Showing posts with label Allatoona. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Allatoona. Show all posts

Monday, December 9, 2013

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, October 19, 1864

IN THE FIELD, SUMMERVILLE, Geo., October 19, 1864.

. . . Hood is afraid to fight me in open ground and therefore he tries to break up the railroad which supplies my Army. First Forrest got across the Tennessee, but never reached the Chattanooga Road. Next, Hood with three Corps, about 40,000 men, swung round by Dallas and broke the road at Big Shanty to Kenesaw. He stole a march on me of one day, and his men, disencumbered of baggage, move faster than we can. I have labored hard to cut down wagons, but spite of all I can do officers surround me. All the campaign I slept without a tent, and yet doctors and teamsters and clerks and staff officers on one pretext or another get tents and baggage, and now we can hardly move. I'll stop this or dispense with doctors, clerks and staff officers as ‘useless in war.’ Hood got up as far as the Tunnel before I could head him off, but at Resaca I broke through the Gap and he at once commenced to move south, and is now beyond my reach. He may now try to enter Tennessee by way of Decatur. I shall make proper dispositions and if seconded can keep him south, but I cannot get anybody to move as quickly as they should, save some of my old favorites. Corse saved Allatoona, by obeying promptly a message sent him by signals over the head of Hood's army. Mower is also coming to me and when I move south I shall have some smart columns. I am not going to stand on the defensive and you will soon hear of me on a bigger road than that to Meridian. Unless things take a turn not anticipated, you will have to get used to being without letters from me for some time, as it will be impossible to keep up mails much further. . . .

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 312.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 2/18

Friday, December 6, 2013

Major General William T. Sherman to Thomas Ewing, August 11, 1864

IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, Georgia,
August 11, 1864.

I can well understand the keen feelings of apprehension that agitate you, as you sit with mind intent on the fate of a vast machine, like the one I am forced to guide, whose life and success depend on the single thread of rails that for near five hundred miles lies within an hostile or semi-hostile country. I assure you that to the extent of my ability, nothing has been left undone that could be foreseen, and for one hundred days not a man or horse has been without ample food, or a musket or gun without adequate ammunition. I esteem this a triumph greater than any success that has attended me in battle or in strategy, but it has not been the result of blind chance. At this moment I have abundant supplies for twenty days, and I keep a construction party in Chattanooga that can in ten days repair any break that can be made to my rear. I keep a large depot of supplies at Chattanooga and Allatoona, two mountain fastnesses which no cavalry force of the enemy can reach, and in our wagons generally manage to have from ten to twenty days' supplies.

I could not have done this without forethought beginning with the hour I reached Nashville. I found thousands of citizens actually feeding on our stores on the plea of starvation, and other citizens by paying freights were allowed to carry goods, wares and merchandise, to all the towns from Nashville to Chattanooga; also crowds of idlers, sanitary agents, Christian commissions, and all sorts of curiosity hunters loading down our cars. It was the Gordian Knot and I cut it. People may starve, and go without, but an army cannot and do its work. A howl was raised, but the President and Secretary of War backed me, and now all recognize the wisdom and humanity of the thing. Rosecrans had his army starving at Chattanooga, and I have brought an army double its size 138 miles further, and all agree that they were never better fed, clothed and supplied. I think you may rest easy on that score.

My only apprehension arises from the fact that the time of the three year men is expiring all the time, and daily regiments are leaving for home, diminishing my fighting force by its best material; and the draft has been so long deferred, and the foolish law allowing niggers and the refuse of the South to be bought up and substituted on paper (for they never come to the front) will delay my reinforcements until my army on the offensive, so far from its base, will fall below my opponent's, who increases as I lose. I rather think to-day Hood's army is larger than mine, and he is strongly fortified. I have no faith in the people of the North. They ever lose their interest when they should act — they think by finding fault with an officer they clear their skirts of their own sins of misfeasance. . . .

The good news has just come that Farragut's fleet is in Mobile Bay, and has captured the Rebel fleet there; also that Fort Gaines which guards the west entrance to the Bay has surrendered, and some prisoners we took this morning say it was the talk in their camp that the Yankees had the City of Mobile. So all is coming round well, only we should not relax our energies or be deluded by any false hope of a speedy end to this war, which we did not begin, but which we must fight to the end, be it when it may. . . .

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 306-8

Sunday, November 24, 2013

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, April 27, 1864

NASHVILLE, April 27, 1864.

. . . To-morrow I start for Chattanooga and at once prepare for the coming campaign. I will have 20,000 less men than I calculated, from the Red River disaster1 and two divisions of McPherson, whose furlough won't expire. These furloughs have, as I feared, impaired if not lost us this campaign. When men get home they forget their comrades here, and though Governors are very patriotic in offers of troops their acts fall far short of their promises. Our armies are now weaker than at any former point of the war. My old corps has dwindled away to 10,000 though we had promises that all the regiments would come with two or three hundred recruits each, but the recruits seem to have pocketed the money and like selfish men staid at home.

I will begin with Schofield, 12,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; Thomas, 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; and McPherson, 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Combined it is a big army and a good one, and it will take a strong opposition to stop us once in motion.

Dalton will be our first point, Kingston next, then Allatoona and then Atlanta. All the attacks of the enemy on Paducah, Fort Pillow and in North Carolina are to draw us off from our concentration. As soon as we move they will attempt to cut in behind and cut our roads and fight us in front. So we are forced to detach men to guard our railroads all the way from Louisville to Chattanooga. . . .
__________

1 The failure of the Red River expedition under General Banks. See p. 285.

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 288-9.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 2/13

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Major General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, May 20, 1864

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
KINGSTON, GA., May 20, 1864.

Dear Brother:

I have daily telegraphed to General Halleck our progress, and have no doubt you have kept pace with our movement. Johnston had chosen Dalton as his place of battle, but he had made all the roads to it so difficult that I resolved to turn it, so I passed my army through a pass twenty miles south of Dalton and forced him to battle at Resaca. That, too, was very strong, but we beat him at all points, and as I had got a bridge across the Oostenaula below him and was gradually getting to his rear, he again abandoned his position in the night and I have been pushing my force after him as fast as possible; yet his knowledge of the country and the advantage of a good railroad to his rear enabled him to escape me, but I now have full possession of all the rich country of the Etowah. We occupy Rome, Kingston, and Cassville. I have repaired the railroad to these points and now have ordered the essential supplies for ward to replenish our wagons, when I will make for Atlanta, fifty-nine miles from here and about fifty from the advance. Johnston has halted across the Etowah at a place called Allatoona, where the railroad and common road passes through a spur of the mountain, making one of those formidable passes which gives an army on the defensive so much advantage, but I propose to cross the Etowah here and to go for Marietta via Dallas. Look at your map and you will see the move. We expect to cross the Etowah on the 23d, when we will move straight on fighting when opposed. Of course our laboring and difficulties increase as we progress, whereas our enemy gains strength by picking up his rear guard and detachments.

Put forth the whole strength of the nation now, and if we can't whip the South we must bow our necks in patient submission. A division of our territory by the old lines is impossible. Grant surely is fighting hard enough, and I think this army will make its mark.

Your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 234-5

Sunday, January 10, 2010

Colonel Henry J. B. Cummings

THIRTY-NINTH INFANTRY.

Henry Johnson Broadhead Cummings is the only representative that little New Jersey can claim among the Iowa Colonels. He was born in the town of Newton, Sussex county, on the 21st day of May, 1831, and continued to reside at that place until he was ten years of age. He then accompanied his parents to Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, where he lived till he reached his eighteenth year. His education was acquired at the common schools of that county. In his eighteenth Winter, he taught school, and after its close, entered the law-office of Judge Maynard of Williamsport, Pennsylvania, and began the study of the law. From 1851 to 1854, he edited a paper in Schuylkill Haven, after which he resumed his legal studies in the office of Henry Johnson, Esq., of Muncey, Pennsylvania, and was admitted to the bar in 1855. But, being without means, he was again compelled to return to the editorial tripod. In 1856, he came West and located in Winterset, Iowa, where he opened an office, and for the first time entered upon the practice of his profession. That same Winter, he assisted in organizing the Republican Party in Madison county; and, in the following August, was elected Prosecuting Attorney for that county. Later, he became a law-partner of the Hon. M. S. McPherson, who, in 1860, was a member of the Iowa State Senate.

Colonel Cummings first entered the war as captain of Company F., 4th Iowa Infantry. While the regiment was at its rendezvous in Council Bluffs, he was elected by the line officers its major. He was not, however, commissioned by the Governor; for Captain English, of the same regiment, had been previously promoted to that rank. Captain Cummings served in the 4th Iowa Infantry until the 6th of September, 1862, when he was promoted to the colonelcy of the 39th Iowa Infantry.

The first engagement of the 39th Iowa, was at Parker's Cross Roads, Tennessee, on the 31st of December, 1862. The enemy were led by Forest, and numbered from five to seven thousand men. The Union forces engaged comprised only one brigade, commanded by Colonel Dunham of the 50th Indiana, and numbered not quite sixteen hundred men.

So soon as the enemy learned of General Grant's plans for the capture of Vicksburg, in the fall of 1862, they at once set on foot schemes for their frustration; and, only a few days after the Federal army had marched from Holly Springs, Van Dorn and Forest were dispatched against General Grant's rear, to overwhelm small garrisons, and destroy all supplies and lines of communication. Van Dorn marched for Holly Springs and vicinity, while Forest made his appearance along the Jackson and Columbus Railroad. On the morning of the 31st of December, 1862, Forest, with the greater portion of his command, was encamped in the timber, about half a mile west of Parker's Cross Roads. A small detachment was stationed at the Cross Roads; and these Colonel Dunham, while moving with his command down the road in the direction of Red Mound, encountered at about eight o'clock in the morning.

But, to give an intelligible history of this affair, I should refer briefly to the previous movements of the 39th Iowa. On the 18th of December, 1862, the regiment left Columbus, Kentucky, under orders to report to General G. M. Dodge at Corinth. Arriving at Jackson, it was ordered by General Sullivan to disembark; for an attack upon that place by Forest was hourly looked for. It remained at Jackson four days, when, it becoming evident that Forest did not intend attacking that place, it was sent back to Trenton. There it was organized with the 50th Indiana and 122d Illinois, and sent in pursuit of Forest, then reported at Huntingdon, thirty miles east. Parker's Cross Roads is between Huntingdon and Lexington, where, as above stated, a portion of Forest's command was encountered.

The 50th Indiana was at once deployed as skirmishers, and drove the small detachment back to the main body, stationed on the hill or in the timber. Colonel Dunham now began making his dispositions to attack them in this position; but he soon learned that the position was so strong, and that their numbers so superior to his own that an attempt to rout them must be unsuccessful. After a vigorous use of his artillery, he therefore withdrew his command south, and took up a position on the east side of the road on a gentle rise of ground near Red Mound. The enemy followed and took up a position on the brow of a hill about one thousand yards distant. The enemy had eleven pieces of artillery, and the Federal troops but three; and in all other respects they were equally superior. The engagement now opened with artillery; but only a few shots had been fired, when Colonel Dunham saw that he could not hold his present position. He therefore moved down the hill into low ground, and took position behind a rail fence. The 39th held the left, the 122 Illinois the centre, and the 50th Indiana the right. The enemy still held the brow of the hill In front.

Their position was most admirable. Retiring just behind the crest of the hill, and charging their artillery, they would then shove it forward, and, depressing the pieces, continue a most destructive fire on our lines. Their infantry, too, at long range and well covered, did much execution; while our troops, lying along the fence in the bottom, were able only by their presence to hold the enemy at bay. The right of the line, however, was able to do some execution. Thus matters stood till about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy, despairing of routing the Federal troops from the position they then held, dismounted a force of about one thousand men, and sent them round to the rear of Colonel Dunham's right flank. Moving by a circuitous route through the timber, they were not discovered till their skirmishers opened fire on the right-rear of the Federal line. This was the signal for the enemy on the hill in front to concentrate their artillery-fire on the Federal left; for this was necessary to save their own men, approaching from the rear; and now the shower of grape and canister, which fell on the 39th Iowa, was terrific. With the enemy approaching in its rear, and this terrible fire in front, the right wing of the 39th broke, and sought shelter in a cornfield to the west of the road. Portions of the 50th Indiana and 122d Illinois also joined in this brief stampede. But relief was now near at hand: a brigade of reinforcements — the "Ohio Brigade" —soon fell upon the enemy's rear, and scattered their lines in confusion. This, however, was not done till after the 39th Iowa had rallied, and, with the balance of the brigade, driven back the enemy's flanking-party. The engagement now closed, and the Federal troops rested that night on the battle-ground. The following is the result of the engagement: Four hundred prisoners were captured. Five hundred horses and seven cannon were also among the spoils of war; but the three pieces of artillery belonging to the command of Colonel Dunham had been literally knocked to pieces. The losses of the 39th Iowa, in killed, wounded and missing, were forty-seven. Three only were killed; and among these was the color-guard, J. C. Stearns. The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Redfield, while rallying his men, was severely wounded in the shoulder. Major Griffiths, Captain Browne and Lieutenant Rawls were also among the wounded. This was the first engagement of the 39th Iowa; and all things considered, it sustained itself well.

With the battle of Parker's Cross Roads closed the old year of 1862. On the morning following, the 39th Iowa, with the balance of its brigade, started on the return march to Jackson, where it arrived on the evening of the 2d. At Columbus, as already stated, Colonel Cummings had been ordered to report to General G. M. Dodge, commanding 2d Division, 16th Army Corps, and on the 6th instant he left Jackson with his regiment for Corinth. Arriving at Corinth, the 39th Iowa was assigned to the 2d Brigade, Colonel M. M. Banes, and, for more than a year thereafter, was attached to that command. From the date of its arrival at Corinth, till the time it joined the forces of General Sherman in the grand march on Atlanta, the history of the 39th Iowa may be soon told. It was stationed on garrison-duty, and passed the most of its time in camp.

The march to Tuscumbia, Alabama, the object of which was to cover the movements of Colonel Streight, in his raid into Georgia, I must not, however, omit to mention. All things being in readiness, General Dodge moved out of Corinth with his entire division on the 15th of April, and, proceeding by easy marches, arrived at Bear Creek without incident. At Bear Creek, his advance encountered the enemy under Roddy, and soon after that force was strengthened by the arrival of Forest. But General Dodge pushed steadily on, driving back the enemy with a line of skirmishers, until he arrived at Town Creek. Here the enemy, on the opposite bank, had their artillery in position, which was well supported. An artillery-duel followed of half a day in length, when, bridges having been constructed under the enemy's fire, the forces of General Dodge began crossing to the east side of the stream. The enemy now retired precipitately, and General Dodge, knowing Colonel Streight, who had passed by the enemy's left flank, was well on his way, returned to Corinth. The 39th Iowa arrived at Corinth on the 2d of May. Four days after, Company H of the regiment, while guarding a corral near Corinth, was surrounded by a large body of rebel cavalry and captured. Its Captain, James H. Loomis, was made a prisoner, and only a few of the men escaped.

Colonel Cummings remained with his regiment at Corinth, until November, 1863, and then marched with the command of General Dodge to the line of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad.

He arrived with his regiment at Pulaski the 11th of November, and the day following was sent north seven miles to Reynold's Station, where regimental head-quarters were established. Five companies remained at head-quarters. Three were stationed at grist-mills; and two on guard-duty, at railroad-bridges. Seven weeks later, regimental head-quarters were removed to Culleoka, twenty miles further north. The regiment remained here till the 12th of the following March, when, with its brigade, it marched south to Athens; but its day of garrison- and railroad guard-duty was now soon to close.

In the early part of May, 1864, the 39th Iowa marched with its brigade to Huntsville, where the whole command of General Dodge assembled, preparatory to joining General Sherman on the march against Atlanta: from that point it moved directly to the front at Dalton. But the movements of the left wing of the 16th Army Corps during the Atlanta Campaign have been given elsewhere, and up to the time of the occupation of Rome, the history of the 39th is the same as that of this command: the 39th Iowa, and, I think, all the regiments of its brigade — the 7th, 50th and 57th Illinois Infantry regiments, went no further than Rome, being left at that point to guard Sherman's flank, and his line of communications. Where the regiment most distinguished itself, and where it lost its best officer — Lieutenant-Colonel James Redfield — was at Allatoona, Georgia.

Its defense of this place was gallant in the extreme, and a full history of the affair would be read with the greatest interest; but want of space forbids me giving it. The following is from a statement of Major, afterward Lieutenant-Colonel Griffiths:

"The entire force on our side was one thousand eight hundred: that of the enemy, seven thousand. Our forces were commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Corse. They arrived at 10 o'clock P. M., expecting that the enemy would not attack, knowing they (we) were reinforcements. In this we were deceived. They attacked in the morning at 7 A. M. General Corse had time only to hastily dispose of his little force, when they came up with massed columns.

"The 39th Iowa was placed at the forks of a road, three hundred yards from the fort, where the heaviest column of the enemy charged. It was important to hold this position, and check the enemy. This they did twice, although terribly cut to pieces. The third time the enemy was in such force as to be irresistible, and the remainder of our regiment fell back, contesting every foot of ground to the fort.

"General Corse and the veteran troops, who witnessed the heroism and determination of the 39th on that day, say they have never before seen such fighting. They pronounced it 'Chickasaw Bayou,' continued for five hours. It was during this time that the above named officers, except Lieutenant Blodgett, were killed. He was one of the four officers who succeeded in reaching the fort, and was shot while carrying a message from General Corse to Colonel Rowett. There were ten of our officers in the engagement: five were killed, and two wounded and captured, leaving but three with the command.

"It gives me great pleasure to testify to the heroism, valor and gallantry of these officers. I have seen them before when in discharge of their duties and under fire, and can say of them that in every emergency they displayed coolness and determined courage. As officers, they had the respect and confidence of the command. As men, they had won, by their geniality of disposition and uniform courtesy of manner, the kindest regards and affections of their officers and men, so that we can feelingly exclaim: Their places, who can fill them?"

The regiment lost, in killed, five officers and twenty-seven enlisted men, and, in wounded, one officer and sixty-one enlisted men. Two officers and sixty-eight enlisted men were captured. The commissioned officers killed, were Lieutenant-Colonel James Redfield and Lieutenants O. C. Ayers, A. T. Blodgett, N. P. Wright and J. P. Jones. Lieutenant-Colonel Redfield was a man of much excellence. It has often been said he should have been colonel of the 39th Iowa.

Colonel Cummings is a short, fleshy man, with blue eyes, and a large, red face. In his manners, he is dignified and consequential. He is reputed as being able to endure as much rest as any man in Iowa. He was a good tactician, but, beyond that, possessed little merit as a soldier.

SOURCE: Addison A. Stuart, Iowa Colonels and Regiments, p. 525-32