Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, August 2, 1865

 General Butler called on me to-day. Came direct from the Executive Mansion. Says the President is no better. He could not see him. Is confined to his room, indeed he every day confines himself to the house and room. General B. was very much inclined to talk on public affairs, and evidently intends taking an active part in the rising questions. Much of our conversation related to Jeff Davis and General Lee, both of whom he would have tried, convicted, and executed. Mild and lenient measures, he is convinced, will have no good effect on the Rebels. Severity is necessary.

Cameron called on me with his friend for the twentieth time at least, in relation to two appointments in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He does not conceal from me, nor probably from any one, that he intends to be a candidate for the Senate. Hence his vigilance in regard to certain appointments, and he has prevailed in the Treasury and in the Post Office, against the combined efforts of all the Members of Congress. In sustaining, as he does, the policy of the President he shows sagacity. Kelley and the Members, but especially K., have shot wild on negro suffrage. There is a strong pressure towards centralism at this time. Many sensible men seem to be wholly oblivious to constitutional barriers and restraints, and would have the Federal government assume authority to carry out their theories. General Butler, to-day, speaks of the Rebel States as dead. I suggested that it was a more correct theory to consider them as still States in and of the Union, but whose proper constitution functions had been suspended by a conspiracy and rebellion. He said that was pretty much his view.

Chief Engineer Stimers sends in his resignation. I had given him orders to the Powhatan, and he does not wish to go to sea.

Unfortunately Stimers has got into difficulty with Lenthall and Isherwood; others, perhaps, are in fault. Stimers rendered good service in the first Monitor, and afterwards at Charleston, for which I felt under obligations to him, and did not hesitate to express it. Subsequently, when preparing to build the light-draft monitors, he and the Assistant Secretary took the subject in hand. Stimers became intoxicated with his own importance. While I supposed the Naval Constructor and Chief Engineer, to whose bureaus it belonged, were prosecuting the subject, under advisement with Mr. Ericsson, it appeared that these men had been ignored. When my attention was called to the question, Lenthall and Isherwood informed me that they had been excluded, and I then, for the first time, was made aware that Ericsson was on bad terms with Stimers and the two had no personal intercourse.

Inquiring into proceedings, I found serious difficulties existed, requiring essential modifications and a large increase of expenditure to make the vessels efficient or capable of flotation with their armament. No one, however, was willing to take the responsibility for the mistake committed. I was to bear the whole, and I had been deceived and kept uninformed of the whole proceeding.

Stimers and Fox, had, I think, connived that they could do this work independent of the proper officers and perhaps of Ericsson; probably hoped to acquire reputation. Their plan was kept from my knowledge, although the work was done in my name.

Lenthall and Isherwood culpably withheld from me information of what was being done; were vexed with Fox and Stimers, and were willing they should become involved, because a slight had been shown them. When I was made aware of the facts, I called all to an account. Fox and Stimers placed the blame on Lenthall and Isherwood, and when I called these latter gentlemen to account they plead ignorance and disclosed the whole truth. The whole thing was disgracefully improper and wrong.

In the mean time, the enemies of the Department, having got hold of the failure, opened their batteries, and I was compelled to encounter them for the follies and errors of my subordinates. On the whole, I succeeded in extricating the Department from very serious difficulties, and got a tolerable vindication before Congress, but I look upon the whole transaction as the most unfortunate that has taken place during my administration of the Navy Department.

The Assistant Secretary was probably more in fault than any other. It was his specialty. He expected great successes, where he had a great failure. Stimers was implicated about as deeply, but Stimers became intoxicated, overloaded with vanity. Neither of them, nor both combined, were competent for what they undertook. The glory was to have been theirs, the responsibility was mine.

The bureau officers failed in their duty in not informing me. I so told them and they each admitted it. Lenthall did so repeatedly and with many regrets, with much suppressed indignation that Fox should shrink from an honest, open avowal of his responsibility.

Stimers I have treated kindly. He is more weak than wicked, not devoid of talents, though Lenthall and Isherwood deny him any ability. But I know he has some capability and I do not forget his services in the turreted vessels.

While Fox would give him special favor, and the others would grant him none, I would treat Stimers kindly but justly. He has wanted shore duty entirely. Under existing circumstances it is better he should get afloat. Fox and Stimers had arranged that Admiral Gregory should employ Stimers on gun-carriages, and the Admiral was persuaded to apply for him. I set the whole aside, and told Fox Stimers must go to sea. He assented to the correctness of my views, but hoped that I would not permit the enmity of L. and I. to crush Stimers. I assured him not, and gave Stimers the Powhatan. The return mail brings his resignation. I cannot do otherwise than to accept it.

Talked over the whole subject with Captain Drayton,¹ who concurs in my views. Had also a full interchange of views concerning Wilkes, whom he characterizes as the most insubordinate man in the Navy, insolent to his superiors, and the most arrogant and exacting to his subordinates. We also agreed in regard to Admiral Davis as an amiable man, a feeble officer, of some literary acquirements, but Drayton says very little pretensions to science.

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 ¹ Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 348-351

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, February 21, 1865

Have had no time the last ten eventful days to open this book; and am now in haste.

In the Senate as well as in the House, there has been a deliberate and mendacious assault on the Navy Department, but with even less success than the first. Senator Wade moved to adopt the Winter Davis proposition for a Board of Admiralty. It obtained, I am told, but two votes. A proposition which, under proper direction and duly prepared was not destitute of merit as a naval measure, provided the government is to have a more military and central character, has been put down, probably for years, perhaps forever.

The scheme in this instance was concocted by a few party aspirants in Congress and a few old and discomfited naval officers, with some quiddical lawyer inventors, schemers, and contractors. They did not feel inclined to make an open assault on me; they therefore sought to do it by indirection. Much of the spite was against the Assistant Secretary, who may have sometimes been rough and who has his errors as well as his good qualities, but who has well performed his duties, — sometimes, perhaps, has overdone, — has his favorites and decided prejudices.

Senator Hale, while he does not love me, has now particular hatred of Fox, and in striving to gratify his grudge is really benefiting the man whom he detests. He and others in the House have spoken of F. as the actual Secretary instead of the Assistant, striving thereby to hold him to a certain degree of accountability, and also hoping to sow dissension between him and me. For three years Hale made it his chief business to misrepresent and defame me, and he had with him at the beginning some who have become ashamed of him. In the mean time he has obtained other recruits. Blaine of Maine dislikes Fox, and in his dislike denounces the Navy Department, which he says, in general terms, without mentioning particulars, is mismanaged.

But I have no reason to complain when I look at results and the vindication of able champions. They have done me more than justice. Others could have done better, perhaps, than I have done, and yet, reviewing hastily the past, I see very little to regret in my administration of the Navy. In the matter of the light-draft monitors and the double-enders I trusted too much to Fox and Stimers. In the multiplicity of my engagements, and supposing those vessels were being built on an improved model, under the approval and supervision of Lenthall and the advice of Ericsson, I was surprised to learn when they were approaching completion, that neither Lenthall nor Ericsson had participated, but that Fox and Stimers had taken the whole into their hands. Of course, I could not attempt to justify what would be considered my own neglect. I had been too confiding and was compelled, justly perhaps, to pay the penalty in this searching denunciation of my whole administration. Neither of the men who brought me to this difficulty take the responsibility.

We have made great progress in the Rebel War within a brief period. Charleston and Columbia have come into our possession without any hard fighting. The brag and bluster, the threats and defiance which have been for thirty years the mental aliment of South Carolina prove impotent and ridiculous. They have displayed a talking courage, a manufactured bravery, but no more, and I think not so much inherent heroism as others. Their fulminations that their cities would be Saragossas were mere gasconade, — their Pinckneys and McGrawths and others were blatant political partisans.

General Sherman is proving himself a great general, and his movements from Chattanooga to the present demonstrate his ability as an officer. He has, undoubtedly, greater resources, a more prolific mind, than Grant, and perhaps as much tenacity if less cunning and selfishness.

In Congress there is a wild, radical element in regard to the rebellious States and people. They are to be treated by a radical Congress as no longer States, but Territories without rights, and must have a new birth or creation by permission of Congress. These are the mistaken theories and schemes of Chase, — perhaps in conjunction with others.

I found the President and Attorney-General Speed in consultation over an apprehended decision of Chief Justice Chase, whenever he could reach the question of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Some intimation comes through Stanton, that His Honor the Chief Justice intends to make himself felt by the Administration when he can reach them. I shall not be surprised, for he is ambitious and able. Yet on that subject he is as much implicated as others.

The death of Governor Hicks a few days since has brought on a crisis of parties in Maryland. Blair is a candidate for the position of Senator, and the President wishes him elected, but Stanton and the Chase influence, including the Treasury, do not, and hence the whole influence of those Departments is against him. Blair thinks the President does not aid him as much as he had reason to suppose he would, and finds it difficult to get an interview with him. I think he has hardly been treated as he deserves, or as the President really wishes, yet the vindictiveness of the Chief Justice and Stanton deter him, control him against his will.

The senior Blair is extremely anxious for the promotion of his son-in-law, Lee, and has spoken to me several times on the subject. He called again to-day. I told him of the difficulties, and the great dissatisfaction it would give the naval officers. Pressed as the old man is by not only Lee but Lee's wife, and influenced by his own willing partiality, he cannot see this subject as I and others see it.

A few days since the President sent into the Senate the nomination of Senator E. D. Morgan for the Treasury. It was without consultation with M., who immediately called on the President and declined the position.

Seward, whom I saw on that evening, stated facts to me which give me some uneasiness. He called, he says, on the President at twelve to read to him a dispatch, and a gentleman was present, whom he would not name, but S. told the gentleman if he would wait a few moments he would be brief, but the dispatch must be got off for Europe. The gentleman declined waiting, but as he left, the President said, “I will not send the paper in to-day but will hold on until to-morrow." Seward says he has no doubt the conversation related to M.'s nomination, but that, the paper being made out, his private secretary took it up with the other nominations, and the President, when aware of the fact, sent an express to recall it, in order to keep faith with the gentleman mentioned. This gentleman was, no doubt, Fessenden.

I called on Governor Morgan on Sunday evening and had over an hour's conversation with him, expressing my wish and earnest desire that he should accept the place, more on the country's account than his own. He gave me no favorable response. Said that Thurlow Weed had spent several hours with him that morning to the same effect as myself and trying to persuade him to change his mind, but he would give Weed no assurance; on the contrary had persisted in his refusal. He, Morgan, was frank and communicative, as he has generally been with me on important questions, and reviewed the ground, State-wise and national-wise. “What,” he inquired, “is Seward's object? He never in such matters acts without a motive, and Weed would not have been called here except to gain an end."

Seward, he says, wants to be President. What does he intend to do? Will he remain in the Cabinet, or will he leave it? Will he go abroad, or remain at home? These, and a multitude of questions which he put me, showed that Morgan had given the subject much thought, and especially as it affected himself and Seward. Morgan has his own aspirations and is not prepared to be used by Weed or Seward in this case.

My own impressions are that Morgan has committed a great mistake as regards himself. Seward may be jealous of him, as M. is suspicious he is, but I doubt if that was the controlling motive with S. I think he preferred Morgan, as I do, for the Treasury, to any tool of Chase. The selection, I think, was the President's, not Seward's, though the latter readily fell in with it. Blair had advised it. Fessenden was probably informed on the morning when Seward met him at the President's and desired to have the nomination postponed.

I am told Thurlow Weed expressed great dissatisfaction that Morgan did not accept the position. That Weed and Seward may have selfish schemes in this is not unlikely, but whether they have or not, it was no less the duty of Morgan to serve his country when he could.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 240-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, August 17, 1864

 I wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, softly pointing out the proper course of proceeding in this French claim for captured cotton, for I should be sorry to have him let down himself and the Government. But I know not how, having taken charge of this claim, he will receive it. I think, however, he will show his shrewdness and tact and take the hint, if he has not committed himself, as he often does, without being aware of the effect.

Had quite a talk to-day with Mr. Lenthall, Naval Constructor, on the subject of the light-draft monitors and his duties generally. He claims to know but little about them. I told him this would not answer, that I should hold him responsible for what pertained to his bureau; that it was his duty to criticize, and let me know what, in his opinion was wrong; that it was his duty to know, and he must not plead ignorance to me; that on important matters I did not want his views second-handed, but he must come to me direct. From what I could learn in relation to the light-draft vessels, I had come to the conclusion that, while I had trusted to him, he had mere superficial conversations with Mr. Fox, without seeing or advising with me, and I apprehended Fox and Stimers had been going on without consulting others, with confident belief they would give us very superior vessels, until they awoke to the fact that they were not Naval Constructors or the men to do this work, except under the advice and direction of experts. I had supposed until last spring that Lenthall and Ericsson were giving the light ironclads their attention, but I found they were not, and I had not been advised of the fact. My plain talk seemed to astonish, and yet not altogether displease Lenthall. He said he had no doubt Mr. Fox and Mr. Stimers had committed the great mistake I alluded to. They thought after submitting their plans to him, without, however, procuring from him any computations, but an expression, that struck him more favorably than Ericsson that they could show off something for themselves that would give them a name.

Fred Seward called on me with a letter from Raymond to his father inquiring whether anything had been effected at the navy yard and custom-house, stating the elections were approaching, means were wanted, Indiana was just now calling most urgently for pecuniary aid. I told Seward that I knew not what the navy yard had to do with all this, except that there had been an attempt to levy an assessment on all workmen, as I understood, when receiving their monthly pay of the paymaster, by a party committee who stationed themselves near his desk in the yard and attempted the exaction; that I was informed Commodore Paulding forbade the practice, and I certainly had no censure to bestow on him for the interdiction. If men choose to contribute at their homes, or out of the yards, I had no idea that he would object, but if he did and I could know the fact, I would see such interference promptly corrected; but I could not consent to forced party contributions. Seward seemed to consider this view correct and left.

I am sadly oppressed with the aspect of things. Have just read the account of the interview at Richmond between Jaquess and Gilmore on one side and Jeff Davis and Benjamin on the other.¹ What business had these fellows with such a subject? Davis asserts an ultimatum that is inadmissible, and the President in his note, which appears to me not as considerate and well-advised as it should have been, interposes barriers that were unnecessary. Why should we impose conditions, and conditions which would provoke strife from the very nature of things, for they conflict with constitutional reserved rights? If the Rebellion is suppressed in Tennessee or North Carolina, and the States and people desire to resume their original constitutional rights, shall the President prevent them? Yet the letters to Greeley have that bearing, and I think them unfortunate in this respect.

They place the President, moreover, at disadvantage in the coming election. He is committed, it will be claimed, against peace, except on terms that are inadmissible. What necessity was there for this, and, really, what right had the President to assume this unfortunate attitude without consulting his Cabinet, at least, or others? He did, he says, advise with Seward, and Fessenden, who came in accidentally, also gave it his sanction. Now Seward is a trickster more than a statesman. He has wanted to get an advantage over Horace Greeley, and when the President said to Greeley, therefore, that no terms which did not include the abolition of slavery as one of the conditions (would be admissible), a string in Greeley's harp was broken. But how it was to affect the Union and the great ends of peace seems not to have been considered. The Cabinet were not consulted, except the two men as named, one, if not both, uninvited, nor as regarded Jaquess and Gilmore in their expedition. It will be said that the President does not refuse other conditions, and that he only said “to whom it may concern” he would make peace with those conditions, but that he does not refuse different and modified conditions to others. (It was undoubtedly an adroit party movement on the part of the President that rebuked and embarrassed Greeley and defeated a wily intrigue.) But, after all, I should, even with this interpretation, wish the President not to be mixed up with such a set, and not to have this ambiguity, to say the least. Most of the world will receive it as a distinct ultimatum.

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¹ An account of the interview of Colonel James F. Jaquess and Mr. James R. Gilmore with the President of the Confederacy and his Secretary of State, written by Mr. Gilmore, appeared in the Atlantic Monthly for September, 1864.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 107-10

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, June 10, 1864

The caucus of the New Hampshire members of the legislature friendly to the Administration has resulted in the substitution of Cragin for John P. Hale. This will be a sore and sad disappointment to Hale, who had until recently thought himself invincible in New Hampshire. Although I have no doubt he would make terms with the Copperheads if he could, they would not with him, and it therefore seems scarcely possible that it can be otherwise than he will be fully and finally defeated. I rejoice at it, for he is worthless, a profligate politician, a poor Senator, an indifferent statesman, not without talents, though destitute of industry, and I question his integrity. He has some humor, is fond of scandal, delights in defaming, loves to oppose, and is reckless of truth in his assaults. The country will sustain no loss from his retirement. As chairman of the Naval Committee and the organ of communication between the Navy Department and the Senate, he has rendered no service, but has been a constant embarrassment and obstruction. During the whole of this civil war, when all our energies and efforts were exerted in the cause of the Union and the country, no assistance, no word of encouragement even, has ever come to the Department from John P. Hale; but constant assaults, insinuations, and pronounced, if not wilful and deliberate, misrepresentations have emanated from him. Of course, I shall not regret his defeat, for though his term does not expire till the close of this Administration, and my connection with the Government may terminate at the same time, I am glad that his factious conduct is not indorsed by his State, and that the buffoon and vilifier will not be in a position to do further injury. He has been less offensive this session than heretofore, whether because he had become aware that his conduct did not meet the approval of the people and the election was at hand, I care not to judge. A letter from Admiral Gregory, inclosing a report from himself and Chief Engineer King on the Chimo, one of the light-draught monitors, gives a bad account. There have been mistakes and miscalculations in this class of vessels of a serious character. Stimers and Fox have had them in charge, and each has assured me that my apprehensions were groundless. Fox has been persistent in this matter, and assumed that the objections were wholly groundless. Admiral Gregory has also given me strong assurances that all was right. The Chimo, the first, would, he said, be a little deep, but this would be obviated in all the others, and not very bad in her case. I am not satisfied with Stimers’s management, yet Fox has in this matter urged what has been done. The report indicates unfitness on the part of Stimers, who miscalculated or made no calculation for displacement, has become vain, and feared to acknowledge his error.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 51-3