Have had no time the last ten eventful days to open this book; and am now
in haste.
In the Senate as well as in the House, there has been a deliberate and mendacious
assault on the Navy Department, but with even less success than the first.
Senator Wade moved to adopt the Winter Davis proposition for a Board of
Admiralty. It obtained, I am told, but two votes. A proposition which, under
proper direction and duly prepared was not destitute of merit as a naval
measure, provided the government is to have a more military and central
character, has been put down, probably for years, perhaps forever.
The scheme in this instance was concocted by a few party aspirants in
Congress and a few old and discomfited naval officers, with some quiddical
lawyer inventors, schemers, and contractors. They did not feel inclined to make
an open assault on me; they therefore sought to do it by indirection. Much of
the spite was against the Assistant Secretary, who may have sometimes been
rough and who has his errors as well as his good qualities, but who has well
performed his duties, — sometimes, perhaps, has overdone, — has his favorites
and decided prejudices.
Senator Hale, while he does not love me, has now particular hatred of
Fox, and in striving to gratify his grudge is really benefiting the man whom he
detests. He and others in the House have spoken of F. as the actual Secretary
instead of the Assistant, striving thereby to hold him to a certain degree of
accountability, and also hoping to sow dissension between him and me. For three
years Hale made it his chief business to misrepresent and defame me, and he had
with him at the beginning some who have become ashamed of him. In the mean time
he has obtained other recruits. Blaine of Maine dislikes Fox, and in his
dislike denounces the Navy Department, which he says, in general terms, without
mentioning particulars, is mismanaged.
But I have no reason to complain when I look at results and the
vindication of able champions. They have done me more than justice. Others
could have done better, perhaps, than I have done, and yet, reviewing hastily
the past, I see very little to regret in my administration of the Navy. In the
matter of the light-draft monitors and the double-enders I trusted too much to
Fox and Stimers. In the multiplicity of my engagements, and supposing those
vessels were being built on an improved model, under the approval and
supervision of Lenthall and the advice of Ericsson, I was surprised to learn
when they were approaching completion, that neither Lenthall nor Ericsson had
participated, but that Fox and Stimers had taken the whole into their hands. Of
course, I could not attempt to justify what would be considered my own neglect.
I had been too confiding and was compelled, justly perhaps, to pay the penalty
in this searching denunciation of my whole administration. Neither of the men
who brought me to this difficulty take the responsibility.
We have made great progress in the Rebel War within a brief period.
Charleston and Columbia have come into our possession without any hard
fighting. The brag and bluster, the threats and defiance which have been for
thirty years the mental aliment of South Carolina prove impotent and
ridiculous. They have displayed a talking courage, a manufactured bravery, but
no more, and I think not so much inherent heroism as others. Their fulminations
that their cities would be Saragossas were mere gasconade, — their Pinckneys
and McGrawths and others were blatant political partisans.
General Sherman is proving himself a great general, and his movements
from Chattanooga to the present demonstrate his ability as an officer. He has,
undoubtedly, greater resources, a more prolific mind, than Grant, and perhaps
as much tenacity if less cunning and selfishness.
In Congress there is a wild, radical element in regard to the rebellious
States and people. They are to be treated by a radical Congress as no longer
States, but Territories without rights, and must have a new birth or creation
by permission of Congress. These are the mistaken theories and schemes of Chase,
— perhaps in conjunction with others.
I found the President and Attorney-General Speed in consultation over an
apprehended decision of Chief Justice Chase, whenever he could reach the
question of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Some
intimation comes through Stanton, that His Honor the Chief Justice intends to
make himself felt by the Administration when he can reach them. I shall not be
surprised, for he is ambitious and able. Yet on that subject he is as much
implicated as others.
The death of Governor Hicks a few days since has brought on a crisis of
parties in Maryland. Blair is a candidate for the position of Senator, and the
President wishes him elected, but Stanton and the Chase influence, including
the Treasury, do not, and hence the whole influence of those Departments is
against him. Blair thinks the President does not aid him as much as he had
reason to suppose he would, and finds it difficult to get an interview with
him. I think he has hardly been treated as he deserves, or as the President
really wishes, yet the vindictiveness of the Chief Justice and Stanton deter
him, control him against his will.
The senior Blair is extremely anxious for the promotion of his
son-in-law, Lee, and has spoken to me several times on the subject. He called
again to-day. I told him of the difficulties, and the great dissatisfaction it
would give the naval officers. Pressed as the old man is by not only Lee but
Lee's wife, and influenced by his own willing partiality, he cannot see this
subject as I and others see it.
A few days since the President sent into the Senate the nomination of
Senator E. D. Morgan for the Treasury. It was without consultation with M., who
immediately called on the President and declined the position.
Seward, whom I saw on that evening, stated facts to me which give me some
uneasiness. He called, he says, on the President at twelve to read to him a
dispatch, and a gentleman was present, whom he would not name, but S. told the
gentleman if he would wait a few moments he would be brief, but the dispatch
must be got off for Europe. The gentleman declined waiting, but as he left, the
President said, “I will not send the paper in to-day but will hold on until
to-morrow." Seward says he has no doubt the conversation related to M.'s
nomination, but that, the paper being made out, his private secretary took it
up with the other nominations, and the President, when aware of the fact, sent
an express to recall it, in order to keep faith with the gentleman mentioned.
This gentleman was, no doubt, Fessenden.
I called on Governor Morgan on Sunday evening and had over an hour's
conversation with him, expressing my wish and earnest desire that he should
accept the place, more on the country's account than his own. He gave me no
favorable response. Said that Thurlow Weed had spent several hours with him
that morning to the same effect as myself and trying to persuade him to change
his mind, but he would give Weed no assurance; on the contrary had persisted in
his refusal. He, Morgan, was frank and communicative, as he has generally been
with me on important questions, and reviewed the ground, State-wise and
national-wise. “What,” he inquired, “is Seward's object? He never in such
matters acts without a motive, and Weed would not have been called here except
to gain an end."
Seward, he says, wants to be President. What does he intend to do? Will
he remain in the Cabinet, or will he leave it? Will he go abroad, or remain at
home? These, and a multitude of questions which he put me, showed that Morgan
had given the subject much thought, and especially as it affected himself and
Seward. Morgan has his own aspirations and is not prepared to be used by Weed
or Seward in this case.
My own impressions are that Morgan has committed a great mistake as
regards himself. Seward may be jealous of him, as M. is suspicious he is, but I
doubt if that was the controlling motive with S. I think he preferred Morgan,
as I do, for the Treasury, to any tool of Chase. The selection, I think, was
the President's, not Seward's, though the latter readily fell in with it. Blair
had advised it. Fessenden was probably informed on the morning when Seward met
him at the President's and desired to have the nomination postponed.
I am told Thurlow Weed expressed great dissatisfaction that Morgan did
not accept the position. That Weed and Seward may have selfish schemes in this
is not unlikely, but whether they have or not, it was no less the duty of
Morgan to serve his country when he could.
SOURCE: Gideon
Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and
Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 240-5
