Major-General Ulysses S. Grant too Brigadier-General Elias S. Dennis, June 8, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 8, 1863.

Brig. Gen. E. S. DENNIS,
        Commanding District of Northeastern Louisiana:

I have ordered General Mowers brigade over to re-enforce you. He is sent merely for temporary service, to repel any threatened attack. With the force you will have with this accession, 1 think you can drive the enemy beyond the Tensas River. If, however, you think more force is required, let me know, and it will be promptly sent.

If the enemy is in the neighborhood of Richmond, he should be driven from there, and our troops should push on to Monroe. Every vestige of an enemy's camp ought to be shoved back of that point. I am not fully advised of the force you are likely to meet, but cannot think it large. No such blind move could be made by an intelligent foe as to send more than a force for a raid into such a pocket.

Let me hear what intelligence you have from the rebel forces concentrating on the peninsula.

U.S. GRANT.

P. S.—You understand that all the troops in the District of Northeastern Louisiana, both black and white, are subject to your orders. At Lake Providence you have two white regiments that can join you in any movement toward Monroe.

U. S. G.

 SOURCES: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 326-7; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 390

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant too Brigadier-General Elias S. Dennis, June 11, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 11, 1863.

Brig. Gen. E. S. DENNIS

        Commanding District of Northeastern Louisiana:

In view of present danger of attack upon your command, it is advisable that every precaution should be taken to hold all government stores, and the troops at least secure from capture. If the government farms can be held, they should be held also, but not at the expense of sacrificing government troops and stores first, and the plantations afterwards in detail. Not being on the ground myself, I cannot say exactly how your troops should be located. A general direction, I would say occupy and fortify three points. One of these should be Lake Providence and one Millikens Bend. At Lake Providence direct Gen’l Reid to fortify close to the river, where he can protect his troops and public stores, at least until he can notify you of his necessities for more troops. All the Black troops should be got as much to themselves as possible, and required to fortify. Millikens Bend will be the proper place for them. You want to keep Youngs Point and the road across the point perfectly protected. This can be done with a very small force, the distance across being short, and Gun boats at both ends of the road. Gen'l Mowers Brigade was sent to you merely for an emergency. As soon as the emergency ceases, I want them returned to their Division. With the Cavalry you have, the mounted men Gen'l Reid has, and by mounting part of one negro Regiment, they can scout out every road from Lake Providence to Youngs Point so as to keep you advised of the approach of any force in time to prepare for them. Have you learned what has become of the force that attacked you a few days since? They should not be allowed to remain about Richmond.

U. S. GRANT.

SOURCES: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 353-4; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 403-4

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Acting Rear Admiral David D. Porter, June 21, 1863

Head Quarters Dept of the Tennessee        

Near Vicksburg June 21st 1863

Admiral D. D. Porter Comdg Miss Squadron.

Admiral:—

Information received from Vicksburg last night confirms your theory of the probable method Pemberton will take for escaping in the last extremity. One of our Pickets and one of the enemy by mutual consent laid down their arms, met half way and had a long conversation. The rebel said that our cannonading killed and wounded a great many in the rifle pits, otherwise done no great damage. They fully counted upon an assault as being intended and were prepared for it. Finding that no assault was made, the feelings of the troops was canvassed to see if they could be got out to attack the Yankees They not only declined this, but those on the right and left almost mutinied because their officers would not surrender. They were only reassured and persuaded to continue on duty by being told that they had provisions enough on hand to last seven days. In that time they would have 2000 boats finished, and they could make their escape by the river. The rebel said they were tearing down houses to get the material out of which to build boats. I will direct Mower (Gen) to keep a strong Picket in the river in front of Vicksburg at night, to place his battery behind the levees or hold it in some good position to be used if an attempt should be made to escape in that way. If possible fix up Material to light and illuminate the river should a large number of boats attempt to cross. I will direct Gen Mower to call on you, and consult as to the best plan for defeating this method of escape. You will find Gen Mower an intelligent and gallant officer, capable of carrying out any plan that may be adopted

Very truly your Obt Servt

U. S. Grant 

Maj. Genl.

SOURCE: John Y. Simon, Editor, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8, p. 398-9

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, June 17, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,        

Camp on Walnut Hills, June, 17, 1863.

Lieut. Col. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Tennessee:

SIR: On my return last evening from an inspection of the new works at Snyder's Bluff, General Blair, who commands the Second Division of my corps, called my attention to the inclosed publication in the Memphis Evening Bulletin of June 13, instant, entitled “Congratulatory Order of General McClernand,” with a request that I should notice it, lest the statements of fact and inference contained therein might receive credence from an excited public. It certainly gives me no pleasure or satisfaction to notice such a catalogue of nonsense—such an effusion of vain-glory and hypocrisy; nor can I believe General McClernand ever published such an order officially to his corps. I know too well that the brave and intelligent soldiers and officers who compose that corps will not be humbugged by such stuff.

If the order be a genuine production and not a forgery, it is manifestly addressed not to an army, but to a constituency in Illinois, far distant from the scene of the events attempted to be described, who might innocently be induced to think General McClernand the sagacious leader and bold hero he so complacently paints himself; but it is barely possible the order is a genuine one, and was actually read to the regiments of the Thirteenth Army Corps, in which case a copy must have been sent to your office for the information of the commanding general.

I beg to call his attention to the requirements of General Orders, No. 151, of 1862, which actually forbids the publication of all official letters and reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before the President of the United States for dismissal. The document under question is not technically a letter or report, and though styled an order, is not an order. It orders nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, manifestly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. It perverts the truth to the ends of flattery and self-glorification, and contains many untruths, among which is one of monstrous falsehood. It substantially accuses General McPherson and myself with disobeying the orders of General Grant in not assaulting on May 19 and 22, and allowing on the latter day the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth Army Corps alone. General McPherson is fully able to answer for himself, and for the Fifteenth Army Corps I answer that on May 19 and 22 it attacked furiously, at three distinct points, the enemy's works, at the very hour and minute fixed in General Grant's written orders; that on both days we planted our colors on the exterior slope and kept them there till nightfall; that from the first hour of investment of Vicksburg until now my corps has at all times been far in advance of General McClernand's; that the general-in-chief, by personal inspection, knows this truth; that tens of thousands of living witnesses beheld and participated in the attack; that General Grant visited me during both assaults and saw for himself, and is far better qualified to judge whether his orders were obeyed than General McClernand, who was nearly 3 miles off; that General McClernand never saw my lines; that he then knew, and still knows, nothing about them, and that from his position he had no means of knowing what occurred on this front. Not only were the assaults made at the time and place and in the manner prescribed in General Grant's written orders, but about 3 p.m., five hours after the assault on the 22d began, when my storming party lay against the exterior slope of the bastion on my front, and Blair's whole division was deployed close up to the parapet, ready to spring to the assault, and all my field artillery were in good position for the work, General Grant showed me a note from General McClernand, that moment handed him by an orderly, to the effect that had carried three of the enemy's forts, and that the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg, asking that the enemy should be pressed at all points lest he should concentrate on him. Not dreaming that a major-general would at such a critical moment make a mere buncombe communication, I instantly ordered Giles A. Smith's and Mower's brigades to renew the assault under cover of Blair's division and the artillery, deployed as before described, and sent an aide to General Steele, about a mile to my right, to convey the same mischievous message, whereby we lost, needlessly, many of our best officers and men.

I would never have revealed so unwelcome a truth had General MCClernand, in his process of self-flattery, confined himself to facts in the reach of his own observation, and not gone out of the way to charge others for results which he seems not to comprehend. In cases of repulse and failure, congratulatory addresses by subordinate commanders are not common, and are only resorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of responsibility from their own to the shoulders of others. I never make a practice of speaking or writing of others, but during our assault of the 19th several of my brigade commanders were under the impression that McClernand's corps did not even attempt an assault.

In the congratulatory order I remark great silence on the subject. Merely to satisfy inquiring parties, I should like to know if McClernand's corps did or did not assault at 2 p.m. of May 19, as ordered. I do not believe it did, and I think General McClernand responsible.

With these remarks I leave the matter where it properly belongs, in the hands of the commanding general, who knows his plans and orders, sees with an eye single to success and his country's honor, and not from the narrow and contracted circle of a subordinate commander, who exaggerates the importance of the events that fall under his immediate notice, and is filled with an itching desire for "fame not earned."

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,        

Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 1 (Serial No. 36), p. 162-3

Captain Charles Wright Wills: February 4, 1865

Buford's Bridge, north side Salkehatchie River,

February 4, 1865. 

Most unaccountably, to me, the Rebels evacuated an impregnable position (if there is such a thing), and our brigade was saved thereby from making some more history, for which I am grateful. A straight pike or causeway three quarters of a mile long and in which there are 24 bridges, was our only chance of crossing. They had strong embrasured works, but left an hour before our advance reached their fortifications. We got a lot of good horses and more good forage than I ever before saw brought in. I am sure that we have either a nice ham or shoulder for every two men in the regiment, and I think, more. A Company B boy got a good strong horse which he let me have. People here say that the Rebels have all gone to Branchville. Colonel Catterson told Sherman (he was in our camp some time to-night) that a negro reported that the Rebels had all gone to Branchville. "Pap" replied, “They can go to Branchville and be d-d.” We infer from that, that we don't go there. He also said to Catterson, who was superintending the bridge building, “Build them strong, Catterson, build them strong; the whole army may have to pass over them, and the ‘Army of the Cumberland’ is a very heavy army, sir.” Besides the little slur on the 14th and 20th, that gave us an idea of the whereabouts of the left wing.

I just now heard what made the Rebels evacuate this. Mowers' Division of the 17th formed line and marched across this stream and swamp eight miles below at River Bridge. They waded through three miles of water and then took the Rebel works with a loss to us of only 12 killed and 72 wounded. I think that beats anything I ever heard of in the show line. There was a town of 20 or 25 houses here, but we have used it up in building bridges.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 340-1

Major-General William T. Sherman to Edward M. Stanton, June 15, 1864 – 6:30 p.m.

IN THE FIELD, June 15, 1864—6.30 p.m.  

(Received 12 p.m.)

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Washington, D. C.:

I will have the matter of Sturgis critically examined, and, if he be at fault, he shall have no mercy at my hands. I cannot but believe he had troops enough. I know I would have been willing to attempt the same task with that force; but Forrest is the very devil, and I think he has got some of our troops under cower. I have two officers at Memphis that will fight all the time—A. J. Smith and Mower. The latter is a young brigadier of fine promise, and I commend him to your notice. I will order them to make up a force and go out and follow Forrest to the death, if it cost 10,000 lives and breaks the Treasury. There never will be peace in Tennessee till Forrest is dead. We killed Bishop Polk yesterday, and have made good progress to-day, of which I will make a full report as soon as one of my aides comes from the extreme right flank. General Grant may rest easy that Joe Johnston will not trouble him, if I can help it by labor or thought.

W. T. SHERMAN,    

Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 4 (Serial No. 75), p. 480

Diary of 5th Sergeant Alexander G. Downing: Wednesday, May 24, 1865

This is a very pleasant day, for which we are all thankful. We left for Washington City at 8 o'clock, and crossing the Potomac river over Long Bridge, marched up to the south side of the capitol. Our column was formed on the east side of the capitol, and at 9 o'clock commenced to move forward past the reviewing stand. The Army of the Tennessee was in the advance, with the Army of Georgia following. General Sherman was riding at the head of his army and he passed down the avenue amidst loud cheering.

The following officers were in command of the different departments: Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard was in command of the Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. John A. Logan commanding the Fifteenth Corps, and Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair commanding the Seventeenth Corps; the Army of Georgia was in command of Maj. Gen. Slocum, with Maj. Gen. J. C. Davis commanding the Fourteenth Corps, and Maj. Gen. Mower commanding the Twentieth Corps.

The reviewing stand was built on the south side of the avenue, and the army was reviewed by the president of the United States and Lieutenant-General Grant, together with members of the president's cabinet. There were about one hundred thousand spectators along the avenue, and there was great cheering while the army was passing. At times there was hearty laughter, when some of Sherman's “bummers” would fall in behind their regiments, displaying some of the articles, as trophies, which they had taken when marching through Georgia and the Carolinas.

We marched out across Rock creek about four miles northwest of the city and went into camp. Our knapsacks were brought around by the supply train.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 276

Diary of 5th Sergeant Alexander G. Downing: Saturday, February 4, 1865

We remained in line of battle all night, not being allowed to build any fires. This morning we moved out about two miles nearer the upper bridge, the rebels having left the vicinity during the night. We remained here, fortifying the bridge. Our teams and batteries came across the bridge this morning. General Mower's division lost several men here at the bridge yesterday morning about the time that we were crossing below.¹

_______________

¹ There was a concerted move by the Union army all along the line. —Ed.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 250

Diary of Corporal Alexander G. Downing: Friday, October 28, 1864

Weather still pleasant. The Seventeenth Army Corps was reviewed by General Mower. We were out in full dress with knapsacks, haversacks and canteens on. There is to be only one battery to each division of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Twentieth Army Corps. The remainder of the artillery, with all defective wagons, horses and mules, is being sent back to Chattanooga. All things quiet in camp. We received orders to be ready to march in the morning at daylight.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 224-5

Brigadier-General Thomas Kilby Smith to Elizabeth Budd Smith, March 17, 1864

Headquarters Div. Seventeenth Army Corps,

Red River Expedition, Fort De Russey,

Avoyelles County, Louosiana, March 17, 1864.

My Dear Wife:

My last hurried letter to you was dated from on board ship at Vicksburg. The fleet of transports under my command sailed from that point at seven o'clock, Thursday, 10th inst., arrived at mouth of Red River and reported to Admiral Porter on Friday at noon. At 10 A.m., Saturday, sailed up Red River and Atchafalaya under orders and signals from flagship Black Hawk, to Simmesport. Morning of Sunday debarked my troops for inspection, review and drill by regiments. At seven o'clock P.M., received marching orders, and at 8 P.M. marched, bringing up the rear of the column, repaired bridges through the night, roads for greater part of the way bad and swampy; bivouacked at 4 A.M., Monday, eight miles from Simmesport. Meanwhile, Gen. A. J. Smith, with General Mower's command, had reconnoitred the front, driven four regiments of the enemy from a fortification, situate some five miles from Simmesport, and was making across country for Moreauville on Bayou L'Eglise. Gave my troops rest two hours; at six o'clock took up the line of march, moving forward rapidly till eleven o'clock, when I halted, ordered coffee for the men and fed the animals. Meanwhile pioneers were reconstructing bridge destroyed by the enemy. At noon resumed march which till this time had led us for the most part through a rich and highly-cultivated country past extensive canefields and sugar-houses, now crossing a bayou and penetrating a swamp spreading some few miles before us. Ascending a slight elevation, we suddenly emerged in one of the most beautiful prairies imaginable. High table land, gently undulating, watered by exquisite lakes occasional groves, the landscape dotted with tasteful houses, gardens and shrubberies. This prairie, called Avoyelles, is settled exclusively by French emigrés, many of whom, as our army passed, sought shelter under the tricolor of France. Pushing forward rapidly, we gained Marksville at 4.30 P.M. Deserters had warned us that the enemy were on our left flank and rear as early as three o'clock. My troops were well closed up. Two and a half miles beyond Marksville, I formed line of battle at 5.30, my right resting immediately on the left of the advanced forces. My transportation and ambulances parked far to the rear. As my command came to front, brisk musketry firing commenced at the fort. Some shells fell to the rear and right of my line. I was ordered by the general commanding to look well to my rear and left wing, that I might anticipate attack from General Walker with six thousand Texans. I stood to arms. At 6.30 news was brought me that the fort had surrendered. I threw out heavy pickets, stacked arms and went into bivouac, a piercing cold “Norther” sweeping over the plain. In summary, I remark that the command on the 14th inst, marched twenty-eight and a half miles, built a substantial bridge of sixty feet in length, repaired minor ones, and took a fort between sunrise and sunset. But one brigade, Colonel Ward, commanding, was actively engaged; their casualties nine killed, thirty-seven wounded. The substantial results I enclose in memorandum of ordnance and ordnance stores, to which may be added a large amount of commissary stores, flour, beef, sugar and molasses, and three hundred and thirty-four prisoners, thirty-four of whom were officers from lieutenant-colonel to third lieutenant.

Meanwhile, convoy and fleet had made slow and devious way through the tortuous windings of Red River, where navigation at present stage of water is difficult. Rapid current, frequent eddies, sharp bends and snags, are the natural obstacles; to these the enemy added rafts and spiles; nevertheless, as the fort surrendered, the Black Hawk rounded to land shortly afterwards the general commanding received the congratulations of the Admiral, whom he will compliment by present of the nine-inch Dahlgren, of the Indianola, and the two heavy guns of the Harriet Lane, recaptured. My command is in occupation of the fort, and will be engaged to-day and to-morrow in the demolition of the casemates, bridges, etc., etc., and finally the blowing-up of the magazines, in which we shall permit to be destroyed vast quantities of powder. The main body under command of General Mower, convoyed by Admiral Porter, sailed last night for Alexandria, where I expect to join them in three days. Gen. A. J. Smith remains with me, and gunboats Essex and Benton, Captains Grier and Townsend.

A glance at the map will give you my present locality without the aid of sketch; but I will enclose herewith draft and dimensions of fortifications that you may intelligently answer questions; to which end, indeed, I have written you a sort of condensed report. If you have not “Colton's” maps, you had better buy first volume, North and South America; meanwhile you can borrow and trace me down the Mississippi, up the Atchafalaya, pronounced “Chafalia,” to Simmesport, across country to Marksville, from thence to Fort De Russy, on the Red, thence up the river to Alexandria.

SOURCE: Walter George Smith, Life and letters of Thomas Kilby Smith, p. 356-9

Brigadier-General Nathan Kimball to Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Rawlins, June 5, 1863

HEADQUARTERS KIMBALL'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION,

Satartia, Miss., June 5, 1863.

COLONEL: I find the enemy in force at Yazoo City. About 6 miles above here are 8.000, at Liverpool. The whole force on this (the Big Black) river is 20,000 infantry and cavalry and twenty-five guns. The force between the Yazoo and Black Rivers is under [W. H. T.] Walker. Johnston's headquarters are still at Canton, where he is massing troops; rumor says 60,000.

My cavalry penetrated to the Big Black River yesterday, and burned the ferries east of this place, but I find it impossible to go farther north on the Big Black as the enemy hold the country in force.

General Mower is occupying Mechanicsburg, and I am doing everything possible to obstruct an advance should one be made by the enemy. Should it be desired to hold this place in such a case, more force will be required and more artillery. Should I not be able to beat or repulse them, I shall hold to the very last.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 NATHAN KIMBALL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. JOHN A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-Genera1.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 2 (Serial No. 37), p. 387

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Brigadier-General Nathan Kimball, June 3, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 3, 1863.

Brig. Gen. NATHAN KIMBALL,

Commanding Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps:

You will proceed with your command* to Satartia, on the Yazoo River, thence to Mechanicsburg, 3 miles distant. You will find General Mower there with one brigade, and a force of 1,200 cavalry in addition. Being the senior officer, you will have command of the whole force.

Instructions have been given for a movement to destroy Black River bridge, on the Mississippi Central Railroad. General Mower will inform you of the instructions given.

The object of placing troops at Mechanicsburg is to watch the movements of the enemy, who are said to be collecting a large force in the vicinity of Canton.

With your cavalry you will watch all the ferries over Big Black, north of Bridgeport. Obstruct all roads leading west from the river, not wanted by yourself, in every way possible. Collect all the forage, cattle, and provisions you can, and destroy what you cannot bring away. It is important that the country be left so that it cannot subsist an army passing over it. Wagons, horses, and mules should be taken from the citizens to keep them from being used with the Southern Army. All negroes coming into your lines send to Haynes' Bluff, unless their services are required with your command. One gunboat and one transport, besides the commissary boat, should be kept at Satartia at all times.

The chief quartermaster at Chickasaw Bayou Landing, and ordnance officer at same place, will supply everything required for your command from their respective departments. It is desirable that all possible information should be acquired of the movements of the enemy, and sent promptly to these headquarters.

You are, therefore, authorized to employ spies, and send orders on the chief quartermaster, Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, to be approved at these headquarters, for payment.

U.S. GRANT.

_______________

* Troops from the Third and Sixth Divisions, Sixteenth Army Corps.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 379

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower, June 2, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG) MISS., June 2, 1863.

Brig. Gen. JOSEPH A. MOWER,

Commanding Advance Forces:

Move your brigade, together with all the cavalry assigned to your command, to Mechanicsburg. Take with you the commissary boat and one other boat, which the chief quartermaster is directed to send up to you to-day. Admiral Porter has been requested to send the gunboats now at Haynes' Bluff up with you. These, with the steamers, will probably be able to carry your infantry to Satartia; if not, let the transport steamer make additional trips until your troops are all up. The cavalry, artillery, and such land transportation as you want with you can be moved up by the bottom road. Keep the extra steamer with you to use in case of need.

When your troops are posted at Mechanicsburg, keep the cavalry actively employed in watching the movements of the enemy. Should a large force get to your rear, move to Satartia, and, with your transports, move to the west bank of the Yazoo, from which withdraw to Haynes' Bluff by land and water, as best you can. Whilst stationed in the advance, obstruct all the roads leading to the Big Black River in every way you can. Destroy or bring in for your own use all the forage, provisions, and transportation you can reach.

In a few days I will be able to send an entire division, or move to re-enforce you, when I think you will be able to make excursions up through the rich Yazoo bottoms, and keep me well informed of all information collected.

 U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 375

Major-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General Francis P. Blair Jr., May 29, 1863

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., May 29, 1863.

Maj. Gen. F. P. BLAIR,  Jr.,

Commanding Advance Expedition:

Yours of the 28th, inclosing report of Colonel Johnson, is just received. It is so important that we should save all our troops to act together, that I would direct that you take no risks whatever, either of a defeat or of being cut off. If you are satisfied of the presence of a large force at Canton and north of there, returned immediately, leaving Mower's brigade at Haynes' Bluff. If you deem Haynes' Bluff in danger of an early attack, you may also leave McArthur, with the brigade of his division. Returning, destroy all the forage and stock you can, and obstruct all roads behind you by burning bridges, felling timber, and in all possible ways. I requested Admiral Porter yesterday to send a gunboat or two up the river to cruise until you return. You may rest at Haynes' Bluff' with your entire command until you receive further orders from me. Such information may be received from the enemy and sufficient re-enforcements arrive here as to make it advisable to send out an army large enough to clean out Joe Johnston and his party.

 U.S. GRANT.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 24, Part 3 (Serial No. 38), p. 361-2

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, October 19, 1864

IN THE FIELD, SUMMERVILLE, Geo., October 19, 1864.

. . . Hood is afraid to fight me in open ground and therefore he tries to break up the railroad which supplies my Army. First Forrest got across the Tennessee, but never reached the Chattanooga Road. Next, Hood with three Corps, about 40,000 men, swung round by Dallas and broke the road at Big Shanty to Kenesaw. He stole a march on me of one day, and his men, disencumbered of baggage, move faster than we can. I have labored hard to cut down wagons, but spite of all I can do officers surround me. All the campaign I slept without a tent, and yet doctors and teamsters and clerks and staff officers on one pretext or another get tents and baggage, and now we can hardly move. I'll stop this or dispense with doctors, clerks and staff officers as ‘useless in war.’ Hood got up as far as the Tunnel before I could head him off, but at Resaca I broke through the Gap and he at once commenced to move south, and is now beyond my reach. He may now try to enter Tennessee by way of Decatur. I shall make proper dispositions and if seconded can keep him south, but I cannot get anybody to move as quickly as they should, save some of my old favorites. Corse saved Allatoona, by obeying promptly a message sent him by signals over the head of Hood's army. Mower is also coming to me and when I move south I shall have some smart columns. I am not going to stand on the defensive and you will soon hear of me on a bigger road than that to Meridian. Unless things take a turn not anticipated, you will have to get used to being without letters from me for some time, as it will be impossible to keep up mails much further. . . .

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 312.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 2/18