whom that duty was intrusted seemed to become unmanned by the cold and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's Creek sufficient material for a bridge over Duck River was hastily pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time to enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the 22d and get into position on the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia. The water in the river fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations and causing much delay. The enemy, in his hasty retreat, had thrown into the stream several fine pieces of artillery, which were rapidly becoming uncovered, and were subsequently removed.

Notwithstanding the many delays to which the command had been subjected, I determined to continue the pursuit of Hood's shattered forces; and for this purpose decided to use General Wilson's cavalry and General Wood's corps of infantry, directing the infantry to move on the pike, whilst the cavalry marched on its either flank across the fields; the remainder of the command, Smith's and Schofield's corps, to move along more leisurely, and to be used as the occasion demanded.

Forrest and his cavalry, and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army whilst besieging Nashville, had rejoined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear guard, made up of detachments from all his organized force, numbering about 4,000 infantry, under General Walthall, and all his available cavalry, under Forrest. With the exception of his rear guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause to put an end to their sufferings. The rear guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last.

During the 23d General Wilson was occupied crossing his command over Duck River, but took the advance on the 24th, supported by General Wood, and came up with the enemy just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's Station, at both of which places the enemy made a short stand, but was speedily dislodged, with a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our advance was so rapid as to prevent the destruction of the bridges over Richland Creek. Christmas morning, the 25th, the enemy, with our cavalry at his heels, evacuated Pulaski, and was pursued toward Lamb's Ferry over an almost impracticable road and through a country devoid of subsistence for man or beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road, and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's skirmishers; he then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking; but before this could be accomplished the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breast-works and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carrying off one gun belonging to Battery I, Fourth U.S. Artillery, which was not recovered by us, notwithstanding the ground lost was almost immediately regained. By night-fall the enemy was driven from his position, with a loss of about 50 prisoners. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to out-distance the trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy. General Wood's corps kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December 25 six miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry road, and pursuing the same route as the cavalry, reached Lexington, Ala., thirty miles from Pulaski, on the 28th, on which date, having definitely ascertained that the enemy had made good his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, I directed farther pursuit to cease. At Pulaski the enemy's hospital, containing about 200 patients, fell into our hands, and four guns were found in Richland Creek. About a mile south of the town he destroyed twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Cheatham's corps, taking the animals belonging to the train to help pull his pontoons. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge, and indeed back to Nashville, was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small-arms, blankets, &c., showing most conclusively the disorder of the enemy's retreat.

During the foregoing operations with the advance Smith's and Schofield's troops were in motion toward the front, General Smith's command reaching Pulaski on the 27th, whilst General Schofield was directed to remain at Columbia for the time being.

On our arrival at Franklin, on the 18th, I gave directions to General Steedman to move with his command across the country from that point to Murfreesborough, on the Chattanooga railroad, from whence he was to proceed by rail to Decatur, Ala., via Stevenson, being joined at Stevenson by Brig. Gen. R. S. Granger and the troops composing the garrisons of Huntsville, Athens, and Decatur. Taking general direction of the whole force, his instructions were to reoccupy the points in Northern Alabama evacuated at the period of Hood's advance, then cross the Tennessee with the balance of his force and threaten the enemy's railroad communications west of Florence.

General Steedman reoccupied Decatur on the 27th, and proceeded to carry out the second portion of his instructions, finding, however, that the enemy had already made good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee, and any movement on his railroad would be useless.

On announcing the result of the battles to Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding Mississippi Squadron, I requested him to send as much of his force as he could spare around to Florence, on the Tennessee River, and endeavor to prevent Hood's army from crossing at that point; which request was most cordially and promptly complied with. He arrived at Chickasaw, Miss., on the 24th, destroyed there a rebel battery, and captured two guns with caissons at Florence Landing. He also announced the arrival at the latter place of several transports with provisions.

Immediately upon learning of the presence at Chickasaw, Miss., of the gun-boats and transports with provisions, I directed General Smith to march overland from Pulaski to Clifton, via Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough, and take post at Eastport, Miss. General Smith started for his destination on December 29.

On the 30th of December I announced to the army the successful completion of the campaign, and gave directions for the disposition of the command, as follows: Smith's corps to take post at Eastport, Miss.; Wood's corps to be concentrated at Huntsville and Athens, Ala.; Schofield's corps to proceed to Dalton, Ga.; and Wilson's cavalry, after sending one division to Eastport, Miss., to concentrate balance at or near Huntsville. On reaching the several positions assigned to them the different commands were to go into winter quarters and recuperate for the spring campaign.

The above not meeting the views of the general-in-chief, and being notified by Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, U.S. Army, that it was not intended for the army in Tennessee to go into winter quarters, orders were issued on the 31st of December for Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson to concentrate their commands at Eastport, Miss., and that of General Wood at Huntsville, Ala., preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama.

During the active operations of the main army in Middle Tennessee General Stoneman's forces in the northeastern portion of the State were also very actively engaged in operating against Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn. Having quietly concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's Station, on the 12th of December General Stoneman started for Bristol, his advance under General Gillem striking the enemy, under Duke, at Kingsport, on the North Fork of the Holston River, killing, capturing, or dispersing the whole command. General Stoneman then sent General Burbridge to Bristol, where he came upon the enemy, under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until the remainder of the troops—Gillem's column—came up, when Burbridge was pushed on to Abingdon, with instructions to send a force to cut the railroad at some point between Saltville and Wytheville, in order to prevent re-enforcements coming from Lynchburg to the salt-works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th, the enemy under Vaughn following on a road running parallel to the one used by our forces. Having decided merely to make a demonstration against the salt-works and to push on with the main force after Vaughn, General Gillem struck the enemy at Marion early on the 16th, and after completely routing him, pursued him to Wytheville, Va., capturing all his artillery and trains and 198 prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, was destroyed, as also the extensive lead-works near the town and the railroad bridges over Reedy Creek. General Stoneman then turned his attention toward Saltville, with its important salt-works. The garrison of that place, re-enforced by Giltner's, Cosby's, and Witcher's commands and the remnant of Duke's, all under the command of Breckinridge in person, followed our troops as they moved on Wytheville, and on returning General Stoneman met them at Marion, where he made preparations to give Breckinridge battle, and disposed his command so as to effectually assault the enemy in the morning, but Breckinridge retreated during the night, and was pursued a short distance into North Carolina, our troops capturing some of his wagons and caissons.

General Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire command, capturing at that place 8 pieces of artillery and a large amount of ammunition of all kinds, 2 locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. The extensive salt-works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with rubbish, and burning the buildings. His work accomplished, General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by General Gillem's command, General Burbridge's proceeding to Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap. The country marched over was laid waste to prevent its being used again by the enemy—all mills, factories, bridges, &c., being destroyed. The command had everything to contend with as far as the weather and roads were concerned, yet the troops bore up cheerfully throughout, and made each twenty-four hours an average march of forty-two miles and a half.

The pursuit of Hood's retreating army was discontinued by my main forces on the 29th of December, on reaching the Tennessee River; however, a force of cavalry, numbering 600 men, made up from detachments of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Second Michigan, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana Regiments, under command of Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania, operating with Steedman's column, started from Decatur, Ala., in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. The enemy's cavalry, under Roddey, was met at Leighton, with whom Colonel Palmer skirmished and pressed back in small squads toward the mountains. Here it was ascertained that Hood's trains passed through Leighton on the 28th of December and moved off toward Columbus, Miss. Avoiding the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Palmer left Leighton on the 31st of December, moved rapidly via La Grange and Russellville and by the Cotton-gin road, and overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon-boats, when ten miles out from Russellville. This he destroyed. Having learned of a large supply train on its way to Tuscaloosa, Colonel Palmer started on the 1st of January toward Aberdeen, Miss., with a view of cutting it off, and succeeded in surprising it about 10 p.m. on the same evening, just over the line in Mississippi. The train consisted of 110 wagons and 500 mules, the former of which were burned, and the latter sabered or shot. Returning via Toll-gate, Ala., and on the old military and Hacksburg roads, the enemy, under Roddey, Biffle, and Russell, was met near Russellville and along Bear Creek, whilst another force, under Armstrong, was reported to be in pursuit of our forces. Evading the force in his front, by moving off to the right under cover of the darkness, Colonel Palmer pushed for Moulton, coming upon Russell when within twelve miles of Moulton, and near Thorn Hill attacked him unexpectedly, utterly routing him, and capturing some prisoners, besides burning five wagons. The command then proceeded to Decatur without molestation, and reached that place on the 6th of January, after a march of over 250 miles. One hundred and fifty prisoners were captured and nearly 1,000 stand of arms destroyed. Colonel Palmer's loss was 1 killed and 2 wounded.

General Hood, while investing Nashville, had sent into Kentucky a force of cavalry numbering about 800 men and two guns, under the command of Brigadier-General Lyon, with instructions to operate against our railroad communications with Louisville. McCook's division of cavalry was detached on the 14th of December and sent to Bowling Green and Franklin to protect the road. After capturing Hopkinsville, Lyon was met by La Grange's brigade near Greensburg, and after a sharp fight was thrown into confusion, losing one gun, some prisoners, and wagons; the enemy succeeded, however, by making a wide detour via Elizabethtown and Glasgow, in reaching the Cumberland River and crossing at Burkesville, from whence General Lyon proceeded, via McMinnville and Winchester, Tenn., to Larkinsville, Ala., on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attacked the little garrison at Scottsborough on the 10th of January. Lyon was here again repulsed and his command scattered, our troops pursuing him toward the Tennessee River, which, however, he, with about 200 of his men and his remaining piece of artillery, succeeded in crossing; the rest of his command scattered in squads among the mountains. Col. W. J. Palmer, commanding Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with 150 men, crossed the river at Paint Rock and pursued Lyon to near Red Hill, on the road from Warrenton to Tuscaloosa, at which place he surprised his camp during the night of the 14th of January, capturing Lyon himself, his one piece of artillery, and about 100 of his men, with their horses. Lyon being in bed at the time of his capture, asked his guard to permit him to dress himself, which was acceded to, when, watching his opportunity, he seized a pistol, shot the sentinel dead upon the spot, and escaped in the darkness. This was the only casualty during the expedition.

To Colonel Palmer and his command is accorded the credit of giving Hood's army the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over 200 miles from where we first struck the enemy on the 15th of December, near Nashville.

To all of my sub-commanders—Major-Generals Schofield, Stanley, Rousseau, Steedman, Smith, and Wilson, and Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood—their officers and men, I give expression of my thanks and gratitude for their generous self-sacrifice and manly endurance under the most trying circumstances and in all instances. Too much praise cannot be accorded to an army which, hastily made up from the fragments of three separate commands, can successfully contend against a force numerically greater than itself and of more thoroughly solid organization, inflicting on it a most crushing defeat—almost an annihilation.

Receiving instructions unexpectedly from General Sherman, in September, to repair to Tennessee and assume general control of the defenses of our line of communication in the rear of the Army of the Mississippi, and not anticipating a separation from my immediate command, the greater number of my staff officers were left behind at Atlanta and did not have an opportunity to join me after General Sherman determined on making his march through Georgia, before the communications were cut. I had with me Brig. Gen. W. D. Whipple, my chief of staff; Surgeon G. E. Cooper, medical director; Capts. Henry Stone, Henry M. Cist, and Robert H. Ramsey, assistant adjutants-general; Capt. E. C. Beman, acting chief commissary; Capts. John P. Willard and S. C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; and Lieut. M. J. Kelly, chief of couriers; all of whom rendered important services during the battles of the 15th and 16th, and during the pursuit. I cordially commend their services to favorable consideration.

There were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the foregoing report treats, 13,189 prisoners of war, including 7 general officers and nearly 1,000 other officers of all grades, 72 pieces of serviceable artillery, and—battle flags. During the same period over 2,000 deserters from the enemy were received, to whom the oath was administered. Our own loss will not exceed 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a consolidated return of casualties, the report of Col. J. G. Parkhurst, provost-marshal-general, and that of Capt. A. Mordecai, chief of ordnance.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,        

Major-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. R. M. SAWYER,
        Asst. Adjt. Gen., Military Division of the Mississippi.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

Report of casualties of the Army of the Cumberland.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Twenty-third Army Corps:
Battle of Franklin	189	1,033	1,104	2,326
Battle of Nashville	9	154	....	163
Fourth Army Corps:a
Detachment Army of the Tennessee (Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith commanding):
Battle of Nashville	77	665	2	744
Cavalry Corps (Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson commanding
Battles of Franklin and Nashville	88	437	91	616
Total	363	2,289	1,197	3,849

^a No report received.

SOUTHARD HOFFMAN,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure No. 2.]

OFFICE PROV. MAR. GEN., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Nashville, Tenn., February 4, 1865.

Report of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.

Captured.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
September 7-30.	....	....	....	....	....	2	4	17	145	5
October	....	....	....	....	1	12	40	151	1,135	1
November	....	....	2	3	1	7	25	87	550	3
December	1	7	14	10	18	173	487	1,512	6,336	77
January 1-20	....	....	....	1	2	18	45	120	842	3
Total	1	7	16	14	22	212	601	1,887	9,008	89
Grand total, 11,857.

[A Major generals.  B Brigadier-generals.  C Colonels.  D Lieutenant-colonels.  E Majors.  F Captains.  G Lieutenants.  H Non-commissioned officers.  I Privates.  J Surgeons and chaplains.]

Report of rebel deserters received at Nashville, Tenn., from September 7, 1864, up to January 20, 1865.

Received.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commis-sioned Officers	Privates.	Surgeons.	Chaplains.
September 7-30	....	1	6	70	....	....
October	....	....	8	96	....	....
November	....	1	3	68	....	....
December	2	6	28	281	2	1
January 1-20	5	15	61	660	....	....
Total	7	23	106	1,175	2	1
Grand total, 1,314.

Prisoners of war exchanged during the month of September, 1864.

Commissioned officers	128
Non-commissioned officers	225
Privates	979
Total	1,332

(Equivalent to 2,045 privates.)

Aggregate of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865 (inclusive), 13,189.

Report of rebel deserters received outside of Nashville office from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.

Date of reception.	Officers.	Men.
September 7-30	....	75
October 1-31	2	146
November 1-30	....	80
December 1-31	....	14
January 1-31	18	558
Total	20	873
Grand total, 893.

Aggregate of rebel deserters to whom the oath has been administered from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, 2,207.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. PARKHURST,        

Colonel and Provost-Marshal. General.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

OFFICE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE, DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Nashville, Tenn., February 5, 1865.

Maj. Gen. G. H. THOMAS,  U.S. Army,
        Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Eastport, Miss.:

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions of the 20th ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report of ordnance material captured from the enemy by the army under your command, between the 1st of October, 1864, and the 20th of January, 1865, all of which material has been received by the ordnance department:

Light 12-pounder guns, rebel model	42
Light 12-pounder guns, U. S. model	7
Light 12-pounder howitzers, U. S. model	7
3-inch rifles, rebel model	3
10-pounder Parrotts, caliber 2.9 inch, U.S. model	2
3-inch wrought-iron rifle, U. S. model	1
6-pounder smooth-bore guns, U. S. model	2
Field carriages and limbers complete	59
Field carriages and limbers without wheels	2
Field carriages, no limbers	2
Field caissons and limbers	16
Field caissons, no limbers	4
Infantry small-arms of different models, no bayonets.	3,079
Bayonets of different models	262
Cartridge-boxes, infantry	1,208
Cartridge-box plates	238
Cartridge-box belts	234
Cartridge-box belt-plates	141
Waist belts	178
Waist-belt plates	181
Bayonet scabbards	166
Cap pouches	364
Gun slings	231

Of the above, two 12-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers were captured by Major-General Milroy, at Murfreesborough, Tenn., December, 1864; one 12-pounder howitzer, carriage, and limber was captured by Colonel Palmer from the command of the rebel General Lyon, near Huntsville, Ala.; two 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, carriages, and limbers were captured by Major-General Steedman, near Decatur, Ala.; three 12-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers; one 10-pounder Parrott rifle and carriage; one 3-inch wrought-iron rifle and carriage, U.S., were captured at Columbia, Tenn.

All the remaining artillery and carriages, and all the small-arms and accouterments, were captured before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th of December, 1864.

The larger number of ammunition chests captured were filled with ammunition in good condition, and six wagons, loaded with similar ammunition, were captured before this place.

I am informed that there are, in addition to what are reported above, 4 guns and carriages now at Pulaski, Tenn., and 3 or 4 guns in the Duck River at Columbia, Tenn., all captured from the enemy or abandoned by him in his retreat to the Tennessee River.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. MORDECAI,

Captain Ordnance, Chief of Ordnance, Dept. of the Cumberland.

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Nashville, Tenn., April 14, 1865.

Lieut. Col. R. M. SAWYER,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Military Division of the Mississippi:

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following supplementary report to my report of the operations of the troops under my command from September 7 to December 31, 1864, as an act of justice to Lieut. Col. William G. Le Duc, chief quartermaster Twentieth Army Corps, whose name was inadvertently omitted in that report.

Colonel Le Duc reaching Nashville from leave of absence too late to join his proper command, which had then left Atlanta, Ga., was assigned by me to duty temporarily as acting chief quartermaster of the troops then concentrating about Nashville. He immediately entered upon those duties with his characteristic energy and zeal, rendered important service in his department for the troops in front of Nashville under Major-General Schofield, when the army was concentrated at Nashville, and during the pursuit of the enemy. I cheerfully and cordially commend him for efficiency, intelligence, and zeal in the discharge of his duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

GEO. H. THOMAS,        

Major-General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

_______________

NASHVILLE, TENN., April 14, 1865.

Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS,  Adjutant-General U.S. Army, Washington:

An error was made in my report of the battle of Brentwood Hills, near Nashville, December 16, which I desire to correct. In the assault on Overton's Hill, at 3 p.m., Col. C. R. Thompson, Twelfth U.S. Colored Troops, led the colored brigade, and not Colonel Morgan, as reported. Please alter it on your records.

GEO. H. THOMAS,        

Major-General, U.S. Army.

(Copy to Lieut. Col. R. M. Sawyer, New Berne, N. C.)

_______________

GENERAL ORDERS No. 167.}

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Near Nashville, Tenn., December 16, 1864.

The major-general commanding, with pride and pleasure, publishes the following dispatches to the army, and adds thereto his own thanks to the troops for the unsurpassed gallantry and good conduct displayed by them in the battles of yesterday and to-day.

A few more examples of devotion and courage like these, and the rebel army of the West, which you have been fighting for three years, will be no more, and you may reasonably expect an early and honorable peace:

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 16, 1864--11.30 a.m.

Major-General THOMAS:

Please accept for yourself, officers, and men the Nation's thanks for your good work of yesterday. You made a magnificent beginning. A grand consummation is within your easy reach; do not let it slip.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 15, 1864—midnight.

Major-General THOMAS:

I rejoice in tendering to you and the gallant officers and soldiers of your command the thanks of this Department for the brilliant achievements of this day, and hope that it is the harbinger of a decisive victory, and will crown you and your army with honor and do much toward closing the war. We shall give you an hundred guns in the morning.

EDWIN M. STANTON,        

Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 15, 1864--11.45 p.m.

Major-General THOMAS:

Your dispatch of this evening, just received. I congratulate you and the army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a conviction that to-morrow will add more fruits to your victory.

U.S. GRANT,        

Lieutenant-General.

By command of Major-General Thomas:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

GENERAL ORDERS No. 169.}

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,        

Pulaski, Tenn., December 29, 1864.

SOLDIERS: The major-general commanding announces to you that the rear guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the Tennessee River on the night of the 27th instant. The impassable state of the roads and consequent impossibility to supply the army compels a closing of the campaign for the present.

Although short, it has been brilliant in its achievements and unsurpassed in its results by any other of this war, and is one of which all who participated therein may be justly proud. That veteran rebel army which, though driven from position to position, opposed a stubborn resistance to much superior numbers during the whole of the Atlanta campaign, taking advantage of the absence of the largest portion of the army which had been opposed to it in Georgia, invaded Tennessee, buoyant with hope, expecting Nashville: Murfreesborough and the  whole of Tennessee and Kentucky to fall into its power an easy prey, and scarcely fixing a limit to its conquests, after having received the most terrible check at Franklin, on the 30th of November, that any army has received during this war, and later met with a signal repulse from the brave garrison of Murfreesborough in its attempt to capture that place, was finally attacked at Nashville, and although your forces were inferior to it in numbers, it was hurled back from the coveted prize upon which it had only been permitted to look from a distance, and finally sent flying, dismayed and disordered, whence it came, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, and thinking only how it could relieve itself for short intervals from your persistent and harrassing pursuit, by burning the bridges over the swollen streams as it passed them, until finally it had placed the broad waters of the Tennessee River between you and its shattered, diminished, and discomfited columns, leaving its artillery and battle-flags in your victorious hands, lasting trophies of your noble daring and lasting mementoes of the enemy's disgrace and defeat.

You have diminished the forces of the rebel army, since it crossed the Tennessee River to invade the State, at the least estimate, 15,000 men, among whom were killed, wounded, or captured 18 general officers.

Your captures from the enemy, as far as reported, amount to 68 pieces of artillery, 10,000 prisoners, as many stand of small-arms, several thousand of which have been gathered in, and the remainder strew the route of the enemy's retreat, and between 30 and 40 flags, besides compelling him to destroy much ammunition and abandon many wagons, and, unless he is mad, he must forever relinquish all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed rebellion.

A short time will now be given you to prepare to continue the work so nobly begun.

By command of Major-General Thomas:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

GENERAL ORDERS No. 33.}

WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE,        

Washington, March 11, 1865.

The following resolution is published for the information of all concerned:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 24.]

JOINT RESOLUTION of thanks to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the army under his command.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby tendered, to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the officers and soldiers under his command for their skill and dauntless courage, by which the rebel army under General Hood was signally defeated and driven from the State of Tennessee.

Approved March 3, 1865.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,        

Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

¹ For portion of report here omitted, relating to operations in North Georgia and North Alabama, see Vol. XXXIX, part I, p. 584.

² As recorded in Thomas’ order book, this reads—He will mass the remainder, &c.

³ See addenda, p. 49.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 32-51