Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, January 1, 1866

Made complimentary call with my family on the President at 11 A.M. By special request I went some fifteen minutes before the time specified, but there were sixty or eighty carriages in advance of us. The persons who got up the programme were evidently wholly unfit for the business. Instead of giving the first half-hour to the Cabinet and the several legations, and then to Army and Navy officers, Members of Congress, etc., in succession, numbers, including Members of Congress, and they embrace everybody, all the members of their respective boarding-houses, all their acquaintances, immediate and remote, who were in Washington, were there at an early hour. Consequently there was neither order nor system. After a delay of about twenty minutes we were landed in the Executive Mansion, which was already filled to overflowing in the hall and anterooms. While moving in the crowd, near the entrance to the Red Room, some of the officials signed to us and threw open the door to the Blue Room, or reception-room, which we entered, much relieved; but on turning, we found the President and his family immediately behind us. The affair passed off very well. A great want of order and system prevails on these occasions, owing to the ignorance and want of order of the marshal. No one having any conception of discipline or forethought directs or counsels those in charge. We left in a very short time, and the company began to flock in upon us at our house before twelve, and until past four a pretty steady stream came and went, naval and army officers, foreign ministers, Senators and Representatives, bureau officers and clerks, civilians and strangers. Pleasant but fatiguing, and the day was murky and the roads intolerable.

Mr. Seward left on Saturday. The rest of the members received, as did many other officials.

Henry Winter Davis, a conspicuous Member of the last Congress and a Maryland politician of notoriety, died on Saturday. He was eloquent, possessed genius, had acquirements, was eccentric, ambitious, unreliable, and greatly given to intrigue. In politics he was a centralist, regardless of constitutional limitations. I do not consider his death a great public loss. He was restless and active, but not useful. Still there will be a class of extreme Radicals who will deplore his death as a calamity and eulogize his memory.

When at the Executive Mansion the memory of the late President crowded upon my mind. He would have enjoyed the day, which was so much in contrast with all those he had experienced during his presidency.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 408-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, July 24, 1865

On Saturday evening I went with the President (whose health is suffering from excessive labor and care) and Preston King down the Potomac and took a sail yesterday in the Bay, returning last evening to Washington. Mr. Fox and Mr. Faxon accompanied us, also Wright Rives, the President's private secretary, also Dr. Duval. It was a small, pleasant, quiet party, intended to promote health and strength, especially to the President, who permits himself to be overtaxed.

The great iron ram Dunderberg was launched on Saturday. The papers give details of the vessel from its inception to the launch, but much of it warped. Among other things it is said the Navy Department entered upon the construction of this ship with great reluctance. It was after deliberate consideration. If it had been stated that I engaged in this work and made this contract with great caution and circumspection it would have been true. At the time this decision was made and the vessel commenced, a foreign war was feared. We had a large defensive force, but not as many and formidable vessels as we should need in the event of a war with a maritime power.

We had contracted for the Dictator and the Puritan, turreted vessels, which, if completed, would break up any attempted blockade of our harbors or coasts, but we could not cruise with them. Admiral Smith urged that one of these vessels should be of iron, the other of wood. The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fox, was urgent and persistent for the construction of four vessels. Mr. Lenthall was not partial to the turreted form of vessel. I decided in favor of two, and but two, and the Dictator and the Puritan were the results of that decision. I have since wished that one of these vessels was of wood, as Admiral Smith proposed, and I have rejoiced that I did not yield to the appeals for more. Probably those who urged the construction of more are glad also.

The Dunderberg was a different description of vessel. Mr. Webb had been importuned to build a large vessel for the government and was urged as the best man for such a contract in the country by numbers of the first men in New York and elsewhere. While glad to have the indorsement of such men, I by no means entered into a contract to oblige them or Mr. Webb, who, I have no doubt, procured the names by solicitation. In view of what was being done by England and France, and of the then condition of our affairs, I felt that we might need such a vessel. So feeling, I came to the conclusion that Mr. Webb was the best builder with whom I could contract, offered the best terms, and, under the circumstances, his plan, though exceptionable, was perhaps the best, with some modifications. These he made, reserving the turrets, to which Mr. Lenthall strongly objected, and which he predicted Mr. Webb would wish to abandon before the ship was completed. Events have verified his anticipations. These are some of the facts in regard to the Dunderberg. I take no special pride in the vessel, and could I have the money which she costs, I should prefer it to the vessel. Yet I feel assured I did right in ordering her to be built. We could not, in the crowded condition of the yards, attempt to build her in either of them.

In the violent assaults of Winter Davis and others upon the Department, I was accused of not having a navy of formidable vessels. I had vessels for the purposes then wanted. Ships of a more expensive and formidable character, like the Dunderberg, could not be built in a day. Now, when they are likely not to be wanted, and when they are drawing near completion, the same class of persons abuse me for what I have done towards the building up of a formidable navy. But one must not expect to escape the abuse and unjust attacks of demagogues. I certainly ought not to complain, for the country has nobly stood by me through all the misrepresentation and detraction of the malicious and ungenerous who have made it a point to assail me. Conscious that I have tried to do my duty, I have borne with patience.

I called on the President in relation to the Navy Agent in Washington, Brown, whose term expires on the 27th inst. Last winter, it was understood between Mr. Lincoln and myself that paymasters should hereafter perform the duty of Navy Agents, and thus save the expense of that class of officers. But about the 4th of March Vice-President Hamlin made a special appeal in behalf of Brown, and in view of Hamlin's disappointments and retirement, the good Mr. Lincoln had not the stamina to refuse him, or to say to him that it conflicted with a policy which he had deliberately adopted. My relations with Hamlin were such that I could not very well argue this point, and the President could modify or yield his own opinions. He understood my embarrassment and addressed me a note, stating his pledge inconsiderately made to Hamlin. I have submitted this note and the circumstances to President Johnson. He concurs with me, and is also somewhat embarrassed from delicacy, in consequence of his attitude towards Hamlin, whom he superseded. I suggested that he might oblige Hamlin by giving some other place to Brown or to any one else whom H. should name. This met his approval, and he suggested that I should have a letter prepared to H. for him, the President, to sign. I proposed speaking to Brown himself, stating the general policy of appointing no Navy Agent, and that, by acquiescing, the President would feel disposed to consider him and Hamlin favorably. He liked this, and I accordingly stated the case to Brown soon after, who was a good deal flurried and not prepared to decide whether he would resign or let his appointment run out and another be appointed, but would inform me on Wednesday.

While with the President, I remonstrated on his severe labors which are over-tasking his system. The anterooms and halls above and below were at the time a good deal crowded. He said he knew not what to do with these people; that a large delegation from Maryland had just left him, having called in relation to appointments in that State and here.

We had some conversation in regard to the Baltimore officers and Maryland matters and differences which there existed. The combination against the Blairs is fed and stimulated from Maryland). I expressed myself very decidedly for the Blairs, whom I had long known and who are true men. To which he fully responded and made the remark that they were true to their friends always, quality ever to be commended.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 340-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 23, 1865

Rear-Admiral Dahlgren returned this morning from Charleston. Two years since he left. Simultaneous with his return come tidings of the death of Rear-Admiral Du Pont, whom he relieved, and who died this A.M. in Philadelphia. Du Pont possessed ability, had acquirements, was a scholar rather than a hero. He was a courtier, given to intrigue, was selfish, adroit, and skillful. Most of the Navy were attached to him and considered his the leading cultured mind in the service. He nursed cliques. There are many intelligent and excellent officers, however, who look upon him with exceeding dislike; yet Du Pont had, two and three years ago, greater personal influence than any man in the service. He knew it, and intended to make it available in a controversy with the Department on the subject of the monitor vessels, to which he took a dislike. Although very proud, he was not physically brave. Pride would have impelled him to go into action, but he had not innate daring courage. He was determined not to retain his force or any portion of it in Charleston Harbor, insisted it could not be done, disobeyed orders, was relieved, and expected to rally the Navy and country with him, but was disappointed. Some of his best friends condemned his course. He sought a controversy with the Department, and was not successful. Disappointed and chagrined, he has been unhappy and dissatisfied. I believe I appreciated and did justice to his good qualities, and am not conscious that I have been at any time provoked to do him wrong. He challenged me to remove him, and felt confident I would not do it. I would not have done it had he obeyed orders and been zealous for operations against Charleston. As it was, I made no haste, and only ordered Foote and Dahlgren when I got ready. Then the step was taken. Du Pont was amazed, yet had no doubt the Navy would be roused in his favor, and that he should overpower the Department. Months passed. He procured two or three papers to speak for him, but there was no partisanship in the Navy for him, except with about half a dozen young officers, whom he had petted and trained, and a few mischievous politicians.

Returning to Delaware, he went into absolute retirement. None missed or called for him. This seclusion did not please him and became insupportable, but he saw no extrication. He therefore prepared a very adroit letter in the latter part of October, 1863, ostensibly an answer to a dispatch of mine written the preceding June. This skillful letter, I have reason to believe, was prepared in concert with H. Winter Davis, and was intended to be used in an assault on me at the session of Congress then approaching. Although much engaged, I immediately replied, and in such a manner as to close up Du Pont. Davis, however, made his attack in Congress, but in such a way as not to draw out the correspondence. Others remedied that deficiency, and Davis got more than he asked. Du Pont sank. He could rally no force, and the skill and tact at intrigue which had distinguished him in earlier years and in lower rank was gone. He felt that he was feeble and it annoyed him. Still, his talent was not wholly idle. False issues were put forth, and doubtless some have been deceived by them.

Admiral Porter is ordered to superintend the Naval School. In some respects a good officer, but is extravagant in expenditure sometimes, and I am apprehensive has a tendency to be partial. I trust, however, he may prove successful.

A letter of General Grant, urging the necessity of prompt action against the Imperial Government of Mexico, was read in Cabinet. Differences of opinion were expressed, but there was not a general concurrence in the apprehensions expressed by General Grant, who, naturally perhaps, desires to retain a large military force in service.

In a long conversation with Blair this evening he told me he had put himself in communication with some of the New York editors. Greeley had disappointed him, and was unreliable. Marble of the World he commends highly. I incline to think he has ability and he, or some of his writers, exhibits more comprehension of the true principles and structure of the government than in other journals. There is in the World more sound doctrine in these days than in most papers.

Blair still holds on to McClellan, — stronger, I think, than he did a year ago. Perhaps Marble and his New York friends have influenced him more than he supposes, and that he, instead of, or as well as they, may have been at least partially converted.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 320-22

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 30, 1865

The weather for several days has been exceedingly warm. For some time there have been complaints of mismanagement of affairs in the storekeeper's department at Boston, and on Monday last I made a change, appointing an officer who lost a leg in the service. Mr. Gooch comes to me with an outcry from the Boston delegation wanting action to be deferred. Told G. if there was any reason for it I would give it consideration. He wished to know the cause of the change. I told him the welfare and best interest of the service. It is not my purpose in this and similar cases to be placed on the defensive. I do not care to make or prefer charges, yet I feel it a most unpleasant task to remove even objectionable men.

The President is still indisposed, and I am unable to perfect some important business that I wished to complete with the close of the fiscal year. There are several Radical Members here, and have been for some days, apparently anxious to see the President. Have met Senator Wade two or three times at the White House. Complains that the Executive has the control of the government, that Congress and the Judiciary are subordinate, and mere instruments in his hands; said our form of government was on the whole a failure; that there are not three distinct and independent departments but one great controlling one with two others as assistants. Mentions that the late President called out 75,000 men without authority. Congress, when it came together, approved it. Mr. Lincoln then asked for 400,000 men and four hundred millions of money. Congress gave him five of each instead of four. I asked him if he supposed or meant to say that these measures were proposed without consulting, informally, the leading members of each house. He replied that he did not, and admitted that the condition of the country required the action which was taken, that it was right and in conformity with public expectation.

Thad Stevens called on me on business and took occasion to express ultra views, and had a sarcastic hit or two but without much sting. He is not satisfied, nor is Wade, yet I think the latter is mollified and disinclined to disagree with the President. But his friend Winter Davis, it is understood, is intending to improve the opportunity of delivering a Fourth-of-July oration, to take ground distinctly antagonistic to the Administration on the question of negro suffrage.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 324-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, February 4, 1865

There was yesterday no meeting of the Cabinet. This morning the members were notified to meet at twelve meridian. All were punctually on hand. The President with Mr. Seward got home this morning. Both speak of the interview with the Rebel commissioners as having been pleasant and without acrimony. Seward did not meet or have interview with them until the President arrived. No results were obtained, but the discussion will be likely to tend to peace. In going the President acted from honest sincerity and without pretension. Perhaps this may have a good effect, and perhaps otherwise. He thinks he better than any agent can negotiate and arrange. Seward wants to do this.

For a day or two, the naval appropriation bill has been under consideration in the House. A combination, of which H. Winter Davis is the leader, made it the occasion for an onset on the Department and the Administration. The move was sneaking and disingenuous, very much in character with Davis, who is unsurpassed for intrigue and has great talents for it. He moved an amendment, having for its object a Board of Admiralty, which should control the administration of the Department. The grounds of this argument were that the Department had committed errors and he wanted a board of naval officers to prevent it. He presents the British system for our guidance and of course has full scope to assail and misrepresent whatever has been done. But, unfortunately for Davis, the English are at this time considering the question of abandoning their system.

Mr. Rice, Chairman of the Naval Committee, a Boston merchant, is reported to have made a full and ample and most successful reply to Davis, who was voted down. I have not doubted the result, but there was a more formidable effort made than was at first apparent. The Speaker, who is not a fair and ingenuous man, although he professes to be so, and also to be personally friendly to me, is strictly factious and in concert with the extremists. In preparation for this contest he had called General Schenck to the chair. Schenck is one of the Winter Davis clique, and so far as he dare permit it to be seen, and more distinctly than he supposes, has the sympathy of Colfax. Stevens, Chairman of the Ways and Means, is of the same stripe. It is a combination of the radicals prompted and assisted by Du Pont and Wilkes. Hitherto hating each other, and invidiously drawing in others, the miserable wretched combinations of malcontents and intriguers, political and naval, had flattered themselves they should succeed. But they were voted down. I am told, however, that under the rulings and management of the hypocritically sanctimonious Speaker the subject is to be reopened.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 235-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, February 6, 1865

There was a Cabinet-meeting last evening. The President had matured a scheme which he hoped would be successful in promoting peace. It was a proposition for paying the expenses of the war for two hundred days, or four hundred millions, to the Rebel States, to be for the extinguishment of slavery, or for such purpose as the States were disposed. This in few words was the scheme. It did not meet with favor, but was dropped. The earnest desire of the President to conciliate and effect peace was manifest, but there may be such a thing as so overdoing as to cause a distrust or adverse feeling. In the present temper of Congress the proposed measure, if a wise one, could not be carried through successfully.

I do not think the scheme could accomplish any good results. The Rebels would misconstrue it if the offer was made. If attempted and defeated it would do harm.

The vote of to-day in the House on the renewed effort of Winter Davis to put the Navy Department in commission was decided against him. He and his associates had intrigued skillfully. They relied on the Democrats going with them in any measure against the Administration, and, having succeeded in rebuking Seward for his conduct of our foreign affairs in not conforming to their views, Davis and his friends now felt confident that they could indirectly admonish me. But a portion of the Democrats became aware of the intrigue, and declined to be made the instruments of the faction. It seems to have been a sore disappointment.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 237-8

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, February 10, 1865

On Wednesday evening Mrs. W. held a levee, which always disarranges. The season has thus far been one of gaiety. Parties have been numerous. Late hours I do not like, but I have a greater dislike to late dinners. The dinner parties of Washington are to be deprecated always by those who regard health.

The President has communicated his movements tending to peace. Jeff Davis has published the letter of Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell. They do not materially differ. The prospect of peace does not seem nearer than before the interview took place, yet I trust we are approximating the much desired result. There are ultras among us who do not favor the cessation of hostilities except on terms and conditions which make that event remote. A few leading radicals are inimical to the Administration, and oppose all measures of the Administration which are likely to effect an immediate peace. They are determined that the States in rebellion shall not resume their position in the Union except on new terms and conditions independent of those in the proposed Constitutional Amendment. Wade in the Senate and Winter Davis in the House are leading spirits in this disturbing movement. It is the positive element, violent without much regard to Constitutional or State rights, — or any other rights indeed, except such as they may themselves define or dictate.

Not much was done to-day at the Cabinet. Some discussion of general matters. Speed suggested what if one of the States, Michigan for instance, should decline to send Senators or Representatives to Congress, or take any action of themselves in the conduct of the federal government; or supposing Michigan were to take such action or non-action, and the western peninsula of that State, being a minority, should non-concur with the State but persist in being represented in Congress. In the course of the remarks, I inquired what would be said or done provided any State should choose to adopt a different organization from any that we now have, — for instance, combine the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the same hands, elect perhaps ten men and have one go out yearly. The subjects were novel. The President thought there were implied obligations on the part of each State to perform its duties to the general government which they could not neglect or refuse.

We get as yet no Secretary of the Treasury. Fessenden is locum tenens, reluctantly, I apprehend. The place is one which he does not like and cannot fill, and he is aware of it. Nor is he a very useful man to devise measures in council. He has ability as a critic and adviser but is querulous and angular. Some allowance must be made for infirm health, which has sharpened a sometimes unhappy temper. On two or three occasions he has manifested a passionate and almost vindictive ferocity towards Preston King which surprised me. His ability is acute rather than comprehensive. My intercourse with him has been pleasant, but not very intimate. We must soon know his successor. Of all the men named, Morgan is probably the best, and my impression is that he will finally be appointed. Some will object because Seward is from the same State, but that is a frivolous objection. I am not certain who the radicals are pressing for the place. They will not be pleased with Morgan if S. remains, but who their favorite is I do not learn.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 238-40

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, February 21, 1865

Have had no time the last ten eventful days to open this book; and am now in haste.

In the Senate as well as in the House, there has been a deliberate and mendacious assault on the Navy Department, but with even less success than the first. Senator Wade moved to adopt the Winter Davis proposition for a Board of Admiralty. It obtained, I am told, but two votes. A proposition which, under proper direction and duly prepared was not destitute of merit as a naval measure, provided the government is to have a more military and central character, has been put down, probably for years, perhaps forever.

The scheme in this instance was concocted by a few party aspirants in Congress and a few old and discomfited naval officers, with some quiddical lawyer inventors, schemers, and contractors. They did not feel inclined to make an open assault on me; they therefore sought to do it by indirection. Much of the spite was against the Assistant Secretary, who may have sometimes been rough and who has his errors as well as his good qualities, but who has well performed his duties, — sometimes, perhaps, has overdone, — has his favorites and decided prejudices.

Senator Hale, while he does not love me, has now particular hatred of Fox, and in striving to gratify his grudge is really benefiting the man whom he detests. He and others in the House have spoken of F. as the actual Secretary instead of the Assistant, striving thereby to hold him to a certain degree of accountability, and also hoping to sow dissension between him and me. For three years Hale made it his chief business to misrepresent and defame me, and he had with him at the beginning some who have become ashamed of him. In the mean time he has obtained other recruits. Blaine of Maine dislikes Fox, and in his dislike denounces the Navy Department, which he says, in general terms, without mentioning particulars, is mismanaged.

But I have no reason to complain when I look at results and the vindication of able champions. They have done me more than justice. Others could have done better, perhaps, than I have done, and yet, reviewing hastily the past, I see very little to regret in my administration of the Navy. In the matter of the light-draft monitors and the double-enders I trusted too much to Fox and Stimers. In the multiplicity of my engagements, and supposing those vessels were being built on an improved model, under the approval and supervision of Lenthall and the advice of Ericsson, I was surprised to learn when they were approaching completion, that neither Lenthall nor Ericsson had participated, but that Fox and Stimers had taken the whole into their hands. Of course, I could not attempt to justify what would be considered my own neglect. I had been too confiding and was compelled, justly perhaps, to pay the penalty in this searching denunciation of my whole administration. Neither of the men who brought me to this difficulty take the responsibility.

We have made great progress in the Rebel War within a brief period. Charleston and Columbia have come into our possession without any hard fighting. The brag and bluster, the threats and defiance which have been for thirty years the mental aliment of South Carolina prove impotent and ridiculous. They have displayed a talking courage, a manufactured bravery, but no more, and I think not so much inherent heroism as others. Their fulminations that their cities would be Saragossas were mere gasconade, — their Pinckneys and McGrawths and others were blatant political partisans.

General Sherman is proving himself a great general, and his movements from Chattanooga to the present demonstrate his ability as an officer. He has, undoubtedly, greater resources, a more prolific mind, than Grant, and perhaps as much tenacity if less cunning and selfishness.

In Congress there is a wild, radical element in regard to the rebellious States and people. They are to be treated by a radical Congress as no longer States, but Territories without rights, and must have a new birth or creation by permission of Congress. These are the mistaken theories and schemes of Chase, — perhaps in conjunction with others.

I found the President and Attorney-General Speed in consultation over an apprehended decision of Chief Justice Chase, whenever he could reach the question of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Some intimation comes through Stanton, that His Honor the Chief Justice intends to make himself felt by the Administration when he can reach them. I shall not be surprised, for he is ambitious and able. Yet on that subject he is as much implicated as others.

The death of Governor Hicks a few days since has brought on a crisis of parties in Maryland. Blair is a candidate for the position of Senator, and the President wishes him elected, but Stanton and the Chase influence, including the Treasury, do not, and hence the whole influence of those Departments is against him. Blair thinks the President does not aid him as much as he had reason to suppose he would, and finds it difficult to get an interview with him. I think he has hardly been treated as he deserves, or as the President really wishes, yet the vindictiveness of the Chief Justice and Stanton deter him, control him against his will.

The senior Blair is extremely anxious for the promotion of his son-in-law, Lee, and has spoken to me several times on the subject. He called again to-day. I told him of the difficulties, and the great dissatisfaction it would give the naval officers. Pressed as the old man is by not only Lee but Lee's wife, and influenced by his own willing partiality, he cannot see this subject as I and others see it.

A few days since the President sent into the Senate the nomination of Senator E. D. Morgan for the Treasury. It was without consultation with M., who immediately called on the President and declined the position.

Seward, whom I saw on that evening, stated facts to me which give me some uneasiness. He called, he says, on the President at twelve to read to him a dispatch, and a gentleman was present, whom he would not name, but S. told the gentleman if he would wait a few moments he would be brief, but the dispatch must be got off for Europe. The gentleman declined waiting, but as he left, the President said, “I will not send the paper in to-day but will hold on until to-morrow." Seward says he has no doubt the conversation related to M.'s nomination, but that, the paper being made out, his private secretary took it up with the other nominations, and the President, when aware of the fact, sent an express to recall it, in order to keep faith with the gentleman mentioned. This gentleman was, no doubt, Fessenden.

I called on Governor Morgan on Sunday evening and had over an hour's conversation with him, expressing my wish and earnest desire that he should accept the place, more on the country's account than his own. He gave me no favorable response. Said that Thurlow Weed had spent several hours with him that morning to the same effect as myself and trying to persuade him to change his mind, but he would give Weed no assurance; on the contrary had persisted in his refusal. He, Morgan, was frank and communicative, as he has generally been with me on important questions, and reviewed the ground, State-wise and national-wise. “What,” he inquired, “is Seward's object? He never in such matters acts without a motive, and Weed would not have been called here except to gain an end."

Seward, he says, wants to be President. What does he intend to do? Will he remain in the Cabinet, or will he leave it? Will he go abroad, or remain at home? These, and a multitude of questions which he put me, showed that Morgan had given the subject much thought, and especially as it affected himself and Seward. Morgan has his own aspirations and is not prepared to be used by Weed or Seward in this case.

My own impressions are that Morgan has committed a great mistake as regards himself. Seward may be jealous of him, as M. is suspicious he is, but I doubt if that was the controlling motive with S. I think he preferred Morgan, as I do, for the Treasury, to any tool of Chase. The selection, I think, was the President's, not Seward's, though the latter readily fell in with it. Blair had advised it. Fessenden was probably informed on the morning when Seward met him at the President's and desired to have the nomination postponed.

I am told Thurlow Weed expressed great dissatisfaction that Morgan did not accept the position. That Weed and Seward may have selfish schemes in this is not unlikely, but whether they have or not, it was no less the duty of Morgan to serve his country when he could.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 240-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, October 1, 1864

The President yesterday made inquiry of me as to the disposition made of Farragut. Informed me that General Canby wanted him to remain at Mobile, and that F. preferred doing so to coming to Wilmington. I told him Farragut was relieved of the latter duty, and he could remain as long as he pleased in the Gulf. This morning the President called at the Navy Department and made further inquiry. Said that Halleck and Sherman had some movements on hand, and the War Department also, and would like to know if F. could remain. I told him he could.

Shortly after he left, two dispatches from Admiral Farragut came on to my table, received by this morning's mail, in which he expressed decided aversion to taking command at Wilmington.

These dispatches inform me that General Canby has an expedition on foot for the capture of Mobile, that he is getting troops for this purpose, etc., all of which has been studiously kept from the Navy Department, and now when ready to move, they are embarrassed. I immediately went over to the War Department and the President was there. He was, I soon saw, but slightly informed of the proposed army movement, but Stanton and Halleck, finding they had refined too much, had communicated hastily with him, in order that he should see me.

All this is bad administration. There will be want of unity and concert under such management. It is not because the President has any want of confidence in his Cabinet, but Seward and Stanton both endeavor to avoid Cabinet consultations on questions of their own Departments. It has been so from the beginning on the part of the Secretary of State, who spends more or less of every day with the President and worms from him all the information he possesses and can be induced to impart. A disposition to constantly intermeddle with other Departments, to pry into them and often to control and sometimes counteract them, has manifested itself throughout, often involving himself and others in difficulty. Chase for some time was annoyed that things were so but at length went into competition for the President's ear and company. He did not succeed, however, as against Seward, though adopting his policy of constant attendance. Stanton has been for the departmental system always. Pressing, assuming, violent, and impatient, intriguing, harsh, and arbitrary, he is often exceedingly offensive in his manners, deportment, and many of his acts.

A majority of the friends of the Administration in the last Congress was opposed to the President, but his opponents were the cronies and intimates of Stanton, or Chase, who, however, were not cordial towards one another or in anything but in their hostility to the President. Stanton kept on more intimate terms with the President, while his friends were the most violent in their enmity. Wade, Winter Davis, and men of that description were Stanton's particular favorites and in constant consultation with him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 165-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, August 26, 1864

Am harassed by the pressure on the enlistment question. A desire to enter the Navy to avoid the draft is extensive, and the local authorities encourage it, so that our recruiting rendezvous are, for the time being, overrun. The Governors and others are applying for more rendezvous in order to facilitate this operation. The draft for five hundred thousand men is wholly an army conscription. Incidentally it aids the Navy, and to that extent lessens the number of the army. I have been willing to avail ourselves of the opportunity for naval recruiting, but the local authorities are for going beyond this and making our enlistments a primary object of the draft. Because I cannot consent to this perversion I am subjected to much captious criticism, even by those who should know better.

Neither Stanton, Blair, nor Bates were to-day at the Cabinet-meeting. Judge Johnson of Ohio informs me that Wade is universally denounced for uniting with Winter Davis in his protest, and that he has been stricken from the list of speakers in the present political campaign in that State.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 121-2

To The Supporters Of The Government.

We have read without surprise, but not without indignation, the Proclamation of the President of the 8th of July, 1864.

The supporters of the Administration are responsible to the country for its conduct: and it is their right and duty to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.

It is impossible to pass in silence this Proclamation without neglecting that duty; and, having taken as much responsibility as any others in supporting the Administration, we are not disposed to fail in the other duty of asserting the rights of Congress.

The President did not sign the bill “to guarantee to certain States whose Governments have been usurped, a Republican form of Government”—passed by the supporters of his Administration in both Houses of Congress after mature deliberation.

The bill did not therefore become a law: and it is therefore nothing.

The proclamation is neither an approval nor a veto of the bill; it is therefore a document unknown to the laws of the Constitution of the United States.

So far as it contains an apology for not signing the bill, it is a political manifesto against the friends of the Government.

So far as it proposes to execute the bill which is not a law, it is a grave Executive usurpation.

It is fitting that the facts necessary to enable the friends of the Administration to appreciate the apology and usurpation be spread before them.

The Proclamation says:

“And whereas the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than an hour before the sine die adjournment of said session and was not signed by him—”

If that be accurate, still this bill was presented with other bills which were signed.

Within that hour, the time of the sine die adjournment was three times postponed by the votes of both Houses; and the least intimation of a desire for more time by the President to consider this bill would have secured a further postponement.

Yet the Committee sent to ascertain if the President had any further communication for the House of Representatives reported that he had none; and the friends of the bill, who had anxiously waited on him to ascertain its fate, had already been informed that the President had resolved not to sign it.

The time of presentation, therefore, had nothing to do with his failure to approve it.

The Bill had been discussed and considered for more than a month in the House of Representatives, which it passed on the 4th of May; it was reported to the Senate on the 27th of May without material amendment, and passed the senate absolutely as it came from the House on the 2nd of July.

Ignorance of its contents is out of the question.

Indeed, at his request, a draft of a bill substantially the same in all material points, and identical in the points objected to by the Proclamation, had been laid before him for his consideration in the Winter of 1862-63.

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose the provisions of the bill took the President by surprise.

On the contrary, we have reason to believe them to have been so well known that this method of preventing the bill from becoming a law without the constitutional responsibility of a veto, had been resolved on long before the bill passed the Senate.

We are informed by a gentleman entitled to the entire confidence, that before the 22d of June in New-Orleans it was stated by a member of Gen. Banks’s staff, in the presence of other gentlemen in official position, that Senator Doolittle had written a letter to the department that the House Reconstruction bill would be staved off in the Senate to a period too late in the session to require the President to veto it in order to defeat it, and that Mr. Lincoln would retained the bill, of necessary, and thereby defeat it.

The experience of Senator Wade, in his various efforts to get the bill considered in the Senate, was quite in accordance with that plan; and the fate of the bill was accurately predicted by letters received from New-Orleans before it passed the Senate.

Had the Proclamation stopped there, it would have been only one other defeat of the will of the people by an Executive perversion of the Constitution.

But it goes further.  The President says:

“And whereas the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration—”

By what authority of the Constitution?  In what forms?  The result to be declared by whom?  With what effect when ascertained?

Is it to be a law by the approval of the people without the approval of Congress at the will of the President?

Will the President, on his opinion of the popular approval, execute it as law?

Or is this merely a device to avoid the serious responsibility of defeating a law on which so many loyal hearts reposed for security?

But the reasons now assigned for not approving the bill are full of ominous significance.

The President proceeds:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration—”

That is to say, the President is resolved that the people shall not by law take any securities from the Rebel States against a renewal of the Rebellion, before restoring their power to govern us.

His wisdom and prudence are to be our sufficient Guarantees!

He further says:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration—”

That is to say, the President persists in recognizing those shadows of Governments in Arkansas and Louisiana, which Congress formally declared should not be recognized—whose Representatives and Senators were repelled by formal votes of both Houses of Congress—which it was declared formally should have no electoral vote for President and Vice President.

They are more creatures of his will. They cannot live a day without his support.  They are mere oligarchies, imposed on the people by military orders under the forms of elections, at which generals, provost-marshals, soldiers and camp-followers where the chief actors, assisted by a handful of resident citizens, and urged on to premature action by private letters from the President.

In neither Louisiana nor Arkansas, before Banks’s defeat, did the United States control half the territory or half the population.  In Louisiana, Gen. Banks’s proclamation candidly declared: “the fundamental law of the State is martial law.”

On that foundation of freedom, he erected what the President calls “the free Constitution and Government of Louisiana.”

But of this State, whose fundamental law was martial law, only sixteen parishes of forty-eight parishes were held by the United States; and in five of the sixteen we held only our camps.

The eleven parishes we substantially held had 233,185 inhabitants; the residue of the State not held by us, 575,617.

At the farce called an election, the officers of Gen. Banks returned that 11,346 ballots were cast; but whether any or by whom the people of the United States have no legal assurance but it is probable that 4,000 were cast by soldiers or employees of the United States military or municipal, but none according to any law, State or National, and 7,000 ballots represent the State of Louisiana.

Such is the free Constitution and Government of Louisiana; and like it is that of Arkansas.  Nothing but the failure of a military expedition deprived as of a like once on the swamps of Florida; and before the Presidential election, like ones may be organized in ever Rebel State where the United states have a camp.

The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the Rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition.

If those votes turn the balance in his favor, is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce?

If the Rebel majority assert their supremacy in those States, and send votes which elect an enemy of the Government, will we not repel his claims?

And is not that civil war for the Presidency, inaugurated by the votes of the Rebel States.

Seriously impressed with these dangers, Congress, “the proper and constitutional authority,” formally declared that there are no State Governments in the Rebel States, and provided for their erection at a proper time; and both the Senate and the House of Representatives rejected the Senators and Representatives chosen under the authority of what the President calls the Free Constitution and Government of Arkansas.

The President’s Proclamation “holds for naught” this judgment, and discards the authority of the Supreme Court, and strides headlong toward the anarchy his Proclamation of the8th of December inaugurated.

If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President to “hold for naught” the will of Congress rather than his Government in Louisiana and Arkansas.

The judgment of Congress which the President defies was the exercise of an authority exclusively vested in Congress by the Constitution to determine what is the established Government in a State, and in its own nature and by the highest judicial authority binding on all other departments of the Government.

The supreme Court has formally declared that under the 4th section of the IVth article of the Constitution, requiring the United States to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, “it rests with Congress to decide what Government is the established one in a State;” and “when Senators and Representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the Government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character is recognized by the proper constitutional authority, and its decision is binding on ever other department of the Government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.  It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and, as no Senators or Representatives were elected under the authority of the Government of which Mr. Door was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy.  Yet the right to decide is placed there.”

Even the President’s proclamation of the 8th of December, formally declares that “Whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats, constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive.”

And that is not the less true because wholly inconsistent with the President’s assumption in that proclamation of a right to institute and recognize State Governments in the Rebels States, nor because the President is unable to perceive that his recognition is a nullity if it be not conclusive on Congress.

Under the Constitution, the right to Senators and Representatives is inseparable from a State Government.

If there be a State Government, the right is absolute.

If there be no State Government, there can be no Senators or Representatives chosen.

The two Houses of Congress are expressly declared to be the sole judges of their own members.

When, therefore, Senators and Representatives are admitted, the State Government, under whose authority they were chosen, is conclusively established; when they are rejected, its existence is as conclusively rejected and denied; and to this [judgment] the President is bound to submit.

The President proceeds to express his unwillingness “to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish Slavery in States” as another reason for not signing the bill.

But the bill nowhere proposes to abolish Slavery in States.

The bill did provide that all slaves in the Rebel states should be manumitted.

But as the President had already signed three bills manumitting several classes of slaves in States, it is not conceived possible that he entertained any scruples touching that provision of the bill which he is silent.

He had already himself assumed a right by proclamation to free much the larger number of slaves in the Rebel States, under the authority given him a discretion it could not exercise itself.

It is more unintelligible from the fact that, except in respect to a small part of Virginia and Louisiana, the bill covered only what the Proclamation covered—added a Congressional title and judicial remedies by law to the disputed title under the Proclamation, and perfected the work the President professed to be so anxious to accomplish.

Slavery as an institution can be abolished only by a charge of the Constitution of the United States or of the law of the State; and this is the principle of the bill.

It required the new Constitution of the State to provide for that prohibition; and the President, in the face of his own proclamation, does not venture to object to insisting on that condition.  Nor will the country tolerate its abandonment—yet he defeated the only provision imposing it!!

But when he describes himself, in spite of this great blow at emancipation, as “sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing Slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, we curiously inquire on what his expectation rests, after the vote of the House of Representatives at the recent session, and in the face of the political complexion of more than enough of the States to prevent the possibility of its adoption within any reasonable time; and why he did not indulge his sincere hopes with so large an installment of the blessing as his approval of the bill would have secured.

After this assignment of his reasons for preventing the bill from becoming a law, the President proceeds to declare his purpose to execute it as a law by his plenary dictatorial power.

He says:

“Nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military Governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.”

A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated.

Congress passed a bill; the President refused to approve it, and then by a proclamation puts as much of it in force as he sees fit, and proposes to execute those parts by officers unknown to the laws of the United States and not subject to the confirmation of the Senate!

The bill directed the appointment of Provisional Governors by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The President, after defeating the law, proposes to appoint without law, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, Military Governors for the Rebel States!

He has already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and he defeated the bill to prevent its limitation.

Henceforth we must regard the following precedent as the Presidential law of the Rebel States:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,               

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1864

His Excellency MICHAEL HAHN, Governor of Louisiana,

Until further orders you are hereby invested with the power expressed hitherto by the Military Governor of Louisiana.

Yours,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This Michael Hahn is no officer of the United States; the President, without law, without the advice and consent of the Senate, by a private note not even countersigned by the Secretary of State, makes him dictator of Louisiana!

The bill provided for the civil administration of the laws of the State—till it should be in a fit of temper to govern itself—repealing all laws recognizing Slavery, and making all men equal before the law.

These beneficent provisions the President has annulled.  People will die, and marry and transfer property, and buy and sell; and to these acts of civil life courts and officers of the law are necessary, Congress legislated for these necessary things, and the President deprives them of the protection of the law!

The President’s purpose to instruct his Military Governors “to proceed according to the bill”—a makeshift to calm the disappointment its defeat has occasional—if not merely a grave usurpation but a transparent delusion.

He cannot “proceed according to the bill” after preventing it from becoming a law.

Whatever is done will be at his will and pleasure, but persons responsible to no law, and more interested to secure the interests and execute the will of the President than of the people; and the will of Congress is to be “held for naught,” “unless the loyal people of the Rebel States choose to adopt it.”

If they should graciously prefer the stringent bill to the easy proclamation, still the registration will be made under no legal sanction; it will give no assurance that a majority of the people of the States have taken the oath; if administered, it will be without legal authority, and void; no indictment will lie for false swearing at the election, or for admitting bad or rejecting good votes; it will be a farce of Louisiana and Arkansas acted over again, under the forms of this bill, but not by authority of law.

But when we come to the guarantees of future peace which Congress meant to enact, the forms, as well as the substance of the bill, must yield to the President’s will that none should be imposed.

It was the solemn resolve of Congress to protect the loyal men of the nation against three great dangers, (1) the return to power of the guilty leaders of the Rebellion, (2) the continuance of Slavery, and (3) the burden of the Rebel debt.

Congress required assent to those provision by the convention of the State; and if refused it was to be dissolved.

The President “holds for naught” that resolve of Congress, because he is unwilling “to be inflexibly committed to any one plan of restoration,” and the people of the United States are not to be allowed to protect themselves unless their enemies agree to it.

The order to proceed according to the bill is therefore merely at the bill of the Rebel States; and they have the option to reject it, accept the proclamations of the 8th of December, and demand the President’s recognition!

Mark the Contrast!  The bill requires a majority, the proclamation is satisfied with one-tenth; the bill requires one oath, the proclamation another; the bill ascertains voters by registering; the proclamation by guess; the bill exacts adherence to existing territorial limits, the proclamation admits of others; the bill governs the Rebel States by law, equalizing all before it, the proclamation commits them to the lawless discretion of military Governors and Provost-Marshals; the bill forbids electors for President, the Proclamation and defeat of the bill threatens us with civil war for the admission or exclusion of such votes; the bill exacted exclusion of dangerous enemies from power and the relief of the nation from the Rebel debt, and the prohibition of Slavery forever, so that the suppression of the Rebellion will double our resources to bear or pay the national debt, free the masses from the old domination of the Rebel leaders, and eradicate the cause of the war; the proclamation secures neither of these guaranties.

It is silent respecting the Rebel debt and the political exclusion of rebel leaders; leaving Slavery exactly where it was by law at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and adds no guaranty even of the freedom of the slaves he undertook to manumit.

It is summed up in an illegal oath, without a sanction, and therefore void.

The oath is to support all proclamations of the President during the Rebellion having reference to slaves.

Any Government is to be accepted at the hands of one-tenth of the people not contravening that oath.

Now that oath neither secures the abolition of Slavery, nor adds any security to the freedom of the slaves the President declared free.

It does not secure the abolition of Slavery; for the proclamation of freedom merely professed to free certain slaves while it recognized the institution.

Every Constitution of the Rebel States at the outbreak of the Rebellion may be adopted without the change of a letter, for none of them contravene that Proclamation, none of them establish slavery.

It adds no security to the freedom of the slaves.

For their title is the Proclamation of Freedom.

If it be unconstitutional, an oath to support it is void.  Whether constitutional or not, the oath is without authority of law, and therefore void.

If it be valid and observed, it exacts no enactment by the State, either in law or Constitution, to add a State guaranty to the proclamation title and the right of a slave to freedom is an open question before the State courts on the relative authority of the State law and the Proclamation.

If the oath binds the one-tenth who take it, it is not exacted of the other nine-tenths who succeed to the control of the State Government; so that it is annulled instantly by the act of recognition.

What the State courts would say of the Proclamation, who can doubt?

But the master would not go into court—he would seize his slave.

What the Supreme Court would say, who can tell?

When and how is the question to get there?

No habeas corpus lies for him in a United States Court; and the President defeated with this bill its extension of that writ to this case.

Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President—a blow at the friends of his Administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government.

The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supports of his Administration have so long practiced, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents.

But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishers our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed Rebellion, and leave political rëorganization to Congress.

If the supporters of the Government fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and security committed to their keeping, they sacrifice.

Let them consider the remedy for these usurpations, and having found it, fearlessly execute it.

B. F. WADE, Chairman Senate Committee.

H. WINTER DAVIS, Chairman Committee House

of Representatives on the Rebellious States.

SOURCE: New York Daily Tribune, New York, New York, Friday August 5, 1864, p. 5

The Political Situation

[From the Richmond Examiner (opp. Organ) Aug. 15.]

Whatever may turn out to be the meaning of fact, the fact itself begins to shine out clear that Abraham Lincoln is lost; that he will never be president again—not even President of the Yankee remnant of States, to say nothing of the whole six and thirty—or, how many are there, counting “Colorado” and “Idaho,” and other Yahoo commonwealths lately invented?  The obscene ape of Illinois is about to be deposed from the Washington purple, and the White House will echo to his little jokes no more.  It is in no spirit of exultation we contemplate this coming event, for Abraham has been a good Emperor for us; but has served our turn; his policy has settled, established, and made irrevocable the separation of the old Union into nations essentially foreign, and we may be almost sorry to part with him.  He was, in the eyes of all mankind, and unanswerable argument for our secession, for he stood there a living justification, seven feet high, of the steadfast resolution of these States to hold no more political union with a race capable not only of producing such a being, but of making it a ruler and king.

Certainly his elevation to that position astonished the world, but it amazed nobody so much as the creature himself; he knew he was neither rich nor rare, and wondered how the devil he got there, or, as he expressed it himself the other day, to a Canadian editor, “It seems to be strange that I, a boy born, as it were, in the woods, should have drifted into the apex of this great event.”  Why strange?  One may be drifted into any apex if he only embarks upon a chain of circumstances; and those who sneer at Abraham’s figures are desired to observe that Noah’s ark did actually drift to an apex; and it contained, with every other beast of his kind, a pair of baboons.  If they drifted to an apex, so may he.  However that may be, he is certainly now about to come down, and even to be dragged or kicked down.  The prognostications of last spring were infallable, that the “rebellion” must be crushed this year—at least very signal and decided successes must be gained over it, or else the war would no longer be carried on under Lincoln’s government; let what might come of the war and the Union, he would get no more armies to fling into the red pit of Virginia for slaughter.

Now to put aside for the present the total loss of what Yankees fondly believe to be their conquests in the trans-Mississippi; pretermitting also the dead lock to which Sherman’s army has been brought, with all Kentucky, Tennessee and half of Georgia lying between him and his own country, and looking only to this most colossal invasion of Virginia with three large armies all bound for Richmond—the thing is over.  Grant’s army is rapidly going away from our front at Petersburg, and returning to Washington or elsewhere.  Of course Grant will not put up a notice on the shore of the Appomattox that he hereby abandons his enterprise; either will Stanton officially notify that the armies of “the Union” are found wholly unable to advance one yard out of the protection of their ships, and therefore they discontinue the campaign with a loss of one hundred fifty thousand killed, wounded and missing.  This would be unreasonable to expect, nevertheless the enterprise is abandoned.  Richmond is no more to hear the roar of Yankee siege guns under that potentate’s reign.

One cannot but arrive at this conclusion from several indications—from the greatly increasing excitement at the North touching the Chicago Convention, which is to nominate a Democratic President; from the daring violence with which some newspapers counsel resistance in arms against the draft of half a million of men, and from the singular movement of some of Lincoln’s own Black Republican supporters in the Washington Congress.  They waited for the moment when their sovereign’s fortunes were declining from their “apex” to give them a treacherous shove down the hill.  Two of his most vehement and efficient allies, Wade, of Ohio, and Winter Davis, of Maryland, gave him this blow under the fifth rib.  They present, in their official capacity, what almost amounts to a legal impeachment, save in matter of form, against their fond and too indulgent master, now tottering to his fall; charge him with arrogance, usurpation, knavery, in withholding his assent to a bill touching the status of these Confederate States—a matter which though of small importance to us, is of the deepest moment, it seems in that country; inasmuch as he has a plan of his own for readmitting States to the Union on the application of one-tenth of their population; and this would, they say, give him the control of the presidential election.  So they inform him that an election carried by this artifice must be resisted, and that he is inaugurating a civil war for the Presidency.

If Grant had only taken Richmond, would they have dared to set their names to such a document as this?  All the world suddenly, within one week, in short, since the blow up of the campaign at Petersburg, seems to feel instinctively that Abraham’s gave is played; and the New York Herald at once calls for a new National convention at Buffalo to nominate some other men instead of the baboon of Illinois and the tailor of Tennessee, and finds out that “the very winds have been whispering it for weeks”—that is for two weeks, since the Petersburg blow up.  Abe! The Emperor, is a fallen tree; no bird of the air will ever again leather its nest under his branches; a dying gorilla against whom the smallest cur can lift up its leg.

Taking it as certain, then, that the enemy’s present sovereign is as good as gone, next comes the most interesting consideration of who is to be his successor.  It is not very plain in the interest of whom, or what, Wade and Davis have so suddenly found out the enormities of Lincoln; nor whether they mean to aid the Fremont party of impossible ultra-radicals, or lay the pipes for themselves, Wade and Davis; but the most interesting matter to us is the keen and active agitation in the two branches of the Democratic party.  The peace Democrats openly avow that they will labor in the Chicago Convention of this month to get a “platform” of instant and absolute peace. We learn that the War Democrats are beginning, through some of their influential papers, to give their assent to an armistice, as one of the “planks” of the Chicago Convention—an armistice to allow negotiations for reconstruction.  In other words, these war Democrats propose that, leaving the military lines of each party where they now are, the Confederate states should be invited to send delegates to meet the Yankee States in Convention.

Let there be not only an armistice, but a formal renunciation of all right and pretense to coerce these states; and of course  an entire withdrawal of all land and sea forces which occupy any portion of our soil, or blockade any of our ports; and then the Northern States will be in a position to propose to us reconstruction of the Union, or a convention of States for the purpose of negotiating that.  It may safely be promised that such proposals would then be at least considered; at present, one cannot say what would be the result of that consideration; but, it short, let our Northern brethren try us.  With such change in the existing relations, no doubt there may come also a great change over men’s minds?  The hideous apparition of the blood-bolstered Lincoln will be laid; the bayonet will be no longer point at our throats, our dead will have been buried out of our sight, and it is vain as humorous Abraham says, to grieve over spilt milk—for so the facetious man calls blood.  We do not answer for a favorable result of this policy, but the Chicago Democrats will find it worthwhile to try it, seeing that is the only chance they have.

SOURCE: The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Brooklyn, New York, Tuesday, August 16, 1864

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, May 13, 1864

The army news is interesting and as well received as the great loss of life will permit. Hancock has made a successful onset and captured Edward Johnson and two other generals, with about fifty other officers and four thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of cannon, etc. General Sheridan, with his cavalry, has got in rear of Lee and destroyed about ten miles of railroad, captured two trains, and destroyed the depot of Rebel supplies at Beaver Dam. Our troops are in good heart and everything looks auspicious for the republic. Many valuable lives have been offered up for the Union, and many a Rebel has fallen. I dwell not on particulars. The public press and documents will give them. The tidings have caused joy to the patriotic everywhere, but among the intense partisans, known as Copperheads, it is obvious there is no gratification in the success of the Union arms. It is painful to witness this factious and traitorous spirit, but it plainly shows itself.

I saw Governor Morgan yesterday respecting his circular. He says he sent it out in self-defense; that, while he knew I would stand by him in resisting a postponement of the convention, he was not certain that others would, should things by any possibility be adverse. He says the answers are all one way, except that of Spooner of Ohio, who is for a postponement. This is indicative of the Chase influence.

To-night Governor Morgan informs me that the hall in which the convention is to meet has been hired by the malcontents, through the treachery and connivance of H. Winter Davis, in whom he confided. He called on me to advise as to the course to be pursued. Says he can get the theatre, can build a temporary structure, or he can alter the call to Philadelphia. Advised to try the theatre for the present.

Admiral Shubrick says Admiral Du Pont is writing a book in vindication of himself; that he (Shubrick) and other friends of Du Pont have counselled him against such a course, but without effect; that he is under the control of H. Winter Davis, etc., etc. The subject gives me no concern or disquietude. If Du Pont desires to vindicate or explain his acts, or to assail mine or me personally, I shall not regret his proceeding. His great mistake is in overestimating his own personal consequence and undervaluing his country. Vanity and the love of intrigue are his ruin.

Mr. Representative Gooch of the Charlestown, Massachusetts, district, has undertaken, with a few other interested spirits, to discuss the management of the navy yard, and has had much to say of the rights of the citizens and of the naval gentlemen. Wants the civilians to control the yard. In all matters of conflict between the government and the mischievous element of the yard, Mr. Gooch sides against the government. This morning he called on me to protest against Admiral Smith and the naval management of the yard. After hearing his complaints I remarked that the difficulties at that yard were traced mainly to Mr. Merriam, and antagonisms got up between civilians and naval officers had their origin with him and his associates. He wished me to order a restoration of all appointments in certain departments to Merriam, which I declined, but told him I would select two masters instead of leaving the employment of workmen with the Chief Engineer.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 29-31

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, April 9, 1864

Senator Wilson to-day and Mr. Rice yesterday called in relation to the investigations which Olcott is prosecuting in Boston. They both were moved to call by Smith brothers, who are beginning to feel uneasy. Their attacks on others, if not their wrong acts, have provoked inquiries concerning themselves. I remarked to each of the gentlemen that the Smiths had nothing to apprehend if they had done no wrong.

Finished draft of letter in reply to three resolutions — one of the Senate and two of the House — inquiring concerning the ironclads, Du Pont's attack last April, etc. The documents to be sent are voluminous. Du Pont instigated the inquiry, and will be very likely to regret it, not having seen my report and accompanying papers. He evidently thought I would not publish the detailed reports, which he had secured and prepared for a purpose, but I had communicated them with my report. Spaulding, one of the Naval Committee, allowed himself to be used in the intrigue, and, to his discredit, called for the documents which I had sent in with report and which had been printed before his resolution was offered, though he avers I had not presented them. Few of the Members of Congress do their work thoroughly, or give matters examination, and hence, like Spaulding, are often victimized. But Du Pont and his friend Winter Davis, like all intriguers, overrode themselves in some of their movements. For two years Du Pont was the petted man of the Department. He has abilities and had courted and brought into his clique many of the best officers of the Navy. These always were lauding him. Those who were not of his circle were silent, and I had to form my opinions and conclusions from what I saw and heard. Fox was very devoted to him and could never do too much for him. To no man has he ever evinced more partiality. As a general thing, I have thought Fox, considering his associations and prejudices formed in the service, has been fair and just towards the officers, but DuPont asked for nothing that Fox was not willing and urgent to have me grant, yet eventually D. turned upon him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 7-8