Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 8. — Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

No. 8.

Report of Surg. George E. Cooper, U. S. Army, Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,                

MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,        

Nashville, Tenn., April 7, 1865.

SIR: My report of the medical department of the Army of the Cumberland from the time of the invasion of Northern Alabama and Tennessee by the rebel army under General Hood till the defeat of the same by the Government forces in front of Nashville, and the pursuit thereof to beyond the Tennessee River, must be a meager and unsatisfactory one in consequence of my having been separated from the army, and not having myself been in active campaign with it until after the battle of Franklin, Tenn., when it presented itself in the defenses of Nashville. The proceedings of the medical corps are, however, exceedingly well pointed out in the accompanying report of Surg. J. Theo. Heard, medical director Fourth Army Corps, who in person accompanied that corps—all that was left as an organized force of the old Army of the Cumberland, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps having been taken by Major-General Sherman to form a portion of the army with which he made the great raid through Georgia.

At the time of evacuating Atlanta the corps hospitals of the Army of the Cumberland were, as they had been in the summer campaign, fully organized and equipped, and were ready to move at a moment's notice. The general field hospital, under the charge of Surg. M. C. Woodworth, was in fine condition and of sufficient capacity to receive all the sick and wounded of the army, who, on the breaking up of the division hospitals, might require medical treatment. Supplies of all kinds had been called for and procured by the field medical purveyor, and the army corps were amply and liberally supplied. The ambulances, which had been greatly used during the summer campaign, were repaired and put in as serviceable condition as the time and material on hand would admit of. When the rebel army fell upon the line of railroad at our rear the inconvenience suffered therefrom was, as far as the medical department was concerned, in reality nothing. The only article which ran short was whisky, and this was procured in ample quantities from the subsistence department. The quality, though not equal to that furnished by the medical department, was good enough for all practicable purposes.

The Fourth and Fourteenth Army Corps, having been detailed to follow Hood's army to the rear, the sick from their division hospitals were transferred to the general field hospital, where they were cared for as well as could be wished for, and the troops left Atlanta entirely disencumbered with sick or wounded men. What occurred from that time till the last days of November, 1864, is known to me by hearsay only and from reading the reports furnished these headquarters. For this information I refer to the excellent report of Surgeon Heard, medical director, Fourth Army Corps, who, having been one of that little band who held the whole rebel army in check from Decatur, Ala., to Nashville, Tenn., is far more competent to make the report than I. Synchronous with my arrival at Nashville from Atlanta and Chattanooga came reports of the falling back of our army from Pulaski, Tenn., and of heavy and continuous skirmishing with Hood's advance. On the 30th of November came the news that a severe action had taken place near Franklin, Tenn., and that our losses in both killed and wounded had been heavy. The medical director of the Fourth Army Corps was immediately telegraphed to and asked if he required a hospital train, and early next morning hospital train No. 2 was sent to Brentwood, between Nashville and Franklin. On the night of November 30 two freight trains loaded with wounded from skirmishes beyond Franklin, and which had been brought to that place in ambulances, arrived here. The wounded were transferred to the general hospitals here, and were promptly and skillfully cared for by the medical officers there on duty.

On the following day the troops arrived from Franklin, bringing with them quite a number of wounded, but having, unfortunately, been compelled to leave by far the greater portion in the hands of the enemy. Almost at the same time came the troops commanded by Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith. These troops were deficient in almost everything belonging to the hospital department; they had no organized ambulance corps or trains; there was no division or brigade organization of hospitals, but were as they had been from the beginning of the war, and seemed to have learned nothing from experience or the example of others, and opposed every improvement as an innovation. They had but few medical supplies, and were wanting in almost everything which would aid them in alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded of their commands. It became necessary to fit them out with all possible dispatch, which was done; and thanks are due to Surg. Robert Fletcher, U.S. Volunteers, medical purveyor, for his energy, efficiency, and promptness in this emergency. No one could have performed the duties of purveyor in a manner more creditable to himself or with greater benefit to the Government.

As soon as the troops arrived in front of Nashville they were placed in the lines and were compelled to throw up intrenchments. They were much prostrated by their constant harassing night and day marches from the Tennessee River to Nashville; but, notwithstanding this, in a short time, by constant and severe labor, works were thrown up which rendered Nashville impregnable. As the army was short of men, it became necessary to call to the aid of the beleaguered city all the troops within call. Consequently, the different detachments of the army which left Atlanta with General Sherman, and had remained behind, in hospitals and otherwise, were organized into a temporary corps under the command of Major-General Steedman. This extemporized corps was without any organization whatever, and to it was attached the regiments of colored troops. It is impossible for me to learn if these troops consider themselves a part and parcel of the Army of the Cumberland, or a separate command made for Colonel Mussey. I should judge them to be out of the department did I take the attention they pay to the existence of this office as a criterion. They are more irregular in forwarding their reports than any regiments in the Army of the Cumberland.

The weather, which, previous to the arrival of the troops, had been moderate, became, shortly after their arrival at Nashville, excessively cold for this latitude. The result of this was much suffering on the part of the troops and the comparative cessation of all offensive measures on the part of either army. At this time the results of the fatigue undergone by the troops in the retreat from Decatur and the subsequent labor in the trenches began to show themselves in the greatly increased number of men who presented themselves for medical treatment. Many, too, who had without detriment to their health undergone all the hardships of the summer and fall campaign, now yielded to the effects of the bitter cold, and diseases of the pulmonary viscera became numerous. Rheumatic affections, too, became quite prevalent. The advent of the rebel army in front of Nashville, and the fact of intrenching itself, rendered the necessity of a general action a moral certainty. To prepare for the sick and wounded of the Government forces demanded a much larger amount of hospital accommodation than was at that time at the disposal of the hospital department. Anticipating a large influx of wounded, the efficient superintendent and director of U.S. general hospitals at Nashville took possession of every building that could be made use of for hospital purposes and had them fitted up with all possible dispatch. Consequently, some 4,000 vacant beds were at the disposal of the medical department. The Assistant Surgeon-General, too, anticipating the necessity, ordered to Nashville a large number of medical officers, of whom many arrived prior to the actions and all in sufficient time to be of the greatest service to the wounded in the battles in front of Nashville. The medical officers of the Fourth Army Corps, being emphatically experts in the care of the wounded after battle, had everything prepared for prompt and efficient action. They had supplied themselves with all the necessaries, and, in addition, had procured all the delicacies within their reach. The result was that after the actions of 15th and 16th of December the men belonging to the Fourth Army Corps, and all who were brought to the field hospitals of that corps, were promptly and skillfully treated and most carefully provided for. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the medical staff of the Fourth Army Corps for their untiring attention and skillful manner of treating the wounded in their division hospitals. Were it not invidious to designate and particularize by name certain officers when all are worthy, I would give a list of the medical officers who so faithfully performed their duty. This I will not do, but justice to themselves demands that I should mention and particularize Surgs. M. G. Sherman, Ninth Indiana Volunteers; Stephen J. Young, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers; E.B. Glick, Fortieth Indiana Volunteers, and C. N. Ellinwood, Seventy-fourth Illinois Volunteers, as men deserving of more than ordinary notice. Previous to the battles instructions had been given to the surgeons in charge to establish division field hospitals as near to the field as practicable, and strict orders were issued directing the surgeons to operate on the field upon all requiring it, previous to transferring the men to the general hospitals in the city.

The weather, which had entirely stopped all offensive military operations, having moderated considerably, the army on the morning of December 15 marched out beyond the fortifications for the purpose of assaulting the enemy's lines. The medical department of the Army of the Cumberland proper were prepared to attend to any number of wounded brought in to them from the field, and established their hospitals as near the front as the safety of the wounded and the configuration of the country would admit of. Water being quite plenty, position only had to be sought for. The extemporized corps, commanded by Major-General Steedman, had no organized medical staff. This was composed of all the surgeons who could be found unattached, in consequence of being on leave of absence or having been separated from their regiments which had marched from Atlanta with Major-General Sherman. To these were added the medical officers of the U.S. Colored Troops. This portion of the medical staff was under the charge of Surg. Josiah D. Cotton, Ninety-second Ohio Volunteers, who acted as medical director. Though hastily brought together and lacking in all the appurtenances for field hospitals, the medical officers of this command did all in their power to assist and relieve the wounded under their charge. The only great drawback to prompt action in this portion of the army was the entire absence of an ambulance corps. The blockade of the Cumberland River by the rebel batteries had prevented the quartermaster's department from bringing a sufficient number to Nashville. To avoid the want of ambulances as much as possible, every one that could be found in Nashville, no matter in what capacity used, was taken possession of and sent into the field, to be used as circumstances might demand. This, in a manner, served in the place of an ambulance corps, but the want of system and organization was most apparent. The soldiery wounded in the action of the 15th of December were, on the same night, brought into the city and placed in the U.S. general hospitals, where every necessary attention was paid them. Such as had not been operated upon were then examined, and such measures were taken as their cases demanded. The wounded in the action of the 16th of December, 1864, were also brought in and placed in the general hospitals. Some were brought in by ambulances of the corps and some by vehicles, which had been impressed for that purpose. Surg. O. Q. Herrick, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, superintendent of transportation of sick and wounded, made use of all available means to remove from the field each and every wounded man found there. This was a matter of no little labor, for the scene covered several miles, and wounded men were in every portion of it, and the cavalry wounded even farther distant; yet, by midday of the 17th of December all our wounded were in comfortable hospitals, the recipients of every attention that skill and science could furnish. The pursuit of the enemy entailed, as a necessary consequence, much more labor in the care of the wounded. The railroads were destroyed, and all the wounded had to be transferred by means of ambulances to the hospitals at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski. This was done under the supervision of Surg. O. Q. Herrick; and too much praise cannot be given him for his untiring energy and labor in collecting and bringing in from the houses in the vicinity of the line of march the wounded of our own and the rebel army. The cavalry in advance paid but little attention to their wounded, but left them in houses by the roadside, to be cared for by the surgeons of the infantry troops who were following. The Fourth Army Corps carried with them the sick and wounded in ambulances until they arrived where proper hospital accommodations could be furnished. The Sixteenth and Twenty-third Army Corps, not being-in the advance, had no wounded to care for.

In Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski a large number of rebel wounded were found who had been left by their army. A sufficient number of medical officers had been left with them to give them proper attention. These wounded were, as soon as practicable, transferred in hospital cars to Nashville, where they were placed in one large hospital. The medical officer in charge was directed to furnish them all necessaries and such luxuries as the condition of their wounds required. This was done until the arrival of the Commissary-General of Prisoners, who directed that the wounded rebels should be confined to prison hospital rations. I do not think that it is the intention of the Government to deprive wounded men, rebels though they be, of everything needful for their treatment. Prison hospitals being at a distance from the front, it was not expected that wounded men would be brought there till sufficiently well to travel, when diet would be but a matter of minor import. No surgeon can give good results if he be not allowed to use every article called for by sinking nature and to treat disease untrammeled by orders from non-professional men.

The wounded of our armies who were left at Franklin, Columbia, and Pulaski had medical officers detailed to remain with them until the railroad should have been repaired, when those who could bear transportation were to be removed to Nashville. The necessary supplies were left with the sick and wounded as far as was practicable, but not in such abundance as would have been furnished had the railroad been intact.

The weather during the pursuit was of the most disagreeable character. Rain fell for four successive days, and when this ceased the weather grew severely cold. This was followed by rain, rain, rain, and as a sequence mud. Probably in no part of the war have the men suffered more from inclement weather than in the month of December, 1864, when following Hood's retreating army from Nashville to the Tennessee River. The result of this weather and the hard marching was, as might have been looked for, severe affections of the pulmonary viscera, fevers, rheumatism, and diarrheas, which served to fill the hospitals in this vicinity to their utmost capacity.

The number of men wounded in the actions in front of Nashville will never be correctly furnished, in consequence of the character of some of the troops engaged and their having no organized medical department. The records of this office, as far as furnished, show for the actions from Decatur to Nashville, 402 wounded; in front of Nashville and during the pursuit of the rebels, 1,717 wounded. The wounds were caused by musketry, throwing conoidal projectiles, and by artillery of the latest and most approved character. The wounds were received at all distances, from contact with the muzzle of the piece to the extreme range of artillery and musketry. The character of many of the wounds were of the most severe kind, having been received at short range, consequent upon the peculiarity of the battle, which was a series of charges upon heavily fortified lines held by strong forces of the enemy.

The medical officers of the Army of the Cumberland did in this campaign all that men could do to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded soldiery, and have only added to the envious reputation gained by them on many a former battle-field. They are skillful, zealous, untiring, and faithful, knowing their whole duty and doing it most conscientiously. The medical officers of Sixteenth Corps did their duty well and faithfully, but want of systematic organization crippled their movements most perceptibly.

I will transmit the nominal list of wounded as soon as it can be made out; it will be defective in the Cavalry Corps and in those troops commanded by Major-General Steedman.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. COOPER,        

Surg., U.S. Army, Medical Director, Dept. of the Cumberland.

ASST. ADJT. GEN., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
        Nashville, Tenn.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 107-11

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 231. — Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

No. 231.

Report of General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, commanding Military Division of the West.

HEADQUARTERS, &c.,        

Greensborough, N. C., April 15, 1865.

GENERAL: I have read in the Richmond Enquirer of the 25th ultimo the report of General J. B. Hood touching the operations of the Army of Tennessee from July 18, 1864, to January 23, 1865. During a portion of the period embraced in that report, General Hood having been under my command, his report should have passed through me for my consideration and remarks before it reached the War Department. The regular channel of communication should have been observed, as my own acts and conduct as his commanding officer are referred to by him. I am the more surprised at this irregularity, as I informed General Hood, at Tupelo, a few days previous to his being relieved that I desired and expected his report to be addressed to and pass through me to the Department. At that time he expressed his intention of making through me a report covering the operations of the Army of Tennessee from the date of his assumption of command, to which I objected, as I only had a right to call for one embracing his operations from the time I took command. There are several errors and inaccuracies in the report which I cannot leave unnoticed, while reserving for some more suitable occasion a more extended report of operations in the Military Division of the West while under my command.

Unexpectedly to me His Excellency the President, on October 2, 1864, called me to the command of the departments then under General J. B. Hood and Lieut. Gen. R. Taylor, respectively, embracing together the States of Mississippi, Alabama, East Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia, with my headquarters to be established at the most convenient point for purposes of communication, but with the understanding that my personal presence would be given wheresoever in my judgment the interest of my command rendered it necessary, and that when present with an army in the field I should exercise the immediate command.

On the 1st of November, the President, repeating his instructions that I should exercise immediate command when present with the troops, added: That in order to retain freedom of motion it was expected I would not relieve the commander of the particular army, but by retaining the existing organization be enabled to leave it when expedient at any moment without impairing its administration and efficiency.

In pursuance of orders I repaired to the headquarters of General Hood, at Cave Spring, Ga., on or about the 9th of October, and there conferred with him in regard to his future movements. General Hood is, therefore, in error in saying that I joined the army at Gadsden, Ala. Being at the time unprovided with my staff and horses, and desirous also to confer with Lieutenant-General Taylor, I hastened thence to Jacksonville, Ala., which had then become the new base of operations, intending to return in the event a battle should become probable.

On the 19th of October, supposing that General Hood was near Alpine or Summerville, Ga., I proceeded to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime, however, he had commenced his movement toward Middle Tennessee without advising me, and had marched as far as Gadsden—

a fact which I ascertained at Round Mountain Iron-Works (in advance of Center)—when, retracing my steps, I joined him on the 21st of October.

In an interview with General Hood he informed me that he was then en route to Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee River. At Gadsden I had conferences during two days with him in relation to the future operations of the army, in the course of which he stated that his general plan had been submitted to and approved by General Bragg, then commanding the Armies of the Confederate States. In view of existing condition of affairs the movement then in progress met my approval also, for reasons, some of which are as follows:

First. General Hood alleged that Sherman was short of provisions and forage at Atlanta, while his wheel transportation was in wretched condition.

Second. That the destruction of the railroad near Marietta and Dalton by our forces had been so thorough it would require at least five or six weeks to repair it, during which the Army of Tennessee could be thrown into Middle Tennessee, via Gunter's Landing, distance about forty miles from Gadsden, and destroy the railroad bridges at Bridgeport and across the Elk and Duck Rivers before Sherman could finish the repairs of the road below Chattanooga, thus forcing him to return to Tennessee to protect his communications and obtain supplies.

To add to the chances of success I remained two days at Gadsden after the departure of the army, to issue the necessary orders to secure railroad communications in Mississippi and Middle Alabama for the transportation of supplies, and to direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to report to General Hood with his command.

While en route to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise, that the line of march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly intrenched. As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great and unnecessary sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally, at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of November.

The effective strength of the force at this date was as follows: Three corps—infantry, 25,085; artillery, 2,200; total, 27,285.

No report has been received of the strength of the cavalry. Jackson's division consisted of three brigades, estimated at 2,000 men; General Forrest's command estimated at 3,500 men, and General Roddey's at 2,000; making an aggregate of 34,785.

General Roddey with his command was to cover the line of communication from Tuscumbia to Corinth, and thence toward Meridian.

When it became apparent that Sherman (still at Atlanta) was dividing his army by assembling two corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, (about 20,000 infantry and artillery), at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur, it was determined by General Hood, after a discussion between us, that our army should move promptly into Tennessee and strike the enemy before a junction could be effected with the forces of A. J. Smith (about 8,000 effectives), known to be moving from Missouri, and of Steele (about the same strength), from Arkansas. To this end our forces were to be thrown forward as speedily as possible from Florence to Lawrenceburg, and thence either to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate; and I repeated my orders to General Forrest to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesborough, making first, however, a demonstration toward Columbia to distract and harass the enemy. The movement of the Army of Tennessee did not commence, however, on the 9th of November, as arranged, and I addressed General Hood, on the 15th of that month, a communication, from which the following are extracts:

My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday, first, to the necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River; second, to the necessity of securing from the passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point above Savannah or Clifton, besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in case of disaster; third, to the necessity of giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point. * * *

I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent upon me to call again your attention to those important matters. * * *

General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control; but these being limited, ample previous notice for what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. * * *

G. T. BEAUREGARD,          

General.

Lieutenant-General Taylor was then directed to repair to Georgia to assume command of all forces there, with instructions to call on the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina for the militia of their respective States; and General Hood, in view of the fact that General Sherman had divided his army, was directed to hasten his movement and strike the enemy a vigorous blow before he could unite with his re-enforcements. He was likewise ordered to send to Major-General Wheeler, who was closely watching General Sherman, the cavalry division of Brigadier-General Jackson. In consequence, however, of the urgent solicitation of General Hood, who represented his deficiency in cavalry, the order for Jackson's division was countermanded so far as to direct only one brigade to be detached.

On the 17th of November the following order was given General Hood:

General Beauregard directs me to say he desires that you will fake the offensive at the earliest practicable moment and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. To relieve you from any embarrassment while operating in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders in General Taylor's department you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and successful administration and operations of your army, sending to Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whosoever may be in command, copies of all such orders. He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division, and the balance of that division, as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia, and also to advise General Wheeler that in such a case Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders. * * *

GEO. WM. BRENT,              

 Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Hood in his report states:

General Beauregard left it optional with me either to divide the army, sending a part after Sherman and to push on with the remainder, or to move at once against Thomas with the entire force. The army I thought too small to divide. I so informed him, when he directed me by telegraph to push forward at once.

General Hood's request to retain all the cavalry having then been repeated, I adhered to the order for the one brigade and telegraphed him accordingly, leaving him with his three corps and artillery intact, as well as a large cavalry force. He was confronted in Middle Tennessee by General Thomas with only two corps (about 20,000 infantry and artillery) and about 6,000 cavalry, General Sherman being in Georgia with four corps (about 40,000 infantry and artillery) and about 4,000 cavalry, at a long distance from us, with muddy roads, burned bridges, and broad devastated districts between the two armies. It was, therefore, our clear policy to strike Thomas with the utmost celerity before he could be re-enforced, rather than to retrace our march and pursue Sherman. But the offensive in Middle Tennessee could only be successful if undertaken at once and executed with energy, without any division or material diminution of our forces. I certainly contemplated in that event no such division, for I could not regard it as compatible with the plan of the campaign, though under existing circumstances a division and active employment of forces would doubtless have been preferable to inaction.

On the 6th day of December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman, for the following reasons, namely:

First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.

Second. Sherman, with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about 275 miles on comparatively good roads.

Third. To pursue Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country, affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.

Fourth. Moreover, to have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

Fifth. From the assurances of Governor Brown and Major-General Cobb, it was a reasonable supposition that about 17,000 men would be furnished in a great emergency by the State of Georgia, which force, added to thirteen brigades of cavalry, under Major-General Wheeler, and some 5,000 men, who, it was thought, might be drawn from the States of North and South Carolina, would have given us about 29,000 men to throw across Sherman's path. Although the delays and changes of line of march were not satisfactory to me, nevertheless, I had not felt it to be necessary to assume, as authorized to do, the immediate command of the Army of Tennessee, because I had found it in good spirits, resulting in part from its recent successful blows at the enemy's railroad communications from Dalton to Atlanta; all appeared confident of a successful issue to the impending campaign, and the commanders immediately subordinate to General Hood seemed to regard him as capable to lead them. Moreover, I knew that he possessed in a high degree the confidence of the Government as likewise of General Bragg, at the time commander of the Armies of the Confederate States. Nevertheless, I thought it proper, so long as my presence elsewhere was not exigent, that I should accompany the troops; but as soon as Sherman's purposes were fully developed in Georgia I deemed myself called on to repair at once to that theatre of operations, to do what I might to baffle them, assured that I left General Hood quite strong enough for the proposed campaign. On reaching there the forces I had been led to expect were not available. The cavalry of Major-General Wheeler and a small force of Georgia militia, under Major-General Smith, with the detailed men from our workshops, and State reserves, were all that could be organized and brought into the field against the overwhelming numbers of the thoroughly organized, disciplined, and equipped veterans of the enemy.

In January, 1865, General Hood furnished me with a copy of a letter from him to the War Office giving a general summary of his campaign from the 29th of September, 1864, to the 7th of January, 1865; but although repeatedly called for, no official detailed report either from General Hood or his subordinate officers has passed through me, as required by the regulations of the service.

And now, in conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill; Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee to repair and protect his line of communications before he could have collected sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky, or perchance, the defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial diversion in favor of that commander; meantime, too, we would have been enabled to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains, delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a successful attack on Nashville—a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force for the protection of South Carolina.

Untoward and calamitous as were the issues of this campaign, never in the course of this war have the best qualities of our soldiery been more conspicuously shown; never more enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more crossed the Tennessee River; never greater gallantry than that which was so general at Franklin; and never higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion to duty than were displayed on the retreat from Nashville to Tupelo.

The heroic dead of that campaign will ever be recollected with honor by their countrymen, and the survivors have the proud consolation that no share of the disaster can be laid to them, who have so worthily served their country, and have stood by their colors even to the last dark hours of the republic.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,        

General.

General SAM. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. Army.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 646-51

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General William T. Sherman, June 23, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 23, 1863.

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,

        Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps:

In addition to the troops with you and at Snyder's, I have notified Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. In addition to this, two more brigades can be taken from your corps without breaking the line investing Vicksburg. Should Johnston come, we want to whip him, if the siege has to be raised to do it.

Use all the forces indicated above as you deem most advantageous; and should more be required, call on me, and they will be furnished, to the last man here and at Young's Point.

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 430-1

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, June 23, 1863—11 a.m.

AT McCALL'S, June 23, 1863—11 a.m.

DEAR GENERAL: Parke, with Smith's division and one brigade of his Yankee troops, is on the river road from Neily's to Post Oak Ridge, with orders to feel forward to the bridge across Bear Creek, 6 miles beyond Post Oak Ridge. My cavalry is now down at Little Bear Creek, on the Birdsong road. Tuttle's division is close up to the cavalry, and McArthur's is near here, and we are waiting for his troops to come up. I will put them on the Birdsong road. Parke and I can communicate by the ridge from McCall's to Neily's. After nooning I propose to go forward to the Big Black. I hear nothing of Johnston at all; no trace of him or signs of his approach. The country is ill-adapted to large masses. It is cut up by impracticable ravines, and all the roads are on narrow ridges, where a regiment will find difficulty in forming a front. A small force can oppose a large one, and as to getting at Johnston unless he crosses to this side of Big Black, I think it cannot be done. If he crosses Big Black and comes by any road, I shall, of course, meet him and oppose him, calling for all the help I may deem necessary. If he crosses Big Black, I think this is the place to fight him. Order Osterhaus to be certain to blockade all roads from Big Black toward Vicksburg, between Clear Creek and this road. After satisfying myself that there is, or is not, a purpose on his part to cross over, I will communicate the fact; but, no matter what his strength, he must come by narrow roads, and I have as many men as can be handled on such grounds. If I conclude he does not design to come in by Birdsong Ferry or the ford above, I will blockade it, so as to force him to come on the main ridge within striking distance of Haynes' Bluff, so that we won't care if he comes or not.

Yesterday four companies of my cavalry (Fourth Iowa) had gone to Big Black River on the road to obstruct it. They had felled many trees, and must have been off their guard when their pickets came in from three directions, giving notice of the approach of the enemy. Quite a fight ensued, in which our men got the worst, and were forced to fly. As soon as the news reached camp, Colonel Swan went to the ground with his regiment, and found 8 dead, 12 wounded, and about 20 missing. From the people he heard the attack came from Wirt Adams' cavalry, which had gone off in the direction of Mechanicsburg. Colonel Swan buried the dead, and brought off all the wounded except one, who was left well cared for at a house. He could hear of but about 12 prisoners in the hands of the enemy, so that he expects some 8 more will have gone down to Osterhaus, and will come in to-day.

The party lost that 2-pounder gun we captured at Jackson, but before abandoning it they disabled it by taking out the breech-pin. The fact of our coming out today is attributed by the secesh to our purpose to punish the perpetrators of this action.

I will send you positive intelligence to-night if Johnston be coming or not this side of Big Black River. On the best evidence now procurable, he is not coming this way, or at this time.

I take it for granted you do not want me to attempt to follow him across that river unless after a defeat. If he comes to this side, I can hold him till re-enforced, and then I know we can whip him. In the mean time look out toward Baldwin's and Hankinson's, though I do not believe he will put himself in such a pocket.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,        

Major-General, Commanding Expedition.

General GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 2 (Serial No. 37), p. 245-6

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General John A. McClernand, June 15, 1863

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,        

    Near Vicksburg, Miss., June 15, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. McCLERNAND,
        Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

A portion of the Ninth Army Corps, about 8,000 strong, have now arrived, and will take position on the south side of the city, thus making the investment complete. This will release General Herron, who is instructed to move to General Hovey's place, thus contracting your front to the ground occupied by Smith and Carr.

Should the enemy attack Haynes' Bluff in such force as to make it necessary to detach a greater force than  has already been designated, i.e., the six reserve brigades of McPherson's and Sherman's corps, I will have to entirely uncover on the south side of the city. This will necessarily involve an exposure of our left flank from the garrison of Vicksburg. We should hold and fight the enemy wherever he presents himself, from the extreme right to your extreme left—that is, all the ground taken by the three army corps on first investing the city should be held.

Your left division is, or will be, replaced by one numerically stronger. By replacing it thus it gives you a reserve of three brigades. Lauman's, with nearly 6,000 men, will also be there to strengthen you still further in this emergency.

I do not want to give up the front occupied by Lauman unless it should become absolutely necessary to do so, but give this as a plan to be adopted in case of the greatest pressure on the left. The idea, then, is, that two lines should now be selected running perpendicular to our present line, one from Lauman's left, along Hall's Ferry road, and one from Hovey's present left. Should Parke's command, the Ninth Corps, be removed, your reserve should at once be thrown on to the first line chosen on the Hall's Ferry road. Should they be so hotly pressed as to make it necessary for them to fall back into the second line, then Lauman's division should be brought into it also. The very moment an order goes for the removal of the Ninth Corps you will be notified. You will then assume command of all the forces to the left of you in addition to your own corps.

Everything in the shape of ammunition, commissary stores, and other public property not required, should be got back to within what may possibly become our most contracted line.

Should the enemy attempt to get past your left, with the view of forming a junction with Johnston's forces, he must be defeated. An attempt to leave his lines, however, I do not look upon as probable. This would give us the city, and leave my whole force to act directly against the enemy, and as a last resort fall into his lines, and act on the defensive, behind works of his own building. This is given only as a general plan, to be adopted under certain circumstances. The movements of an enemy necessarily determine counter-movements.

After writing the foregoing, and after General Parke had moved one division of his command to opposite Warrenton, I had to change my plan and send him to Haynes' Bluff. From information received, the enemy have 12,000 infantry and artillery at Yazoo, with orders to move south; four thousand cavalry already between the Yazoo and Big Black River, and Loring ordered to cross. This made it necessary to send the extra force up the Yazoo River.

You will assume command of Lauman's division at once, Herron taking up part of the ground occupied by Lauman. The latter can better spare a garrison regiment to garrison Warrenton than any one else. I would not take a regiment from you for a garrison of Warrenton, but Herron has a long line to hold, and but eight regiments to do it with.

Lauman will be directed to report to and receive orders from you.

U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 409-10

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 200. — Report of Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Division, of operations November 24-December 19, 1864.

No. 200.

Report of Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson, U. S. Army,

commanding Sixth Division, of operations November 24-December 19, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,        

Edgefield, Tenn., December 24, 1864.

MAJOR: In accordance with military usage, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the cavalry under my command during the recent and still pending campaign against the enemy in Middle Tennessee:

It may be proper for me to premise that when I assumed command of this division, on the 24th day of November, near Columbia, I found present only Capron's old brigade of the Cavalry Division, Army of the Ohio, composed of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Illinois Regiments and Eighth Michigan Cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about 800 mounted men, poorly armed and equipped, and I regret to say considerably demoralized by an unsuccessful campaign of some duration against an enemy superior to them in numbers, mount, and equipment. On this same day the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, Maj. J. Morris Young commanding, about 500 strong, reported to me, and on the day following Brigadier-General Croxton, with his fine brigade of the First Cavalry Division, was also placed under my command. Of the operations of General Croxton's brigade during the short time he was under my command I shall not attempt particularly to speak, though I desire to observe that upon all occasions both General Croxton and the officers and soldiers of his command conducted themselves in a manner becoming the high reputation which both he and they deservedly enjoy.

Early in the afternoon of the 24th, the infantry having arrived at Columbia, my troops were, by order of Brevet Major-General Wilson, withdrawn to the north side of Duck River and encamped directly opposite Columbia. I lay at this place until the evening of the 25th, picketing the river below Columbia as far down as Williamsport, and sending scouts across the river above, in the direction of Lewisburg. On the 25th I removed Croxton's brigade to Caldwel's house, six miles above Columbia, on the road to Raleigh [Rally] Hill. Capron's brigade, to which the Fifth Iowa had been temporarily assigned, was sent to take post on the Lewisburg pike at the crossing of Duck River, with instructions to scout toward Shelbyville and Lewisburg, and to picket the fords as far down as Huey's Mill. Croxton established a strong picket at Huey's Mill, which lay directly south of his camp, and also relieved the pickets from Capron's brigade at the fords below Columbia. In this position I lay until the 27th [28th]. On the morning of that day it became apparent, from the reports of my pickets, that the enemy were making preparations to force the passage of the river at Huey's Mill, at the Lewisburg pike, and at many intermediate fords. At 1 o'clock of this day, under orders from Brevet Major-General Wilson, I moved with Croxton's brigade for Hurt's house, on the Lewisburg pike, at the same time sending orders to Colonel Harrison, whom I then supposed to be in command of my First Brigade (Capron's), to fall back to that point. The head of my column reached the Lewisburg turnpike just after night-fall in time to find the Seventh Ohio Cavalry and detachments of the other regiments of Capron's brigade retiring in the direction of Franklin. Understanding the enemy to be in pursuit I directed Colonel Garrard, Seventh Ohio Cavalry, to send out one company to hold them in check, formed Croxton's brigade across the pike and sent orders to Colonel Capron to halt, reorganize, and form his troops. The enemy, however, did not come on, and later in the evening the Fifth Iowa Cavalry and the greater part of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry, from whom Colonel Capron had been cut off by the enemy, came into camp, having gallantly charged through the superior force of the enemy, which had interposed itself between them and the rest of the command.

On the 28th [29th] we fell back, contesting the ground with the enemy's cavalry, across Harpeth River to the road from Franklin to Triune, where we camped for the night near Matthews' house, picketing the river at Davis', Henderson's, and Hughes' Fords. On the morning of the 29th [30th] the Fifth Iowa Cavalry was detached pursuant to orders of Major-General Schofield, and sent to picket the right of the army; they did not rejoin me until we reached Nashville. Croxton's brigade was posted on the immediate left of the infantry, covering the Lewisburg turnpike. General Hatch's division was interposed between him and my First Brigade, of which on this day Col. Thomas J. Harrison, Eighth Indiana Cavalry, under orders from Brevet Major-General Wilson, assumed command. Late in the afternoon of this day occurred the battle of Franklin. For the gallant part taken by General Croxton's brigade I respectfully refer to his report. Colonel Harrison's brigade held the extreme left and was not engaged. On the 30th [December 1] we retired by the dirt road north to Mayfield's house, near Brentwood, thence across the country to the Nolensville pike, and camped for the night on Mill Creek near the Widow Harris'.

On the morning of the 1st [2d] of December we retired to Nashville, and later in the day crossed the river and encamped in Edgefield. The week of rest allowed us here was assiduously devoted to recuperating and shoeing the horses of the command, pressing new ones from the surrounding country, refitting the command in respect to clothing, camp and garrison equipage, of which they stood in great need, and exchanging the infantry arms, with which the regiments of Capron's old brigade had been encumbered, for carbines. In these labors I was efficiently assisted by Colonel Harrison, commanding First Brigade, and by his regimental commanders. In spite of the proverbial inefficiency of the ordnance department, Colonel Harrison, by untiring efforts, succeeded in procuring sabers sufficient to arm all his regiments; Burnside carbines for the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Illinois Regiments, and revolvers for the Eighth Michigan. In the matter of horses we were not quite so fortunate—the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, which was sent to Hopkinsville, Ky., procured a full remount for themselves; the Seventh Ohio Cavalry, which during our stay in Edgefield was stationed at Hyde's Ferry to watch the river in that direction, procured eighteen horses from the country in their rear; the other regiments perhaps twenty horses altogether. By dismounting the Eighth Michigan and Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, however, pursuant to orders from Brevet Major-General Wilson, I was able to efficiently mount the Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry and Seventh Ohio Cavalry. My mounted troops I placed under command of Colonel Harrison and my dismounted regiments under command of Col. James Biddle, Sixth Indiana Cavalry, who, on the 7th of December, joined me with his regiment dismounted, so that when offensive operations began I moved with one brigade mounted, composed of the Fifth Iowa, Seventh Ohio, and Sixteenth Illinois Regiments, commanded by Colonel Harrison, with an aggregate strength of 1,340, and a dismounted brigade, composed of the Sixth Indiana and Fourteenth Illinois Regiments, commanded by Col. James Biddle, of an aggregate strength of 759. The Eighth Michigan Cavalry, being armed with only pistols and sabers, and the Third Tennessee Cavalry, which reported to me on the 13th of December, for the most part without arms (their arms having been taken away from them by order of Brigadier-General Hammond, upon their return to my division from his brigade, with which they had been serving), I left in camp at Nashville.

On the morning of the 12th of December, in accordance with orders from the brevet major-general commanding corps, we broke camp, classed the river, and moved to the vicinity of Heiferman's house, near the Charlotte pike; there we remained in bivouac during the two following days.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 15th of December, in accordance with Special Orders, No. 3, from corps headquarters, I broke camp and moved on the Charlotte pike to the exterior line of fortifications, which I found occupied by McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's corps. My orders required me to advance upon the enemy at 6 a.m., but as General McArthur's troops did not get in motion until long past this hour, and when their movement began advanced at first on the precise line by which I was directed to move, and as the orders contemplated a simultaneous attack, both by the infantry and cavalry, all along the line, my division covering the right and rear of the movement, I was delayed for several hours beyond the time designated. It was about 11 o'clock, as nearly as I can remember, that I received a message from Major-General Wilson, through a staff officer, notifying me that everything was in readiness for the attack, and directing me to advance. In order to answer the fire of a battery, which the movements of General McArthur's troops had previously developed on the commanding heights beyond Richland Creek, I had previously posted two pieces of Lieutenant Smith's battery in position near Douglass' house in the low ground on this side of the creek. I at first ordered Colonel Biddle to advance with his regiments deployed across the pike, and with a strong skirmish line covering his front to cress the creek, drive in the enemy's skirmishers, and assault the enemy's barricades on the crest of the ridge beyond, Harrison to hold himself in readiness to follow up Biddle's attack with his mounted brigade. But the movements of the dismounted cavalry were so slow, owing, I suppose, partly to their being unused to maneuver as infantry, partly to the difficulty in crossing the creek, and partly to their sabers, which the commanding officer of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry had, with a singular shortsightedness, permitted his men to bring with them, that I finally ordered Harrison to pass the dismounted brigade and attack the enemy with all possible energy. My order was executed with commendable celerity. The Fifth Iowa dismounted and engaged the skirmishers sharply in the neighborhood of the pike, finally crossing the creek and driving them from their covert, while the Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry, passing to their left, crossed the creek and charged mounted up the long slope to the ridge upon which the enemy's battery and dismounted men in barricades were posted. The object of this charge was to capture this battery, or, at least, to disperse the supports and shoot down the horses before the guns could be moved, in which case I confidently anticipated the guns would fall into our hands, even though the charge should be repelled by a counter-charge. I never saw a charge more gallantly made or more persistently pressed than this. It failed only by a few moments. Major Beeres, commanding, came upon a stone wall, over which he could not leap his horses. The delay necessary to pull it down sufficed for the enemy to limber up and move the guns, which they incontinently did, the cavalry which had been supporting them also mounting and riding away in haste. A few prisoners, however, fell into our hands. The enemy, retiring by the pike, made a second stand near Cochran's house, from which, however, Harrison hustled them with amusing celerity, and drove him rapidly to Davidson's house. Here, along the ridge beyond a little creek which empties into the Cumberland this side of Davidson's and opposite Bell's Mill, the enemy took up a strong position, his left resting upon the river and his line stretching some distance across the pike; his artillery posted near the house swept the bridge and the pike beyond it, and his dismounted men, strongly posted in barricades, which I suppose he had previously constructed with a view to such an emergency, commanded at close range all the crossings of the creek. Harrison's men, in the energy of his pursuit not observing, or at least not appreciating, the advantages of the enemy's position, attempted to follow the enemy's rear directly into his works, and in this too gallant effort one company of the Seventh Ohio was roughly handled, losing one man seriously wounded, and several captured, including Lieutenant Little, the commanding officer. Our advance being stayed by this repulse, the enemy opened a sharp fire from his battery, doing us, however, no damage. This continued until I brought up Lieutenant Smith with his battery, who, taking position near the pike, soon closed out his rebel adversary. I had now accomplished the limit of the day's work assigned me, but there being still some hour or two of daylight left, I was determined not to give the enemy rest if it could be avoided. Colonel Harrison reported, and my own observation justified his opinion, that the enemy's position was too strong to be carried by my small command, prisoners reporting Chalmers' whole division to be in our front. I had strong hopes, however, that if I could obtain the co-operation of General Croxton's brigade I might capture the enemy's guns, and, if he should make too determined a stand, perhaps a good part of his force. I was encouraged to think by an officer who came to me from General Croxton that the condition of things in his front might permit this, and I accordingly maneuvered my troops so as to attract the attention of the enemy to me, while Croxton, who was now a long distance to my left and rear, should comply with a request which I sent him to close up on my left and swing around so as to envelop the enemy's right and cut him off from the Charlotte pike, which here bears considerably to the south—that is, toward the enemy's right. In this way I hoped we might double him back upon the river, when I felt sure we should make short work of him. In the meantime I sent an officer to notify the commander of one of the gun-boats which lay in the river above my right that by dropping down to near Bell's Mills he might enfilade the rebel line; this information he speedily took advantage of and the tremendous discharges of his heavy guns contributed largely, I doubt not, to the already serious demoralization of the enemy. I was disappointed, however, in my anticipations of General Croxton's aid. I was informed late in the evening that orders from Brevet Major-General Wilson prevented his complying with my request. I learned this when it was too late to make other dispositions in time to follow up my advantage in case my attack should succeed, and accordingly, after throwing my mounted men to my left, I went into bivouac, ordering everything to be in readiness for movement by 4 o'clock on the following morning, and instructing Colonel Harrison, with the first break of day, to execute the movement which I had requested General Croxton to make. I must not neglect to mention that in this day's operations we captured near fifty horses, so rapidly were our lines advanced.

At break of day on the following morning Harrison advanced, as I had instructed him, only to find the enemy's works abandoned. I pushed Harrison forward on the road by which he had retreated, moving with Harrison and the battery myself, and ordering Colonel Biddle to follow with his dismounted brigade and my ammunition train of four wagons, We marched down the Charlotte pike near a mile; there following the enemy's trail we diverged by a dirt road to the left, crossing the Hardin pike at the brick church, nine miles from Nashville. From there, following the valley of the Little Harpeth, I reached the Hillsborough pike about 2 p.m., where, posted on the ridges north of Murray's house, we found the enemy in some force and with artillery, which they opened upon us. The first round from Lieutenant Smith's guns, however, silenced their battery, and at our first advance they retired, after exchanging a few shots with our skirmishers, their main force by the road east toward the Franklin pike, and a few down the Hillsborough pike toward Harpeth River. On reaching the pike I found a brigade of General Knipe's division upon it in my rear, and, having had no communication with the brevet major-general commanding the corps during the day, I halted and dispatched a messenger to notify him of my whereabouts and to request instructions. At nightfall the messenger not having returned, and General Knipe's troops being still in the position in which I found them, I went into bivouac, covering the pike and the cross-road by which the enemy had retreated. In our haste to overtake the enemy, on discovering their evacuation of the position they had taken at Davidson's, we left behind us a battery of six guns abandoned by the enemy. They were afterward discovered, as I am informed, by the forces of the gun-boat flotilla and sent into Nashville. I submit that I am entitled to claim these as the capture of my division.

On the morning of the 17th I moved at 4 o'clock in the morning down the Hillsborough pike, driving the enemy's pickets, whom we found in barricades on the ridges beyond Brown's Creek; forded the Harpeth River, and moved by the dirt road past Moore's and Davis' into Franklin, where I struck the flank of the rebel rear guard of cavalry, who were there posted to prevent the passage of the river by General Knipe's division, which had advanced down the Franklin turnpike. On discovering my approach they immediately withdrew their artillery, and as my skirmishers advanced they retired precipitately down the Columbia pike to the high ridges south of the town. Here there fell into our hands all of the rebel and our own wounded of the late battle of Franklin, besides some 17,000 rations. The Seventh Ohio Cavalry, charging through the town, captured some fifty of the enemy's rear guard, and would have pressed the pursuit farther had I not sent them word to stop. Passing from my right over to the Columbia pike, I found Brigadier-General Knipe with his advance, which had followed my charge through the town. On conferring with him it was agreed that he should continue his advance by the Columbia pike, while I took the Carter's Creek pike to the right of this. Accordingly, I moved down the latter pike, three miles and a half, to Reams' house, and from there sent Harrison with the Fifth Iowa by a cross-road to strike the right of the enemy's rear guard, which I judged from the sound to be heavily engaged with General Knipe. The enemy retired so rapidly, however, that this attempt failed, and, Harrison returning, we bivouacked two regiments and artillery at Reams', the Fifth Iowa three miles farther from the pike. On the following morning, starting at 5 a.m., I moved down the Carter's Creek pike to —— house, and from there by the dirt road east into Spring Hill, coming up here, as at Franklin, just in time to turn the enemy's flank and compel him to retire precipitately before the forces advancing down the main pike. Here, together with the Fifth and Seventh Divisions of the corps, I halted by order of Brevet Major-General Wilson to await rations, and on the day following I returned with my dismounted regiments to this place to remount them.

For the subsequent operations of Colonel Harrison's brigade I most respectfully refer to the report of that officer.

I will forward at an early day a list of casualties, which cannot be furnished at this time for the want of the subreports.

I cannot close my report without expressing my deep regret that the corps commander should have ordered my two best regiments transferred to another divisions, while I received in their place one dismounted regiment, not distinguished for its efficiency.

The campaign, though short, called for great endurance on the part of officers and men; long, tedious marches in cold and constant rains were endured without a murmur, and it is a pleasure, as well as a duty, for me to report that both officers and men did their duty nobly.

To the energy and gallantry of Col. Thomas J. Harrison much of our success is due. No colonel in the army has a more brilliant record, and I hope he may receive his well-earned promotion at an early day. Col. Israel Garrard, Lieutenant-Colonel Baird, and Major Beeres deserve especial mention for their good conduct and able management of their regiments.

To the officers of my staff' my thanks are due. Capt. E. T. Wells, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. T. F. Allen, inspector; Capt. J. J. Kessler, provost-marshal; Lieuts. L. T. Morris and W. R. Lowe, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant McKee, ordnance officer, were distinguished here, as on many other fields, for their devotion to duty and gallantry in the discharge of the same. Chief Surgeon Train was always on hand, and through his energy and zeal our wounded were well and promptly attended to.

Respectfully submitted.

R. W. JOHNSON,        

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Maj. E. B. BEAUMONT,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Corps.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 597-602

Diary of 5th Sergeant Osborn H. Oldroyd: June 24, 1863

Awaiting orders to march is as tiresome as waiting at a station for a train. We were ready for marching orders again this morning, but failed to get them.

The weather is hot. Some of the rebel prisoners have said we could not stand this heat, but I guess the Yanks can stand it if they can, and if it should actually get too hot, we will just cool their country off. The nights are pleasant enough and we are thankful for the comfort of the sleep which they allow us. We have a chance out here to forage a little, and though but little, any change from army rations becomes agreeable.

It is amazing what progress soldiers make in foraging. The began commiting such depredations as to cause an order on the subject to be issued, an on the eighth of May last the commanding genera required a general order, prohibiting foraging, to be read throughout the army five times a day. Not long after that, two soldiers of the 13th corps were arrested and brought before General A. J. Smith, at his headquarters in a fine grove of stately poplars, where the General was informed by the guard that the men had been caught in the act of stealing chickens. The gallant General appeared to be revolving the heinousness of the charge as he looked aloft among the poplars, and presently the guard inquired what should be done with the men, when the General, after another glance upward, turning to the guard, replied, “O, damn 'em, let 'em go. There ain't any tree here high enough to hang ’em on.”

_______________

FRICTION TUBE FOR FIRING CANNON. — The tube is inserted into the vent of the cannon and fired by means of a stout cord, which has a wooded handle at one end, and an iron hook at the other; the cannoneer puts the hook through the loop in the wire of the friction tube, and holding the cord by the handle, pulls steadily until the wire is withdrawn, when an explosion takes place, induced by the friction of the ware against the composition in the tube.

SOURCE: Osborn Hamiline Oldroyd, A Soldier's Story of the Siege of Vicksburg, p. 64-5

Diary of 5th Sergeant Osborn H. Oldroyd: June 19, 1863

Whitworth Projectile

For a month we have been watching our enemy vigilantly, and a panorama, consisting of a great variety of war scenes, has, during that time, passed before us. We have had charging, digging rifle-pits, blowing up forts and firing all sizes of cannon, to say nothing of percussion shells, spherical case shot, time shells, parrot, grape, cannister, shrapnel, etc., the memory of which will be vivid to all, both blue and gray, who have seen the show around Vicksburg. The terrible noises, too, that have rung in our ears, must echo for years to come. I may add our endurance of this southern sun, at times being short of rations, and at no time out of danger, yet all the time nearly uncomplaining-every one trying to make the best of it, and all as merry as the situation would admit. Each day some of the Boys have come in relating new discoveries on reconnoisance, and I do not think there is a foot of ground about these hills that has not been explored, a well or spring that has not been tested, or a single object of interest of any kind that has not been worked until it was stale.

SHELL WITH FUSE.—The fuse is graduated on the outside into equal parts, representing seconds and quarter-seconds. In the bottom of this channel is a smooth layer of a composition of lead and tin, with a piece of wick or yarn underneath it. On this is placed a piece of metal. When ready for firing, the dial is gauged at the proper point at which the fuse is to burn through into the shell.

Then each man has had his peculiar view of how a siege like this ought to be conducted—that is, from the standpoint of rank and file. However, we are all agreed that the quiet man in command of our forces is still able to anticipate the requirements of our situation. I call him quiet, for that is just what he is. There is no dash or glitter about him, but he is marked by a steady nerve, and piercing glance that seems to be always on the alert. Many a second lieutenant has fallen a victim to the sharpshooter because of his fresh uniform, while officers of more experience have escaped under slouched hats and old blouses. There seems to be no limit, however, to the experience of some of them.

A cook of the 96th Ohio happened to be cooking beans the other day, when Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding a division of the 13th Army Corps, came around on camp inspection. After being properly saluted by the cook, the general began a colloquy as follows:

Gen. Smith.— What are you cooking?
The Cook. —Beans, sir.
General Smith. —How long do you cook beans?
The Cook. —Four hours, sir.
Gen. Smith (with a look of withering scorn).—Four hours! You cook 'em six hours!

That cook’s beans were tender enough that day.

"Once again the fire of hell
    Rained the rebel quarters,
With scream of shot and burst of shell,
    And bellowing of the mortars.”

SOURCE: Osborn Hamiline Oldroyd, A Soldier's Story of the Siege of Vicksburg, p. 58-9

Major-General William T. Sherman to Edward M. Stanton, June 15, 1864 – 6:30 p.m.

IN THE FIELD, June 15, 1864—6.30 p.m.  

(Received 12 p.m.)

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Washington, D. C.:

I will have the matter of Sturgis critically examined, and, if he be at fault, he shall have no mercy at my hands. I cannot but believe he had troops enough. I know I would have been willing to attempt the same task with that force; but Forrest is the very devil, and I think he has got some of our troops under cower. I have two officers at Memphis that will fight all the time—A. J. Smith and Mower. The latter is a young brigadier of fine promise, and I commend him to your notice. I will order them to make up a force and go out and follow Forrest to the death, if it cost 10,000 lives and breaks the Treasury. There never will be peace in Tennessee till Forrest is dead. We killed Bishop Polk yesterday, and have made good progress to-day, of which I will make a full report as soon as one of my aides comes from the extreme right flank. General Grant may rest easy that Joe Johnston will not trouble him, if I can help it by labor or thought.

W. T. SHERMAN,    

Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 4 (Serial No. 75), p. 480

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 157. Report of Lieut. Col. William H. Heath, Thirty-third Missouri Infantry, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

No. 157.

Report of Lieut. Col. William H. Heath,  Thirty-third Missouri Infantry,

of operations December 15-16, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-THIRD MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,       

Near Pulaski, Tenn., December 28, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers in the battles of 15th and 16th of December, 1864, at Nashville, Tenn.:

On the morning of the 15th instant, at about 7 o'clock, the regiment moved out, pursuant to orders from Colonel Hill, commanding Third Brigade, and was formed in line-north of Hardin pike and on the right of Third Brigade, connecting on the right with the Second Brigade, Colonel Hubbard commanding. At 9 o'clock the line of battle advanced diagonally across the pike, and a break occurring in the skirmish line in my front, Captain Rose was sent forward with Company H to fill up the gap. This company became engaged immediately with a line of the enemy concealed behind a rail fence south of the Hardin pike. A general advance of the entire line drove the enemy from this position and back toward his main works. With but feeble resistance, the enemy's skirmishers were pushed rapidly back, until at about 1 p.m. our main line of battle had been brought to within about 1,500 yards of the left of the enemy's works, when I received orders to take position on the right of Battery I, Second Missouri Artillery, and support it upon that flank. Sharp artillery firing ensued between this battery and a four-gun battery posted on the enemy's extreme left, during which Captain Rose with his skirmishers drove the rebel sharpshooters promptly in and took position so near their battery as to seriously annoy the gunners and impede the handling of the artillery. At 1.30 I received orders to move to the left of Battery I and close a gap between it and the Thirty-fifth Iowa. This change made it necessary to send out Lieutenant Knowlton with Company B as skirmishers in front of the new position. Lieutenant Knowlton handled his line with good effect, driving in the rebel skirmishers and pressing them closely. At about 2.30 o'clock, the main work on the enemy's left being captured, with all its artillery, by troops on my right, I received orders from Major-General Smith to advance the regiment, making a half wheel to the left, so as to confront the next work toward the rebel right, and on the completion of this movement, received orders from Colonel Hill to halt and have the men lie down. (During this halt Captain Rose returned his company to its place in line of battle.) At about 4 o'clock I received orders to advance to the charge, keeping closed up on the Thirty-fifth Iowa and conforming to the movements of that regiment. The order of battle brought the regiment directly in a dense thicket, through which it was impossible to advance with regularity. The line of defenses of the enemy was such that when the Thirty-fifth Iowa entered his works on my left and 100 yards north of Hillsborough pike, I discovered a body of the enemy directly in front of my line strongly posted behind a stone wall on the pike, this wall being covered by a work south of the pike and still farther toward the rebel right. Without waiting to restore my line, I ordered a charge upon this wall pell mell, and had little difficulty in driving the enemy, who appeared panic stricken and fired badly. The loss of the regiment in this charge was but two wounded. It being now dark, orders were issued to bivouac in line for the night parallel with Hillsborough pike and south of it.

December 16, shortly after daylight, orders were received to move forward in line of battle, keeping in line with the Seventh Minnesota, on our right, and conforming to the movement of that regiment. In this order the regiment passed across the Granny White pike and then wheeled to the right, in order to confront a line of rebel works at right angles with the pike. Orders were now received to form line fifteen paces in rear of the Twelfth Iowa, which was at the right of the brigade, and take shelter behind a stone wall. All these movements were executed under a galling fire from two rebel batteries, aided by musketry, our own batteries in our rear also firing over us, and occasionally bursting their shells immediately over or amongst us. We remained in this position until about 3.30 p.m., when we received orders to intrench for the night. While this order was being executed there was a general movement of the lines to our right, and a charge was made upon the rebel works. This regiment, with the Twelfth Iowa and Seventh Minnesota, was ordered to move forward and carry the enemy's position in front of us. Passing over the stone wall and through a plowed field, we received a terrible direct musketry fire from a brigade of the enemy posted behind a stone wall in our front, and a very galling cross-fire of canister from a strong and well-handled battery to our left. Seeing the left flank of the enemy's infantry already turned by the First and Second Brigades, I ordered my regiment to wheel to the left and storm his works and battery in that direction. This was done in the most gallant and successful manner, the men pressing eagerly forward through the first line, and being the first regiment to display their colors inside that portion of the enemy's works. Expecting a counter movement from the enemy's reserves, I here halted the regiment momentarily to reform the line, and immediately thereafter advanced about one mile through the rebel encampment to the foot of a chain of bluffs, being joined by numbers of men, who, in their impetuosity, had entered the works in advance of their regiments. No resistance was offered by the enemy to our farther advance until we arrived at the foot of the bluffs. Here we were met by a hot but inaccurate fire from rebel stragglers on the crest of these bluffs, but succeeded in silencing them by sending out a few skirmishers. It being again near dark, farther pursuit was refused, and we received orders to bivouac in line for the night.

During this day the skirmishing was done by Company G, under command of Lieutenant Rutledge, and subsequently by Company C, Captain Campbell, who relieved Rutledge about noon. Both companies did excellent work in annoying the rebel gunners, and both joined in the final charge.

Too much cannot be said in praise of the gallant men and officers who thus carried strong defenses manned by the flower of Hood's army of veterans. The coolness and determination of their advance were beyond all praise. They fired but little, pushing ahead at the double-quick and saving their ammunition till they should come to close quarters.

Among the losses I regret to number Adjt. S. Edward Day, of Saint Joseph, Mo., an officer of the first ability and conspicuous gallantry. He received a mortal wound during the heat of the charge, while bravely cheering on the men to victory. Also, Lieut. Thomas Rutledge, of Saint Louis, at the head of his noble company, received a wound which it is feared will prove fatal. Beloved by all for their manly patriotism and social qualities, they were mourned sincerely by every brave comrade.

The regiment went into this day's battle with 280 men, and lost 43 killed and wounded.

Appended is a full list of casualties in the two days' battles.*

Very respectfully,

WM. H. HEATH,      

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

 Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* Embodied on table, p. 101.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 468-70