No. 10.
Reports of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, U. S.
Army, commanding Fourth Army Corps, of operations October 26, 1864-January 5,
1865.
GENERAL: In pursuance with orders received from the headquarters Department of the Cumberland to report the operations of the corps from the time it was detached from the main army of the Military Division of the Mississippi, in the latter part of October, to its arrival at Nashville, on the 1st of December ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following:
During the evening of the 26th of October ultimo, in the vicinity of Gaylesville, Ala., an order was received from Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, commanding the grand Military Division of the Mississippi, directing that the Fourth Corps should proceed to Chattanooga, and stating that the commanding officer of the corps would there receive instructions from Major-General Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, regulating its future movements. By rapid marches, though a portion of the road was exceedingly heavy from the recent rains, the corps reached Rossville, four miles from Chattanooga, during the afternoon of the 29th. Here it encamped for the night. During the night of the 29th an order was received by telegraph directing the corps to proceed by railway to Athens, Ala. Early the morning of the 30th the corps moved into Chattanooga to take the cars. So soon as the trains could be got ready the Third Division was embarked, and before noon all the sections transporting the division moved out of Chattanooga and proceeded to Athens, where it arrived on the morning of the 31st. The First Division embarked the morning of the 1st of November and the Second Division as soon as the transportation could be obtained for it. The instructions from the commanding general were to concentrate the corps at Athens, with an intimation that it would have to march thence to Pulaski, but not to proceed to the latter without a special order to that effect, unless it should be learned satisfactorily that the enemy had crossed the river and was moving on that place. The artillery and transportation of the corps were ordered to follow, by the way of Stevenson, Winchester, &c., and a brigade of the First Division was left as an escort to convoy them. At midday on the 31st of October, at Athens, instructions were received from the commanding general to move to Pulaski immediately. The Third Division being the only portion of the corps which had arrived at Athens, marched that afternoon ten miles, and the following day, November 1, after a march of twenty-four miles, involving the passage of Elk River, reached Pulaski. On the following morning preparations were commenced for putting the town in defensible condition. General Hatch's cavalry, which had arrived there the preceding day, was dispatched to the Tennessee River, in the neighborhood of Florence, to co-operate with General Croxton's command, already in that region, in gaining intelligence of the movements of the enemy, and to retard his march should he cross the Tennessee River and attempt to move northward.
By Saturday, the 5th of November, the three divisions of the corps, less the brigade escorting the artillery and trains, were concentrated at Pulaski. On the following morning an elaborate system of field-works was laid out, a certain portion assigned to each division, and ground was immediately broken in their construction. The labor was vigorously continued, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, till the works were completed, and when completed the works were impregnable; the Fourth Corps could have easily held them against the entire rebel army commanded by General Hood. The trains and artillery of the corps reached Pulaski on Saturday, the 12th. On the following day the several batteries were assigned their positions in the various works. The information received from the cavalry corroborated the information which had been previously obtained, that the enemy was in force on the Tennessee River and was preparing to advance. The vital questions were, what route would he take, and where would the blow fall. On the 13th of November Major-General Schofield arrived at Pulaski, and on the 14th assumed command of all the forces. He brought with him a portion of the Twenty-third Corps. The information received from the 14th to the 22d attested that the enemy had not only crossed the river in heavy force, but was moving northward. On the 22d it was satisfactorily settled that he was moving northward through Lawrenceburg, and would thence probably move on Columbia; possibly, however, he might turn eastward from Lawrenceburg toward Pulaski. The Second Division of the corps was sent to Lynnville, ten miles north of Pulaski, the afternoon of the 22d. During the forenoon of the 23d it was ascertained satisfactorily that the bulk of the enemy's force was moving northward from Lawrenceburg. Hence the remaining two divisions of the corps, the First and Third, with the artillery and trains, moved to Lynnville during the afternoon of that day. Information received during the night at Lynnville indicated that the enemy was advancing rapidly on Columbia, and would probably reach that place on the 24th. This would have placed him between us and Nashville.
The head of the corps moved at 1 a.m. of the 24th, and by 3 a.m. the whole corps was in motion. By a rapid march the two leading divisions of the corps, the Second and Third, were concentrated at Columbia and in position by 12 m., having marched a distance of twenty miles. They had been preceded by Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, which had barely arrived in time, by turning westward some two or three miles south of Columbia, and taking position on the Mount Pleasant road, to prevent the head of the enemy's column from occupying Columbia in advance of our forces. When the corps evacuated Pulaski on the 3d, the Third Brigade of the First Division, Colonel Waters, Eighty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, commanding, was left to cover the rear. This service was well performed. The afternoon of the 24th of November was spent by the Second and Third Divisions in throwing up strong intrenchments. The First Division, which had marched in rear of the train, arrived during the evening and went into position on the left of the corps. The Twenty-third Corps was in position on the right. Friday, the 25th, the work of intrenching was continued, and by night-fall a strong line of works was completed. An apprehension was raised at this time that the Twenty-third Corps, occupying the right of our intrenched position, would not be able to maintain its position against a decided assault. It was hence deemed expedient to construct an interior line of works north and west of the town; this line would have the advantage of being much shorter and of occupying much stronger ground than the exterior line, and of having its flanks resting more securely on Duck River. For the construction of the interior line the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth Corps, and all of the Twenty-third Corps, less one brigade, were withdrawn from the exterior line. The Third Division was left to hold in the exterior line, the entire former front of the corps, the remainder of the exterior line being held by a brigade of the Twenty-third Corps. During the night of the 25th of November the First and Second Divisions were actively employed in constructing the interior line, and the dawn of the 26th had it well advanced toward completion. Just before daylight on the 26th the enemy made a decided assault on the pickets on and adjacent to the Pulaski road. As he had advanced in greatly superior numbers he succeeded in driving back the pickets a considerable distance, but re-enforcements being promptly brought up the enemy was in turn driven back and the picket-line substantially restored to its former position. It terminated in an affair of pickets, and would scarcely have deserved an official mention, as so many such affairs occur in an active campaign, were it not that we have to lament in connection with it the mortal wounding and subsequent death of Captain Green, Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, picket officer of the First Brigade, Third Division. When our pickets along a part of the front of his brigade were driven back he rushed out, with all the gallantry and enthusiasm of his soldierly character, to the front, and by his orders and the influence of his example succeeded in driving back the enemy. While he was so engaged he received a wound in the abdomen, from which he died in twenty-four hours afterward. His gallant spirit winged its way to join the hosts of others that have preceded it, victims to their patriotic devotion to their country. No further effort was made by the enemy, so long as our forces occupied the southern bank of Duck River, to molest us.
During the 26th an intimation was communicated that the forces would evacuate Columbia and pass to the northern bank of the river that night, the movement to be commenced just after night-fall. Preparations were made accordingly, but just after dark instructions were distributed that the troops would remain in position, and that the evacuation would not take place till the following night, the 27th. Sunday, the 27th, was a dark, dreary, and cheerless day. An occasional picket skirmish broke the dull monotony of the day. The transportation of the corps and its reserve artillery were passed to the north bank of the river during the day. At 5 p.m. the artillery was withdrawn from the exterior line and sent across the river. At 7 p.m. the infantry of the corps commenced to withdraw from the lines and prepare to cross the river. The Third Division led, followed by the First, then the Second. The pickets were ordered to remain in position for half an hour after the most advanced division, the Third, commenced to withdraw, then to retire quietly to the exterior line of works, where they were to remain for an hour, then to withdraw to the interior line, where they were to remain till midnight, or later, should the passage of the troops over the river not warrant their crossing at that hour. The whole operation was accomplished as directed. The enemy did not attempt to interrupt the movement. After crossing the river the troops bivouacked till daylight. The passage of the river had been made about two miles below the town. After the passage was completed all the bridges were destroyed. Shortly after daylight of the 28th the corps moved up the river, and took position to prevent the passage of the river should the enemy attempt to cross it near the town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up; pickets and outposts were judiciously disposed to give an early intimation of the movements of the enemy. Near night-fall of the 28th some evidences were received that the enemy was crossing the river some five miles above our left. By daylight on the morning of the 29th these evidences were so far strengthened as to require immediate and vigorous action to prevent our being flanked and turned. A brigade, the Second of the Third Division, Colonel Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, was ordered to make a reconnaissance eastward and up the river to watch the movements of the enemy, with instructions to report frequently during the day the result of his observations, and further, if the enemy after crossing should turn westward at once with a view of attacking our left flank in the position we then occupied, to hold him in check as long as possible by retreating slowly and contesting the ground stubbornly. Orders were also issued for the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth Corps, with all the baggage and other trains of the entire force present, and all the reserve artillery, to commence moving to the rear at 8 a.m. on the 29th. At the appointed hour the movement was begun; but to check any immediate movement of the enemy to the left after crossing the river the First Division was stopped on the hills on the south bank of Rutherford's Creek. This stream is an affluent of Duck River, and is crossed by the turnpike road to Franklin, about four miles north of Columbia. Frequent reports were received from Colonel Post during the day, which were duly reported to Major-General Schofield, commanding the forces present, showing that the enemy had crossed the river in force and was moving northward and parallel with the Columbia and Franklin pike, with trains, &c. The Second Division of the Fourth Corps moved up the Franklin pike as a convoy to the trains and reserve artillery of the forces, and arrived at Spring Hill, a small village but twelve miles north of Columbia, at 12.30 p.m. As the head of the division approached the village it was perceived that a regiment of infantry and one of cavalry, previously stationed in that vicinity, and which had deployed east of the road, were being forced back on the town. The First Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Opdycke, was immediately deployed into order of battle east of the road to check the enemy, which, as his force was cavalry, was easily done. So soon as this was done the division was disposed so as to cover the passage of the trains and the reserve artillery by the village. Opdycke's brigade was posted northward, with its left resting on the turnpike road, Colonel Lane's brigade was formed in the center, and Brigadier-General Bradley's brigade was formed on the right, with its right slightly refused, but not sufficiently to rest on the road. Skirmishing was kept up during the afternoon, without, however, serious result, till 4.30 p.m. Then the enemy appeared in front, and on the flank of Bradley's brigade, with a strong infantry force (it Was Cleburne’s division, of Cheatham's corps); and made a vigorous attack. As Bradley's brigade was heavily outflanked, while pressed in front, it was forced from its position, and its right doubled back on the road and into the village. A few prisoners were captured from us, including the assistant adjutant-general of the brigade. But the heaviest loss was in the serious wounding of the gallant brigade commander, Brig. Gen. L. P. Bradley. While nobly attempting to stay his brigade under the tremendous assault which was then being made on it he received a serious wound (fortunately for the country and the military service it was only a flesh wound), which compelled him to relinquish command of his brigade and leave the field. He was succeeded in command by that gallant soldier and useful officer, Col. Joseph Conrad, Fifteenth Wisconsin [Missouri] Volunteers. Fortunately, the enemy did not press the success he had gained. The casualties of the Second Division amounted to some 350 killed and wounded. The immense trains and reserve artillery were parked in the village of Spring Hill and protected by the Second Division; crescent-shaped, with its convexity eastward and its flanks resting on the road, the division maintained its defensive position. The enemy, encamped a short distance only from the division, did not renew the attack. At 7 p.m. the movement of withdrawing from the north bank of Duck River was commenced Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, led off. It was followed by the Third Division of the Fourth Corps, and lastly came the First Division of the Fourth Corps, and covered the retreat to Spring Hill. The movement to Spring Bill was protracted and much drawn out by the delay in crossing Rutherford's Creek. By some unfortunate oversight no sufficient bridge had been constructed over this creek, and the troops, arriving at it in the night, were much delayed in crossing it. After the First Division followed the pickets. The head of the Third Division arrived at Spring Hill about midnight, passed rapidly and silently through the village, and took post about a mile north of it, formed parallel to the road and east of it. The object of this disposition was to cover the movement of the trains out of Spring Hill and toward Franklin. Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps, had already moved on toward Franklin. As rapidly as possible the trains were drawn out of park and pushed toward Franklin. While this work was in progress the First Division came up, passed rapidly through Spring Hill, and moved on as a convoy to the trains. It was necessary to move the troops rapidly and silently through Spring Hill to avoid a night attack from an entire corps of four divisions—Cheatham's—which lay encamped within 800 yards of the road. The effect of a night attack on a column en route would have been, beyond doubt, most disastrous. The embarrassment of the situation was greatly increased by the presence of the large number of wagons, artillery carriages, &c., which had to be protected and quietly withdrawn. By 5 a.m. of the 30th the whole of the trains had been put on the road, and the rear had passed a mile north of Spring Hill. The Third Division then moved out, marching east of the road a short distance and parallel to it, as a cover to the train; the Second Division followed the Third. A few miles north of Spring Hill, just before the dawn, the rebel cavalry made a dash at the trains, but was promptly repulsed by a part of the division. The march was continued without further interruption till about 7 a.m., when the rebel cavalry made a second dash at the trains, but was again quickly repulsed by two regiments of the Third Division, deployed as skirmishers, aided by a section of artillery. Without further interruption the command continued its march to the vicinity of Franklin. Much credit is due to Colonel Opdycke, whose brigade brought up the rear, for the energetic measures he adopted and carried out to get forward the greatly fatigued and worn-out men of the entire command. But for these judicious measures many weary and sorefooted soldiers would evidently have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Reference is made to Colonel Opdycke's report for more minute details.
On arriving at Franklin the Twenty-third Corps had taken position in the suburbs of the village, with its left resting on the river above the town and its right extending across and west of the turnpike road. The First Division of the Fourth Corps (Kimball's) was posted on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, with its right flank resting on the river below the town. Intrenchments were at once thrown up by the Twenty-third Corps and Kimball's division, of the Fourth Corps. The Third Division of the Fourth Corps arrived next, and was ordered to cross the river and take post on the north side. This was done. Wagner's (the Second Division), which was marching in rear, was ordered to halt on a range of hills nearly two miles south of the town and deploy his command to hold the enemy in check should he attempt to press us. In the meantime the transportation was being passed rapidly across the river. At 12 m. General Wagner -reported the appearance of the enemy in heavy force in his front, and later he reported that the enemy was evidently making preparations to attack him in force. The position General Wagner then held was entirely too extensive to be covered by one division, and as the country was open on both flanks and favorable to the movement of troops, the position could be readily flanked, hence General Wagner very judiciously determined to retire his command nearer to the town. He posted two brigades, Conrad's and Lane s, across the pike, with their flanks slightly refused, about a third of a mile south of the intrenched position of the Twenty-third Corps. The other brigade, Opdycke's, was sent inside of our main works—a most fortunate disposition of this brigade, as the sequel of this narrative will show. Conrad's and Lane's brigades hastily threw up rude barricades to protect themselves from the coming storm. Their orders were to maintain their position as long as it could be done without becoming too severely engaged, and then retire on the main line. At 4 p.m. the enemy made a vigorous attack on the front of these two advanced brigades, threatening at the same time their flanks with strong columns. Unwilling to abandon their position so long as there was any probability of maintaining it, unfortunately, the gallant commanders remained in front too long, and as a consequence, when they did retire, they were followed so closely by the enemy as to enter the works through the break which had been caused by the burst over them of the retiring brigades. The enemy had come on with a terrific dash, had entered our intrenchment, and victory seemed almost within his grasp. Our line had been broken in the center, two 4-gun batteries had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and it seemed that it was only necessary for him to press the advantage he had gained to complete his success. But at this critical moment the gallant, prompt, and ready Opdycke was at hand, calling to his men in a stentorian tone, "Forward to the lines!" and, adding example to command, he, with his bold brigade, with lowered bayonets, rushed forward, bore the exultant enemy back over our intrenchments, recovered the lost guns, and captured nigh 400 prisoners. But this reverse did not seem to discourage the enemy; it seemed rather to add to his determination and increase the vigor of his assaults. On, on, he came, till he made four distinct assaults, each time to be hurled back, with heavy loss. So vigorous and fierce were these assaults that the enemy reached the exterior slope of the rude intrenchments, and hand-to-hand encounters occurred between the courageous combatants across the works, and between the assaults the work of death was not stopped. The undulations of the ground are such as to afford good protection to an attacking force. Under this cover the enemy pressed sharpshooters as near our lines as possible, and kept up a most galling fire. While these vigorous attacks were being made on our center and left the right, held by Kimball's division, was also fiercely attacked three times, all of which assaults were handsomely repulsed, with comparatively slight loss to us, but with terrific slaughter of the enemy. At no time did the enemy gain any advantage on this part of our lines. As night approached the enemy desisted from his fierce assaults, and his offensive efforts degenerated into a sharp skirmish fire.
Thus terminated one of the fiercest, best contested, most vigorously sustained passages at arms which have occurred in this war. I am sure it will be no exaggeration to estimate the loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and captured at 6,000. His loss, as attested by the dispatches of his commanding general, was particularly heavy in general officers, no less than 14 in killed, wounded, and captured. After the conflict was over the ground was thickly strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. Our captures amounted to 21 battle-flags and stands of colors, 11 swords and sabers, and 618 prisoners, including 46 officers. Our casualties amounted to 5 officers killed. 37 wounded, and 14 missing. Enlisted men--killed, 62; wounded, 570; missing, 680. Total casualties, 1,368.
For more minute details of this interesting contest I must refer to the reports of division and brigade commanders, herewith forwarded; they will repay perusal.
The highest commendation is due to Brigadier-Generals Kimball and Wagner, commanding the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth Corps, for the skillful manner in which they handled their commands and for personal gallantry displayed in trying positions. These division commanders write in high terms of praise of the good conduct of their brigade commanders, and these latter of the soldierly conduct of their regimental commanders.
Among so many who not only did their duty well, but nobly, it is difficult to discriminate individual officers or men for special mention, but I am sure it will not be deemed invidious if I signalize Col. Emerson Opdycke, One hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, and Lieut. Col. G. W. Smith, Eighty-eighth Illinois, commanding his regiment in Opdycke's brigade, whose good fortune it was on this blood-stained day, the 30th of November, 1864, to render the most important and distinguished service. The artillery was splendidly served and made terrible havoc in the enemy's ranks, both as he advanced and retired. The officers and men of the batteries are entitled to the highest praise for their good conduct.
When the enemy had temporarily broken our center Major-General Schofield, commanding the forces in the vicinity of Franklin, under the apprehension that our forces engaged on the south side of the river might be compelled to pass to the north side, ordered the following disposition, which was made, of the Third Division (then in reserve) of the Fourth Corps, with a view to cover in the withdrawal of our troops, should it become necessary: Beatty's brigade was deployed on the north bank of the river above the town; Streight's brigade along the bank of the river immediately opposite the town; and Post's brigade on the bank of the river below the town. Fortunately, the exigency for which this disposition was made did not occur in the progress of the contest, but the brigades retained their positions to cover the withdrawal at night, which had been ordered before the occurrence of the attack. To prepare for the withdrawal and retirement toward Nashville the trains were started before night-fall of the 30th. At midnight the troops on the south side of the river began to withdraw from the lines and pass to the north side of the stream; this work was rapidly and successfully accomplished. The enemy probably suspected what was going on, but did not attempt to interfere with the movement. The Third Division of the Fourth Corps had been designated to move in rear and cover the retrograde movement. By 3 a.m. of the 1st of December all the troops had been withdrawn from the south side of the river, and the bridges were fired. So soon as the conflagration was so far advanced as to insure its being complete the Third Division commenced to withdraw, and by 4 a.m. the whole of it was on the road. As the flames rose from the bridge and communicated fully to the enemy our movements he opened a heavy cannonade, which, fortunately, did no injury, and was soon suspended; otherwise the enemy did not attempt to molest us. The rear of the command reached Brentwood, nine miles north of Franklin, at 9 a.m. There the command was halted an hour to allow the men to cook breakfast. Between 10 and 11 o'clock the march was resumed, and the rear of the troops reached the vicinity of Nashville at 1 p.m. The corps was reported to Major-General Thomas, commanding the forces, and by him the position designated, which it occupied from that date to the 15th of December, when offensive operations were commenced.
In conclusion it is proper that I should remark that during the operations briefly sketched in this report the corps was commanded by Major-General Stanley. He was wounded in the battle at Franklin, and was compelled by the casualty to relinquish command of the corps before he could submit a report of its operations; hence the duty has devolved on me.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
GENERAL: The Fourth Army Corps arrived in the vicinity of Nashville, on the retreat from Pulaski, on the 1st of December, ultimo. Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, having been wounded in the conflict at Franklin, on the 30th of November, and having received a leave of absence on account of his wound, relinquished and I assumed command of the corps on the 2d of December. So soon as I had assumed command of the corps I placed it in position as follows, in conformity with orders received from the commanding general of the forces in the field in person: The left of the corps rested on the Casino and extended westward across the Granny White and Hillsborough pikes; the right rested on the left of the Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee (Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's command), midway between the Hillsborough and Hardin pikes. As the condition of the forces was not such as to warrant the commencement of offensive operations immediately, the first duty to be provided for was the safety of Nashville against assault. For this purpose a line of strong intrenchments, strengthened with an abatis, slashes of timber, and pointed stakes firmly planted in the ground, was constructed along the entire front of the corps. The entire development of this work was something over two miles; it was completed by the morning of the 5th of December. But while the safety of Nashville was being provided for, preparations were also being made for offensive operations. The troops were rapidly re-equipped in every particular, the trains repaired and loaded with supplies, &c. As early as the 7th of December the commanding general of the forces had begun to communicate to the corps commanders his plans of attack, and had intimated that the morning of the 10th would witness the inauguration of offensive operations. But the morning of the 9th dawned upon us, bringing a heavy sleet storm, which soon covered the whole face of the earth with a perfect ruer de glace, and rendered all movements of troops, so long as it remained, impossible. The weather and the condition of the ground were not sufficiently ameliorated before midday of the 14th of December to permit the commencement of operations with any hope of success. The commanding general summoned a meeting of corps commanders at his headquarters at 3 p.m. on the 14th, and delivered to them written orders, from which the following are extracts:
As soon as the weather will admit of offensive operations the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:
* * * * * * * * * *
3. Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood, commanding Fourth Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens' Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsborough pike, to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position, on Montgomery's Hill.
* * * * * * * * * *
Should the weather permit the troops will be formed in time to commence operations at 6 a.m., or as soon thereafter as practicable.
To carry out these brief but sententious and pointed instructions of the commanding general, I directed, so soon as I had returned to my headquarters, the division commanders to assemble there at 7 p.m., and after explaining to them fully the intended movements, delivered to them the following written orders:
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 14, 1864.
Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December 15, 1864:
I. Reveille will be sounded at 4 a.m. The troops will get their breakfast, break up their camps, pack up everything, and be prepared to move at 6 a.m.
II. Brigadier-General Elliott, commanding Second Division, will move out by his right, taking the small road which passes by the right of his present position, form in echelon with General A. J. Smith's left, slightly refusing his own left, and, maintaining this relative position to General Smith's troops, will advance with them. When he moves out he will leave a strong line of skirmishers in his solid works.
Ill. Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding First Division, on being relieved by General Steedman, will move his division to the Hillsborough pike, inside of our lines, and by it through the lines, and form in echelon to General Elliott's left, slightly refusing his own left. He will maintain this position and advance with General Elliott.
IV. As soon as General Kimball's division has passed out of the works, by the Hillsborough pike, General Beatty, commanding Third Division, will take up the movement, drawing out by his left, and will form in echelon to General Kimball's left. He will maintain this position and advance with General Kimball; he will also leave a strong line of skirmishers behind the solid works along his present position.
V. The pickets on post, being strengthened when in the judgment of division commanders it becomes necessary, will advance as a line of skirmishers to cover the movement. The formation of the troops will be in two lines--the front line deployed, the second line in close column by division, massed opposite the interval in the front line. Each division commander will, so far as possible, hold one brigade in reserve. Five wagon-loads of ammunition, ten ambulances, and the wagons loaded with the intrenching tools, will, as nearly as possible, follow immediately after each division; the remaining ammunition wagons, ambulances, and all other wagons, will remain inside of our present lines until further orders. One rifle battery will accompany the Second Division, and one battery of light 12-pounders will accompany each of the other divisions; the rest of the artillery of the corps will maintain its present positions in the lines.
By order of Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood:
J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant
Adjutant-General.
The morning of the 15th was dark and somber; a heavy fall of fog and smoke rested on the face of the earth and enveloped every object in darkness. At 6 a.m. the movement of the troops was entirely impracticable, but between 7 and 8 a.m. the fog began to rise, and the troops silently and rapidly commenced to move into the positions assigned to them. This preliminary work being completed, nothing further remained for the Fourth Corps to do until the cavalry and General Smith had made the long swing from our right which was necessary to bring them on the left and rear of the enemy's position. At 12.30 p.m., General Smith having swung up his right so that his command prolonged the front of the Fourth Corps, the serried ranks of the corps began to advance toward the enemy's intrenched position.
I should have remarked previously that as soon as the troops began to debouch from our intrenched lines the skirmishers were pushed forward to cover the movement, and soon became sharply engaged with the enemy's skirmishers and rapidly drove them back. During fill the preliminary movement's an occasional shot, as the shells hurled through the air and burst over the troops from the enemy's batteries, added interest to the scene and showed that he was keenly watching our operations. When the grand array of the troops began to move forward in unison the pageant was magnificently grand and imposing. Far as the eye could reach the lines and masses of blue, over which the nation's emblem flaunted proudly, moved forward in such perfect order that the heart of the patriot might easily draw from it the happy presage of the coming glorious victory. A few minutes after 12.30 p.m. I deemed the moment favorable for the attack on the left and rear of Montgomery's Hill. Montgomery's Hill is an irregularly cone-shaped eminence, which rises some 150 feet above the general level of the Country. The ascent to its summit throughout most of its circumference is quite abrupt, and its sides are covered with forest trees. The enemy had encircled the hill just below its crest with a strong line of intrenchments, and embarrassed the approach of an assaulting force with an abatis and rows of sharpened stakes firmly planted in the ground. The hill was the enemy's most advanced position, and was not more than 800 yards from our lines. The ascent on the left and rear of the hill, taken with reference to the enemy's occupation, is more gradual than the portion which directly confronted our intrenchments. As our troops advanced and swung to the left, the left of the hill was brought directly in front of the Third Division of the corps. This disposition was favorable to the assault. I ordered Brigadier-General Beatty, commanding the Third Division, to detail a brigade to make the attack. The Second Brigade of the Third Division, commanded by Col. P. Sidney Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois Veteran Volunteers, was selected for the work.
The necessary arrangements having been made, at 1 p.m. I gave the order for the assault. At the command, as sweeps the stiff' gale over the ocean, driving every object before it, so swept the brigade up the wooded slope, over the enemy's intrenchments; and the hill was won. The Second Brigade was nobly supported in the assault by the First Brigade (Colonel Streight's) of the Third Division. Quite a number of prisoners and small-arms were captured in the assault. Previous to the assault I had caused the enemy to be well pounded by the artillery from our lines. This was the first success of the day, and it greatly exalted the enthusiasm of the troops. Our casualties were small compared with the success. Up to this time the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, had been held in reserve in rear of the Fourth Corps and Major-General Smith's command; but shortly after the assault on Montgomery's Hill I received a message from the commanding general of the forces to the effect that he had ordered General Schofield to move his command to the right to prolong General Smith's front, and directing me to move my reserves as much to the right as could be done compatible with the safety of my own front. The order was at once obeyed by shifting the reserve brigade of each division toward our right. The entire line of the corps was steadily pressed forward and the enemy engaged throughout its whole front. The battery accompanying each division was brought to the front, and being placed in short and effective range of the enemy's main line, allowed him no rest. As the troops advanced the skirmishers were constantly engaged, at times so sharply that the fusilade nearly equaled in fierceness the engagement of solid lines of battle. I pressed the corps as near to the enemy's main line as possible without making a direct assault on it. In doing so at the same time swinging to the left, the right of the corps, which had during the previous portion of the day been in rear of General Smith's left to support it, passed in front of it. This movement brought the center of the corps, General Kimball's division, directly opposite a very strongly fortified hill near the center of the enemy's main line. Impressed with the importance of carrying this hill, as the enemy's center would be broken thereby, I ordered up two batteries and had them so placed as to bring a converging fire on the crest of the hill. I will here remark that the enemy's artillery on this hill had been annoying us seriously all day. After the two batteries had played on the enemy's line for half an hour, during which time the practice had been most accurate, I ordered General Kimball to assault the hill with his entire division. Most nobly did the division respond to the order. With the most exalted enthusiasm and with loud cheers it rushed forward up the steep ascent and over the intrenchments. The solid fruits of this magnificent assault were several pieces of artillery and stands of colors, many stand of small-arms, and numerous prisoners. The Second Division of the corps (General Elliott's) followed the movement of General Kimball's division, and entered the enemy's works farther to the right shortly after the main assault had been successful. The division in this movement captured three pieces of artillery. Farther to the left the Third Division, General Beatty commanding, had attacked and carried the enemy's intrenchments and captured several pieces of artillery and caissons and numerous prisoners.
Fortunately, this brilliant success along the entire front of the corps was achieved with comparatively slight loss. The onset was so fierce, the movement of the troops so rapid, that a very brief interval elapsed between the first shout of the advancing lines and the planting of our colors on the enemy's works. But this rapid movement had somewhat disordered the ranks, as well as blown the men, and it was hence necessary to halt the corps for a brief space to reform and prepare for a farther advance. The enemy on being driven from his works had retired in the direction (eastward) of the Franklin pike. His works extending across this pike were still intact. While the troops were being reformed I received an order from the commanding general to move toward the Franklin pike, some two miles and a half distant, to reach it if possible before dark, drive the enemy hard, and form the corps across it, facing southward. This order was received about 5 p.m., almost sunset. The reformation of the troops was quickly completed, and the whole corps, formed in two lines and covered by a cloud of skirmishers, was pushed rapidly toward the Franklin pike. Soon our skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's, but only to drive them. But the rapidly approaching darkness too soon brought a period to this glorious work. After crossing the Granny White pike, and arriving within about three-quarters of a mile of the Franklin pike, the darkness became so thick that it was necessary, in order to avoid confusion and to prevent our troops from firing into each other, to halt the corps for the night. The corps was formed parallel to the Granny White pike, its right resting on General Smith's left and its left on the most northern line, then abandoned, of the enemy's works. In this position, about 7 p.m. of a bleak December night, the troops bivouacked, after their arduous but, fortunately, glorious labors of the day. The result of the day's operations for the corps was the capture of 10 pieces of artillery, 5 caissons, several stand of colors, a considerable number of small-arms, and some 500 prisoners. The enemy's intrenched lines had been broken in two places by direct assault and he driven more than two miles. Of his loss in killed and wounded I could form no estimate, but it must have been heavy. Fortunately, our casualties were unusually light compared with the success achieved, not more than 350 killed and wounded in the corps. After having provided for the safety of the corps for the night I repaired to the quarters of the commanding general to receive his orders for the operations of the morrow. These orders were to advance at daylight the following morning, the 16th, and if the enemy was still in front to attack him; but if he had retreated to pass to the eastward of the Franklin pike, to face southward, and pursue him till found.
At 11.30 p.m. of the 15th instructions were distributed to the division commanders to advance at daylight and attack the enemy if found in front of their commands; but if he should not be found to cross' to the eastward of the Franklin pike and move southward parallel to it, Elliott's division leading, followed by Kimball's, then Beatty's. At 6 a.m. on the 16th instant the corps commenced to move toward the Franklin pike. The movement at once developed the enemy in our front, and sharp skirmishing commenced immediately. The enemy was steadily driven back, and at 8 a.m. we gained possession of the Franklin pike. The enemy's skirmishers, after being driven eastward of the pike, retreated southward. Elliott's division was deployed across the road, facing southward; Beatty's division was formed on the left of Elliott s, and Kimball's division massed near the pike in rear of Elliott's. In this order the corps advanced nearly three-quarters of a mile, when it encountered a heavy skirmish line stoutly barricaded. Some half a mile in rear of the enemy's skirmish line his main line, strongly intrenched, could be seen. An effort was at once made to connect General Elliott's right with General Smith's left. The interval being too great to accomplish this, I ordered General Kimball to bring up his division and occupy the space between Generals Smith's and Elliott's commands. This was promptly done, the troops moving handsomely into position under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery. Thus formed, the entire corps advanced in magnificent array, under a galling fire of small-arms and artillery, and drove the enemy's skirmishers into his main line. Farther advance was impossible without making a direct assault on the enemy's intrenched lines, and the happy moment for the grand effort had not yet arrived. I hence ordered the division commanders to press their skirmishers as near to the enemy's intrenchments as possible, and to harass him with a constant fire.
In a conflict of this nature I knew we would have greatly the advantage of him, as our supply of ammunition was inexhaustible and his limited. All the batteries of the corps on the field were brought to the front, placed in eligible positions in short range of the enemy's works, and ordered to keep up a measured but steady fire on his artillery. The practice of the batteries was uncommonly fine. The ranges were accurately obtained, the elevations correctly given, and the ammunition being unusually good, the firing was consequently most effective. It was really entertaining to witness it. The enemy replied spiritedly with musketry and artillery, and his practice with both was good. In the progress of the duel he disabled two guns in Ziegler's battery. After the dispositions above recounted had been made the commanding general joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike, examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but for the time to bide events. The general plan of the battle for the preceding day--namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to be acted on. Before leaving me the commanding general desired me to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange a military connection between his right and my left. The enemy had made some display of force between the Franklin and Nolensville pikes, but its extent could not be fixed, and it was hence necessary to take precautions with reference to it. Near 12 m. I rode toward the left and met Major-General Steedman, communicated to him the views of the commanding general, and submitted to him some suggestions in regard to the disposition of his command to meet those views. General Steedman coincided in opinion with me and promptly and handsomely, though exposed to a sharp fire from one of the enemy's batteries, placed his command, both infantry and artillery, in a position which effectually secured my left from being turned. I will here remark that General Steedman's command most gallantly and effectually co-operated with my command during the remainder of the day.
For a proper understanding of the last great and decisive struggle in the battle of Nashville a brief description of the scene of its occurrence and of the topography of the adjacent country is requisite. The basin in which the city of Nashville stands is inclosed on the southwest, south, and southeast by the Brentwood Hills. The Franklin pike runs nearly due south from Nashville. The Brentwood Hills consist of two ranges or branches--the branch to the west of the Franklin pike runs from northwest to southeast; the branch to the east of the Franklin pike runs from northeast to southwest; the two branches unite' in a depression, or gap, about nine miles from Nashville. The Franklin pike passes through this gap, and in it is situated the little hamlet of Brentwood. The most northern point of each branch is about five miles from Nashville. From this description it will be perceived that the general configuration of the Brentwood Hills is that of a rudely shaped V. Nashville is north of and about opposite the center of the space included between the two branches; Brentwood is at the apex. The valley inclosed between the two branches is nearly bisected by the Franklin pike. The average elevation of the Brentwood Hills above the general level of the surrounding country is about 350 feet. The surface of the Nashville basin is broken by detached hills, some of which rise to an elevation of 150 feet, with abrupt sides, densely wooded. About five miles from Nashville the Franklin pike passes along the base of one of these isolated heights, which is known as the Overton Hill. When the heavy stress which had been put on the enemy during the forenoon of the 16th had forced him into his works, he was found to occupy a strongly intrenched line running for some distance along the base of the western branch of the Brentwood Hills; thence across the valley eastward to and across the Franklin pike, around the northern slope of the Overton Hill, about midway between its summit and base, with a retired flank, running nearly southward, prolonged along its eastern slope. This line of intrenchments was strengthened with an abatis and other embarrassments to an assault. The right of the enemy's main line rested on the Overton Hill. A close examination of the position satisfied me that if the Overton Hill could be carried the enemy's right would be turned, his line from the Franklin pike westward would be taken in reverse, and his line of retreat along the Franklin pike and the valley leading to Brentwood commanded effectually. The capture of half of the rebel army would almost certainly have been the guerdon of success. It was evident that the assault would be very difficult, and, if successful, Would probably be attended with heavy loss; but the prize at stake was worth the hazard. Early in the afternoon I began to make preparations for assaulting the hill. Owing to the openness of the country the preparatory movements could not be concealed from the enemy; in truth, from our extreme proximity to his intrenchments, they were necessarily made under the fire of his artillery. Knowing that the safety of his army depended on holding the Overton Hill to the last moment, he re-enforced the position heavily with troops drawn from his left and left center. I directed Colonel Post to reconnoiter the position closely, with the view of determining, first, the feasibility of an assault, and, secondly, to determine the most practicable point on which to direct it.
After a thorough and close reconnaissance, in which perhaps three-quarters of an hour were spent, Colonel Post reported that the position was truly formidable; that it would be very difficult to carry, but that he thought he could do it with his brigade. He further reported that an assault, in his opinion, on the northern slope of the hill held out the greatest promise of success. I ordered him to prepare his brigade for an assault immediately and to inform me when he was ready to move. I directed General Beatty, commanding Third Division, to have the First Brigade (Colonel Streight's) formed to support Colonel Post's. I further ordered Major Goodspeed, chief of artillery of the corps, to open a concentrated fire on the hill for the purpose of silencing the enemy's batteries and demolishing his defenses, and to continue the fire as long as it could be done with safety to our advancing troops. The order was effectually obeyed. I also conferred with Major-General Steedman and explained to him what I intended to do. He promptly agreed to move his command forward with the assaulting brigade to cover its left; also to participate in the assault, with a view to carrying whatever might be in its front. Everything being prepared for the attack, near 3 p.m. I gave the order for the assaulting brigade to advance, This it did steadily, followed by its support. Major-General Steedman's command moved simultaneously. I will here remark that General Steedman's artillery had kept up an effective fire on the enemy's works during the interval during which the preparations for the assault were being made. The front of the assaulting force was covered with a cloud of skirmishers, who had been ordered to advance rapidly, for the purpose of drawing the fire of the enemy, as far as possible, and to annoy his artillerists, and to prevent, as much as it could be done, the working of his guns. The assaulting force was instructed to move steadily forward to within a short distance of the enemy's works, and then, by a "bold burst," ascend the steep ascent, cross the abatis, dash over the rude but strong parapet, and secure the coveted goal.
The troops were full of enthusiasm, and the splendid array in which the advance was made gave hopeful promise of success. Near the foot of the ascent the assaulting force dashed forward for the last great effort. It was welcomed with a most terrific fire of grape and canister and musketry; but its course was onward. When near, however, the enemy's works (a few of our men, stouter of limb and steadier of movement, had already entered his line) his reserves on the slope of the hill rose and poured in a fire before which no troops could live. Unfortunately, the casualties had been particularly heavy among the officers, and more unfortunately still, when he had arrived almost at the abatis, while gallantly leading his brigade, the chivalric Post was struck down by a grape-shot and his horse killed under him. The brigade--its battalions bleeding, torn, and broken--first halted and then began to retire; but there was little disorder and nothing of panic. The troops promptly halted and were readily reformed by their officers. But for the unfortunate fall of Colonel Post, the commander of the assaulting brigade, I think the attack would have succeeded. I had watched the assault with a keen and anxious gaze. It was made by troops whom I had long commanded and whom I had learned to love and admire for their noble deeds on many a hard-fought field. I had observed, with pride and exultation, the evident steady resolve with which they had prepared for the assault, the cheerfulness with which they had received the announcement that they were les enfans perdus. So soon as I perceived the troops begin to retire, apprehending that the enemy might attempt an offensive return, I dispatched an order to all the batteries bearing on the hill to open the heaviest possible fire so soon as their fronts were sufficiently cleared by the retiring troops to permit it. I also ordered Colonel Knefler, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division, to hold his command well in hand, ready to charge the enemy should he presume to follow our troops. Both orders were promptly obeyed, and if the enemy ever had the temerity to contemplate an offensive return, he never attempted to carry it into effect. Not a prisoner was captured from us--a fact almost unparalleled in an assault so fierce, so near to success, but unsuccessful; and no foot of ground previously won was lost. After the repulse our soldiers, white and colored, lay indiscriminately near the enemy's works at the outer edge of the abatis. But while the assault was not immediately successful, it paved the way for the grand and final success of the day. The re-enforcements for the Overton Hill, which the enemy had drawn from his left and left center, had so much weakened that part of his line as to assure the success of General Smith's attack.
After withdrawing and reposting the troops that had been engaged in the assault I rode toward the right to look to the condition of the First and Second Divisions. Shortly after reaching the First Division, which was on the right of the corps, an electric shout, which announced that a grand advance was being made by our right and right center, was borne from the right toward the left. I at once ordered the whole corps to advance and assault the enemy's works, but the order was scarcely necessary. All had caught the inspiration, and officers of all grades and the men, each and every one, seemed to vie with each other in a generous rivalry and in the dash with which they assaulted the enemy's works. So general and so combined an attack on all parts of the enemy's line was resistless. It rushed forward like a mighty wave, driving everything before it. The sharp fire of musketry and artillery did not cause an instant's pause. I advanced with the First Division and witnessed, with the highest satisfaction, the gallant style in which it assaulted and carried the enemy's works. The division carried every point of the works in its front and captured five pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and many hundred stand of small-arms. The Second Division gallantly carried the enemy's works in its front and captured many prisoners and small-arms. The Third Division reassaulted the Overton Hill, carried it, and captured four pieces of artillery, a large number of prisoners and small-arms, and two stand of colors. The enemy fled in the utmost confusion. The entire corps pushed rapidly forward, pressed the pursuit, and continued it several miles and till the fast approaching darkness made it necessary to halt for the night. In the pursuit the Third Division captured five pieces of artillery. The batteries of the corps advanced with the infantry in the pursuit, and by timely discharges increased the confusion and hastened the flight of the enemy. The corps bivouacked eight miles from Nashville, and within a mile of the Brentwood Pass, which was under our guns. By the day's operations the enemy had been driven from a strongly intrenched position by assault and forced into an indiscriminate rout. In his flight he had strewn the ground with small-arms, bayonets, cartridge-boxes, blankets, and other material, all attesting the completeness of the disorder to which he had abandoned himself. The captures of the day were 14 pieces of artillery, 980 prisoners, 2 stand of colors, and thousands of small-arms. It may be truthfully remarked that military history scarcely affords a parallel of a more complete victory.
At 12.30 a.m. of the 17th instructions were received from the commanding general of the forces to move the Fourth Corps as early as practicable down the Franklin pike in pursuit of the enemy. At 6 a.m. of the 17th I directed division commanders to advance as early as practicable, move rapidly, and if the enemy should be overtaken to press him vigorously. The night had been rainy and the morning broke dark and cloudy. It was, hence, nearly 8 a.m. before the column was well in motion, but it then advanced rapidly. The instructions of the commanding general, received during the night, informed me that the cavalry would move on my left during the day. It did not, however, get to my left before I moved, and at 10 a.m. I was detained a short time in permitting a portion of the cavalry to get to the front, which was necessary, in order that it might reach the position assigned to it in the order of march. After this brief delay I pushed rapidly forward, and, although the road was very heavy, reached Franklin at 1.20 p.m. The whole line of march of the day bore unmistakable evidence of the signalness of the victory our arms had achieved and the completeness of the rout. The road was strewn with small-arms, accounterments, and blankets. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges over the Big Harpeth at Franklin, and as the rains of the previous night and that morning had so swollen the stream as to make it impassable by infantry without a bridge, it was necessary to halt to build one, the pontoon train not having come up. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, nobly volunteered to build the bridge, and thanks to his energy and ingenuity and the industry of his gallant regiment, it was ready--though he had few conveniences in the way of tools, the scantiest materials, and the stream was rising rapidly--for the corps at daylight the morning of the 18th. This service was the more useful, as well as the more gratifying, as our cavalry, which, from reaching the Harpeth earlier on the 17th, had been able to ford it, was sharply engaged with the enemy's rear guard, several miles in front, and the whole corps was burning with impatience to get forward to join in the conflict. The corps was pushed rapidly across the Harpeth, pressed forward and marched eighteen miles that day, though the road was very heavy and many crossings had to be made over the streams. Near night-fall it passed in front of the cavalry and encamped about a mile in advance of it. The weather was very inclement.
During the night of the 18th the rain poured down in torrents, and the morning brought no improvement to the weather of the night. During the night I received instructions from the commanding general of the forces informing me, first, that the cavalry, then encamped in my rear, would move at 6 a.m., pass to the front, and that I should move out at 8 a.m. The cavalry had not all passed at 8 a.m., but at the appointed hour the corps was in motion. The rain still fell in torrents, flooding the earth with water and rendering all movements off the pike impossible. The head of the column advanced three miles and a half and arrived at Rutherford's Creek. This is a bold and rapid stream, usually fordable, but subject to rapid freshets, and the heavy rains of the preceding twenty-four hours had swollen it beyond a possibility of it being crossed without bridges. To construct these it was necessary we should first occupy the opposite bank of the stream. As the head of column approached the creek the hostile fire from the southern bank opened with musketry and artillery. To clear the enemy from the opposite bank at the turnpike crossing, where the bridge for the passage of the artillery and trains had to be constructed, it was necessary to pass troops over, either above or below, and as the pontoon train was not yet up, every expedient that ingenuity could devise was resorted to to effect the desired object. Rafts were constructed and launched, but the current was so rapid that they were unmanageable. Huge forest trees growing near the margin of the stream were felled athwart the stream, with the hope of spanning it in this way and getting some riflemen over; but the creek was so rapid and the flood so deep that these huge torsos of the forest were swept away by the resistless torrent. In these efforts was passed one of the most dreary, uncomfortable, and inclement days I remember to have passed in the course of nineteen and a half years of active field service. Late in the afternoon some dismounted cavalry succeeded in crossing the creek on the ruins of the railroad bridge and drove off the enemy from its southern bank. During the night and the early forenoon of the following day, the 20th, two bridges for infantry were constructed across the stream--one at the turnpike crossing, by Colonel Opdycke's brigade, of the Second Division, and the other by General Grose's brigade, of the First Division. So soon as these were completed the infantry of the corps was passed over, marched three miles, and encamped for the night on the northern bank of Duck River.
During the night of the 20th the weather became bitterly cold. Wednesday, the 21st, operations were suspended, and the corps remained quietly in camp, as the pontoon train, detained by the swollen streams, the inclement weather, and the miserable condition of the roads, had not been able to get to the front. The day was bitterly cold, and the rest which the command gained by laying in camp was much needed after their arduous and laborious service of the many preceding days. During the night of the 21st, between midnight and daylight, the pontoon train came up and reported. I had, as early as the evening of the 20th, encamped a brigade (the First Brigade of the Third Division, Colonel Streight commanding) on the margin of the river, ready to lay down the bridge the very earliest moment that it could be done. So soon as it was light enough to work the morning of the 22d a sufficient number of pontoons (they were canvass) were put together to throw across the river a detachment of the Fifty-first Indiana to clear the opposite bank of the enemy. This service was handsomely performed by the detachment, and quite a number of prisoners was the result of the operation. So soon as the opposite bank was cleared of the enemy Colonel Streight commenced to lay down the bridge, and completed the work with commendable celerity, though, owing to the inexperience of the troops in such service and the extreme coldness of the weather, more time was consumed in doing it than could have been desired. So soon as the bridge was completed I began to pass the infantry of the corps, and during the time which intervened before the time designed by the commanding general for the cavalry to commence crossing, succeeded in getting over most of the artillery and a sufficiency of the ammunition and baggage trains to permit the corps to continue the pursuit. After crossing the river I moved the corps a mile out of the town of Columbia, which stands on the southern bank of the river, and encamped it for the remainder of the night.
During the evening of the 22d the commanding general informed me that he wished the pursuit continued by the Fourth Corps and the cavalry, conjointly, so soon as the cavalry had crossed the river; that he wished the Fourth Corps to press down the turnpike road, and the cavalry to move through the country on either side of the corps. Friday, the 23d, I rested near Columbia, awaiting for the cavalry to complete its passage of Duck River, till midday, when, the cavalry not being yet over, I informed the commanding general I would move the corps a few miles to the front that afternoon, encamp for the night, and wait the following morning for the cavalry to move out, with which, as already stated, I had been instructed to co-operate. While at Duck River we learned that the enemy had thrown several pieces of artillery into the river, being unable to get them across. We also learned that his rear guard was composed of all the organized infantry that could be drawn from his army, which was placed under the command of General Walthall, and his cavalry commanded by General Forrest. After advancing some five miles south of Columbia, the afternoon of the 23d, the head of the corps came on a party of the enemy posted advantageously in a gap through which the highway passed, with inclosing heights on either side. I ordered Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding the leading division, to deploy two regiments as skirmishers, bring up a section of artillery, and with this force to advance and dislodge the enemy from the pass. The service was handsomely and quickly performed. One captain of cavalry and one private certainly killed and four privates captured were among the known casualties to the enemy. It being now near night-fall, the corps was halted to await the completion of the crossing of the cavalry.
On the following morning, the 24th, I was detained till 12 m., waiting for the cavalry to come up and move out. Shortly after the cavalry had passed out through my camp Brevet Major-General Wilson sent me a message to the effect that he had found the ground so soft that he could not operate off of the turnpike, and begging that I would not become impatient at the delay he was causing in the movement of my command. At 12 m. the road was free of the cavalry, when the corps was put in motion and marched sixteen miles that afternoon, and encamped two miles south of Lynnville. During all this period of the pursuit, and, indeed, to the end of it, the rear guard of the enemy offered slight resistance, and generally fled at the mere presence of our' troops. Sunday morning, the 25th, the corps followed closely on the heels of the cavalry, passed through Pulaski, from which the cavalry had rapidly driven the enemy's rear guard, and encamped for the night six miles from the town, on the Lamb's Ferry road. The corps marched sixteen miles on the 25th, the last six miles on a road next to impracticable from the depth of the mud. As we could not have the use of the turnpike farther south than Pulaski, I ordered all the artillery of the corps but four batteries to be left at Pulaski, using the horses of the batteries left to increase the horses of the pieces taken with the command to eight, and of the caissons to ten horses each. I also ordered that only a limited number of ammunition wagons, carrying but ten boxes each, should accompany the command. These arrangements were necessary on account of the condition of the road on which the enemy had retreated. Without extra teams to the artillery carriages and lightening of the usual load of an ammunition wagon, it would have been impracticable to get the vehicles along; a vigorous pursuit would have been impossible. These dispositions were reported to the commanding general. He directed me to follow the cavalry and support it. The pursuit was continued with all possible celerity to Lexington, Ala., thirty miles south of Pulaski. Six miles south of Lexington Brevet Major-General Wilson learned certainly, on the 28th, the rear of the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River on the 27th, and that his bridge was taken up the morning of the 28th. These facts were reported to the commanding general, who ordered that the pursuit be discontinued. To continue it farther at that time, besides being useless, even if possible, was really impossible. Of the pursuit it may be truly remarked that it is without a parallel in this war. It was continued for more than a hundred miles at the most inclement season of the year, over a road the whole of which was bad, and thirty miles of which were wretched, almost beyond description. It were scarcely an hyperbole to say that the road from Pulaski to Lexington was bottomless when we passed over it. It was strewn with the wrecks of wagons, artillery carriages, and other material abandoned by the enemy in his flight. The corps remained two days at Lexington awaiting orders.
On the 30th of December instructions were received to take post at this place. On the 31st the corps marched to Elk River, a distance of fifteen miles. The river being too swollen to ford two days were spent in bridging it. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, and Major Watson, Seventy-fifth Illinois, using the pioneers of the corps as laborers and mechanics, built a substantial trestle bridge, 309 feet long, over which the corps, with its artillery and wagons, safely passed. Elk River was crossed on the 3d of January, and on the 5th the corps was encamped in the vicinity of this place.
Thus was closed for the Fourth Corps one of the most remarkable campaigns of the war. The enemy, superior in numbers, had been driven by assault, in utter rout and demoralization, from strongly intrenched positions, pursued more than 100 miles, and forced to recross the Tennessee River. By actual capture on the field of battle and by abandonment in his flight the enemy had lost three-quarters of his artillery; in prisoners taken from him, by desertion, in killed and wounded, his force had certainly been diminished 15,000; and his loss in small-arms, ammunition, and other material of war enormous. From an organized army, beleaguering the capital of Tennessee, the foe had been beaten into a disorganized mass--a mere rabble. The Fourth Corps captured 25 pieces of artillery, 4 stand of colors, and of small-arms a large number, of which, however, no account could be taken, as the pursuit was commenced early the morning of the 17th. Of the artillery captured 19 pieces were taken by assault on the enemy's works. The corps captured 111 commissioned officers and 1,857 non-commissioned officers and privates.
The casualties of the corps amounted to—Officers, killed, 19; wounded, 55. Non-commissioned officers and privates, killed, 114; wounded, 759.*
For the more minute details of the movements of the troops on the field of battle and in the pursuit, I most respectfully refer the commanding general to the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders; and for the special mention of numerous acts of gallantry and good conduct, I must also refer him to their reports.
I desire to commend to the consideration of the commanding general the skill and intelligence evinced by the division commanders—Brigadier-Generals Kimball, Elliott, and Beatty—in the handling of their commands, and for the personal gallantry displayed by them on the field of battle. Their services entitle them to the gratitude of the nation and to the most kindly consideration of the Government. The division commanders mention the services of their brigade commanders in terms of the highest praise; they also commend their staff officers for good conduct and valuable services. The reports of the brigade commanders attest the meritorious conduct of the regimental commanders and of the brigade staff officers.
From the very best opportunity of observing, I can truly bear testimony, and I do it with the highest satisfaction, to the soldierly, in truth, splendid conduct of the whole corps in all the conflicts of the 15th and 16th. I have never seen troops behave better on any battlefield.
To the members of my staff--Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood, assistant inspector-general; Major Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general; Major Dawson, Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, chief of outposts and pickets; First Lieut. George Shaffer, Ninety-third Ohio, and First Lieut. C. D. Hammer, One hundred and twenty-fourth Ohio, aides-de-camp; Captain Stansbury, Nineteenth Regulars, assistant commissary of musters; Capt. Henry Kaldenbaugh, provost-marshal; and Lieutenant Kennedy, acting assistant inspector--I owe many thanks for the zealous, intelligent, and gallant manner in which they performed their duties, both on the field of battle and in the long and arduous pursuit. I commend them to the favorable consideration of my seniors in rank and to the Government.
Major Goodspeed, chief of artillery, rendered the most valuable service on both the 15th and 16th. A battery was never required in any position that it was not promptly put there. The officers of all the batteries engaged behaved with great gallantry, as did their men. The artillery practice on both those days was splendid.
Surgeon Heard, medical director, Surgeon Brumley, medical inspector, and Captain Tousley, chief of ambulances, performed their duties most satisfactorily. Ample preparation had been made in advance for the wounded, and humane and efficient care was promptly rendered them.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster, and Captain Hodgdon, chief commissary, performed the duties of their respective departments in a satisfactory manner.
To the officers of every grade and to the brave but nameless men in the ranks my grateful thanks for the cheerful, gallant, and effective manner in which every duty was performed are due, and are hereby officially tendered.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADDENDA.
Commanding Second Division, Fourth Army Corps:
GENERAL: When General Stanley left he directed me to address you and express for him to you, and to the officers and men serving in your command, his sincere thanks and gratitude for the gallant service rendered at the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November. His wound compelled him to leave you for a time, and while he did it with regret, he felt from the record you have made that in whatever position you may be called to act, under whatever circumstances you may be surrounded, you will in future, as in the past, discharge the duties devolving upon you with credit to yourselves and honor to his successor and to the corps.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF FOURTH ARMY CORPS:
You have received the commendation of his Excellency the President of the United States for your glorious deeds in the various conflicts around Nashville on the 15th and 16th ultimo. You have also received the commendation of the commanding general of the forces engaged in those conflicts, not only for your splendid achievements on the field of battle, but for your cheerful endurance of privations and hardships, in the most inclement weather, during the long and vigorous pursuit which followed the rout of the enemy in the vicinity of Nashville. As your actual commander on the field and in the pursuit, 1 desire to add my commendation to the high encomiums you have already received, and to tender you my grateful thanks for your soldierly conduct both on the field of battle and in the trying pursuit.
Without faltering, at the command of your officers, you repeatedly assaulted the enemy's strongly intrenched positions, and drove him from them in confusion and dismay. When he was utterly routed and no longer durst confront you in battle, you at once commenced the most vigorous pursuit, continued it more than a hundred miles, at the most inclement season of the year, over the most miserable roads, and across deep and difficult streams, which were passed by your labor alone, and until the enemy was driven in utter disorganization across the Tennessee River. The substantial fruits of these glorious deeds were 24 pieces of artillery, 5 caissons, several stand of colors, many thousand stand of small arms, and 2,486 prisoners. Such noble services entitle you to the lasting gratitude of the nation. Fortunately, this great success was achieved with comparatively slight loss to the corps—750 killed and wounded will cover the entire casualties of the corps in the two days' conflict.
To the friends of the gallant dead and to the wounded—and I am sure you will join me in this tribute of comradeship—I offer my sincere sympathy and condolence.
Swords and sabers captured at Franklin, 11; at Nashville, 28; total, 39. Regimental commanders report many more swords captured and thrown away, for want of transportation, in the pursuit of Hood. Guns captured at Nashville, 25.
Prisoners reported by the corps provost-marshal, captured at Spring Hill and Franklin, 46 commissioned officers and 572 enlisted men; captured at Nashville, 111 commissioned officers and 1,857 enlisted men; total, 2,586 prisoners.
I regret that I could not send this report sooner; it was impossible to get division reports.
GENERAL: Though the troops whose gallant conduct I desire to commend to the notice of the commanding general do not belong to my command, yet as he had charged me with the duty of trying to destroy the force of the rebel General Lyon, and as the gallantry was displayed in the operations against the rebel chieftain, I deem it my duty, as it certainly is my pleasure, to make a special report of the obstinate defense made by First Lieut. John H. Hull, One hundred and first U.S. Colored Troops, and the small detachment under his command. Lieutenant Hull, with a detachment of fifty- four colored recruits, was ordered on the 7th instant to Scottsborough, on Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to guard the water-tanks and depot. During the afternoon of the 8th Lieutenant Bull found the enemy advancing on him in heavy force. Retiring to the depot, which he had loop-holed for defense, he awaited the attack. The enemy made a vigorous assault on the north side of the depot, which was repulsed. Changing his point of attack, he assaulted the south side of the depot, only to be repulsed. Finally he attacked the west end and north side of the building, to be again more seriously repulsed than in either of the previous assaults. Lieutenant Hull reports that the enemy came up in the assaults so near that he seized the muzzles of the muskets and attempted to wrest them through the loopholes. After the third repulse the enemy retired out of musket range and opened on the depot with his artillery, two 12-pounder howitzers. This made the building untenable, when Lieutenant Hull evacuated it and led his brave little band up the side of the mountain, a distance of about 450 yards, intending there to renew the fight, but the enemy scarcely attempted to follow. After reaching the mountain Lieutenant Hull learned that a train with re-enforcements had reached one of the water-tanks, about a mile and a quarter distant. He at once concentrated his command to it, and was not followed by the enemy, who, on the contrary, retreated toward the Tennessee River. Lieutenant Hull estimates the enemy's force at 1,200, and reports having inflicted on him a loss of Colonel Oneal and 17 men killed and 45 wounded. The casualties of the gallant garrison were 2 men wounded. I think such a resolute defense against such overwhelming odds merits commendation in orders, not only as an act of justice to the brave men who made it, but as an example to other railroad guards of what may be accomplished by a determined resistance. I am informed that the recruits under Lieutenant Hull's command had not been mustered into the service. Justice to these brave men requires that it should be done without delay.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
* But see revised table, p. 99
