Showing posts with label James B Steedman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James B Steedman. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 27, 2024

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 8. — Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

No. 8.

Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,                
MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,        
Nashville, Tenn., April 7, 1865.

SIR: My report of the medical department of the Army of the Cumberland from the time of the invasion of Northern Alabama and Tennessee by the rebel army under General Hood till the defeat of the same by the Government forces in front of Nashville, and the pursuit thereof to beyond the Tennessee River, must be a meager and unsatisfactory one in consequence of my having been separated from the army, and not having myself been in active campaign with it until after the battle of Franklin, Tenn., when it presented itself in the defenses of Nashville. The proceedings of the medical corps are, however, exceedingly well pointed out in the accompanying report of Surg. J. Theo. Heard, medical director Fourth Army Corps, who in person accompanied that corps—all that was left as an organized force of the old Army of the Cumberland, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps having been taken by Major-General Sherman to form a portion of the army with which he made the great raid through Georgia.

At the time of evacuating Atlanta the corps hospitals of the Army of the Cumberland were, as they had been in the summer campaign, fully organized and equipped, and were ready to move at a moment's notice. The general field hospital, under the charge of Surg. M. C. Woodworth, was in fine condition and of sufficient capacity to receive all the sick and wounded of the army, who, on the breaking up of the division hospitals, might require medical treatment. Supplies of all kinds had been called for and procured by the field medical purveyor, and the army corps were amply and liberally supplied. The ambulances, which had been greatly used during the summer campaign, were repaired and put in as serviceable condition as the time and material on hand would admit of. When the rebel army fell upon the line of railroad at our rear the inconvenience suffered therefrom was, as far as the medical department was concerned, in reality nothing. The only article which ran short was whisky, and this was procured in ample quantities from the subsistence department. The quality, though not equal to that furnished by the medical department, was good enough for all practicable purposes.

The Fourth and Fourteenth Army Corps, having been detailed to follow Hood's army to the rear, the sick from their division hospitals were transferred to the general field hospital, where they were cared for as well as could be wished for, and the troops left Atlanta entirely disencumbered with sick or wounded men. What occurred from that time till the last days of November, 1864, is known to me by hearsay only and from reading the reports furnished these headquarters. For this information I refer to the excellent report of Surgeon Heard, medical director, Fourth Army Corps, who, having been one of that little band who held the whole rebel army in check from Decatur, Ala., to Nashville, Tenn., is far more competent to make the report than I. Synchronous with my arrival at Nashville from Atlanta and Chattanooga came reports of the falling back of our army from Pulaski, Tenn., and of heavy and continuous skirmishing with Hood's advance. On the 30th of November came the news that a severe action had taken place near Franklin, Tenn., and that our losses in both killed and wounded had been heavy. The medical director of the Fourth Army Corps was immediately telegraphed to and asked if he required a hospital train, and early next morning hospital train No. 2 was sent to Brentwood, between Nashville and Franklin. On the night of November 30 two freight trains loaded with wounded from skirmishes beyond Franklin, and which had been brought to that place in ambulances, arrived here. The wounded were transferred to the general hospitals here, and were promptly and skillfully cared for by the medical officers there on duty.

On the following day the troops arrived from Franklin, bringing with them quite a number of wounded, but having, unfortunately, been compelled to leave by far the greater portion in the hands of the enemy. Almost at the same time came the troops commanded by Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith. These troops were deficient in almost everything belonging to the hospital department; they had no organized ambulance corps or trains; there was no division or brigade organization of hospitals, but were as they had been from the beginning of the war, and seemed to have learned nothing from experience or the example of others, and opposed every improvement as an innovation. They had but few medical supplies, and were wanting in almost everything which would aid them in alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded of their commands. It became necessary to fit them out with all possible dispatch, which was done; and thanks are due to Surg. Robert Fletcher, U.S. Volunteers, medical purveyor, for his energy, efficiency, and promptness in this emergency. No one could have performed the duties of purveyor in a manner more creditable to himself or with greater benefit to the Government.

As soon as the troops arrived in front of Nashville they were placed in the lines and were compelled to throw up intrenchments. They were much prostrated by their constant harassing night and day marches from the Tennessee River to Nashville; but, notwithstanding this, in a short time, by constant and severe labor, works were thrown up which rendered Nashville impregnable. As the army was short of men, it became necessary to call to the aid of the beleaguered city all the troops within call. Consequently, the different detachments of the army which left Atlanta with General Sherman, and had remained behind, in hospitals and otherwise, were organized into a temporary corps under the command of Major-General Steedman. This extemporized corps was without any organization whatever, and to it was attached the regiments of colored troops. It is impossible for me to learn if these troops consider themselves a part and parcel of the Army of the Cumberland, or a separate command made for Colonel Mussey. I should judge them to be out of the department did I take the attention they pay to the existence of this office as a criterion. They are more irregular in forwarding their reports than any regiments in the Army of the Cumberland.

The weather, which, previous to the arrival of the troops, had been moderate, became, shortly after their arrival at Nashville, excessively cold for this latitude. The result of this was much suffering on the part of the troops and the comparative cessation of all offensive measures on the part of either army. At this time the results of the fatigue undergone by the troops in the retreat from Decatur and the subsequent labor in the trenches began to show themselves in the greatly increased number of men who presented themselves for medical treatment. Many, too, who had without detriment to their health undergone all the hardships of the summer and fall campaign, now yielded to the effects of the bitter cold, and diseases of the pulmonary viscera became numerous. Rheumatic affections, too, became quite prevalent. The advent of the rebel army in front of Nashville, and the fact of intrenching itself, rendered the necessity of a general action a moral certainty. To prepare for the sick and wounded of the Government forces demanded a much larger amount of hospital accommodation than was at that time at the disposal of the hospital department. Anticipating a large influx of wounded, the efficient superintendent and director of U.S. general hospitals at Nashville took possession of every building that could be made use of for hospital purposes and had them fitted up with all possible dispatch. Consequently, some 4,000 vacant beds were at the disposal of the medical department. The Assistant Surgeon-General, too, anticipating the necessity, ordered to Nashville a large number of medical officers, of whom many arrived prior to the actions and all in sufficient time to be of the greatest service to the wounded in the battles in front of Nashville. The medical officers of the Fourth Army Corps, being emphatically experts in the care of the wounded after battle, had everything prepared for prompt and efficient action. They had supplied themselves with all the necessaries, and, in addition, had procured all the delicacies within their reach. The result was that after the actions of 15th and 16th of December the men belonging to the Fourth Army Corps, and all who were brought to the field hospitals of that corps, were promptly and skillfully treated and most carefully provided for. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the medical staff of the Fourth Army Corps for their untiring attention and skillful manner of treating the wounded in their division hospitals. Were it not invidious to designate and particularize by name certain officers when all are worthy, I would give a list of the medical officers who so faithfully performed their duty. This I will not do, but justice to themselves demands that I should mention and particularize Surgs. M. G. Sherman, Ninth Indiana Volunteers; Stephen J. Young, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers; E.B. Glick, Fortieth Indiana Volunteers, and C. N. Ellinwood, Seventy-fourth Illinois Volunteers, as men deserving of more than ordinary notice. Previous to the battles instructions had been given to the surgeons in charge to establish division field hospitals as near to the field as practicable, and strict orders were issued directing the surgeons to operate on the field upon all requiring it, previous to transferring the men to the general hospitals in the city.

The weather, which had entirely stopped all offensive military operations, having moderated considerably, the army on the morning of December 15 marched out beyond the fortifications for the purpose of assaulting the enemy's lines. The medical department of the Army of the Cumberland proper were prepared to attend to any number of wounded brought in to them from the field, and established their hospitals as near the front as the safety of the wounded and the configuration of the country would admit of. Water being quite plenty, position only had to be sought for. The extemporized corps, commanded by Major-General Steedman, had no organized medical staff. This was composed of all the surgeons who could be found unattached, in consequence of being on leave of absence or having been separated from their regiments which had marched from Atlanta with Major-General Sherman. To these were added the medical officers of the U.S. Colored Troops. This portion of the medical staff was under the charge of Surg. Josiah D. Cotton, Ninety-second Ohio Volunteers, who acted as medical director. Though hastily brought together and lacking in all the appurtenances for field hospitals, the medical officers of this command did all in their power to assist and relieve the wounded under their charge. The only great drawback to prompt action in this portion of the army was the entire absence of an ambulance corps. The blockade of the Cumberland River by the rebel batteries had prevented the quartermaster's department from bringing a sufficient number to Nashville. To avoid the want of ambulances as much as possible, every one that could be found in Nashville, no matter in what capacity used, was taken possession of and sent into the field, to be used as circumstances might demand. This, in a manner, served in the place of an ambulance corps, but the want of system and organization was most apparent. The soldiery wounded in the action of the 15th of December were, on the same night, brought into the city and placed in the U.S. general hospitals, where every necessary attention was paid them. Such as had not been operated upon were then examined, and such measures were taken as their cases demanded. The wounded in the action of the 16th of December, 1864, were also brought in and placed in the general hospitals. Some were brought in by ambulances of the corps and some by vehicles, which had been impressed for that purpose. Surg. O. Q. Herrick, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, superintendent of transportation of sick and wounded, made use of all available means to remove from the field each and every wounded man found there. This was a matter of no little labor, for the scene covered several miles, and wounded men were in every portion of it, and the cavalry wounded even farther distant; yet, by midday of the 17th of December all our wounded were in comfortable hospitals, the recipients of every attention that skill and science could furnish. The pursuit of the enemy entailed, as a necessary consequence, much more labor in the care of the wounded. The railroads were destroyed, and all the wounded had to be transferred by means of ambulances to the hospitals at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski. This was done under the supervision of Surg. O. Q. Herrick; and too much praise cannot be given him for his untiring energy and labor in collecting and bringing in from the houses in the vicinity of the line of march the wounded of our own and the rebel army. The cavalry in advance paid but little attention to their wounded, but left them in houses by the roadside, to be cared for by the surgeons of the infantry troops who were following. The Fourth Army Corps carried with them the sick and wounded in ambulances until they arrived where proper hospital accommodations could be furnished. The Sixteenth and Twenty-third Army Corps, not being-in the advance, had no wounded to care for.

In Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski a large number of rebel wounded were found who had been left by their army. A sufficient number of medical officers had been left with them to give them proper attention. These wounded were, as soon as practicable, transferred in hospital cars to Nashville, where they were placed in one large hospital. The medical officer in charge was directed to furnish them all necessaries and such luxuries as the condition of their wounds required. This was done until the arrival of the Commissary-General of Prisoners, who directed that the wounded rebels should be confined to prison hospital rations. I do not think that it is the intention of the Government to deprive wounded men, rebels though they be, of everything needful for their treatment. Prison hospitals being at a distance from the front, it was not expected that wounded men would be brought there till sufficiently well to travel, when diet would be but a matter of minor import. No surgeon can give good results if he be not allowed to use every article called for by sinking nature and to treat disease untrammeled by orders from non-professional men.

The wounded of our armies who were left at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski had medical officers detailed to remain with them until the railroad should have been repaired, when those who could bear transportation were to be removed to Nashville. The necessary supplies were left with the sick and wounded as far as was practicable, but not in such abundance as would have been furnished had the railroad been intact.

The weather during the pursuit was of the most disagreeable character. Rain fell for four successive days, and when this ceased the weather grew severely cold. This was followed by rain, rain, rain, and as a sequence mud. Probably in no part of the war have the men suffered more from inclement weather than in the month of December, 1864, when following Hood's retreating army from Nashville to the Tennessee River. The result of this weather and the hard marching was, as might have been looked for, severe affections of the pulmonary viscera, fevers, rheumatism, and diarrheas, which served to fill the hospitals in this vicinity to their utmost capacity.

The number of men wounded in the actions in front of Nashville will never be correctly furnished, in consequence of the character of some of the troops engaged and their having no organized medical department. The records of this office, as far as furnished, show for the actions from Decatur to Nashville, 402 wounded; in front of Nashville and during the pursuit of the rebels, 1,717 wounded. The wounds were caused by musketry, throwing conoidal projectiles, and by artillery of the latest and most approved character. The wounds were received at all distances, from contact with the muzzle of the piece to the extreme range of artillery and musketry. The character of many of the wounds were of the most severe kind, having been received at short range, consequent upon the peculiarity of the battle, which was a series of charges upon heavily fortified lines held by strong forces of the enemy.

The medical officers of the Army of the Cumberland did in this campaign all that men could do to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded soldiery, and have only added to the envious reputation gained by them on many a former battle-field. They are skillful, zealous, untiring, and faithful, knowing their whole duty and doing it most conscientiously. The medical officers of Sixteenth Corps did their duty well and faithfully, but want of systematic organization crippled their movements most perceptibly.

I will transmit the nominal list of wounded as soon as it can be made out; it will be defective in the Cavalry Corps and in those troops commanded by Major-General Steedman.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. COOPER,        
Surg., U.S. Army, Medical Director, Dept. of the Cumberland.

ASST. ADJT. GEN., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
        Nashville, Tenn.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 107-11

Saturday, January 27, 2024

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 4. — Abstract from return of the District of the Etowah, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman, U.S. Army, for December 10, 1864

No. 4.

Abstract from return of the District of the Etowah, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman, U.S. Army, for December 10, 1864.

 

Command

Present for Duty.

Aggregate present.

Aggregate present and absent.

 

Pieces of artillery

Present for duty—equipped.

Infantry.

Artillery.

Total.

Officers.

Men.

Officers.

Men.

Officers.

Men.

Officers.

Men.

First Separate Division*

101

3,939

4,040

6,690

....

78

4,041

....

....

78

4,041

14th U. S. Colored Troops†

16

594

610

948

....

16

594

....

....

16

594

16th U.S. Colored Troops†

26

655

681

869

....

26

665

....

....

26

665

18th U.S. Colored Troop

11

353

364

936

....

11

352

....

....

11

352

42d U.S. Colored Troops*

20

399

419

552

....

15

217

....

....

15

217

44th U.S. Colored Troops†.

14

198

212

805

....

14

198

....

....

14

198

Artillery*

49

1,474

1,523

2,226

143

....

....

49

1,474

49

1,474

Total

237

7,612

7,849

13,026

143

160

6,067

49

1,474

209

7,541


* At Chattanooga, Tenn.
† At Nashville, Tenn.
‡ At Bridgeport, Ala.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 9 3), p. 59

Sunday, August 21, 2022

Brigadier-General William T. Sherman to Brigadier-General Lorenzo Thomas, October 22, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Louisville, Ky., October 22, 1861.
General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: On my arrival at Camp Dick Robinson I found General Thomas had stationed a Kentucky regiment at Rockcastle Hills, beyond a river of same name, and had sent an Ohio and an Indiana regiment forward in support. He was embarrassed for transportation, but I authorized him to hire teams and to move his whole force nearer to his advance guard, so as to support it, as he had information of the approach of Zollicoffer towards London. I have just heard from him that he had sent forward General Schoepf, with Colonel Wolford's cavalry, Colonel Steedman's Ohio regiment, and a battery of artillery, followed on a succeeding day by the Tennessee brigade. He had still two Kentucky regiments, the Thirty-eighth Ohio, and another battery of artillery, with which he was to follow yesterday. This force if concentrated should be strong enough for the purpose, and at all events is all he had or I could give him. I explained to you fully when here the supposed position of our adversaries, among which was a force in the valley of Big Sandy supposed to be advancing on Paris, Ky. General Nelson, at Maysville, was instucted to collect all the men he could and Colonel Sill's regiment of Ohio volunteers. Colonel Harris was already in position at Olympian Springs, and a regiment lay at Lexington, which I ordered to his support. This leaves the line of Thomas' operations exposed, but I cannot help it. I explained so fully to yourself and the Secretary of War the condition of things, that I can add nothing now until further developments. You know my views-that this great center of our field was too weak, far too weak, and I have begged and implored till I dare not say more.

Buckner still is beyond Green River. He sent a detachment of his men, variously estimated from 2,000 to 4,000, towards Greensburg. General Ward, with about 1,000 men, retreated to Campbellsville, where he called to his assistance some partially formed regiments to the number of about 2,000. The enemy did not advance, and General Ward was at last dates at Campbellsville. These officers, charged with raising regiments, must of necessity be nearer their homes to collect men, and for this reason are out of position; but at or near Greensburg and Lebanon I desire to assemble as large a force of the Kentucky volunteers as possible. This organization is necessarily irregular, but the necessity is so great, that I must have them, and therefore have issued to them arms and clothing during the process of formation. This has facilitated their enlistment; but inasmuch as the legislature provided the means for organizing the Kentucky volunteers, and intrusted their disbursements to a board of loyal gentlemen, I have endeavored to cooperate with them to hasten the formation of these corps. The great difficulty is, and has been, that as volunteers offer we have not arms and clothing to give them. The arms sent us are, as you already know, European muskets of uncouth pattern, which the volunteers will not touch. General McCook has now three brigades—Johnson's, Wood's, and Rousseau's. Negley's brigade arrived to-day, and will at once be sent out. The Minnesota regiment has also arrived, and will be sent forward. Hazzard's regiment of Indiana troops I have ordered to the mouth of Salt Creek; an important point on the turnpike road leading to Elizabethtown.

I again repeat that our force here is out of all proportion to the importance of the position. Our defeat would be disastrous to the nation, and to expect of new men who never bore arms to do miracles is not right.

I am, with much respect, yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,        
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 315-6

Tuesday, August 16, 2022

Official Reports: Action at Rockcastle Hills, or Camp Wildcat, Ky., October 21, 1861. No. 3. — Report of Col. John Coburn, Thirty-third Indiana Infantry.

No. 3.

Report of Col. John Coburn, Thirty-third Indiana Infantry.

HDQRS. THIRTY-THIRD REG'T INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,        
Camp Wildcat, Ky., October 22, 1861.

SIR: In pursuance of your orders to take possession of and occupy an eminence on the east of this encampment, on the morning of the 21st of October I took Company D, Captain McCrea; Company I, Captain Hauser; Company E, Captain Hendricks, and Company G, Captain Dille, of the Thirty-third Indiana, comprising in all 350 men. The companies were immediately deployed around the hill as skirmishers. In less than 20 minutes the rebels, who were concealed in the woods, commenced firing, when at almost the first fire Private McFerran, of Company D, was killed. In 10 minutes more the enemy appeared in front of our position to the south at a distance of half a mile in the valley. They were in large numbers, and were over half an hour in passing by an open space in the woods, when they formed again in line. They soon came near us under cover of a wood, which entirely concealed their approach until we were apprised of their presence by the firing of musketry. At this time we were re-enforced by a portion of the Kentucky cavalry, dismounted, under Colonel Wolford, about 250 strong, who immediately formed and took part in the engagement. The firing at this time was very severe, which caused the cavalry to waver and retreat. They were soon, however, rallied and formed again in order, and fought with good spirit. The enemy engaged was composed of a portion of General Zollicoffer's command, and consisted of two regiments of Tennesseeans, under the command of Colonels Newman and Cummings. They charged up the hill upon us, and were met by a galling and deadly fire, which wounded and killed many of them. The front of their column approached within a few rods of us with their bayonets fixed, declaring themselves “Union men” and “all right,” at the next moment leveling their guns at us and firing. After being engaged nearly an hour the enemy retreated, bearing off a portion of their dead and wounded and their arms. Our men have buried their dead left on the field and taken the wounded to our hospitals. Thirty corpses have been found up to this time. A large number of their wounded and dead were carried off in their wagons. It is safe to estimate the loss of the enemy at least 100 killed.

The bravery of the Thirty-third Indiana was well tested in this engagement. I am happy to state that universal courage, cheerfulness, and promptness marked their whole actions during the entire engagement. Too much praise cannot be given to the brave Captain Hauser, who continued fighting at the head of his men upon the brow of the hill until disabled by a wound. He, however, continued on the field during the day, doing his duty nobly. Captain McCrea, with his men, held a small breastwork, and did fearful execution upon the enemy. Captain Dille was active in rallying the men and urging on the fight in all parts of the field. Captain Hendricks, with coolness and courage, kept his men to their places, and fought without slackening his fire during the engagement. I cannot omit mentioning the bold and active Adjutant Durham, who was wherever duty called him. Lieutenants Maze and Scott were marked for their heroic bearing.

About the close of the engagement four companies of the Seventeenth Ohio, Colonel Connell, came upon the hill and formed in line of battle. Company E, Captain Fox; Company C, Captain Haines; Company K, Captain Rea, and Company H. Captain Whissen, took their positions with promptness, eager for the fray, under the command of Maj. Durbin Ward, of that regiment. They remained on the field during the day and night, and assisted in completing the fortifications. About 2 o'clock p.m. we were again attacked. At this time the Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, appeared upon the field. Company C, Capt. J. W. Brown, of the Fourteenth, immediately formed and opened upon the enemy, and this company: with others, also assisted in completing the fortifications. Afterwards Company G, Captain Eckles, and Company B, Captain Kirk, of the same regiment, came to our assistance. At 10 o'clock at night Lieutenant Sypher, of Captain Standart's Ohio battery, came on the hill, and on an alarm fired three rounds. They were the last shots fired. At about 2 o'clock in the morning we heard sounds which betokened a movement of General Zollicoffer's army. It proved to be a retreat. From a prisoner I have ascertained that his command consisted of two Tennessee regiments, two Mississippi and two Alabama regiments, together with a regiment of cavalry and a battery of six pieces of artillery. The number of our loss is as follows: Company D, 1 killed and 5 wounded; Company I, 1 killed and 10 wounded, 3 mortally. Colonel Wolford lost 1 killed and 11 wounded. The forces now on the hill are in good spirits and ready for further service.

In conclusion, I must commend the coolness, courage, and manliness of Colonel Wolford, who rendered most valuable assistance to me during the day.

Yours, truly,
JOHN COBURN,        
Colonel Thirty-third Regiment Indiana Volunteers.
General A. SCHOEPF,
        Commanding Brigade.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 208-9

Thursday, April 14, 2022

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 229.—Report of Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, of operations December 20, 1864-January 6, 1865.

No. 229.

Report of Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry,
of operations December 20, 1864-January 6, 1865.

HDQRS. FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA (ANDERSON) CAVALRY,        
Huntsville, January 10, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report, as directed by Major-General Steedman, the operations of my command since the 20th ultimo:

On the evening of December 19 I received orders to march with my regiment from Wauhatchie, near Chattanooga, where I was encamped, to Bridgeport, where transports would probably meet me to take my command to Decatur. I reached Bridgeport at 4 p.m. on the 20th, but found no transports, and after telegraphing the facts to General Steedman, at Murfreesborough, was directed by telegraph on the evening of the 22d to march immediately to Huntsville. I accordingly started at 6 p.m. the same day, but was obliged to go into camp six miles from Bridgeport, on the bank of Widow's Creek, in consequence of that stream being past fording and of the bridges having been swept away. I marched at daylight the next morning, and by taking circuitous route around the source of Widow's Creek, succeeded in reaching Stevenson with my wagons early in the afternoon. Here I met Major-General Steedman, who had just arrived by rail from Murfreesborough, and received from him verbal instructions to leave my wagons at Caperton's Ferry, to be shipped by transports to Decatur, and to march as rapidly as possible with my regiment to the same place. This march occupied four days and a half, the rise of water in Crow Creek and Paint Rock River making it necessary to go around by the head of Coon Creek and of Hurricane Fork of Paint Rock River, crossing the spur of the Cumberland Mountain which divides these streams at their source. On this route I had no difficulty in fording the water courses, and found sufficient forage for my command. I reached the north bank of the Tennessee River, opposite Decatur, at 1 p.m. of December 28, and by dark had finished crossing, the infantry and artillery of the expedition, with Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command of cavalry, having nearly finished crossing when I arrived at the river-bank. I at once received orders from Major-General Steedman to take command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's cavalry (detachments of the Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana, numbering in all about 300 effective men), in connection with my own regiment, and to advance on the Courtland road. After feeding the horses I started at 8 p.m., and on reaching a hill two miles from Decatur saw the camp fires of the enemy on an elevation about two miles beyond. Halting the command I took a battalion of 130 men of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry and advanced to reconnoitre the enemy's strength and position. On nearing the lights their pickets fired, when I ordered my advance guard of thirty men to charge, which they did so boldly that the enemy, who proved to be Colonel Windes' regiment, of Roddey's command, had not time to form, but fled in disorder down the road, followed closely by my advance guard for one mile, when the enemy attempted to make a stand to cover his artillery. Another vigorous charge by our advance, however, drove him from his guns (two 6-pounders), which fell into our hands, with all the horses standing hitched to them in the road. We then went into camp (at 10 p.m.) to rest the men and animals for the next day's work. Thus in less than four hours after landing from the boats at Decatur we had advanced in the night six miles in a country and against an enemy of which we were almost entirely ignorant, and had taken possession of the camp and artillery of his rear guard.

Early the next morning [29th] I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser with his command on the main Courtland road, while I advanced with the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry by the Brown's Ferry and Courtland road, both for the purpose of meeting the flank movement of any force that might come up from Bainbridge, where Hood's army had but just crossed the Tennessee River, and also to enable me to get in the rear of Roddey's force, if practicable, while he was being attacked by Colonel Prosser in front. Colonel Prosser first encountered the enemy at Hillsborough, five miles from our camp, and after a running skirmish of five miles more met General Roddey's main force drawn up in two lines at Pond Spring; without hesitation he charged it in the most gallant manner, broke both lines of the enemy, routing him so completely that he hardly attempted to make another stand, but fled ingloriously through Courtland and for eight miles beyond to Town Creek, on the banks of which General Roddey succeeded in reforming such portion of his command as had not taken advantage of their two successive defeats to go home and spend Christmas with their families. Colonel Prosser's attack was so vigorous that my force on the Brown's Ferry road, having several miles the longer distance to march, and in an unknown country, did not have time to reach the flank or rear of the enemy. Forty-five prisoners were captured in this affair, including 3 commissioned officers; the enemy also lost 1 man killed and 2 wounded. Colonel Prosser's loss was 1 man wounded. It appeared that Patterson's (so called) brigade, of Roddey's command, having crossed at Bainbridge, had come up the preceding evening to Pond Spring to re-enforce Roddey, and constituted, with the balance of Windes' regiment, the force in our front on this day.

Being now within half a day's march of Bainbridge, where I knew the whole of Forrest's cavalry had but just crossed the river, it was necessary to advance with more caution. We reached Leighton, however, thirteen miles west of Courtland, by 1 p.m. of the next day, Friday, December 30, having skirmished nearly all the way with flying parties of Roddey's cavalry, who attempted to delay us by burning a bridge over Town Creek, on the Bainbridge Road, and by some show of holding the ford of the same stream on the main Tuscumbia Road. Most of the latter force drifted in squads southward toward the mountains, the remainder, with General Roddey, taking the roads to Tuscumbia and Florence. Toward dark a new force appeared in our front on the Tuscumbia Road, believed to be Armstrong's brigade, which I afterward learned definitely had been sent back by Forrest from Barton Station to re-enforce Roddey and protect General Hood's trains. At Leighton I learned that Hood had commenced crossing the river at Bainbridge on Sunday morning and finished on Tuesday evening, marching at once toward Corinth; his railroad had never been in operation east of Cane Creek, three miles west of Tuscumbia. I also learned that the pontoon bridge had been taken up on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, and that the entire pontoon train of 200 wagons had passed through Leighton on Thursday and camped at La Grange the same night, and that it was bound for Columbus, Miss., with a comparatively small guard. Roddey's so-called division of cavalry had apparently been relied upon to prevent any advance of our forces until the train could get to a safe distance, but his men had become so demoralized by their successive defeats that we could afford to disregard him.

Having communicated with Major-General Steedman, who left me free to make the expedition or not, as I might deem best, I started from Leighton before daylight on Saturday morning, December 31, taking a trail which enabled us to avoid Armstrong's force and to get in the rear of a portion of Roddey's command at La Grange, where we captured Col. Jim Warren, of Tenth [Fifth] Alabama Cavalry, and some other prisoners. About 1 p.m. we passed through Russellville, where we encountered another portion of Roddey's force, which had just arrived from Tuscumbia, and drove it out on the Tuscaloosa road, while we kept on the Cotton-Gin or Bull Mountain road, after the train. Some attempt was made to delay us by burning a bridge over Cedar Creek, but we found a ford and caught up with the rear of the pontoon train at dark, ten miles beyond Russellville. We met no resistance, and our advance guard rode through to the front of the train, which extended for five miles, and consisted of seventy-eight pontoon-boats and about 200 wagons, with all the necessary accouterments and material, engineering instruments, &c.; all the mules and oxen, except what the pontoniers and teamsters were able to cut loose and ride off, were standing hitched to the wagons. Three boats had been set fire to, but so carelessly that no damage had been done. We captured a few prisoners, and went into camp at about the center of the train, fed our horses, and I then started the entire command out in either direction to burn the train, which was done in the most thorough manner, and occupied till 3 a.m. 1 should have been glad to bring the pontoon train—which was built at Atlanta last winter, and was an exceedingly well appointed one—back to our lines, but the condition of the mules, the mountainous character of the country, and the presence in our rear of a force of the enemy's cavalry estimated at three times our own strength, prevented. I had also learned from a negro servant of Captain Cobb, of the engineers, who commanded the train, that a large supply train of General Hood, bound from Barton Station to Tuscaloosa, was ahead.

Early next morning (Sunday) I pushed on through Nauvoo, taking the Aberdeen road, which I knew would flank the train. I led a detachment from near Bexar, across by a trail to head the train on the Cotton-Gin road, and sent another, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lamborn, to follow it, and by 10 p.m. had surprised it in camp a few miles over the State line in Itawamba County, Miss. It consisted of 110 wagons and over 500 mules. We burned the wagons, shot or sabered all the mules we could not lead off or use to mount prisoners, and started back. In one of the wagons was Colonel McCrosky, of Hood's infantry, who had been badly wounded at Franklin. I left a tent with him, some stores, and one of the prisoners to take care of him. About twenty of the teamsters were colored U.S. soldiers of the garrison captured by Hood at Dalton; these came back with us. We returned via Toll-gate and the old military and Hackleburg roads, capturing an ambulance with its guard on the way, to within twenty-five miles south of Russellville, when I found that Roddey's force and the so-called brigades of Biffle and Russell were already stationed in our front at Bear Creek, and on the Biler road, toward Moulton, to retard us, while Armstrong was reported as being in pursuit. The country was very difficult and rugged, with few roads or trails and scarcely any forage, but we evaded, by a night march of twenty-three miles, all the forces of the enemy except Colonel Russell, whom we attacked unexpectedly on the Moulton and Tuscaloosa road, twelve miles east of Thorn Hill, on Wednesday noon (Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser having the advance), routing him so speedily and completely that he did not delay our march twenty minutes, and this only to pick up prisoners and burn his five wagons, including his headquarters wagons, out of which we got all the brigade and other official papers. We had but a few hours previously captured, with its guard of three men, a small mail bound for Tuscaloosa. About fifty or seventy-five conscripts from both sides of the Tennessee River, that Russell was hustling off to Tuscaloosa, were released by our attack, also eight Indiana soldiers captured by Russell near Decatur. We then continued our march unmolested by way of Mount Hope toward Leighton, but, learning when within ten miles of that place that all our troops had returned to Decatur, we came on by easy marches to the same post, reaching it on Friday evening, 6th instant.

The whole distance marched from the time of leaving Decatur, nine days previously, was 265, and about 400 miles from the time of leaving Chattanooga, two weeks and three days previous.

My entire command numbered less than 600 men, consisting of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania (Anderson) Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Charles B. Lamborn, and detachments of the Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. William F. Prosser. To these officers and all those under them, much credit is due for their gallantry and energy, as well as to all their men, for the dash and courage with which they attacked any enemy that appeared, and for the patient manner in which they bore, on the most scanty rations, the severe fatigue of this expedition. I desire particularly to recommend for honorable mention in general orders Sergt. Arthur P. Lyon, of Company A, of the Anderson Cavalry, for repeated acts of marked bravery during this short campaign, including the capture of two pieces of artillery, which fell into his hands on the night of December 28, six miles from Decatur, on the Courtland road, by a daring charge of our advance guard of fifteen inert, which he led on this occasion.

We took about 150 prisoners after leaving Leighton, including 2 colonels (one of whom was left in consequence of his wounds), 2 captains, and 6 lieutenants, and destroyed in all between 750 and 1,000 stand of arms, and captured a considerable number of pistols.

Our entire loss, 1 man killed and 2 wounded, all of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command, in the charge on Russell's force.

The whole of Forrest's cavalry, except Armstrong's brigade, was at Okolona, Miss., within one day's march of us, when the supply train was captured. He had been sent there as soon as he crossed at Bainbridge, on Tuesday evening, to repel our cavalry from Memphis, who had destroyed the railroad for twenty miles near and above Okolona. I do not think General Hood brought across the Tennessee River at Bainbridge more than 12,000 infantry and thirty-five pieces of artillery.

I am very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. J. PALMER,        
Colonel, Commanding.
Maj. S. B. MOE,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. District of the Etowah.
_______________

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,        
Huntsville, January 10, 1865.
Captain RAMSEY,
        Ass. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland, Nashville:

CAPTAIN: As supplementary to my report of my operations in North Alabama, directed to be sent in by the major-general commanding, I inclose a copy of a letter from Major-General Steedman, which left me free to make the expedition after the enemy's pontoon train or not, as I might deem best.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,
WM. J. PALMER,        
Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH,        
Courtland, Ala., December 30, 1864--5.15 p.m.
Col. WILLIAM J. PALMER,
        Commanding Cavalry:

COLONEL: Your dispatch just received. The infantry, if it should move now, could not reach Leighton before 2 a.m. to-morrow. You will, therefore, have to exercise your own judgment as to whether you can safely make the expedition without support from the infantry. It is fair to suppose that the pontoon train has a guard at least equal to your own force. The service of your command will be needed to scout in the direction of the river and Tuscumbia. I do not wish you to break down your horses, but leave you free to make the expedition, if you think you can do it with perfect safety. Send me a commissioned officer with twenty-five of your men for courier duty. Please inform me whether you pursue the train or not.

By command of Major-General Steedman:
S. B. MOE,        
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 641-5