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Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864 — January 23, 1865: No. 96. — Report of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
Columbia, Tenn., December 31, 1864.

GENERAL: In accordance with the desire of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to report the operations of the troops under my command from the time of the separation of the Twenty-third Army Corps from the main army, under General Sherman, to the present time.

On the 30th of October, 1864, at Rome, Ga., I received the order of Major-General Sherman (inclosed herewith and marked A1, directing me to march with the Twenty-third Corps to Resaca, Ga., and report by telegraph to Major-General Thomas, then at Nashville, for further orders. I marched on the following day and arrived at Resaca on the 1st of November, reporting by telegraph to Major-General Thomas from Calhoun on the afternoon of the 31st of October.

At Calhoun, on the 1st of November, I received orders from Major-General Thomas (inclosed herewith and marked B2, directing me to move via Tullahoma to Pulaski, Tenn., which was subsequently changed, and I was ordered to move by way of Nashville and to send my wagon trains forward to Chattanooga. Accordingly the troops commenced to move as soon as the first railroad trains arrived, which was the 3d of November, but owing to delays in the railroads the last of the troops did not reach Nashville until the 9th of November. I arrived at Nashville in person on the 5th of November, and received the orders of the commanding general to go to Johnsonville instead of Pulaski, to repel an attack then being made on that place by a rebel force under Forrest. My advance (Colonel Gallup's brigade of the Second Division) reached Johnsonville on the night of the 5th of November, and found the enemy had already retreated. Upon reporting this fact to the commanding general I was ordered to leave at Johnsonville such portion of my command as was necessary for a strong defense of that place, and to repair with the remainder of my troops to Pulaski and assume command of all the troops in that vicinity. I left two brigades (General Cooper's and Colonel Gallup's) at Johnsonville, with instructions to strongly fortify the place according to plans furnished by the chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland; placed Colonel Strickland's brigade, Second Division, at Columbia, and the Third Division (General Cox's) about three miles north of Pulaski, the latter place being then occupied by the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding.

My instructions from the major-general commanding were embraced in the accompanying telegram (marked C3) to Major-General Stanley, a copy of which was furnished with the order to assume command at Pulaski, and subsequent dispatches, explaining that the object was to hold the enemy in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville, other troops in the Department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, and General Wilson's cavalry to be remounted and fitted for the field. The re-enforcements thus expected were about equal to the force we then had in the field, and would make our entire force, when concentrated, equal or somewhat superior to that of the enemy. To effect this concentration was, therefore, of vital importance — a consideration to which all others were secondary. This required that the enemy's advance should be delayed as much as possible, and, at the same time, a decisive battle avoided unless it could be fought on favorable terms.

I reached Pulaski on the night of the 13th, and assumed command on the 14th of November.

The following is my report of operations [dated December 7] from November 14 to December 1, 1864, when the troops under my command reached Nashville, which is made part of this report:

I assumed command at Pulaski on the 14th of November, 1864. The forces at and near that place were the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and General Cox's (Third) division, Twenty-third Army Corps; General Hatch's division and General Croxton's brigade of cavalry were in front of Pulaski, along Shoal Creek, and Colonel Capron's brigade was near Pulaski. My effective force was 18,000 infantry and four brigades of cavalry. The enemy, under General Hood, was lying about Florence, preparing for an aggressive movement. His force consisted of the old army of Northern Georgia, which had opposed General Sherman during the latter part of his operations, increased by such fragments as could be collected in Alabama and Mississippi, together with all of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's force was variously estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 infantry, and from 10,000 to 20,000 cavalry; the largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are most probably nearly accurate.

November 19, Hood commenced his advance via Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough toward Columbia. His advance reached Lawrenceburg and drove our cavalry from that place on the 22d. I sent all the public property from Pulaski to Columbia, and fell back to Lynnville, and then to Columbia. My advance (General Cox's division) reached that place on the morning of the 24th, just in time to beat back a large rebel force which was driving in General Capron's cavalry from Mount Pleasant. At Columbia I was re-enforced by one brigade and two regiments of General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Corps, the other half of that division having been sent, by order of the major-general commanding, to guard Centerville and other crossings of Duck River below Columbia.

The troops were put in position covering the pontoon bridge on the pike at Columbia and the railroad bridge two miles below. The position was much too extended for the troops I then had, but re-enforcements were expected daily, and it was essential to have that position from which to take the offensive when our force should become sufficiently large. Therefore I determined to hold it as long as possible. I also intrenched an interior line covering the railroad bridge, and short enough to be held by the Fourth Corps.

On the night of the 25th, finding that the enemy had his entire army in my front, and that he might without difficulty effect a crossing of Duck River above Columbia, I sent General Cox, with two brigades of his division, to the north bank to check any such movement, and General Ruger's troops to the railroad bridge to construct and occupy a small bridge-head at that point, and withdrew two divisions of General Stanley's corps to the interior line. General Wood's division and a brigade of General Cox's were left on the exterior line, and our picket line was maintained in its original position. At daylight in the morning the pontoon bridge was floated down the river and laid near the railroad bridge. In this way I hoped still to hold the south bank of the river until re-enforcements should arrive.

We succeeded in holding the outer line during the 26th and 27th against a heavy pressure. But the enemy did not assault, and it became evident that he intended to turn the position by crossing the river above. To hold the south bank longer would have hazarded the loss of the army. I therefore withdrew the whole force to the north bank during the night of the 27th, left General Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, General Cox in front of Columbia, and placed General Stanley in reserve on the Franklin pike, ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to force a crossing at any point near Columbia. The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General Ruger's infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade, to guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during the 28th, and I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of Duck River until re-enforcements should arrive. But I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a.m. on the 29th, that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike; and about daylight in the morning that his infantry was also crossing at Huey's Mill, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Franklin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat or strike me in flank near Duck River, or both. He had already forced a column of cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication between us. I therefore sent General Stanley, with a division of infantry, to Spring Hill to hold that point and cover the trains. General Cox was left in his position to hold the crossing at Columbia. Generals Wood and Kimball were put in line facing Huey's Mill, with a brigade thrown forward to reconnoiter, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the pike in rear of Rutherford's Creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed.

General Stanley reached Spring Hill with General Wagner's division just in time to drive off a body of rebel cavalry and save our trains, which were assembling at that place. Late in the afternoon a division of rebel infantry arrived and attacked. A severe engagement ensued, lasting until dark. General Stanley held his position, except that his right was pressed back so as to nearly uncover the Columbia road, and the enemy's cavalry got possession of the pike, both north and south of Spring Hill. The enemy worked steadily and persistently all day to force a crossing and lay a pontoon bridge at Columbia. This was essential to him, since his artillery could not be crossed at Huey's Mill. But General Cox firmly held his ground, although it was in the concave bend of the river and commanded from the opposite bank. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed with heavy loss. About 3 p.m. I became satisfied the enemy would not attack my position on Duck River, but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill. I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops after dark, and took General Ruger's troops and pushed for Spring Hill to reopen communication with General Stanley, and was followed at a short distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry at dark about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away without difficulty and reached Spring Hill about 7 o'clock.

General Whitaker's brigade, which followed General Ruger, was put in position parallel to the pike, and confronting the enemy's left, within 800 yards of the road, to cover the column as it passed, and I pushed on with General Ruger's division to clear the road at Thompson's Station, which had been occupied by a large body of the enemy's cavalry at dark that evening. On our arrival at Thompson's the enemy had disappeared, his camp-fires still burning, and General Ruger took possession of the cross-roads without opposition. I then returned to Spring Hill and met there the head of General Cox's column about midnight, he having withdrawn from in front of Columbia after dark. General Cox now took the advance and pushed rapidly for Franklin, the trains following under immediate guard of General Ruger, the men marching by the side of the wagons and General Stanley marching in rear of the trains. General Wagner's division held on at Spring Hill until near daylight, and then quietly withdrew and followed the column as rear guard. A small body of rebel cavalry made a dash upon the train a short distance north of Thompson's, and succeeded in destroying a few wagons and stampeding a few cattle; with this exception the whole column and trains arrived at Franklin without loss.

I arrived at Franklin with the head of column a little before daylight on the 30th, and found no wagon bridge for crossing the river and the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be prepared for crossing wagons, and had a foot bridge built for infantry, which fortunately also proved available for wagons, and used the fords as much as possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material, including the public property, and a large wagon train at Franklin, across the river, and move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to attack me. But I put the troops in position as they arrived on the south side, the Twenty-third Corps on the left and center, covering the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of General Wagner's division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved to the north bank of the river to cover the flanks should the enemy attempt to cross above or below.

The enemy followed close after our rear guard, brought up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held their ground too long and hence were compelled to come in at a run. In passing over the parapet they carried with them the troops of the line for a short space and thus permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get in. But the reserves near by instantly sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and captured those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently and continuously with his whole force from about 3.30 p.m. until after dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until about 10 p.m. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line of attack. The enemy attacked on a front of about two miles, extending from our left to our right center, General Kimball's left brigade. Our two right brigades were only slightly engaged. I believe the enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot have been less than 5,000, and may have been much greater. We captured 702 prisoners and 33 stand of colors.

Our loss, as officially reported, is as follows:


Killed.
Wounded.
Missing.
Aggregate.
Fourth Army Corps:




     First Division
5
37
18
60
     Second Division
52
519
670
1,241
     Artillery
10
51
6
67
Twenty-third Army Corps: 




     Second Division
30
142
135
307
     Third Division
48
185
97
330
72d Regiment Illinois Volunteers
10
62
86
158
44th Regiment Missouri Volunteers
34
37
92
163
     Total
189
1,033
1,104
2,326

I am not able at this time to give fully the names of the killed and wounded officers. Among the latter is Major-General Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps, who was severely wounded in the neck while gallantly urging forward his troops to regain the portion of our line which had been lost. General Stanley is deserving of special commendation, and has my hearty thanks for his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short but eventful campaign. Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily the Twenty-third Corps, deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and intrenched under his immediate direction, and the greater portion of the line engaged was under his command during the battle. I recommend General Cox to the special consideration of the Government. Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and that upon which the enemy's assaults were most persistent. He is entitled to very great credit. Brigadier-General Reilly, commanding (temporarily) the Third Division, Twenty-third Corps, maintained his lines with perfect firmness, and captured twenty battle-flags along his parapet. I am also under great obligations to the division commanders of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable manner in which they discharged every duty, and cannot refrain from expressing my high commendation, though in advance of the official report of their immediate commander. Col. Emerson Opdycke, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Army Corps, the reserve which recaptured the lost portion of our line, is spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having displayed on that occasion the highest qualities of a commander. I cordially indorse their recommendation. For other special instances of gallantry and good conduct I must refer to subordinate reports.

On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first information from General Wilson since the enemy commenced his advance from Duck River. I learned that he had been driven back and had crossed the Harpeth above Franklin on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear entirely open to the enemy's cavalry. By my direction he sent General Hatch's division forward again, on the Lewisburg pike, to hold Forrest in check until my trains and troops could reach Franklin. This was successfully done, and General Hatch then retired before a superior force, and recrossed the river, connecting with my infantry pickets on the north bank, early in the afternoon. A short time before the infantry attack commenced the enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above Franklin, and drove back our cavalry, for a time seriously threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the north bank, and moving toward Nashville. I sent General Wilson orders, which he had, however, anticipated, to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a brigade of General Wood's division to support him, if necessary. At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the enemy's infantry I received the most gratifying intelligence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry back across the river. This rendered my immediate left and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the battle of the 30th I had ordered all trains except ammunition and hospital wagons to Nashville, preparatory to falling back from Franklin when it should become necessary, which I expected on the following day. The enemy having nearly double my force of infantry and quite double my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might take and seriously endanger my rear.

Only one division of the enemy's cavalry had been engaged with General Wilson during the 30th. The remaining three divisions were free to strike my line of communications, which they could easily do about Brentwood by daylight the next morning. My experience on the 29th had shown how utterly inferior in force my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was entirely without protection. I could not even rely upon getting up the ammunition necessary for another battle.

To remain longer at Franklin was to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving the enemy another chance to cut me off from re-enforcements, which he had made three desperate though futile attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and had succeeded in inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the primary object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to get re-enforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in the battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December. For these reasons, after consulting with the corps and division commanders, and obtaining your approval, I determined to retire during the night of the 30th toward Nashville. The artillery was withdrawn to the north bank during the early part of the night, and at 12 o'clock the army withdrew from its trenches and crossed the river without loss. During the next day, December 1, the whole army was placed in position in front of Nashville.

Information obtained since the above report was written, and principally since the reoccupation of Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's loss 1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hospitals in Franklin, and 702 prisoners, making 6,252 of the enemy placed hors de combat, besides the slightly wounded. The enemy's loss in general officers was very great, being 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. It is to be observed that more than half of our loss occurred in General Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps, which did not form part of the main line of defense. This loss arose in two brigades of that division from their remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had been accomplished, and after they should have taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdycke's) in its hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy over the portion of the parapet which had been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades. When it became apparent that we should have to fall back from Columbia, orders to rejoin the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the troops guarding the crossings of Duck River below Columbia at Centerville, both by myself and the major-general commanding, which were obeyed as soon as received, and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to delays in receiving his orders and the time necessary to concentrate his troops, General Cooper could not reach Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned his column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brentwood Hills by the Charlotte pike on the night of December 2, and again found the enemy between him and the army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived in safety on the 5th and rejoined my command on the 8th of December. General Cooper deserves great credit for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his retreat.

BATTLES OF THE 15TH AND 16TH OF DECEMBER IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE.

My command consisted of the Second and Third Divisions of the Twenty-third Army Corps, commanded, respectively, by Maj. Gen. D. N. Couch and Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox. The effective strength of each division was about 5,500 men. Previous to the battle the corps occupied the line of defense from Block House Casino to the Nolensville pike, including Fort Negley.

According to the plan of battle, as modified on the evening of the 14th, my troops were to be relieved by Major-General Steedman's at dawn of day in the morning, pass in rear of General Wood's corps, and take position in reserve near the right to support the attack on the enemy's left. The movement commenced at daylight as ordered. General Couch's division debouched from our works on the Hardin pike and formed in rear of General Smith's left, and General Cox's, save one brigade, by the Hillsborough pike, in rear of General Wood's right. General Cox's third brigade was left temporarily in his old works to support, if necessary, General Steedman, who was making a demonstration upon the enemy's right. As General Smith advanced against the enemy's position General Couch moved forward, keeping within supporting distance, while the proper position of General Cox, as reserve to the center, remained essentially unchanged. About 1 p.m. the major-general commanding, remarking that General Smith had borne more to our left than had been expected and had not reached the enemy's flank, ordered me to move my corps to the right of General Smith, attack the enemy's flank, and gain, if practicable, before dark, possession of a group of fortified hills near the Hillsborough pike, which formed the left of the enemy's position. I at once put my troops in motion, moving rapidly by the flank in rear of General Smith's line, rode forward and found General Smith near the right of his line, and informed him of the movement I was making. General Smith then put in his reserve, extending his line about half a mile to the right, and assisted General Hatch's cavalry (dismounted) in assaulting and carrying a high hill, covered by a redoubt, which proved to be a detached work commanding the Hillsborough pike and constituting the extreme flank of the enemy's infantry position, but not connected with  his main line of defense.

General Couch, whose head of column had by this time arrived opposite the right of General Smith's line, at once moved forward, deploying as he advanced, passed immediately by the right of the hill just carried and across the Hillsborough pike, crossed an open valley about half a mile in breadth, and swept by the enemy's artillery and carried the left of a series of hills parallel to and overlooking the Granny White pike, one of the enemy's only two lines of retreat. This assault was made by General Cooper's brigade, led by its brave commander, and was most gallantly executed. The enemy now moved a considerable force toward our right, with the evident design of turning our flank and recovering the position just lost. General Couch sent Colonel Mehringer's brigade, the only one he had disengaged, to meet this movement. Colonel Mehringer met the enemy, much superior to him in numbers, in the valley which General Couch had just passed, and held him in check until General Cox, who had just come up, sent two brigades, Colonel Doolittle's and Colonel Casement's, to his support, when the enemy was repulsed and driven back. The engagement here was sharp, attended with considerable loss on both sides, and lasted until dark. Immediately south of the hill carried by General Couch was a still higher one held by the enemy, without the possession of which his position north of Brentwood was untenable. I had ordered this hill to be carried immediately after the success of General Cooper's assault, but the counter attack made by the enemy occupied our whole available force until dark, and compelled us to rest with the success already gained. After dark the troops intrenched their position and bivouacked for the night.

BATTLE OF THE 16TH.

In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the right and right center forward so that the general direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the attack. Only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to re-enforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major-General Smith's command. In response to this order General Smith sent five regiments and a battery (about 1,600 men), which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breast-works during the night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and continued to mass troops there during the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White pike in rear of the enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I had expected, yet, probably, with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted) whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions, which came under my observation, cannot be too greatly praised.

Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right the salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing 8 pieces of artillery and 200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost simultaneously, resulted in complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, and they bivouacked for the night.

During the operations of the 15th and 16th our troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry and even more than their ordinary enthusiasm, attacking almost inaccessible heights, crowned by breast-works and covered by numerous artillery, with a confidence which presented a most striking contrast to the feeble and spiritless resistance offered by the already demoralized enemy.
The losses of the Twenty-third Corps during the 15th and 16th amounted to only 9 killed, 154 wounded, and none missing.4

The division and brigade commanders displayed their usual high qualities of gallantry and skill. Brig. Gen. J. A. Cooper, commanding First Brigade, Second Division, is specially worthy of mention for gallantry in leading the assault on the 15th.

The officers of my staff were then, as always, active and efficient, discharging every duty with honor and credit.

The commanding general's orders for the pursuit of the enemy placed my corps in rear of the entire army and the main portion of its trains. I was, therefore, able to do no more than follow slowly in rear from the 17th until the 26th, when I was ordered to halt at Columbia, my troops not being needed in advance. On the 30th I received the order of the commanding general, announcing that the rebel army had been driven entirely across the Tennessee River, and ordering the pursuit to cease.

I inclose herewith report of Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding temporarily Twenty-third Army Corps, of the operations during the retreat from Pulaski, including the battle of Franklin, and the reports of his subordinate commanders; also the reports of Generals Couch and Cox of the operations of their divisions during the battles of December 15 and 16, including lists of killed and wounded.

No report has yet been received from Major-General Stanley (he being absent wounded) of the operations of the Fourth Corps while the troops in the field were under my command. The numbers of killed, wounded, and missing furnished by the division commanders are embraced in my report of the battle of Franklin.

I also append hereto copies of orders and correspondence relative to operations of the troops under my command, which are made part of this report.5

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
Major-General.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.


ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
Washington, D.C., January 31, 1865.
Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward to the War Department nine stand of colors captured from the enemy by the Twenty-third Army Corps at the battle of Franklin on the 30th of November, 1864. They are borne by the gallant soldiers who are recognized among their comrades as the actual captors of the flags, and as the representatives of the noble regiments to which they belong. The following are the names of the soldiers to whom this special honor is accorded: Maj. Ed. E. Mullenix, One hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Capt. John H. Brown,6 Company D, Twelfth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry; Capt. George V. Kelley,6 Company A, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Lieut. W. H. Langstaff, Company E, One hundred and seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Joseph Davis,6 Company C, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Corpl. Newton H. Hall,6 Company I, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Private John H. Ricksecker,6 Company D, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Privates Abraham Greenwalt6 and John C. Gaunt,6 Company G, One hundred and fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

These flags, with eleven others, were captured by the Twenty-third Army Corps along its parapets. They afford at the same time evidence of the strength of the enemy's column of attack, and of its disastrous repulses.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
Major-general.
_______________

1 See Special Field Orders, No. 111, paragraph 1, Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 511.
2 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 538.
3 See Vol. XXXIX, Part III, p. 650.
4 But see revised table, p. 100.
5 Orders and correspondence not found with original report on file in the War Department.
6 Awarded a Medal of Honor.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 339-48

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