“We now opened fire for the first time during the day, in
the direction of the regiment or brigade that had so frightfully thinned our
ranks, but they were almost out of reach from us, as well as we from them. At
this moment, however, the Third Division approached them and they filed away.”
It is difficult to conceive why if the enemy could fire at
the union forces here they could not return the compliment, at any rate to one
who has so recently studied the ground. It was a good thing the Third Division
was ’round to drive the rebs away, otherwise they might have more “frightfully
thinned” Col. Walker's ranks. It would be interesting to know exactly how many
men Col. Walker lost here.
“When this was discovered, and after gaining breath, our own
advance was resumed, but with little pretense at order. Emerging upon the plain
before us at the summit of the hill we had climbed, we again turned obliquely
towards the road and charged upon a long breastwork filled with rebels, in our
immediate front. The retreat of their comrades from the ravine apparently
demoralized them; many fled, many more were captured; in fact as we clambered
over the parapet it seemed as if the prisoners who then surrendered exceeded in
number our entire Brigade.”
I saw this movement when the men advanced seemingly to me in
an undeployed skirmish line over the open flat ground beyond the ravine not
shown in No. 7 illustration, but further to the right. It was a weak force and
could not have met any determined resistance from any considerable body; indeed
there was but a small force of the enemy's infantry on that part of the field.
“But we did not stop to count them or to care for them. The
principal position of the enemy in this portion of the field had now been
gained, and we rushed onward toward the distant spires of Winchester, with
shouts and cheers, now thoroughly excited by our unexpected success. A battery
of the enemy was before us, but it limbered up and retired as we advanced.
Several times it turned, fired a round of canister, and resumed its flight. At
our left the other Brigades of our Division were seen moving on in our support.
At our right an unfortunate ridge now rose, parallel with our line of advance,
along the top of which ran the road so often referred to, and which hid our friends
from view; we could only hope that they were equally successful, and push
wildly forward. A point was reached probably three-fourths of a mile beyond the
entrenchments where we had captured the prisoners, when luckily a ditch running
across our path suggested cover and a pause. This ditch was reached only by the
colors of the Fifth, with perhaps two hundred men from the various regiments.
Exhausted with running, they opened fire as vigorously as they could, but a
line of rebels was seen gradually collecting in their front, as the fugitives
were rallied, and the position held by our troops was presently dangerously
threatened. And now to their dismay, the Brigade on the higher ground to their
left saw reason for retiring and called for them to follow. What it could mean
they did not know, but it seemed prudent to withdraw, if only for the purpose
of keeping up the connection. An officer sent to investigate soon reported that
at least a Division of the enemy were far behind their right in an orchard, which
they supposed had been carried by the Third Division. Orders were given
therefore to fall back to the line of the army, following the low ground on the
left, thus keeping under cover of the hill at the right, the enemy meantime
being absorbed in their movement against Ricketts; and thus the detachment
successfully escaped from its dangerous position and re-formed with the balance
of the Brigade near the works we had carried, being as before on the right of
the other Brigades of our Division, connecting with and at first even in front
of the support which was put in to meet the emergency.”
Having watched this whole proceeding, which Sheridan saw,
too, through his field glass just behind me, after I was wounded and the enemy
from the ravine in my front and its artillery were in full retreat, it reads
absurdly. The action of the enemy in Col. Walker's front largely depended on
that of the enemy in ours, which had been routed and was in full pell mell
retreat when Col. Walker's men were advancing in small irregular groups away
from the before-mentioned ravine (see No. 7 illustration) they were so
seemingly anxious to leave. As a matter of fact if they had swung to the right
in and on the high ground west of the ravine, together with the left of our
brigade, they would have done much more effective service. The retreating
battery mentioned — and others further north not mentioned — retreated because
its infantry in the ravine in my front was routed. As a matter of fact these
Second Division men were operating comparatively uselessly far on the enemy's
rear right flank and were in a dangerous situation as soon as the bulk of the
enemy's infantry in my front should reach that neighborhood. I saw this, as did
Sheridan, and it was one thing that caused him to put spurs to his horse and
dash away to send a staff officer to recall these forces. The five succeeding
quoted paragraphs are disingenuously conceived and misleading. They are worse
than worthless for historical purposes because mischievous. The Vermont Brigade
was too grand a body of men to be mortified by exaggerations and overdrawn
situations. The truth is glorious enough, and to write on such a basis is
dignified and fair.
“We afterwards learned that a break had taken place on the
right which for a time seemed likely to result in complete disaster. The report
in our Corps was, that the Nineteenth, advancing through a long stretch of
forest and at first successful, had afterwards been repulsed, and fled in
disorder, many of the fugitives even going back to the Creek, and that our
Third Division had been checked soon after we lost sight of it, presently
becoming more or less involved in the flight of the Nineteenth Corps. On the
other hand Gen. Emory, commanding the Nineteenth Corps, in a letter published
in the World, which was fortified with affidavits, insisted that the
break began at the right of our Third Division, which led to the turning of his
left and the consequent retiring of his Corps. The official reports disagree as
much as the letters of the correspondents, who of course reflected the opinions
of the several headquarters to which they were attached, and who created
considerable ill-feeling by the discrepancies in their accounts, and by their
insinuations; the truth is probably between the claims of both, and the real
cause of the enemy's temporary success seems to have been the unfortunate bend
in the road above mentioned, which interfered with and destroyed the symmetry
of our first advance. Our Third Division obliqued to the left as it moved
against the enemy, following the order to guide on the road, (there were few or
no fences in that vicinity) and so left an interval between its right and the
Nineteenth Corps, which appears to have gone in impetuously and with little
order; the enemy presently made a counter-charge, and, luckily for them, struck
the gap with a heavy force, crumbling off the troops on either side of it, and
causing the troops on each side of the interval to think that the others had
let the enemy through. The front line of the Nineteenth Corps was almost
entirely disorganized, and was replaced by the second line, while only the
right of our Third Division was broken up, its left with our own Division
merely retiring a short distance under orders, as was necessary in order to
keep a continuous front.”
This is widely erroneous; Emery's left was somewhat broken
at first by the terrific shelling from our front, but it was only in the edge
of the shell storm at first when going through the wood. His alleged collapse
virtually of the right of our Third Division, or Second Brigade, going through
the narrow belt of timber behind which we formed, is correct as before stated,
for it was immediately on my right, and I know it; it was largely what we
halted and laid down for after getting through the timber. We feared being
flanked; but the delay was short, for I almost immediately moved forward with
my men and others alone over that flat, unsheltered ground, then being
unmercifully swept by artillery and musketry till it was virtually untenable.
The Nineteenth Corps instead of obliquing to the left towards us to shorten the
interval and help us, intuitively obliqued the other way; but fortunately there
was no road or bend in it to blame it to. In my opinion it was as clear a case
of shirk as to the left of the Third Division, or a desire to find an easier
point to attack. Emery's corps didn't retire that I know of, and our brigade I know
didn't. The marching of his troops in two long lines was one of the
spectacular sights of the day; it was a beautiful feature. It assaulted to the
north of the slight divide running east and west, where I saw no infantry nor
artillery except a little of the latter far across the breaks. The enfilading
infantry and artillery fire from our front at first was about all Emery had to
fear, but his Corps soon obliqued away from it. There was no counter
charge by the enemy in my front or to either side, and in this I am emphatic,
as well as in the fact that general officers were not where they could see
as well as I. There has been more fiction written about this fight than any I
was ever in.
SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections
and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 187-92
