Nothing special at
Cabinet. On Tuesday Seward submitted a correspondence between Schenck and
Romero, the Mexican Minister. It was a very improper proceeding, and R.
evidently thought it wrong in giving a copy to the Secretary of State. Seward
mentioned it as of little moment, — a sort of irregularity. Stanton said there
was nothing wrong so far as Schenck was concerned, but that it was a
questionable proceeding on the part of Romero. I declared my entire disapproval
of the whole transaction and that it was one of the many indications of
ignoring and crowding on the Executive.
The others were
silent, but, after a little earnest talk, Seward said he would give the subject
further consideration. To-day he brought forward the correspondence with an
indorsement disapproving it and said he should communicate it to Romero.
Senator Doolittle
took breakfast with me this morning. We went over the political questions and
discussed what had best be done. Both were satisfied that the time had arrived
when the Administration must take a stand. The game of the Radicals and of
certain conspicuously professed friends of the President, that the Republican
Party must be sustained and kept united at any sacrifice, even the surrender of
the Constitution in some of its important features, and to the jeopardy of the
Union itself, must be checked, and the opposition to any such policy made
clearly manifest. We called on the President and made known our opinions. He
concurred and thought a prompt call for a national convention of friends of the
Union should be issued. Doolittle agreed to undertake to draw up such a call,
but desired that I would also place on paper my views. He proposed that the
call should be signed by the members of the Cabinet, or such of them as
approved the measure. I told them that I, personally, had no objection, but I
questioned its propriety and effect.
McCulloch, with whom
I had a brief interview after Cabinet-meeting, told me that the elder Blair was
preparing the call. I saw Judge Blair this evening and found him much engaged,
yet not altogether satisfied. He expresses apprehension that Seward has control
of the President and has so interwoven himself into the mind and course of the
President as not to be shaken off, and if so that the Democrats must go forward
independent of both President and Congress. Says the Democratic leaders, many
of whom he has seen, such as Dean Richmond, Dawson, and others, say they will
go in under the President's lead provided he will rid himself of Seward, but
they have no confidence in him, would rather give up Johnson than retain
Seward. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts takes a similar view. B. says his
father has had a talk with the President; that he himself has written him
fully; that he advised the President not to dismiss Harlan unless Seward also
went; that the President expressed doubts whether the Senate would confirm two
Cabinet officers; that he was told there would be no difficulty; if there were,
he would let the assistants carry on the Departments, and assign General Grant
ad interim to the War; that Grant had been consulted and assented to the
arrangement.
SOURCE: Gideon
Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and
Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 527-9
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