Showing posts with label Army of the Ohio. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Army of the Ohio. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

Diary of Private Daniel L. Ambrose: Sunday, April 6, 1862

It is now move ing [sic]—a beautiful Sabbath morning. The dews have gone to heaven and the stars have gone to God; the sky is all inlaid with crimson, far away to the east. From behind the eastern hills the sun is peering; it is moving on its path. But ere it has long illumed the sky, war's dread tocsin is heard; the sullen roar of artillery breaks upon our ears, telling to us that the storm-king of battle would ride upon the banks of the Tennessee to-day. The army of the Tennessee springs to arms to meet the advancing columns of Albert Sidney Johnson. The pennons are now flying. Major Rowett and the Seventh are quickly buckled for the conflict. Her old, tattered and shot-riven flag goes flying through the woods, and the regiment is soon in the conflict. Their position is now behind a rail fence. Oh! the angry tempest that rolls around here! Belching cannons, shotted to the muzzle, are now plowing deep lanes in the Union ranks. How can we describe the sound of a storm of grape and canister, cutting their hellish paths through serried ranks of human beings. It is impossible. Many are the storms flying around the Seventh now. Thicker and faster they come, but those noble men who bore that riddled flag over Fort Donelson's walls, struggle on. Many have breathed quickly, and, trampled under their comrades' feet, have rolled in bloody agonies and now lie in quiet eternal slumber. The mighty armies are now struggling—struggling desperately for the life or death of a nation.

Fiercer and fiercer rages the battle. The great Grant is moving on the field with a mighty power. But fearful odds are against us, and the army of the Tennessee is compelled to yield position after position. The Seventh has been forced to yield many points to-day; at one time being so far in the advance, we were left without support, and had it not been for the quick perception of our gallant Major, we would have been cut off and captured. Forming columns by divisions, we retreated from our critical position, and were compelled to fall back across an open field. It was a trying time. The harsh, fierce barking of the dogs of war made the earth tremble, as if in the midst of a convulsion. But there was no confusion in the Seventh-no panic there. Led by the brave Rowett, they moved firmly, as if to say, that shot-pierced flag, tattered and torn, shall not go down to-day. Major Rowett, with the aid of Captain Monroe, acting Major now form a new line with the Seventh. War's ruthless machine is moving with a relentless force.

It is now past noon. Confusion reigns; brave men are falling like rain drops. All seems dark—seems that the Union army will be crushed by this wild sweep of treason. But on the crippled army of the Tennessee struggles; they still keep the flag up. It is now four o'clock. Step by step the army is being driven back towards the river. The old Union banner seems to be drooping in the wrathful storm, but by an almost superhuman effort the tide is checked. For a while there is a lull in the battle, but only to make preparations for the last desperate assault-an assault in which the enemy expect to see the old flag come down to their feet.

Buell is said to be approaching; he is hourly expected. Grant is now seen moving with a care-worn countenance, He moves amid the carnage to form his last grand line one-fourth mile from the Tennessee, where the advance is now driven. Grant's last line is formed. It is a line of iron, a line of steel, a wall of stout hearts, as firm, as powerful as Napoleon under like reverses ever formed in the days of his imperial power. It seems almost impossible for such a line to be formed at this hour 50 compact. On every available spot of earth an iron-lipped monster frowns. It is a trying moment, for Grant knows and his army knows that should this line be broken, the battle would be lost and the proud flag would be compelled to fall. At half-past four o'clock Grant dashes through the woods. His voice rings out: “They come! they come! Army of the Tennessee stand firm!” A breathless silence pervades these serried ranks, until broken by the deafening crash of artillery. The last desperate struggle on Sunday evening now commences. One hundred brazen guns are carrying terror and death across Shiloh's plain. The Seventh is at its place; every officer and soldier is at his post; Rowett and Monroe are at their stations, now on foot; (Rowett's horse killed in former charge; Monroe's disabled.) All the company officers are in their places, cheering and encouraging their gallant men, and as we gaze upon the bristling bayonets that are gleaming along the Seventh's line, we know that every brawny arm that is beneath them will be bared to shield the old flag. The infantry are clashing now, but this line of stout hearts stands firm. The traitor hosts grow desperate; the earth trembles; the sun is hid behind the wrathful smoke, but amid all the deafening battle elements of the darkened field, the flag and its defenders stand. Down beneath its shadow brave men are falling to close their eyes in glory. The storm still increases in its sweeping power. About five o'clock the issue becomes doubtful; each seems to hold the balance, and like Napoleon at Waterloo, who prayed that night or Blucher would come, so we prayed that night or the army of Ohio would come. About this time, Albert Sidney Johnson poured out his life-blood upon the altar of a vain ambition. At that fatal hour the enemy's lines waver, and the sun goes down with the army of the Tennessee standing victorious on their last great line.

Night comes, and with it Buell comes, but only in time to witness the closing scene on Sunday evening. We thanked God for the arrival of the army of the Ohio, but we never thanked God for Don Carlos Buell when he rode across the Tennessee and spoke lightly of the great Grant, who had successfully stemmed the wildest storm of battle that ever rolled upon the American continent.

The sable curtains have now fallen, closing to our eyes the terrible scene. Soon it commences to rain. Dark, dark night for the army of the Tennessee. Many brave men are sleeping silently. They have fought their last battle. Fearful, desolating war has done a desperate work. Noble men have thrown themselves into the dread ordeal, and passed away. The human pen will fail to picture the battle-field of Shiloh as it presented itself on Sunday night. The Seventh, tired and almost exhausted, drops down on the ground, unmindful of the falling rain, to rest themselves. Ere it was noon some of the Seventh had already lain down to rest, and ere it was night others laid down, but it was an eternal rest-the soldier's last slumber. Disastrous war has wrapped its winding sheet around the cold form of many a fond mother's boy, and before many days there will be weeping in the lonely cottage homes; weeping for the loved and lost who are now sleeping beneath the tall oaks on the banks of the Tennessee. About the noble men of the Seventh who fell to-day, we will speak hereafter; we shall not forget them. How could we forget them, when they have played their part so well in the great tragedy?

SOURCES: Daniel Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, p. 49-54

Friday, May 8, 2020

From Rosecrans’Army.

We have just been permitted to peruse a letter from John Bartholomew, of this city, who is a member of the battery connected with the 19th Illinois infantry, now with Rosecrans’ army. His letter is dated at the camp on Elk river, July 8th. He states that the march to that point from Tullahoma was a very hard one, through mud and rain. He says Bragg’s army is completely whipped, and would have been caught entire had it not been for the rain and mud. Several thousand were taken, and they come in every day to give themselves up, saying they are tired of the war and have come to the conclusion that their cause is a hopeless one. Rosecrans’ army was waiting for the supply train before moving forward.

SOURCE: Muscatine Weekly Journal, Muscatine, Iowa, Friday, July 24, 1863, p. 3

Saturday, October 12, 2019

Andrew Hickenlooper, Sr., April 11, 1862

Pittsburgh, Tenn., April 11th, 1862.

My Dear Family:—Andy and father are both well, which you will be glad to hear. We both went through a severe ordeal on the bloody field of battle on last Sunday and Monday, from 6:00 A. M. until dark of both days, and a bloody field it was.

Poor Andy acted gallantly all the time, and lost two of his guns, a large portion of his horses and all his personal effects, papers, etc. He has no clothing but that he has on his back, as all our camps fell into the hands of the enemy. Our forces were gradually driven back about four miles to less than a mile from the river.

About 4:00 P. M., on Sunday, all appeared lost, and it seemed to me it was Bull Run over again. While many gallant men freely shed their blood for their country, a large portion—say, 10,000—ingloriously fled back to the river, and no entreaties could prevail upon them to return. They sheltered themselves under the steep hillside next the river, where they were out of the range of shot and shell.

Colonel Taylor, early on Sunday morning, detailed a Lieutenant and a portion of his command to act as a bodyguard to General Grant, and I was one of the number. We continuously rode along the line of battle, through the hottest of their fire, for the whole distance of about five miles. The battlefield was about as large as a township in Ohio, say five or six miles square, and a greater part of it wild forest land with thick underbrush, and occasionally a small field of cleared land.

Andy had fifty-nine horses killed in their harness, all within a few minutes of each other. I was at his camp yesterday; his battery wagon has two six-pounder shot and sixty-five grape and canister shot through it, and is shattered all to pieces.

Strange to say, I have never been able to see Andy since the battle, although I have all the time hunted for him, and I know he is well.

The last time I saw him was on Sunday, in the forenoon, on the field of battle. He was riding a white horse, whose back, neck and forelegs were all covered with blood, it having received three bullets in its neck without killing it. As we were all driven from our camps, and had to rally where we could, it was impossible to find each other.

I never tasted anything but a few picked-up crackers to eat from early on Sunday morning until Tuesday morning; stood both nights in the rain and mud, protected only by my jacket, all of my clothing having been stolen while we were absent from our camp — my overcoat and poncho with the rest.

About 4 or 5 p. M., when all seemed lost, General Buell's forces appeared upon the opposite side of the river, crossed over as fast as they could, and moved up the hill right into action, which changed the fate of the battle.

Although hostilities were renewed early in the morning, and fought obstinately all day, we gradually and steadily drove them back a distance of six miles, when, about noon, they were completely routed and abandoned the field. It was too late to pursue them far, and the next morning they were beyond our reach, and we got back into our camp.

Many of the dead are not yet (Friday morning, the 11th) buried, and many never will be. Of the number killed and wounded I have no means of estimating; it must, however, be very large, as the field of battle was heavily timbered, and five or six miles square, and twice fought over, with dead scattered everywhere.

From what I saw of the field of battle yesterday I never want to contemplate another.

Your husband and father,
A. HlCKENLOOPER.

SOURCE: W. H. Chamberun, A. M. Van Dyke & George A. Thayer, Editors, Sketches of War History, 1861-1865: Papers Read Before the Ohio, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Vol. 5, p. 435-6

Wednesday, October 2, 2019

Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant to Julia Dent Grant, February 24, 1862

Fort Donelson, Feb. 24th 1862.
DEAR JULIA,

I have just returned from Clarkesville.  Yesterday some citizens of Nas[h]ville came down there ostensibly to bring surgeons to attend their wounded at that place but in reality no doubt to get assurances that they would not be molested.  Johns[t]on with his army of rebels have fallen back about forty miles south from Nashville,1 leaving the river clear to our troops  To-day a Division of Gen. Buells Army reported to me for orders.  As they were on Steamers I ordered them immediately up to Nashville.2  “Secesh” is now about on its last legs in Tennessee.  I want to push on as rapidly as possible to save hard fighting.  These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who loose no friends but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible.  The way to avoid it is to push forward as vigorously as possible.

Gen. Halleck is clearly the same way of thinking and with his clear head I think the Congressional Committee for investigating the Conduct of the war will have nothing to enquire about in the West.

I am writing you in great haste a boat being about leaving here.  I will write you often to make up for the very short letters I send.

Give my love to all at home and write frequently.  Tell me all about the children.  I want to see rascal Jess already.  Tell May she must write to me often.  Kiss the Children for me and the same for yours[elf]

ULYS.
_______________

1 Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
2 See Letter to Brig. Gen. William Nelson, Feb. 24, 1862.

SOURCE: John Y. Simon & William M. Ferraro, Editors The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 4: January 8-March 31, 1862, p. 284

Saturday, February 9, 2019

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 126. Reports of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations November 22-29 and December 15-16, 1864

No. 126.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, commanding
Third Division, of operations November 22-29 and December 15-16, 1864.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,                      
Columbia, Tenn., December 29, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements and engagements of this division from the 22d to the 29th of November ultimo, inclusive:

On the morning of the 22d of November, in accordance with orders received from headquarters Army of the Ohio, I moved the division from Pulaski to Lynnville, and, in view of the report that the enemy were in force at Lawrenceburg, placed Reilly's brigade upon commanding ground on the west of the village and of Lynn Branch, covering the Lawrenceburg road. Henderson's and Casement's brigades were placed north of the village, also on the west side of the turnpike. Wagner's division, of the Fourth Corps, which followed my command and reported to me by order of the major-general commanding, I put in position on the south and southwest of the place, the whole force forming a semicircle, resting upon the turnpike north and south of the village, and all the roads being held by outposts and chains of vedettes. Nothing was seen of the enemy except that on the morning of the 23d a reconnoitering party of cavalry approached on the Lawrenceburg road and captured two men of Reilly's brigade, who were, without authority, beyond the pickets. The commanding general arrived in person about noon of the 23d, and I received orders to move my division toward Columbia about ten miles, so as to cover the crossing of the Columbia pike by the Mount Pleasant and Shelbyville road. The division was immediately put in motion and reached the point designated at dusk and went into camp. Casement's brigade being in advance was put in position with its right resting upon commanding ground near the junction of the roads, and Henderson's and Reilly's brigades being respectively on the left. Nothing was seen of the enemy, though reports were received that they were in force at Mount Pleasant, nine miles distant, and moving toward Columbia.

November 24, at 4 a.m., received orders to move at once with my division to Columbia, and to cover that place during the concentration of the army there, the enemy being reported to be pushing our cavalry rapidly back on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike. The division was immediately put in motion, Reilly's brigade in advance, followed by Henderson's, and Casement's brigade bringing up the rear, covering the train. At a point two miles from Columbia I determined to take a cross-road intersecting the Mount Pleasant pike one mile and a half from the former town, and, marching the head of the column rapidly, reached the last-named turnpike just as the cavalry brigade, commanded by Colonel Capron, reached the same point in hasty retreat before a very superior force of the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, who had been pressing them hard for several miles. This was at 7 a.m. l ordered Reilly's brigade into position on the right (west) of the turnpike, throwing forward the One hundredth Ohio Volunteers to the bank of Bigby Creek (a small stream crossing the road at that place, and at the time not easily fordable), to support a strong line of skirmishers and check the enemy's advance during the formation of the division. Henderson's brigade was put in position on the left of the turnpike, in two lines — the first, an advanced line, at Mrs. Wilson's house, on the first plateau above Bigby Creek, and the second on the continuation of a considerable ridge farther in rear and connected with Reilly's line on the right of the road. Casement's brigade, coming up a little later, was placed on the left of Henderson's, on the ridge, an excellent position, stretching nearly to the Pulaski pike (see topographical sketch accompanying).1 The batteries of the command, under Capt. G. J. Cockerill, acting chief of artillery, were posted as follows: Cockerill's battery (Battery D, First Ohio Light Artillery on the right of the Mount Pleasant pike and at the left of Reilly's brigade, Wilber's battery (Twenty-third Indiana Battery) on a knoll between Henderson's and Casement's brigades, and Harvey's battery (the Fifteenth Indiana Battery) at the left of Casement's line. The enemy pushed in vigorously, and a lively skirmish ensued, which continued most of the forenoon, but they did not succeed in crossing Bigby Creek. Capron's cavalry, by my order, rallied at the rear and then took position upon Reilly's right, covering that flank of the whole line. About 10 a.m. the head of column of the Fourth Corps reached Columbia, and they began to go into position upon the left of this division, Whitaker's brigade of that corps relieving Casement's, which was brought down to the right till its right flank rested on the Mount Pleasant pike, relieving in its turn the second line of Henderson's, which was advanced to the support of the first line of that brigade, thus giving stronger reserves upon the turnpike, which seemed to be the principal line of the enemy's operations. Harvey's battery (Fifteenth Indiana) was brought over to the right and placed, one section near the center and the other at the right of Reilly's brigade. The One hundredth Ohio Volunteer Infantry was relieved from its position in support of the skirmish line at Bigby Creek by the Sixty-fifth Illinois Volunteers, of Casement's brigade. Toward evening portions of the Second Division of this corps came into position on the right of Reilly's brigade, and the cavalry was withdrawn.

On the following morning (the 25th) no force of the enemy was visible in our front, but a reconnaissance sent forward on the Mount Pleasant pike at about four miles from the town met their cavalry again advancing, and supported by heavy columns of infantry, which proved to be the main body of Hood's army. Our whole line was strengthened by a good breast-work of timber and earth, with abatis and other impediments to an attack. The bridges over the Bigby Creek were taken up, but that stream was rapidly falling and was already fordable nearly everywhere. The enemy advanced cautiously, but with considerable determination. An advanced line of our skirmishers beyond the creek were driven back at the pike, though they were still kept out on the right, where the creek approaches nearer to our line of breast-works. Several batteries were put in position opposite us, and under cover of the artillery fire an attempt was made to advance along the turnpike, which, however, was easily repulsed. The Sixty-fifth Illinois Volunteers, in support of the skirmish line, had erected a barricade of rails near the creek, but upon the enemy turning the fire of his artillery upon them the regiment was withdrawn into a slight hollow in rear of their left, leaving a heavy skirmish line in their barricade. The enemy's cannonade was returned from our batteries, which at an early hour in the afternoon silenced those of the rebels and caused them to withdraw both their artillery and the infantry supports out of range. The skirmish fire along the creek was continued until dark. Our losses were trifling, amounting to casualties in all, for the particulars of which reference is made to the lists forwarded herewith. At evening I received orders from the major-general commanding to remove two brigades and the artillery of my command during the night to the north bank of the Duck River, and to take position covering the ford (where the pontoon then was), one brigade, with the whole skirmish line, to remain in the present position, whilst the remainder of the army should take up an inner and shorter line within the town. This movement to be made after the Fourth Corps should have gotten into position on the new line. I accordingly ordered Henderson's brigade to remain in support of the skirmish line and the remainder of the command to be in readiness for the proposed movement during the night. At 12.30, notice being received that the Fourth Corps was in position and the road clear, the brigades of General Reilly and Colonel Casement, with the batteries and baggage train, were put in motion and passed over the river by the pontoon bridge, which was then removed to a point two miles farther down the stream and in rear of the new line occupied in and at the right of the town. The weather, which had been clear since leaving Pulaski, now changed to rain.

At daybreak of the 26th I rapidly reconnoitered the ground on the north of the river, and found that the ford is situated at the extreme southern point of a bend of the river, inclosing a long narrow tongue of land, which is almost everywhere commanded by the hills and bluffs on the southern bank, one of the most commanding of which is crowned by a stone fort, at that time within the line occupied by our troops. The southern point of the tongue of land is entirely bare of trees or other cover, and is from fifteen to twenty feet lower than the banks immediately opposite, the river being here not quite 200 feet wide. A little farther north the ground rises slightly, till, at a distance of from 600 to 800 yards from the ford, a ridge traverses the bend, crossing it in a curved line, which is about as high as the hills on the opposite side, except a range of two or three, including that upon which the fort is situated. Upon this ridge is situated the house of Mrs. Brown (see topographical sketch).1 In rear of the ridge the ground is again depressed, and the whole distance across the tongue is in plain view of and commanded by the ground on the opposite banks of the river. Still farther to the rear, and about a mile distant from the ridge last described, is another ridge or chain of hills nearly at right angles to the Franklin pike and affording a good defensible position. The house of Mrs. Porter is upon this ridge (see sketch)1 Rutherford's Creek, a deep, difficult stream, crosses the Franklin pike two miles from Mrs. Porter's, and by a circuitous course runs into the Duck River about a mile below the ford. The examination of the ground showing that the only tenable position in the bend of the river was the ridge on which Mrs. Brown's house is situated, I ordered Reilly's brigade to occupy that ridge from Mrs. Brown's to the turnpike, and Casement's on the left of the turnpike. Wilber's battery was put in position in the center of Reilly's position, and the other two batteries left in reserve at Casement's position, epaulements being constructed to cover them, facing both east and south, on Casement's line as well as upon Reilly's. The troops were ordered to intrench themselves, and rifle-pits for a strong skirmish line were dug along the margin of the river, taking especial pains to make as much cover for sharpshooters as possible opposite the ford. The Eighth Tennessee Volunteers, of Reilly's brigade (a small regiment numbering less than 200 men), was placed as a reserve for the skirmishers in a small depression a little in rear of the ford, where their flanks were covered by the nature of the ground and their front by a breast-work. During the 26th these preparations were continued without interruption, the skirmish lines not being withdrawn from the old positions on the south of the river. An attack was made upon Colonel Henderson's line, upon the Mount Pleasant pike, but was repulsed and the original lines maintained until night of the next day, 27th, when the whole command was moved by the major-general commanding to the north side of the river.

At daybreak of the 28th the enemy occupied the town, and immediately lined the banks of the river with skirmishers and sharpshooters and opened a lively fire. They also placed several batteries in position and opened fire upon our lines. In addition to the earth-works above mentioned I had on the day before caused good cover for a battery to be made on the farm road leading from Mrs. Brown's to the ford, and also immediately in front of Mrs. Brown's house. In the first of these I placed one section of Harvey's battery, and the other section of the same battery was put in the work at Mrs. Brown's. Our skirmishers, having the advantage of rifle-pits previously prepared, found no difficulty during this day in maintaining their ground, though the cross and plunging fire upon them made their position a trying one. In artillery practice the rifled guns of Cockerill's and Harvey's batteries proved more than a match for the rebel guns, which seemed mostly light 12-pounder smooth guns, and none of the enemy's batteries were able to maintain a position, though they shifted their ground and kept up a fire at intervals throughout the day. During the morning the Fourth Corps took position on the ridge at my rear (on which Mrs. Porter's house is). and the two wings of that command reaching the river, right and left, covered the flanks of this division, and prevented the enemy from annoying me by a flank fire. Soon after noon Henderson's brigade reported (Col. I. N. Stiles temporarily in command, on account of sickness of Colonel Henderson), and was placed on the right of Reilly's, beyond Mrs. Brown's house, and somewhat recurred, so that the whole division was now formed in a crescent upon the ridge before described.

Early in the morning of the 29th I was notified by the major-general commanding that the report that the enemy was crossing Duck River in force several miles above, made it necessary to withdraw most of the Fourth Corps from its position, and I received orders to hold the bend of the river and prevent the rebels from crossing or laying a pontoon bridge till evening. The enemy had used the night in making rifle-pits and other shelter for troops along the river-bank, and succeeded in getting a battery in position where it enfiladed the line of rifle-pits for our skirmishers near the ford and old bridge-head, making it impossible for the men to remain in them or in the open ground at the extreme point of the tongue of land in the bend. I thereupon ordered Brigadier-General Reilly, commanding First Brigade, to establish a new line as far forward as it was possible to obtain cover, and give it such supports as to prevent any enemy from forming above the bank of the river, still keeping the men in the old positions on the right and left, where they could command the approaches to the river on the opposite side. He accordingly ordered the Twelfth and Sixteenth Kentucky Volunteers to occupy the open timber down to the edge of the cleared ground, in irregular open order, using the trees for shelter. These regiments occupied this position through the day, and by a well-directed fire foiled all efforts of the enemy to bring down to the river or launch pontoons until late in the afternoons. A brisk cannonade was kept up on both sides at intervals during the day, the enemy striving to establish batteries sufficiently far up and down the river to take our positions in reverse, but were foiled by the very active use made of his guns by Captain Cockerill, chief of artillery, and the superior practice of our gunners. The enemy in the town (since learned to be Lee's corps, with the whole artillery park of Hood's army) made redoubled efforts to force a crossing as the afternoon advanced, and about 4 o'clock succeeded in getting several pontoon boats down to the water. With these, sheltered by the steep banks of the river and covered by a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, they ferried over a considerable force, which made an effort to form and charge into the open wood where the two Kentucky regiments were posted. As soon, however, as they showed themselves on the open ground they were met with a severe and galling fire, which soon drove them for shelter under the river-bank. Colonel Stiles promptly moved forward the Sixty-third Indiana and the One hundred and twelfth Illinois, of his brigade, to support the right of those advanced regiments, and the enemy finding it impossible to clear the wood by his fire from the south bank, so as to enable his detachment to reform, withdrew them, and made no further effort to cross whilst we remained in the position.

Owing to the advantage taken of every natural and artificial means of shelter for the men, the casualties in the division did not reach 100, although the command was during the whole day under severe concentric fire from all parts of the enemy's line, which was semicircular and exterior to ours. For details of the casualties reference is made to the lists forwarded herewith. From reports of prisoners I am satisfied the enemy's loss was very much greater than our own.

One of the brass guns of Wilber's battery was struck by a solid shot near the trunnion and disabled. No other accident occurred to the artillery.

At dark I received orders to move the division to Spring Hill, leaving the skirmish line with proper supports out until midnight, when it should follow the command. The Twelfth and Sixteenth Kentucky regiments were accordingly left as they were, supporting the skirmishers. Major Dow, assistant inspector-general on my staff, together with the brigade inspectors, being also left to direct the rallying and bringing off of the detachments, and the remainder of the command marched at 7 o'clock for Spring Hill passing the First and Third Divisions of the Fourth Corps on the road. At Spring Hill I received orders to proceed in advance of the army to Franklin without delay, and marched forward, reaching Franklin an hour before dawn on the 30th, having marched over twenty miles since 7 o'clock of the evening preceding.

I have omitted to mention that one regiment of Casement's brigade, One hundred and twenty-fourth Indiana Volunteers, was, on the 28th, detached as an outpost at Rutherford's Creek, on the Franklin pike, and on the 29th was doing picket duty on roads coming into that pike between the creek and Spring Hill. One company, by order of the major-general commanding, reported to Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, for similar duty. The remainder of the regiment reported to the brigade again as we marched to Spring Hill, but the one company has not since been heard from, and is supposed to have been captured from some misunderstanding as to relieving it.

The pickets left at Duck River remained till midnight and were then safely withdrawn, except Lieutenant Sherbondy and ten men of the One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers, who are missing and are supposed to have lost their way in the wood on the extreme right, where they were posted.

The march from Duck River to Franklin was made in the most perfect order; the men, knowing they were moving near the enemy's positions, kept well closed up, and I cannot learn that any were lost by straggling or falling out on the road. The roll-calls at Franklin next morning showed the whole command accounted for, except those referred to above.

Besides expressing my high sense of the services performed by the commandants of brigades during the very trying day and night of the 29th, I beg leave to make special mention of Capt. Giles J. Cockerill, Battery D, First Ohio Light Artillery, my chief of artillery, and of Maj. Tris. T. Dow, One hundred and twelfth Illinois Volunteers, acting assistant inspector-general of the division--the former for his brilliant handling of the batteries of the command during the day and the latter for his admirable performance of the delicate duty in charge of the skirmish line, left on duty and withdrawn at midnight, several hours after the rest of the command had marched.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,     
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of the Ohio.
_______________

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,                      
Columbia, Tenn., December 25, 1864.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the battle of Nashville on the 15th and 16th instant:

On the evening of the 14th I received orders to withdraw the division before daylight next morning from the line of works crossing the Franklin turnpike in front of Nashville, including Fort Negley and the fortified hill at Block-House Casino, and upon their place being supplied by troops of Major-General Steedman's command, to march to the Hillsborough pike and form as a support to the Fourth Corps, Brigadier-General Wood commanding. My picket-line was ordered to be left in position until relieved by General Steedman. Accordingly, at 5.30 a.m. on the 16th [15th], I withdrew the command from the works, massing them behind the hill slopes in rear from 100 to 200 yards. The picket-line was left under command of Major Baker, Sixty-fifth Indiana Volunteers, division field officer of the day. At 7 a.m. the line was partially occupied by General Cruft's division, of General Steedman's command, and the First Brigade, Col. C. C. Doolittle, Eighteenth Michigan Volunteers, temporarily commanding, with the Third Brigade, Col. I. N. Stiles, Sixty-third Indiana Volunteers, temporarily commanding, and Battery D, First Ohio Light Artillery, were marched to the Hillsborough pike. A lively demonstration along the left, leading to a rapid artillery firing from the right of the enemy's line, with some appearance of an advance on their part, led me to order the Second Brigade, Col. J. S. Casement, One hundred and third Ohio Volunteers, commanding, to remain temporarily in support of General Cruft's line, which was very light. This fact was reported to the major-general commanding, who approved the order and farther ordered the Twenty-third Indiana Battery to remain at Casino Block-House, which was done. The two brigades and battery were moved to the Hillsborough pike under cover of a fog, which concealed the movement from the enemy, and were formed one brigade on each side of the road in column of battalions massed, the battery on the road in rear. In this formation the command was gradually advanced as the Fourth Corps advanced, until about 1 p.m., when I received orders from the commanding general to bring up Casement's brigade and move the division, by the rear of General A. J. Smith's command, to the extreme right of the forces engaged with the enemy. The command was moved by the flank, Colonel Doolittle's brigade in advance, by a country road leading diagonally from the Hillsborough toward the Hardin pike, about two miles, thence curving more to the left as the right wing of the army swung forward, about two miles farther, till we reached and crossed the Hillsborough pike again at a point about five miles and a half distant from Nashville, and near where the turnpike enters the high range of hills connected with the Brentwood Heights. During the last mile of the march the brigades moved in parallel lines, the right flanks being equally advanced, and the artillery on the right rear of the division, so that by fronting each brigade a column of brigades would be formed, and that we might be in hand to support the lines engaged close in rear of which we were moving.

After crossing the Hillsborough pike, facing eastwardly, and passing the first range of hills, we came up in rear of General Couch's (Second) division, of this corps, who, with the dismounted cavalry, was engaged with the enemy upon a somewhat low, round-topped hill, one of two overlooking the Granny White pike, and immediately north of a high conical hill held by the left flank of the enemy's forces. I here received orders from the major-general commanding to support General Couch, and accordingly formed the First and Second Brigades (Doolittle's and Casement's) in double line each, Doolittle on the right, and advanced them into the valley in our front. Stiles' brigade (Third) was pushed to the right upon the crest of a very high rocky ridge commanding the ground beyond the right of the brigades advanced, and the battery was halted upon the hill last crossed. At about 4 p.m. General Couch reported a considerable force of the enemy passing toward his right and threatening the flank of Mehringer's brigade of his division, which was detached some 600 yards from the right of the line. I immediately advanced Doolittle's brigade to the right and Casement's to the left of Mehringer's command, swinging the right forward to occupy a subordinate ridge in the angle of high hills (see sketch accompanying) skirting our right flank. A sharp attack was here made by the enemy, which was repulsed, the fighting, however, lasting until dark. Soon after dark General Couch withdrew Mehringer's brigade from the position referred to above, and deeming it very important to hold the line occupied, I ordered the two brigades to be deployed in single line and to throw up breast-works along the ridge they held, which formed a crochet, advanced nearly at right angles to the line of Couch's division, threatening the enemy's flank and facilitating further movements by the right around the connected chain of hills, of which Stiles' brigade occupied the first prominent one. Stiles was also ordered to intrench the hill held by him, and owing to the valley (a very soft cornfield intersected by a brook) being impassable for artillery, the battery was put in position on the continuation to the left of the ridge occupied by Stiles' brigade. The positions were inspected and approved by the major-general commanding, and I received orders to be prepared for offensive movements at daylight.

At about 3 a.m. of the 16th I received notice from General Couch that in closing up his lines to the left a gap of some 300 yards was opened between his position and mine at the base of the hill last carried on the evening previous. At the same time I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding stating that a division from General A. J. Smith's command would report before daylight to support me. I therefore ordered one regiment (Sixty-fifth [Sixty-third?] Indiana) of Stiles brigade to be withdrawn from the position occupied by that brigade and put in on the right of General Couch, connecting with and extending the line of the Second Division, intrenching there, and leaving whatever gap might remain in the low ground at the angle of the two lines. This was done before daylight.

At 6 a.m. Colonel Moore reported with five regiments and a battery of the Seventeenth Corps, numbering in all about 1,600 men. I directed three regiments to relieve Stiles' brigade in the works constructed by them during the night, and the remaining two, with the artillery, to be held in reserve on the ridge farther to the left, where my own battery had been left. I then ordered Colonel Stiles to push his brigade forward and occupy the next of the series of hills beyond our right and intrench the commanding ground upon it, from which he could, in some measure, protect the right of Colonel Doolittle's brigade (which was refused) from assault on that flank. The enemy had been heard chopping during the whole night along the high conical hill in the re-entrant of our line and upon the ridges farther toward our right. At daylight the line of their works was apparent upon ground very considerably higher than that of Casement's and Doolittle's brigades, and early in the morning General Couch notified me that a heavy column of the enemy was passing partially in view across his front toward our right. The major-general commanding, who was on the ground when the information arrived, ordered that part of my line to be held tenaciously, whilst Stiles' brigade should be prepared to second the movement of dismounted cavalry toward the enemy's position from the Hillsborough pike, beyond my right flank. Lively artillery and skirmish fire was kept up during the day, and numerous efforts made by the enemy to dislodge Casement and Doolittle by pushing past their right along the high ridge leading to the Hillsborough pike.

The nature of the ground enabled us to baffle these attempts by throwing forward strong supports for the skirmish lines until about 4 p.m., when the cavalry on the extreme right having pushed past the enemy's left flank a general advance was ordered. I directed accordingly that Stiles' brigade should advance vigorously past the line of Doolittle's right upon the high wooded ridge, keeping pace with the dismounted cavalry beyond him and with Doolittle's brigade on his left. The latter was ordered to assault the salient on his front as soon as the conical hill in front of Major-General Smith's left should be carried, and Casement was ordered to move to the right and occupy Doo-little's works, supporting him and Stiles when they advanced. About 4.30 General Smith's line was seen to reach the summit of the conical hill, and Doolittle was ordered to charge. This he did in the most gallant manner, the Twelfth Kentucky Volunteers having the lead and charging the salient and battery in their front. The enemy was manifestly disconcerted. Their fire was too high, and did no injury to our troops as they scaled the rocky hill. Stiles was promptly up, and as the whole line went forward the enemy broke in confusion, making the best of their way across the hills toward the Franklin pike. Four guns (light 12's) were captured in the salient; four others were taken a little to the left in the depression of the hills. These last were subsequently claimed by McArthur's division, of Smith's command, but the evidence appended to the report of Colonel Doolittle leaves no doubt that they were fairly captured by his brigade. Between 200 and 300 prisoners were also taken. The line of our advance being perpendicular to the Granny White pike, and Major-General Smith's being along and parallel to it, we met his troops at the pike, and to avoid confusion I ordered the division to halt. The major-general commanding coming up immediately directed us to bivouac for the night, as the roads were occupied by other columns moving in pursuit. Doolittle's brigade remained on the ridge it had carried, overlooking the Granny White pike; Stiles was in bivouac on the next slope to the right, and Casement in reserve in the works erected by Doolittle's brigade on the preceding right.

Reports of brigades and lists of casualties are forwarded herewith.2

J. D. COX,     
Brigadier.General, Commanding.
Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of the Ohio.
_______________

Sketch To Accompany Report Of 3d Division 23d Army Corps, of
The Battle Of Nashville,
Showing Operations Of The Evening Of The 15th And Of The 16th December, 1864.
  


EXPLANATION.

Double lines show position of Rebel Forces.
Single lines those of the U.S. Forces.
No. 1.—Position of Casement's and Doolittle's Brigades, first deployed evening of 15th.
No. 2.—Is first position taken up by Stiles' Brigade.
No. 3.—Position of Casement and Doolittle intrenched on night of 15th.
No. 4.—Is second position taken up by Stiles on morning of 16th.
No. 5.—Is position taken by Col. Moore with detachment of 17th Corps, besides occupying Stiles' first line, and also of Cockerill's Battery "D," 1st Ohio.
No. 6.—Is position of Couch's Division, 23d Corps, and of one regiment of Stiles' Brigade.
No. 7.—Position of Cavalry advancing dismounted on 16th.
Nos. 8 and 9.—Position of Doolittle's and Stiles' Brigades on night of 16th.
The dotted line shows the line of advance on the afternoon of the 15th.
_______________

ADDENDA.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,                      
Nashville, Tenn., December 2, 1864.

MAJOR : I have the honor to forward the following approximate statement of casualties in this command during the battle of the 30th ultimo:

Report of casualties in Third Division, Twenty-third Army Corps,
at Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864.

Command.
Officers.
Men.
Aggregate.
K
W
M
T
K
W
M
T
Headquarters
1


1




1
First Brigade.
7
8
1
16
27
113
72
212
228
Second Brigade.

1

1
3
16
3
22
23
Third Brigade
3
5
1
9
7
42
20
69
78
Total
11
14
2
27
37
171
95
303
330

[K = Killed, W = Wounded, M = Missing & T =Total]

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,                 
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio.
_______________

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,                      
Nashville, Tenn., December 3, 1864.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland:

GENERAL: I have the honor of calling to your notice the conspicuous gallantry and meritorious conduct of Col. Emerson Opdycke, commanding a brigade in General Wagner's division, Fourth Corps, in the battle of the 30th ultimo.

In the early part of the engagement a portion of the Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, was somewhat disordered by misunderstanding the purpose of retiring through the lines of the two brigades of Wagner's division, which had been engaged in advance. It was at this time that Opdycke's brigade was lying in reserve on the Columbia pike, and being called upon, he led them forward in the most brilliant manner, charging the advancing rebels and restoring the continuity of our lines, which were not again disordered in the slightest degree. Colonel Opdycke's promptness and courage deserve official notice, and as I was commanding the line at that time I deem it my duty to bring the facts to your attention, the more especially as he does not belong to my division.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. D. COX,                 
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
_______________

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,                      
Nashville, December 3, 1864.
 Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio:

MAJOR: I have reports of twenty battle-flags and standards captured from the rebels by my division during the fight of the 30th, and am confident, after investigation, that the number is accurately stated. I have only eleven, however, to send to headquarters. These are now in General Reilly's possession, and will be forwarded this morning. The men have a passion for tearing them into bits to send home as relics, and in spite of orders have thus destroyed nine. I cannot give any satisfactory approximation as to the prisoners taken; all that I saw came in on the left of the Columbia pike, where my division was posted; but I am unwilling to make any claim to definite numbers, nor do I think it important that I should do so. I ordered all prisoners turned over to the provost-guards of either corps indiscriminately, and those officers can best report how many they have.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 J. D. COX,                
 Brigadier-General, Commanding.
_______________

1 See Plate CV, Map 4 of the Atlas.
2 Casualties embodied in table, p. 100.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 399-410

Monday, July 30, 2018

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 100. — Report of Maj. Gen. Darius N Couch, U S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

No. 100.

Report of Maj. Gen. Darius N Couch, U S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations December 15-16, 1864.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,      
Near Columbia, Tenn., December 28, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to the orders of the major-general commanding the Army of the Ohio, this division moved from the line it occupied in the intrenchments at Nashville at 7.30 a.m. December 15, upon being relieved by the troops of General Steedman, and took position in rear of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's corps, on the Hardin pike. At 1 p.m. advanced to within supporting distance of Smith's troops, then engaged. Soon, after was directed by General Schofield to push forward to the right of the former officer's line and engage the enemy. The division marched rapidly nearly two miles, swinging around at a right angle to the east, crossing the Granny White pike at 2.45 p.m., in line of battle by brigades, in the order of Cooper, Moore, and Mehringer. Passing Smith's extreme right more than half a mile, Cooper, assisted by a few hundred dismounted cavalry, charged a high knob held by the rebels with infantry and three guns, carrying it most gallantly. Moore, swinging to the left, aided in taking a stone wall which flanked my position. In the meantime Mehringer, having been thrown to the right and front to occupy a piece of woods, then received the attack of a rebel column, which he completely repulsed in thirty minutes. A brigade of General Cox's division was sent to support him, but it did not have occasion to go into action. The Fifteenth Indiana Battery followed the division and used its guns with good effect until night. My line was fortified after dark, including the knob previously referred to, which proved to be a point of vital importance to our success on the following day. On the 16th Wilson's Nineteenth Ohio Battery was brought on the field from the intrenchments of Nashville and held in reserve. Harvey at daylight occupied the knob fortified during the night. This battery was the only part of my command seriously engaged during the day, Cooper and Moore simply supporting General A. J. Smith in his advance on the enemy's lines from 2 to 3.30 p.m.

The division displayed great gallantry and dauntless courage throughout the action. Should I commend the officers and men by name I would not know where to stop.

The captures were 200 prisoners, 3 guns, and 2 stand of colors.

Appended please find reports of brigade commanders and lists of casualties.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. N. COUCH,          
Major-general.
 Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General Army of the Ohio.
_______________

* Nominal list (omitted) shows 1 officer and 10 men killed and 11 officers and 126 men wounded.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 369-70

Wednesday, June 6, 2018

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 96. — Report of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
Columbia, Tenn., December 31, 1864.

GENERAL: In accordance with the desire of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to report the operations of the troops under my command from the time of the separation of the Twenty-third Army Corps from the main army, under General Sherman, to the present time.

On the 30th of October, 1864, at Rome, Ga., I received the order of Major-General Sherman (inclosed herewith and marked A1, directing me to march with the Twenty-third Corps to Resaca, Ga., and report by telegraph to Major-General Thomas, then at Nashville, for further orders. I marched on the following day and arrived at Resaca on the 1st of November, reporting by telegraph to Major-General Thomas from Calhoun on the afternoon of the 31st of October.

At Calhoun, on the 1st of November, I received orders from Major-General Thomas (inclosed herewith and marked B2, directing me to move via Tullahoma to Pulaski, Tenn., which was subsequently changed, and I was ordered to move by way of Nashville and to send my wagon trains forward to Chattanooga. Accordingly the troops commenced to move as soon as the first railroad trains arrived, which was the 3d of November, but owing to delays in the railroads the last of the troops did not reach Nashville until the 9th of November. I arrived at Nashville in person on the 5th of November, and received the orders of the commanding general to go to Johnsonville instead of Pulaski, to repel an attack then being made on that place by a rebel force under Forrest. My advance (Colonel Gallup's brigade of the Second Division) reached Johnsonville on the night of the 5th of November, and found the enemy had already retreated. Upon reporting this fact to the commanding general I was ordered to leave at Johnsonville such portion of my command as was necessary for a strong defense of that place, and to repair with the remainder of my troops to Pulaski and assume command of all the troops in that vicinity. I left two brigades (General Cooper's and Colonel Gallup's) at Johnsonville, with instructions to strongly fortify the place according to plans furnished by the chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland; placed Colonel Strickland's brigade, Second Division, at Columbia, and the Third Division (General Cox's) about three miles north of Pulaski, the latter place being then occupied by the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding.

My instructions from the major-general commanding were embraced in the accompanying telegram (marked C3) to Major-General Stanley, a copy of which was furnished with the order to assume command at Pulaski, and subsequent dispatches, explaining that the object was to hold the enemy in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville, other troops in the Department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, and General Wilson's cavalry to be remounted and fitted for the field. The re-enforcements thus expected were about equal to the force we then had in the field, and would make our entire force, when concentrated, equal or somewhat superior to that of the enemy. To effect this concentration was, therefore, of vital importance — a consideration to which all others were secondary. This required that the enemy's advance should be delayed as much as possible, and, at the same time, a decisive battle avoided unless it could be fought on favorable terms.

I reached Pulaski on the night of the 13th, and assumed command on the 14th of November.

The following is my report of operations [dated December 7] from November 14 to December 1, 1864, when the troops under my command reached Nashville, which is made part of this report:

I assumed command at Pulaski on the 14th of November, 1864. The forces at and near that place were the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and General Cox's (Third) division, Twenty-third Army Corps; General Hatch's division and General Croxton's brigade of cavalry were in front of Pulaski, along Shoal Creek, and Colonel Capron's brigade was near Pulaski. My effective force was 18,000 infantry and four brigades of cavalry. The enemy, under General Hood, was lying about Florence, preparing for an aggressive movement. His force consisted of the old army of Northern Georgia, which had opposed General Sherman during the latter part of his operations, increased by such fragments as could be collected in Alabama and Mississippi, together with all of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's force was variously estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 infantry, and from 10,000 to 20,000 cavalry; the largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are most probably nearly accurate.

November 19, Hood commenced his advance via Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough toward Columbia. His advance reached Lawrenceburg and drove our cavalry from that place on the 22d. I sent all the public property from Pulaski to Columbia, and fell back to Lynnville, and then to Columbia. My advance (General Cox's division) reached that place on the morning of the 24th, just in time to beat back a large rebel force which was driving in General Capron's cavalry from Mount Pleasant. At Columbia I was re-enforced by one brigade and two regiments of General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Corps, the other half of that division having been sent, by order of the major-general commanding, to guard Centerville and other crossings of Duck River below Columbia.

The troops were put in position covering the pontoon bridge on the pike at Columbia and the railroad bridge two miles below. The position was much too extended for the troops I then had, but re-enforcements were expected daily, and it was essential to have that position from which to take the offensive when our force should become sufficiently large. Therefore I determined to hold it as long as possible. I also intrenched an interior line covering the railroad bridge, and short enough to be held by the Fourth Corps.

On the night of the 25th, finding that the enemy had his entire army in my front, and that he might without difficulty effect a crossing of Duck River above Columbia, I sent General Cox, with two brigades of his division, to the north bank to check any such movement, and General Ruger's troops to the railroad bridge to construct and occupy a small bridge-head at that point, and withdrew two divisions of General Stanley's corps to the interior line. General Wood's division and a brigade of General Cox's were left on the exterior line, and our picket line was maintained in its original position. At daylight in the morning the pontoon bridge was floated down the river and laid near the railroad bridge. In this way I hoped still to hold the south bank of the river until re-enforcements should arrive.

We succeeded in holding the outer line during the 26th and 27th against a heavy pressure. But the enemy did not assault, and it became evident that he intended to turn the position by crossing the river above. To hold the south bank longer would have hazarded the loss of the army. I therefore withdrew the whole force to the north bank during the night of the 27th, left General Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, General Cox in front of Columbia, and placed General Stanley in reserve on the Franklin pike, ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to force a crossing at any point near Columbia. The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General Ruger's infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade, to guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during the 28th, and I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of Duck River until re-enforcements should arrive. But I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a.m. on the 29th, that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike; and about daylight in the morning that his infantry was also crossing at Huey's Mill, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Franklin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat or strike me in flank near Duck River, or both. He had already forced a column of cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication between us. I therefore sent General Stanley, with a division of infantry, to Spring Hill to hold that point and cover the trains. General Cox was left in his position to hold the crossing at Columbia. Generals Wood and Kimball were put in line facing Huey's Mill, with a brigade thrown forward to reconnoiter, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the pike in rear of Rutherford's Creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed.

General Stanley reached Spring Hill with General Wagner's division just in time to drive off a body of rebel cavalry and save our trains, which were assembling at that place. Late in the afternoon a division of rebel infantry arrived and attacked. A severe engagement ensued, lasting until dark. General Stanley held his position, except that his right was pressed back so as to nearly uncover the Columbia road, and the enemy's cavalry got possession of the pike, both north and south of Spring Hill. The enemy worked steadily and persistently all day to force a crossing and lay a pontoon bridge at Columbia. This was essential to him, since his artillery could not be crossed at Huey's Mill. But General Cox firmly held his ground, although it was in the concave bend of the river and commanded from the opposite bank. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed with heavy loss. About 3 p.m. I became satisfied the enemy would not attack my position on Duck River, but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill. I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops after dark, and took General Ruger's troops and pushed for Spring Hill to reopen communication with General Stanley, and was followed at a short distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry at dark about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away without difficulty and reached Spring Hill about 7 o'clock.

General Whitaker's brigade, which followed General Ruger, was put in position parallel to the pike, and confronting the enemy's left, within 800 yards of the road, to cover the column as it passed, and I pushed on with General Ruger's division to clear the road at Thompson's Station, which had been occupied by a large body of the enemy's cavalry at dark that evening. On our arrival at Thompson's the enemy had disappeared, his camp-fires still burning, and General Ruger took possession of the cross-roads without opposition. I then returned to Spring Hill and met there the head of General Cox's column about midnight, he having withdrawn from in front of Columbia after dark. General Cox now took the advance and pushed rapidly for Franklin, the trains following under immediate guard of General Ruger, the men marching by the side of the wagons and General Stanley marching in rear of the trains. General Wagner's division held on at Spring Hill until near daylight, and then quietly withdrew and followed the column as rear guard. A small body of rebel cavalry made a dash upon the train a short distance north of Thompson's, and succeeded in destroying a few wagons and stampeding a few cattle; with this exception the whole column and trains arrived at Franklin without loss.

I arrived at Franklin with the head of column a little before daylight on the 30th, and found no wagon bridge for crossing the river and the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be prepared for crossing wagons, and had a foot bridge built for infantry, which fortunately also proved available for wagons, and used the fords as much as possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material, including the public property, and a large wagon train at Franklin, across the river, and move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to attack me. But I put the troops in position as they arrived on the south side, the Twenty-third Corps on the left and center, covering the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of General Wagner's division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved to the north bank of the river to cover the flanks should the enemy attempt to cross above or below.

The enemy followed close after our rear guard, brought up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held their ground too long and hence were compelled to come in at a run. In passing over the parapet they carried with them the troops of the line for a short space and thus permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get in. But the reserves near by instantly sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and captured those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently and continuously with his whole force from about 3.30 p.m. until after dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until about 10 p.m. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line of attack. The enemy attacked on a front of about two miles, extending from our left to our right center, General Kimball's left brigade. Our two right brigades were only slightly engaged. I believe the enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot have been less than 5,000, and may have been much greater. We captured 702 prisoners and 33 stand of colors.

Our loss, as officially reported, is as follows:


Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Aggregate.
Fourth Army Corps:




     First Division
5
37
18
60
     Second Division
52
519
670
1,241
     Artillery
10
51
6
67
Twenty-third Army Corps: 




     Second Division
30
142
135
307
     Third Division
48
185
97
330
72d Regiment Illinois Volunteers
10
62
86
158
44th Regiment Missouri Volunteers
34
37
92
163
     Total
189
1,033
1,104
2,326

I am not able at this time to give fully the names of the killed and wounded officers. Among the latter is Major-General Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps, who was severely wounded in the neck while gallantly urging forward his troops to regain the portion of our line which had been lost. General Stanley is deserving of special commendation, and has my hearty thanks for his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short but eventful campaign. Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily the Twenty-third Corps, deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and intrenched under his immediate direction, and the greater portion of the line engaged was under his command during the battle. I recommend General Cox to the special consideration of the Government. Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and that upon which the enemy's assaults were most persistent. He is entitled to very great credit. Brigadier-General Reilly, commanding (temporarily) the Third Division, Twenty-third Corps, maintained his lines with perfect firmness, and captured twenty battle-flags along his parapet. I am also under great obligations to the division commanders of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable manner in which they discharged every duty, and cannot refrain from expressing my high commendation, though in advance of the official report of their immediate commander. Col. Emerson Opdycke, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Army Corps, the reserve which recaptured the lost portion of our line, is spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having displayed on that occasion the highest qualities of a commander. I cordially indorse their recommendation. For other special instances of gallantry and good conduct I must refer to subordinate reports.

On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first information from General Wilson since the enemy commenced his advance from Duck River. I learned that he had been driven back and had crossed the Harpeth above Franklin on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear entirely open to the enemy's cavalry. By my direction he sent General Hatch's division forward again, on the Lewisburg pike, to hold Forrest in check until my trains and troops could reach Franklin. This was successfully done, and General Hatch then retired before a superior force, and recrossed the river, connecting with my infantry pickets on the north bank, early in the afternoon. A short time before the infantry attack commenced the enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the north bank, and moving toward Nashville. I sent General Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a brigade of General Wood's division to support him, if necessary. At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the enemy's infantry I received the most gratifying intelligence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the battle of the 30th I had ordered all trains except ammunition and hospital wagons to Nashville, preparatory to falling back from Franklin when it should become necessary, which I expected on the following day. The enemy having nearly double my force of infantry and quite double my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might take and seriously endanger my rear.

Only one division of the enemy's cavalry had been engaged with General Wilson during the 30th. The remaining three divisions were free to strike my line of communications, which they could easily do about Brentwood by daylight the next morning. My experience on the 29th had shown how utterly inferior in force my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was entirely without protection. I could not even rely upon getting up the ammunition necessary for another battle.

To remain longer at Franklin was to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving the enemy another chance to cut me off from re-enforcements, which he had made three desperate though futile attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and had succeeded in inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the primary object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to get re-enforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in the battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December. For these reasons, after consulting with the corps and division commanders, and obtaining your approval, I determined to retire during the night of the 30th toward Nashville. The artillery was withdrawn to the north bank during the early part of the night, and at 12 o'clock the army withdrew from its trenches and crossed the river without loss. During the next day, December 1, the whole army was placed in position in front of Nashville.

Information obtained since the above report was written, and principally since the reoccupation of Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's loss 1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hospitals in Franklin, and 702 prisoners, making 6,252 of the enemy placed hors de combat, besides the slightly wounded. The enemy's loss in general officers was very great, being 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. It is to be observed that more than half of our loss occurred in General Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps, which did not form part of the main line of defense. This loss arose in two brigades of that division from their remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had been accomplished, and after they should have taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdycke's) in its hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy over the portion of the parapet which had been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades. When it became apparent that we should have to fall back from Columbia, orders to rejoin the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the troops guarding the crossings of Duck River below Columbia at Centerville, both by myself and the major-general commanding, which were obeyed as soon as received, and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to delays in receiving his orders and the time necessary to concentrate his troops, General Cooper could not reach Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned his column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brentwood Hills by the Charlotte pike on the night of December 2, and again found the enemy between him and the army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived in safety on the 5th and rejoined my command on the 8th of December. General Cooper deserves great credit for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his retreat.

BATTLES OF THE 15TH AND 16TH OF DECEMBER IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE.

My command consisted of the Second and Third Divisions of the Twenty-third Army Corps, commanded, respectively, by Maj. Gen. D. N. Couch and Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox. The effective strength of each division was about 5,500 men. Previous to the battle the corps occupied the line of defense from Block House Casino to the Nolensville pike, including Fort Negley.

According to the plan of battle, as modified on the evening of the 14th, my troops were to be relieved by Major-General Steedman's at dawn of day in the morning, pass in rear of General Wood's corps, and take position in reserve near the right to support the attack on the enemy's left. The movement commenced at daylight as ordered. General Couch's division debouched from our works on the Hardin pike and formed in rear of General Smith's left, and General Cox's, save one brigade, by the Hillsborough pike, in rear of General Wood's right. General Cox's third brigade was left temporarily in his old works to support, if necessary, General Steedman, who was making a demonstration upon the enemy's right. As General Smith advanced against the enemy's position General Couch moved forward, keeping within supporting distance, while the proper position of General Cox, as reserve to the center, remained essentially unchanged. About 1 p.m. the major-general commanding, remarking that General Smith had borne more to our left than had been expected and had not reached the enemy's flank, ordered me to move my corps to the right of General Smith, attack the enemy's flank, and gain, if practicable, before dark, possession of a group of fortified hills near the Hillsborough pike, which formed the left of the enemy's position. I at once put my troops in motion, moving rapidly by the flank in rear of General Smith's line, rode forward and found General Smith near the right of his line, and informed him of the movement I was making. General Smith then put in his reserve, extending his line about half a mile to the right, and assisted General Hatch's cavalry (dismounted) in assaulting and carrying a high hill, covered by a redoubt, which proved to be a detached work commanding the Hillsborough pike and constituting the extreme flank of the enemy's infantry position, but not connected with  his main line of defense.

General Couch, whose head of column had by this time arrived opposite the right of General Smith's line, at once moved forward, deploying as he advanced, passed immediately by the right of the hill just carried and across the Hillsborough pike, crossed an open valley about half a mile in breadth, and swept by the enemy's artillery and carried the left of a series of hills parallel to and overlooking the Granny White pike, one of the enemy's only two lines of retreat. This assault was made by General Cooper's brigade, led by its brave commander, and was most gallantly executed. The enemy now moved a considerable force toward our right, with the evident design of turning our flank and recovering the position just lost. General Couch sent Colonel Mehringer's brigade, the only one he had disengaged, to meet this movement. Colonel Mehringer met the enemy, much superior to him in numbers, in the valley which General Couch had just passed, and held him in check until General Cox, who had just come up, sent two brigades, Colonel Doolittle's and Colonel Casement's, to his support, when the enemy was repulsed and driven back. The engagement here was sharp, attended with considerable loss on both sides, and lasted until dark. Immediately south of the hill carried by General Couch was a still higher one held by the enemy, without the possession of which his position north of Brentwood was untenable. I had ordered this hill to be carried immediately after the success of General Cooper's assault, but the counter attack made by the enemy occupied our whole available force until dark, and compelled us to rest with the success already gained. After dark the troops intrenched their position and bivouacked for the night.

BATTLE OF THE 16TH.

In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the right and right center forward so that the general direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the attack. Only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to re-enforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major-General Smith's command. In response to this order General Smith sent five regiments and a battery (about 1,600 men), which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breast-works during the night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and continued to mass troops there during the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White pike in rear of the enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I had expected, yet, probably, with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted) whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions, which came under my observation, cannot be too greatly praised.

Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right the salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing 8 pieces of artillery and 200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost simultaneously, resulted in complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, and they bivouacked for the night.

During the operations of the 15th and 16th our troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry and even more than their ordinary enthusiasm, attacking almost inaccessible heights, crowned by breast-works and covered by numerous artillery, with a confidence which presented a most striking contrast to the feeble and spiritless resistance offered by the already demoralized enemy.
The losses of the Twenty-third Corps during the 15th and 16th amounted to only 9 killed, 154 wounded, and none missing.4

The division and brigade commanders displayed their usual high qualities of gallantry and skill. Brig. Gen. J. A. Cooper, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, is specially worthy of mention for gallantry in leading the assault on the 15th.

The officers of my staff were then, as always, active and efficient, discharging every duty with honor and credit.

The commanding general's orders for the pursuit of the enemy placed my corps in rear of the entire army and the main portion of its trains. I was, therefore, able to do no more than follow slowly in rear from the 17th until the 26th, when I was ordered to halt at Columbia, my troops not being needed in advance. On the 30th I received the order of the commanding general, announcing that the rebel army had been driven entirely across the Tennessee River, and ordering the pursuit to cease.

I inclose herewith report of Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily Twenty-third Army Corps, of the operations during the retreat from Pulaski, including the battle of Franklin, and the reports of his subordinate commanders; also the reports of Generals Couch and Cox of the operations of their divisions during the battles of December 15 and 16, including lists of killed and wounded.

No report has yet been received from Major-General Stanley (he being absent wounded) of the operations of the Fourth Corps while the troops in the field were under my command. The numbers of killed, wounded, and missing furnished by the division commanders are embraced in my report of the battle of Franklin.

I also append hereto copies of orders and correspondence relative to operations of the troops under my command, which are made part of this report.5

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
Major-General.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.


ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
Washington, D.C., January 31, 1865.
Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward to the War Department nine stand of colors captured from the enemy by the Twenty-third Army Corps at the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November, 1864. They are borne by the gallant soldiers who are recognized among their comrades as the actual captors of the flags, and as the representatives of the noble regiments to which they belong. The following are the names of the soldiers to whom this special honor is accorded: Maj. Ed. E. Mullenix, One hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Capt. John H. Brown,6 Company D, Twelfth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry; Capt. George V. Kelley,6 Company A, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Lieut. W. H. Langstaff, Company E, One hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Joseph Davis,6 Company C, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Newton H. Hall,6 Company I, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Private John H. Ricksecker,6 Company D, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Privates Abraham Greenwalt6 and John C. Gaunt,6 Company G, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

These flags, with eleven others, were captured by the Twenty-third Army Corps along its parapets. They afford at the same time evidence of the strength of the enemy's column of attack, and of its disastrous repulses.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
Major-general.
_______________

1 See Special Field Orders, No. 111, paragraph 1, Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 511.
2 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 538.
3 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 650.
4 But see revised table, p. 100.
5 Orders and correspondence not found with original report on file in the War Department.
6 Awarded a Medal of Honor.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 339-48