HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE OHIO,
Columbia, Tenn.,
December 31, 1864.
GENERAL: In accordance with the desire of the major-general
commanding, I have the honor to report the operations of the troops under my
command from the time of the separation of the Twenty-third Army Corps from the
main army, under General Sherman, to the present time.
On the 30th of October, 1864, at Rome, Ga., I received the
order of Major-General Sherman (inclosed herewith and marked A1,
directing me to march with the Twenty-third Corps to Resaca, Ga., and report by
telegraph to Major-General Thomas, then at Nashville, for further orders. I
marched on the following day and arrived at Resaca on the 1st of November,
reporting by telegraph to Major-General Thomas from Calhoun on the afternoon of
the 31st of October.
At Calhoun, on the 1st of November, I received orders from
Major-General Thomas (inclosed herewith and marked B2, directing me to move via Tullahoma
to Pulaski, Tenn., which was subsequently changed, and I was ordered to move by
way of Nashville and to send my wagon trains forward to Chattanooga.
Accordingly the troops commenced to move as soon as the first railroad trains
arrived, which was the 3d of November, but owing to delays in the railroads the
last of the troops did not reach Nashville until the 9th of November. I arrived
at Nashville in person on the 5th of November, and received the orders of the
commanding general to go to Johnsonville instead of Pulaski, to repel an attack
then being made on that place by a rebel force under Forrest. My advance
(Colonel Gallup's brigade of the Second Division) reached Johnsonville on the
night of the 5th of November, and found the enemy had already retreated. Upon
reporting this fact to the commanding general I was ordered to leave at
Johnsonville such portion of my command as was necessary for a strong defense
of that place, and to repair with the remainder of my troops to Pulaski and
assume command of all the troops in that vicinity. I left two brigades (General
Cooper's and Colonel Gallup's) at Johnsonville, with instructions to strongly
fortify the place according to plans furnished by the chief engineer of the
Department of the Cumberland; placed Colonel Strickland's brigade, Second
Division, at Columbia, and the Third Division (General Cox's) about three miles
north of Pulaski, the latter place being then occupied by the Fourth Army
Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding.
My instructions from the major-general commanding were
embraced in the accompanying telegram (marked C3) to Major-General
Stanley, a copy of which was furnished with the order to assume command at
Pulaski, and subsequent dispatches, explaining that the object was to hold the
enemy in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General A. J. Smith's
corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville, other troops in the
Department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, and General Wilson's cavalry
to be remounted and fitted for the field. The re-enforcements thus expected
were about equal to the force we then had in the field, and would make our
entire force, when concentrated, equal or somewhat superior to that of the
enemy. To effect this concentration was, therefore, of vital importance — a
consideration to which all others were secondary. This required that the
enemy's advance should be delayed as much as possible, and, at the same time, a
decisive battle avoided unless it could be fought on favorable terms.
I reached Pulaski on the night of the 13th, and assumed
command on the 14th of November.
The following is my report of operations [dated December 7]
from November 14 to December 1, 1864, when the troops under my command reached
Nashville, which is made part of this report:
I assumed command at Pulaski on the 14th of November, 1864.
The forces at and near that place were the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General
Stanley commanding, and General Cox's (Third) division, Twenty-third Army
Corps; General Hatch's division and General Croxton's brigade of cavalry were
in front of Pulaski, along Shoal Creek, and Colonel Capron's brigade was near
Pulaski. My effective force was 18,000 infantry and four brigades of cavalry.
The enemy, under General Hood, was lying about Florence, preparing for an
aggressive movement. His force consisted of the old army of Northern Georgia,
which had opposed General Sherman during the latter part of his operations,
increased by such fragments as could be collected in Alabama and Mississippi,
together with all of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's force was variously
estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 infantry, and from 10,000 to 20,000 cavalry;
the largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are most
probably nearly accurate.
November 19, Hood commenced his advance via Lawrenceburg and
Waynesborough toward Columbia. His advance reached Lawrenceburg and drove our
cavalry from that place on the 22d. I sent all the public property from Pulaski
to Columbia, and fell back to Lynnville, and then to Columbia. My advance
(General Cox's division) reached that place on the morning of the 24th, just in
time to beat back a large rebel force which was driving in General Capron's
cavalry from Mount Pleasant. At Columbia I was re-enforced by one brigade and
two regiments of General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Corps, the other half
of that division having been sent, by order of the major-general commanding, to
guard Centerville and other crossings of Duck River below Columbia.
The troops were put in position covering the pontoon bridge
on the pike at Columbia and the railroad bridge two miles below. The position
was much too extended for the troops I then had, but re-enforcements were
expected daily, and it was essential to have that position from which to take
the offensive when our force should become sufficiently large. Therefore I
determined to hold it as long as possible. I also intrenched an interior line
covering the railroad bridge, and short enough to be held by the Fourth Corps.
On the night of the 25th, finding that the enemy had his
entire army in my front, and that he might without difficulty effect a crossing
of Duck River above Columbia, I sent General Cox, with two brigades of his
division, to the north bank to check any such movement, and General Ruger's
troops to the railroad bridge to construct and occupy a small bridge-head at
that point, and withdrew two divisions of General Stanley's corps to the
interior line. General Wood's division and a brigade of General Cox's were left
on the exterior line, and our picket line was maintained in its original
position. At daylight in the morning the pontoon bridge was floated down the
river and laid near the railroad bridge. In this way I hoped still to hold the
south bank of the river until re-enforcements should arrive.
We succeeded in holding the outer line during the 26th and
27th against a heavy pressure. But the enemy did not assault, and it became
evident that he intended to turn the position by crossing the river above. To
hold the south bank longer would have hazarded the loss of the army. I
therefore withdrew the whole force to the north bank during the night of the
27th, left General Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, General
Cox in front of Columbia, and placed General Stanley in reserve on the Franklin
pike, ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to force a crossing at any
point near Columbia. The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General
Ruger's infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade, to
guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during the 28th, and
I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of Duck River until
re-enforcements should arrive. But I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a.m.
on the 29th, that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg
pike; and about daylight in the morning that his infantry was also crossing at
Huey's Mill, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the
Franklin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the latter
place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat or strike me in flank near
Duck River, or both. He had already forced a column of cavalry between General
Wilson and me, and cut off all communication between us. I therefore sent
General Stanley, with a division of infantry, to Spring Hill to hold that point
and cover the trains. General Cox was left in his position to hold the crossing
at Columbia. Generals Wood and Kimball were put in line facing Huey's Mill,
with a brigade thrown forward to reconnoiter, and General Ruger was ordered to
move on to the pike in rear of Rutherford's Creek, leaving one regiment to hold
the ford near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed.
General Stanley reached Spring Hill with General Wagner's
division just in time to drive off a body of rebel cavalry and save our trains,
which were assembling at that place. Late in the afternoon a division of rebel
infantry arrived and attacked. A severe engagement ensued, lasting until dark.
General Stanley held his position, except that his right was pressed back so as
to nearly uncover the Columbia road, and the enemy's cavalry got possession of
the pike, both north and south of Spring Hill. The enemy worked steadily and
persistently all day to force a crossing and lay a pontoon bridge at Columbia.
This was essential to him, since his artillery could not be crossed at Huey's
Mill. But General Cox firmly held his ground, although it was in the concave
bend of the river and commanded from the opposite bank. The enemy was
repeatedly repulsed with heavy loss. About 3 p.m. I became satisfied the enemy
would not attack my position on Duck River, but was pushing two corps direct
for Spring Hill. I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the
troops after dark, and took General Ruger's troops and pushed for Spring Hill
to reopen communication with General Stanley, and was followed at a short
distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry at dark
about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away without difficulty
and reached Spring Hill about 7 o'clock.
General Whitaker's brigade, which followed General Ruger,
was put in position parallel to the pike, and confronting the enemy's left,
within 800 yards of the road, to cover the column as it passed, and I pushed on
with General Ruger's division to clear the road at Thompson's Station, which
had been occupied by a large body of the enemy's cavalry at dark that evening.
On our arrival at Thompson's the enemy had disappeared, his camp-fires still
burning, and General Ruger took possession of the cross-roads without
opposition. I then returned to Spring Hill and met there the head of General
Cox's column about midnight, he having withdrawn from in front of Columbia
after dark. General Cox now took the advance and pushed rapidly for Franklin,
the trains following under immediate guard of General Ruger, the men marching
by the side of the wagons and General Stanley marching in rear of the trains.
General Wagner's division held on at Spring Hill until near daylight, and then
quietly withdrew and followed the column as rear guard. A small body of rebel
cavalry made a dash upon the train a short distance north of Thompson's, and
succeeded in destroying a few wagons and stampeding a few cattle; with this
exception the whole column and trains arrived at Franklin without loss.
I arrived at Franklin with the head of column a little
before daylight on the 30th, and found no wagon bridge for crossing the river
and the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be
prepared for crossing wagons, and had a foot bridge built for infantry, which
fortunately also proved available for wagons, and used the fords as much as
possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material,
including the public property, and a large wagon train at Franklin, across the
river, and move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to
attack me. But I put the troops in position as they arrived on the south side,
the Twenty-third Corps on the left and center, covering the Columbia and
Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps on the
right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of General Wagner's
division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and General Wood's
division, with some artillery, was moved to the north bank of the river to
cover the flanks should the enemy attempt to cross above or below.
The enemy followed close after our rear guard, brought up
and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved rapidly
forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held their ground too
long and hence were compelled to come in at a run. In passing over the parapet
they carried with them the troops of the line for a short space and thus
permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get in. But the reserves near by
instantly sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and captured those of the
enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently and continuously with
his whole force from about 3.30 p.m. until after dark, and made numerous
intermittent attacks at a few points until about 10 p.m. He was splendidly
repulsed along the whole line of attack. The enemy attacked on a front of about
two miles, extending from our left to our right center, General Kimball's left
brigade. Our two right brigades were only slightly engaged. I believe the
enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot have been less than 5,000, and may
have been much greater. We captured 702 prisoners and 33 stand of colors.
Our loss, as officially reported, is as follows:
|
Killed.
|
Wounded.
|
Missing.
|
Aggregate.
|
Fourth Army Corps:
|
|
|
|
|
First Division
|
5
|
37
|
18
|
60
|
Second Division
|
52
|
519
|
670
|
1,241
|
Artillery
|
10
|
51
|
6
|
67
|
Twenty-third Army Corps:
|
|
|
|
|
Second Division
|
30
|
142
|
135
|
307
|
Third Division
|
48
|
185
|
97
|
330
|
72d Regiment Illinois Volunteers
|
10
|
62
|
86
|
158
|
44th Regiment Missouri Volunteers
|
34
|
37
|
92
|
163
|
Total
|
189
|
1,033
|
1,104
|
2,326
|
I am not able at this time to give fully the names of the
killed and wounded officers. Among the latter is Major-General Stanley,
commanding the Fourth Corps, who was severely wounded in the neck while
gallantly urging forward his troops to regain the portion of our line which had
been lost. General Stanley is deserving of special commendation, and has my
hearty thanks for his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short but
eventful campaign. Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily the
Twenty-third Corps, deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant
victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and intrenched under
his immediate direction, and the greater portion of the line engaged was under
his command during the battle. I recommend General Cox to the special
consideration of the Government. Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second
Division, Twenty-third Corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and that
upon which the enemy's assaults were most persistent. He is entitled to very
great credit. Brigadier-General Reilly, commanding (temporarily) the Third
Division, Twenty-third Corps, maintained his lines with perfect firmness, and
captured twenty battle-flags along his parapet. I am also under great
obligations to the division commanders of the Fourth Army Corps,
Brigadier-Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable manner in which
they discharged every duty, and cannot refrain from expressing my high
commendation, though in advance of the official report of their immediate
commander. Col. Emerson Opdycke, commanding First Brigade, Second Division,
Fourth Army Corps, the reserve which recaptured the lost portion of our line,
is spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having displayed on that occasion
the highest qualities of a commander. I cordially indorse their recommendation.
For other special instances of gallantry and good conduct I must refer to
subordinate reports.
On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first information
from General Wilson since the enemy commenced his advance from Duck River. I
learned that he had been driven back and had crossed the Harpeth above Franklin
on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear entirely open to the enemy's
cavalry. By my direction he sent General Hatch's division forward again, on the
Lewisburg pike, to hold Forrest in check until my trains and troops could reach
Franklin. This was successfully done, and General Hatch then retired before a
superior force, and recrossed the river, connecting with my infantry pickets on
the north bank, early in the afternoon. A short time before the infantry attack
commenced the enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above
Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously threatening our
trains, which were accumulating on the north bank, and moving toward Nashville.
I sent General Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to drive the
enemy back at all hazards, and moved a brigade of General Wood's division to
support him, if necessary. At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the
enemy's infantry I received the most gratifying intelligence that General
Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across the river. This rendered my
immediate left and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the battle of
the 30th I had ordered all trains except ammunition and hospital wagons to
Nashville, preparatory to falling back from Franklin when it should become
necessary, which I expected on the following day. The enemy having nearly
double my force of infantry and quite double my cavalry, could easily turn any
position I might take and seriously endanger my rear.
Only one division of the enemy's cavalry had been engaged
with General Wilson during the 30th. The remaining three divisions were free to
strike my line of communications, which they could easily do about Brentwood by
daylight the next morning. My experience on the 29th had shown how utterly
inferior in force my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my
immediate flank and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville
was entirely without protection. I could not even rely upon getting up the
ammunition necessary for another battle.
To remain longer at Franklin was to seriously hazard the
loss of my army, by giving the enemy another chance to cut me off from
re-enforcements, which he had made three desperate though futile attempts to
accomplish. I had detained the enemy long enough to enable you to concentrate
your scattered troops at Nashville, and had succeeded in inflicting upon him
very heavy losses, which was the primary object. I had found it impossible to
detain him long enough to get re-enforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion
of the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use
in the battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December. For these
reasons, after consulting with the corps and division commanders, and obtaining
your approval, I determined to retire during the night of the 30th toward
Nashville. The artillery was withdrawn to the north bank during the early part
of the night, and at 12 o'clock the army withdrew from its trenches and crossed
the river without loss. During the next day, December 1, the whole army was
placed in position in front of Nashville.
Information obtained since the above report was written, and
principally since the reoccupation of Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's
loss 1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hospitals in
Franklin, and 702 prisoners, making 6,252 of the enemy placed hors de combat,
besides the slightly wounded. The enemy's loss in general officers was very
great, being 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. It is to be observed that
more than half of our loss occurred in General Wagner's division of the Fourth
Corps, which did not form part of the main line of defense. This loss arose in
two brigades of that division from their remaining in front of the line after
their proper duty as outposts had been accomplished, and after they should have
taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdycke's)
in its hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy over the portion of the parapet
which had been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two
brigades. When it became apparent that we should have to fall back from
Columbia, orders to rejoin the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the
troops guarding the crossings of Duck River below Columbia at Centerville, both
by myself and the major-general commanding, which were obeyed as soon as
received, and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to delays in receiving
his orders and the time necessary to concentrate his troops, General Cooper
could not reach Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned his
column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brentwood Hills by the Charlotte
pike on the night of December 2, and again found the enemy between him and the
army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived in safety on the 5th and
rejoined my command on the 8th of December. General Cooper deserves great
credit for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his retreat.
BATTLES OF THE 15TH AND 16TH OF DECEMBER IN
FRONT OF NASHVILLE.
My command consisted of the Second and Third Divisions of
the Twenty-third Army Corps, commanded, respectively, by Maj. Gen. D. N. Couch
and Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox. The effective strength of each division was about
5,500 men. Previous to the battle the corps occupied the line of defense from
Block House Casino to the Nolensville pike, including Fort Negley.
According to the plan of battle, as modified on the evening
of the 14th, my troops were to be relieved by Major-General Steedman's at dawn
of day in the morning, pass in rear of General Wood's corps, and take position
in reserve near the right to support the attack on the enemy's left. The
movement commenced at daylight as ordered. General Couch's division debouched
from our works on the Hardin pike and formed in rear of General Smith's left,
and General Cox's, save one brigade, by the Hillsborough pike, in rear of
General Wood's right. General Cox's third brigade was left temporarily in his
old works to support, if necessary, General Steedman, who was making a
demonstration upon the enemy's right. As General Smith advanced against the
enemy's position General Couch moved forward, keeping within supporting
distance, while the proper position of General Cox, as reserve to the center,
remained essentially unchanged. About 1 p.m. the major-general commanding,
remarking that General Smith had borne more to our left than had been expected
and had not reached the enemy's flank, ordered me to move my corps to the right
of General Smith, attack the enemy's flank, and gain, if practicable, before
dark, possession of a group of fortified hills near the Hillsborough pike,
which formed the left of the enemy's position. I at once put my troops in
motion, moving rapidly by the flank in rear of General Smith's line, rode
forward and found General Smith near the right of his line, and informed him of
the movement I was making. General Smith then put in his reserve, extending his
line about half a mile to the right, and assisted General Hatch's cavalry
(dismounted) in assaulting and carrying a high hill, covered by a redoubt,
which proved to be a detached work commanding the Hillsborough pike and
constituting the extreme flank of the enemy's infantry position, but not
connected with his main line of defense.
General Couch, whose head of column had by this time arrived
opposite the right of General Smith's line, at once moved forward, deploying as
he advanced, passed immediately by the right of the hill just carried and
across the Hillsborough pike, crossed an open valley about half a mile in
breadth, and swept by the enemy's artillery and carried the left of a series of
hills parallel to and overlooking the Granny White pike, one of the enemy's
only two lines of retreat. This assault was made by General Cooper's brigade,
led by its brave commander, and was most gallantly executed. The enemy now
moved a considerable force toward our right, with the evident design of turning
our flank and recovering the position just lost. General Couch sent Colonel
Mehringer's brigade, the only one he had disengaged, to meet this movement.
Colonel Mehringer met the enemy, much superior to him in numbers, in the valley
which General Couch had just passed, and held him in check until General Cox,
who had just come up, sent two brigades, Colonel Doolittle's and Colonel
Casement's, to his support, when the enemy was repulsed and driven back. The engagement
here was sharp, attended with considerable loss on both sides, and lasted until
dark. Immediately south of the hill carried by General Couch was a still higher
one held by the enemy, without the possession of which his position north of
Brentwood was untenable. I had ordered this hill to be carried immediately
after the success of General Cooper's assault, but the counter attack made by
the enemy occupied our whole available force until dark, and compelled us to
rest with the success already gained. After dark the troops intrenched their
position and bivouacked for the night.
BATTLE OF THE 16TH.
In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general
commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the
enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the right
and right center forward so that the general direction of the line was nearly
perpendicular to that before the attack. Only the right was in contact with the
enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of
retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in the morning, I
requested that a division of infantry be sent to re-enforce the right, which
was ordered accordingly from Major-General Smith's command. In response to this
order General Smith sent five regiments and a battery (about 1,600 men), which
were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy
still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General
Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breast-works during the
night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and
continued to mass troops there during the early part of the day. During the
morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defense and
co-operation with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White
pike in rear of the enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and
Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position,
the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his
right and center, when I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the
cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the
enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was
occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was not intrenched. My order
was not executed with the promptness or energy which I had expected, yet,
probably, with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated
character of General Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over
which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by
General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted) whose gallantry and energy on that and
other occasions, which came under my observation, cannot be too greatly
praised.
Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right
the salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General
Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and the
fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme flank of
the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's
brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing 8 pieces of artillery
and 200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost
simultaneously, resulted in complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cut off
his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, and such of his troops as were
not captured on the line could only escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It
is believed all of the artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line
fell into our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and into
the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, and they
bivouacked for the night.
During the operations of the 15th and 16th our troops
behaved with their accustomed gallantry and even more than their ordinary
enthusiasm, attacking almost inaccessible heights, crowned by breast-works and
covered by numerous artillery, with a confidence which presented a most
striking contrast to the feeble and spiritless resistance offered by the
already demoralized enemy.
The losses of the Twenty-third Corps during the 15th and
16th amounted to only 9 killed, 154 wounded, and none missing.4
The division and brigade commanders displayed their usual
high qualities of gallantry and skill. Brig. Gen. J. A. Cooper, commanding
First Brigade, Second Division, is specially worthy of mention for gallantry in
leading the assault on the 15th.
The officers of my staff were then, as always, active and
efficient, discharging every duty with honor and credit.
The commanding general's orders for the pursuit of the enemy
placed my corps in rear of the entire army and the main portion of its trains.
I was, therefore, able to do no more than follow slowly in rear from the 17th
until the 26th, when I was ordered to halt at Columbia, my troops not being
needed in advance. On the 30th I received the order of the commanding general,
announcing that the rebel army had been driven entirely across the Tennessee
River, and ordering the pursuit to cease.
I inclose herewith report of Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox,
commanding temporarily Twenty-third Army Corps, of the operations during the
retreat from Pulaski, including the battle of Franklin, and the reports of his
subordinate commanders; also the reports of Generals Couch and Cox of the
operations of their divisions during the battles of December 15 and 16,
including lists of killed and wounded.
No report has yet been received from Major-General Stanley
(he being absent wounded) of the operations of the Fourth Corps while the
troops in the field were under my command. The numbers of killed, wounded, and
missing furnished by the division commanders are embraced in my report of the battle
of Franklin.
I also append hereto copies of orders and correspondence
relative to operations of the troops under my command, which are made part of
this report.5
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff, Department of
the Cumberland.
ADDENDA.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE OHIO,
Washington, D.C.,
January 31, 1865.
Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General, U.S. Army,
Washington, D.C.:
GENERAL: I have the honor to forward to the War Department
nine stand of colors captured from the enemy by the Twenty-third Army Corps at
the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November, 1864. They are borne by the
gallant soldiers who are recognized among their comrades as the actual captors
of the flags, and as the representatives of the noble regiments to which they
belong. The following are the names of the soldiers to whom this special honor
is accorded: Maj. Ed. E. Mullenix, One hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer
Infantry; Capt. John H. Brown,6 Company D, Twelfth Kentucky
Volunteer Infantry; Capt. George V. Kelley,6 Company A, One hundred
and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Lieut. W. H. Langstaff, Company E, One
hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Joseph Davis,6
Company C, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Newton H.
Hall,6 Company I, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry;
Private John H. Ricksecker,6 Company D, One hundred and fourth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry; Privates Abraham Greenwalt6 and John C. Gaunt,6
Company G, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
These flags, with eleven others, were captured by the
Twenty-third Army Corps along its parapets. They afford at the same time
evidence of the strength of the enemy's column of attack, and of its disastrous
repulses.
I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-general.
_______________
1 See Special Field Orders, No. 111, paragraph 1,
Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 511.
2 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 538.
3 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 650.
4 But see revised table, p. 100.
5 Orders and correspondence not found with
original report on file in the War Department.
6 Awarded a Medal of Honor.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 339-48
