Statement of Messrs. Miles And Keitt, of what Transpired Between the President and the South Carolina Delegation, between January 1 & 14, 1861

In compliance with the request of the Convention, we beg leave to make the following statement:

On Saturday, the 8th of December, several of the South Carolina delegation, including ourselves, waited upon the President. At this time, there was a growing belief that reinforcements were on the eve of being sent to the forts in Charleston harbor. It was known that the subject was frequently and earnestly discussed in the Cabinet. It was rumored that General Cass and Mr. Holt were urgent that reinforcements should be sent. Upon our being announced, the President, who was then in Cabinet Council, came out to us in the ante-room. We at once entered into a conversation upon the topic, which was so closely occupying his thoughts as well as ours. The President seemed much disturbed and moved. He told us that he had had a painful interview with the wife of Major Anderson, who had come on from New York to see him. She had manifested great anxiety and distress at the situation of her husband, whom she seemed to consider in momentary danger of an attack from an excited and lawless mob. The President professed to feel a deep responsibility resting upon him to protect the lives of Major Anderson and his command. We told him that the news that reinforcements were on their way to Charleston, would be the surest means of provoking what Mrs. Anderson apprehended, and what he so much deprecated. We said, further, that we did not believe that Major Anderson was in any danger of such an attack; that the general sentiment of the State was against any such proceeding. That, prior to the action of the State Convention, then only ten days off, we felt satisfied that there would be no attempt to molest the forts in any way. That, after the Convention met, — while we could not possibly undertake to say what that body would see fit to do, — we yet hoped and believed that nothing would be done until we had first endeavored, by duly accredited Commissioners, to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of all matters, including the delivery of the forts, between South Carolina and the Federal Government. At the same time, we again reiterated our solemn belief that any change in the then existing condition of things in Charleston harbor, would, in the excited state of feeling at home, inevitably precipitate a collision. The impression made upon us was, that the President was wavering, and had not decided what course he would pursue. He said he was glad to have had this conversation with us, but would prefer that we should give him a written memorandum of the substance of what we had said. This we did on Monday, the 10th. It was in these words:

Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to James Buchanan, December 9, 1860

The President did not like the word “provided,” because it looked as if we were binding him while avowing that we had no authority to commit the Convention. We told him that we did not so understand it. We were expressing our convictions and belief, predicated upon the maintenance of a certain condition of things, which maintenance was absolutely, and entirely in his power. If he maintained such condition, then we believed that collision would be avoided until the attempt at a peaceable negotiation had failed. If he did not, then we solemnly assured him that we believed collision must inevitably, and at once, be precipitated. He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send reinforcements, or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words '”relative military status,” as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie, and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to reinforcing the garrison, and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops, lead to the result which we both desired to avoid. When we rose to go, the President said in substance, “After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other.” One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked, “Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send reinforcements; but, suppose that you were hereafter to change jour policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use our personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before Commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embarrassing position.” “Then,” said the President, “I would first return you this paper.” We do not pretend to give the exact words on either side, but we are sure we give the sense of both.

The above is a full and exact account of what passed between the President and the delegation. The President, in his letter to our Commissioners, tries to give the impression that our “understanding” or “agreement” was not a “pledge.” We confess, we are not sufficiently versed in the wiles of diplomacy to feel the force of this “distinction without a difference.” Nor can we understand how, in “a matter of honor among gentlemen,” in which “no paper or writing is necessary,” the very party who was willing to put it on that high footing can honorably descend to mere verbal criticism, to purge himself of what all gentlemen and men of honour must consider a breach of faith. The very fact that we (the representatives from South Carolina) were not authorized to commit or “pledge” the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full powers, but as gentlemen assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of' undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President the more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out that course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession, and prior to the sending on of Commissioners, the President, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, could most positively say, that so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send reinforcements to them, or allow their relative military status to be changed. We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess, to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity; not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out his share of the understanding, or agreement, was potential, but as the head of the army, and, therefore, having the absolute control of the whole matter of reinforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston. But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say, that considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulation, not to make any change in the forts, or to send reinforcements to them, unless they were attacked, we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention, felt equally bound in honor to do everything on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.

The published debates at the very commencement of the session, contain the evidence of our good faith. We trusted the President. We believed his wishes concurred with his policy, and that both were directed to avoiding any inauguration of hostilities. We were confirmed in our confidence, and reassured in our belief by a significant event which took place subsequent to our interview. He allowed his premier Cabinet officer, an old and tried friend to resign, rather than yield to his solicitations for the reinforcement of the garrison at Charleston. We urged this as a convincing proof of his firmness and sincerity. But how have we been deceived! The news of Major Anderson's coup produced a sudden and unexpected change in the President's policy. While declaring that his withdrawal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter was “without orders, and contrary to orders,” he yet refused, for twelve hours, to take any action in the matter. For twelve hours, therefore, without any excuse, he refused to redeem his plighted word. No subsequent acts on the part of our State — no after reasons — can wipe away the stain which he suffered to rest upon his “honor as a gentleman,” while those hours, big with portentous events, rolled slowly by. His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the government — solemly pledged — was broken, if it failed promptly to undo what had been done contrary to its wishes — against its settled policy — and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment. He did not attempt to disabuse the mind of his Secretary as to what was the true position of the Government. What a spectacle does the President's vacillating and disingenuous course present! He allows one Secretary to resign rather than abandon a policy which he has agreed upon. Scarcely have a few short weeks elapsed, and he accepts the resignation of another, rather than adhere to that very policy. He makes an agreement with gentlemen which, while he admits that they have faithfully kept it on their part, he himself evades and repudiates. And this he does rather than redress a wrong — correct an error — what he himself considers an error — committed by a subordinate, without his orders, and contrary to his wishes! It was at least due to Mr. Floyd, who, as one of his Cabinet, had officially and personally stood by his administration from its very commencement — through good report, and through evil report — to have explained to him that he was, in the President's opinion, laboring under a misapprehension. At least, to have said to him, “you are mistaken about this matter — do not leave me on a false issue.” But no; he coldly, ungraciously, yet promptly, receives the resignation without a syllable of remonstrance, and thus tacitly, but unequivocally, accepts without shame the issue presented. He does not deny that the faith of his government is pledged, but he deliberately refuses to redeem it.

WM. PORCHER MILES.

LAURENCE M. KEITT.

SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 21-6, Published in The Richmond Daily Dispatch, Richmond, Virginia, January 14, 1861, p. 1

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: January 12, 1862

At church in the morning.  Good, plain sermon. Wished much to join in communion, but felt myself to subject to temptation to sin. After church went to see Cameron by appointment, but being obliged to meet the President, etc., at one, could only excuse myself. At President's, found Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, and Seward and Blair. Meigs decided against dividing forces; in favor of battles in front. President said McClellan's health was much improved; and thought it best to adjourn until to-morrow; and have all then present, attend, with McC. at three. Home, and talk, and reading. Dinner. Cameron came in. Advised loan in Holland, and recommended Brooks, Lewis, and another whom I have forgotten. Then turned to department matters; and we talked of his going to Russia, and Stanton as successor; and he proposed I should again see the President. I first proposed seeing Seward, to which he assented. He declared himself determined to maintain himself at the head of his department, if he remained; and to resist, hereafter, all interferences. I told him I would, in that event, stand by him faithfully. He and I drove to Willard's, where I left him, and went myself to Seward's. I told him, at once, what was in my mind — that I thought the President and Cameron were both willing that C. should go to Russia. He seemed to receive the matter as new; except so far as suggested by me last night. Wanted to know who would succeed Cameron. I said Holt and Stanton had been named; that I feared Holt might embarrass us, on the slavery question, and might not prove quite equal to the emergency; that Stanton was a good lawyer and full of energy; but I could not, of course, judge him as an executive officer as well as he (S.) could, for he knew him when he was in Buchanan's Cabinet. Seward replied that he saw much of him then; that he was of great force; full of expedients, and thoroughly loyal. Finally, he agreed to the whole thing; and promised to go with me, to talk with the President about it, to-morrow. Just at this point, Cameron came in, with a letter from the President, proposing his nomination to Russia, in the morning. He was quite offended; supposing the letter intended as a dismissal; and, therefore, discourteous. We both assured him it could not be so. Finally, he concluded to retain the letter till morning; and then go and see the President. Seward was expecting General Butler; and Cameron said he ought to be sent off immediately. I said, “Well, let's leave Seward to order him off at once.” C. laughed; and we went off together, I taking him to his house. Before parting, I told him what had passed between me and Seward concerning Stanton, with which he was gratified. I advised him to go to the President in the morning, express his thanks for the consideration with which his wishes, made known through me, as well as by himself orally, had been treated, and tell him frankly, how desirable it was to him that his successor should be a Pennsylvanian, and should be Stanton. I said I thought that his wish, supported as it would be by Seward and myself, would certainly be gratified, and told him that the President had already mentioned Stanton, in a way which indicated that no objection on his part would be made. I said, also, that, if he wished, I would see Seward, and would go to the President, after he had left him, and urge the point. He asked, why not come in when we should be there; and I assented to this. We parted, and I came home. A day which may have — and, seemingly, must have — great bearing on affairs. I fear Mr. Seward may think Cameron's coming into his house pre-arranged, and that I was not dealing frankly. I feel satisfied, however, that I have acted right, and with just deference to all concerned, and have in no respect deviated from the truth.*

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* Warden’s “Private Life and Public Services of Salmon P. Chase.”

SOURCES: Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, p. 44-5; John Niven, Editor, The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Volume 1: Journals, 1828-1872, p. 324-6

James Buchanan to Jeremiah H. Black, March 6, 1857

Washington, 6 March, 1857.

my Dear Sir: I have this moment signed your commission as Attorney General of the United States, and have done this with great pleasure. I hope that you may find it agreeable to yourself to accept this important office, and I entertain no doubt that we shall get on harmoniously and happily together.

There were certainly great difficulties in the way of your appointment, and Mr. Glaucy [sic] Jones has behaved very well in contributing to the result. I may also add that Governor Bigler is quite satisfied with it, and I venture to express the hope that any past difficulties between you and himself may pass away and be forgotten. We must be a unit here if possible.

I hope you will come to Washington immediately, and in the meantime believe me to be always

Very respectfully your friend,

James Buchanan.

Hon. J. S. Black.

SOURCE: Mary Black Clayton, Reminiscences of Jeremiah Sullivan Black, p. 99-100

James Buchanan to Philip F. Thomas, January 12, 1861

WASHINGTON 12 January 1860 [1861].

MY DEAR SIR:

I have received your letter of yesterday resigning the office of Secretary of the Treasury, to take effect when your successor shall be appointed & qualified.

I very much regret that circumstances, in your opinion, have rendered it necessary. Without referring to those circumstances, I am happy to state, in accepting your resignation, that during the brief period you have held this important office, you have performed its duties in a manner altogether satisfactory to myself.

Wishing you health, prosperity, & happiness, I remain

Very respectfully your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

HON: PHILIP F. THOMAS.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, Editor, The Works of James Buchanan, Comprising his Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence, Volume 11: 1860-1868, p. 106

Philip F. Thomas to James Buchanan, January 11, 1861

WASHINGTON D. C., January 11, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: It has not been in my power, as you are aware, to agree with you and with a majority of your constitutional advisers in the measures which have been adopted in reference to the present condition of things in South Carolina; nor do I think it at all probable that I shall be able to concur in the views which you entertain, so far as I understand them, touching the authority, under existing laws, to enforce the collection of the customs at the port of Charleston.

Under such circumstances, after mature consideration, I have concluded that I cannot longer continue in our cabinet without embarrassment to you and an exposure of myself to the just criticism of those who are acquainted with my opinions upon the subject. I therefore deem it proper to tender my resignation of the commission I now hold as Secretary of the Treasury, to take effect when my successor shall be appointed and qualified. In doing so, I avail myself of the occasion to offer you the assurance of the high respect and regard which, personally, I entertain for you, and with which,

I have the honor to be your friend and obedient servant,

PHILIP F. THOMAS

The PRESIDENT.

SOURCE: John Bassett Moore, Editor, The works of James Buchanan, comprising his speeches, state papers, and Private Correspondence, Volume 11: 1860-1868, p. 105

James Buchanan’ Cabinet

President:
James Buchanan	March 4, 1857 – March 4, 1861
Vice President:
John C. Breckinridge	March 4, 1857 – March 4, 1861
Secretary of State:
Lewis Cass	March 6, 1857 – December 14, 1860
Jeremiah S. Black	December 17, 1860 – March 5, 1861
Secretary of Treasury:
Howell Cobb	March 7, 1857 – December 8, 1860
Philip Francis Thomas	December 12, 1860 – January 14, 1861
John Adams Dix	January 15, 1861 – March 6, 1861
Secretary of War:
John B. Floyd	March 6, 1857 – December 29, 1860
Joseph Holt	January 18, 1861 – March 5, 1861
Attorney General:
Jeremiah S. Black	March 6, 1857 – December 16, 1860
Edwin M. Stanton	December 20, 1860 – March 4, 1861
Postmaster General:
Aaron V. Brown	March 6, 1857 – March 8, 1859
Joseph Holt	March 9, 1859 – December 31, 1860
Horatio King	February 12, 1861 – March 7, 1861
Secretary of the Navy:
Isaac Toucey	March 7, 1857 – March 4, 1861
Secretary of the Interior:
Jacob Thompson	March 10, 1857 – January 8, 1861

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, July 2, 1863

A telegram this morning advises me of the death of General R. C. Hale, the brother of Mrs. Welles, at Reedsville in the County of Mifflin, Pennsylvania. He was the efficient Quartermaster-General of Pennsylvania, a good officer and capable and upright man. The public never had a more faithful and honest officer.

Met Sumner and went with him to the War Department. The President was there, and we read dispatches received from General Meade. There was a smart fight, but without results, near Gettysburg yesterday. A rumor is here that we have captured six thousand prisoners, and on calling again this evening at the War Department I saw a telegram which confirms it. General Reynolds is reported killed. The tone of Meade's dispatch is good.

Met the elder Blair this evening at his son's, the Postmaster-General. The old gentleman has been compelled to leave his pleasant home at Silver Spring, his house being in range of fire and Rebel raiders at his door. He tells me McClellan wrote Stanton after the seven days' fight near Richmond that he (Stanton) had sacrificed that army. Stanton replied cringingly, and in a most supplicating manner, assuring McClellan he, Stanton, was his true friend. Mr. F. P. Blair assures me he has seen the letters. He also says he has positive, unequivocal testimony that Stanton acted with the Secessionists early in the War and favored a division of the Union. He mentions a conversation at John Lee's house, where Stanton set forth the advantages that would follow from a division.

Mr. Montgomery Blair said Stanton was talking Secession to one class, and holding different language to another; that while in Buchanan's Cabinet he communicated Toucey's treason to Jake Howard and secretly urged the arrest of Toucey. During the winter of 1860 and 1861, Stanton was betraying the Buchanan Administration to Seward, disclosing its condition and secrets, and that for his treachery to his then associates and his becoming the tool of Seward, he was finally brought into the present Cabinet.

These things I have heard from others also, and there have been some facts and circumstances to corroborate them within my own knowledge. Mr. Seward, who has no very strong convictions and will never sacrifice his life for an opinion, had no belief that the insurrection would be serious or of long continuance. Familiar with the fierce denunciations and contentions of parties in New York, where he had, from his prominent position and strong adherents, been accustomed to excite and direct, and then modify, the excesses roused by anti-Masonry and anti-rent outbreaks by pliable and liberal action, he entertained no doubt that he should have equal success in bringing about a satisfactory result in national affairs by meeting exaction with concessions. He was strengthened in this by the fact that there was no adequate cause for a civil war, or for the inflammatory, excited, and acrimonious language which flowed from his heated associates in Congress. Through the infidelity of Stanton he learned the feelings and designs of the Buchanan Administration, which were not of the ultra character of the more impassioned Secession leaders. One of the Cabinet already paid court to him; Dix¹ and some others he knew were not disunionists; and, never wanting faith in his own skill and management, he intended, if his opponents would not go with him, as the last alternative to go with them and call a convention to remodel the Constitution. Until some weeks after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration Seward never doubted that he could by some expedient — a convention or otherwise — allay the storm. Some who ultimately went into the Rebellion also hoped it. Both he and they overestimated his power and influence. Stanton in the winter of 1861 whispered in his ear state secrets, it was understood, because Seward was to be first in the Cabinet of Lincoln, who was already elected. The Blairs charge Stanton with infidelity to party and to country from mere selfish considerations, and with being by nature treacherous and wholly unreliable. Were any overwhelming adversity to befall the country, they look upon him as ready to betray it.

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¹ John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury In 1861.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 354-6

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 12, 1861

The President has done me the honor to propose certain military questions, concerning Fort Sumter to which he desires replies.

“1st.” To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

Answer. In respect to subsistence he has bread, flour, and rice for about 26 days, and salt meat (pork) for about forty eight days. Without additional supplies of provisions he may hold out some forty days without much suffering from hunger.

The besiegers are understood to be about 3,500 men, now somewhat disciplined, and they have four powerful batteries on land, and one floating battery, all mounting guns and mortars of large calibre and of the best patterns, bearing on Fort Sumter. Supposing Major Anderson not to be reinforced and the means of the assailants to be skilfully and vigorously employed – Fort Sumter being defended by less than 100 men, including common laborers and musicians – it might be taken, at any time, by a single assault, and easily, if previously harassed, perseveringly, for many days and nights; the assailants having the ability (by the force of numbers) of converting one out of every three or four of those demonstrations, into a real attack.

“2d.” Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within the period you specify as the time, within which Major Anderson may hold out without fresh supplies?”

Answer. No, not within many months; But not to speak of October or November, when the proposition was first made, and repeated, in writing, the third time, December 30th – it would have been easy to reinforce Fort Sumter, with war vessels, down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, twice that time, Fort Moultrie has been re-armed and greatly strengthened, in every way, and many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed. Hulks have also been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter, from the sea, impractical, without first carrying all the batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus, by delay, been increased 1[0] or 12 fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored to obtain a ship of war for the purpose; but failing in this we were obliged to employ the steamer Star of the West. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the commander, might then have landed, it is generally believed, men and subsistence. That attempt having failed, I next, before the late Cabinet, submitted, orally, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way to the Fort, or, that Major Anderson should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by bringing-to merchant vessels and helping himself (giving orders for payment) or else should be allowed to surrender, as, sooner or later, had then become inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken – the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable vessels; – another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When that had passed away, Secretaries Holt & Toucy, Capt. Ward of the Navy and myself, with the knowledge of President Buchanan, settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey.- At that time, I have no doubt Captain Ward would have suceeded with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce established between the late President and a number of principal seceders, here, in the Senate, & from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana &c., and this truce continued to the termination of that administration. That plan and all others like it, are now pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson Captain Foster and all the other officers of the Fort, as well as by Brig. General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers: and, in this opinion, I fully concur. The three or four steamers would have been obliged to attempt to make their way past the hostile batteries in an obstructed channel. Possibly one of them might have reached the fort, with (being small) a few days subsistence, but would, certainly probably, have been destroyed on arriving at the entrance (by the concentrated fire of three or four powerful batteries), before landing a man or a ration. In this opinion Captain Ward finally concurred.

“3d.” If I could not supply or reinforce Fort Sumter, within the time specified, with all the means in my control, then what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at my control, would enable me to supply and reinforce the fortress within that time.”

Answer. I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in less than four months; – 5,000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers – that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries both in the harbour (including Ft. Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand, had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.

It is, therefore, my opinion and advice that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the Fort – so long gallantly held by him and his companions – immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark, with his command, for New York.

I have the honor to return, herewith, the reports and communications of Major Anderson and his officers, submitted to me by the President. These papers of themselves demonstrate how the Fort has become untenable during the delays I have described above.

Respectfully Submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army

Washington, March 12, 1861.

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

William Cullen Bryant to Abraham Lincoln, January 22, 1861

New York January 22, 1861.

My dear Sir.

At the risk of being deemed somewhat troublesome, yet with the greatest respect and deference, I take the liberty of addressing you once more on the subject of your cabinet appointments.

I believe you do not differ with me in regard to the importance of giving Mr. Chase a place in the Cabinet, as one whose wisdom, rigid integrity and force of character would make him a most safe counsellor and efficient coadjutor of the Chief Magistrate, not to speak of the need of his presence as a counter poise to another member, who, to commanding talents, joins a flexible and in[d]ulgent temper, and unsafe associations. The appointment of Mr. Chase would give a feeling of security and confidence to the public mind which the rascalities of Mr. Buchanan's cabinet have made exceedingly sensitive and jealous, and would, it seems to me, settle the point in advance that the new administration will be both honored and beloved. For some time to come the federal government must depend largely upon its credit for its resources, and how potent is the effect of placing an honest and economical man at the head of the Treasury Department, is shown by an example now before our eyes. General Dix, with all his mistakes, is a man of unquestioned integrity, and his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury has already greatly raised the credit of the government brought so low by the misconduct of Cobb.

Now, according to what I learn from Mr. Opdyke, who has just returned from Ohio, it is nearly certain that Mr. Chase would not take a place in the Cabinet, unless it were offered him early. He is not inclined to do it at all, preferring a seat in the Senate, but this preference he would forego; yet there are, I am told, some personal reasons, as well as others connected with the choice of his successor in the Senate, that will, if the offer be delayed, induce him to remain where he is. I am not a judge of the force of these reasons; it is enough that they exist.

The only motive for delay is the hope of pacifying Mr. Cameron and his friends. It is thought here, by some who know him to be very tenacious of his purposes, that there is no probablility of doing this effectually, whether the offer to Mr. Chase be postponed or not. If, however, it be possible to satisfy him, it is to be considered, whether it will not be as easily done after Mr. Chase shall have been fixed upon as now, and whether the hope of obtaining better terms may not lead Mr Cameron to affect to spurn any reconciliation, as long as the appointment which he expected is kept open. One thing, however, is perfectly clear, that by failing to secure the services of Mr. Chase in the Treasury Department, both the country and the Republican party will lose infinitely more than the incoming administration can possibly suffer from the enmity of Mr. Cameron and his adherents.

I leave this subject here, that I may say a single word on another. From Mr Opdyke, I learn, that in a letter written to you some weeks since, on the subject of “protection,” I did not make myself fully understood. It seemed to me that I had clearly expressed my meaning when I said, that those who thought with me were “willing that this should be an open question.” I wished merely to express a hope that the administration would not throw its entire influence on the side of protection. The Republican party not being agreed among themselves on this point, the cabinet policy as it seemed to me, should be so moderated, not to disaffect the friends of free trade.

I am, dear Sir,

truly yours

W. C. Bryant.

Hon. A. Lincoln.

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[An earlier draft of this letter can be found in Parke Godwin’s, A Biography of William Cullen Bryant, Volume 1, p. 150-2 included below:]

New York, January 21, 1861: At some risk of being deemed troublesome, yet with the greatest respect and deference, I take the liberty of addressing you once more on the subject of the Cabinet appointments. I believe you do not differ with me in regard to the importance of giving Mr. Chase a place in the Cabinet, as one whose wisdom, rigid integrity, and force of character would make him a most safe counsellor and efficient co-operator, not to speak of the need of his presence there as a counterpoise to the one who joins to commanding talents a flexible and indulgent temper of mind and unsafe associations.

The appointment of Mr. Chase would give a feeling of security and confidence to the public mind which the rascalities of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet have made exceedingly sensitive and jealous, and would, it seems to me, settle the point in advance that the new administration will be both honored and beloved. The Government will be compelled, for the next four years, to depend somewhat for resources upon its credit, and how important it is to have an honest and economical man at the head of the Treasury Department is shown by an example now before our eyes. The appointment of General Dix as Secretary of the Treasury, who, with all his mistakes, is a man of incorruptible honesty, had already greatly raised the credit of the Government, brought so low by the misconduct of Cobb.

Setting out with this position, I proceed to remark that, from what I learn through Mr. Opdyke, who has just seen Mr. Chase, it is not certain that Mr. Chase would take a place in the Cabinet unless it were offered to him early. He is not inclined to do it at all, preferring a seat in the Senate; and there are, I am told, some personal reasons, and others, connected with the choice of his successor in the Senate, that will, if the offer were delayed, induce him to remain where he is. I am not a judge of the force of these reasons, but am only certain that they exist. The only occasion for delaying is the hope of satisfying Mr. Cameron and his friends. It is thought by some who know him to be very tenacious of his purposes, that there is no probability of doing this effectually, whether the appointment of Mr. Chase be delayed or not. If, however, it be possible to satisfy him, it is to be considered whether it will not be as easy to do it after the offer be made to Mr. Chase as now, and whether the hope of obtaining better terms for him will not induce Mr. Cameron to affect to spurn any reconciliation as long as the appointment which he expects is kept open. One thing, however, is perfectly clear — that, by losing the chance of securing the services of Mr. Chase in the Treasury department, both the country and the Republican party will lose infinitely more than the administration could possibly suffer from the enmity of Mr. Cameron and his adherents.

I leave this subject here, that I may say a single word upon another. I learn from Mr. Opdyke that, in a letter written to you some time since on the subject of “protection,” I did not make myself fully understood. I thought I had clearly expressed my meaning when I said that those who thought with me were “willing that this should be an open question.” I wished merely to express a hope that the administration would not throw its entire influence on the side of protection. The Republican party, not being agreed among themselves in regard to this matter, the [cabinet] policy, it seems to me, should be extremely moderate, and not calculated to disaffect either side.

SOURCES: Abraham Lincoln Papers in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Parke Godwin, A Biography of William Cullen Bryant, Volume 1, p. 150-2

Major Robert Anderson to Major-General John A. Dix, March 7, 1861

Fort Sumter, S. C, March 7,1861.

Hon. General John A. Dix, Washington, D. C., — Thank you — many thanks to you — for your whole-souled letter of March 4. One such letter is enough to make amends for a life of trial and of discomfort.

I regret that the change of administration deprives the country of your services and of those of Mr. Holt. I felt, while you two were members of the Cabinet, that, whenever I should need assistance, it would be sent promptly and in full force.

My position is not a very enviable one; but still, when I consider how God has blessed me at every step I have taken here, I have not the least fear of the result. I have written to the department very fully, and the administration now know my opinion, and the opinion of each individual officer of this command, of the strength of the force necessary for forcing an entrance into this harbor.

You speak of the disgraceful incidents developed in your report to Congress. I had already read some of your correspondence, and was shocked at the developments they made. The faithful historian of the present period will have to present a record which will sadden and surprise. It would seem that a sirocco, charged with treachery, cunning, dishonesty, and bad faith, had tainted the moral atmosphere of portions of our land. And, alas! how many have been prostrated by its blast!

I hope that, ere long, we shall see symptoms of restoration, and that a healthier wind will recover some of those who have given way to the blast. A long life of honest devotion to every duty, moral and social, may cause their course to be forgiven, but it cannot be forgotten.

The South Carolinians arc on the qui vive to-night—why, we know not. They have four guard-boats in the stream instead of the usual number of late — two. I cannot believe, though, that General Beauregard, lately of the Engineer Corps, would make an attack without having given formal notice of his intention to do so. My rule is, though, always to keep a bright lookout.

With many thanks, my dear General, for your most kind and welcome letter, I am, as ever, your sincere friend,

Robert Anderson.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 8-9

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 20, 1861

I visited the editors of the “Charleston Mercury” and the “Charleston Courier” to-day at their offices. The Rhett family have been active agitators for secession, and it is said they are not over well pleased with Jefferson Davis for neglecting their claims to office. The elder, a pompous, hard, ambitious man, possesses ability. He is fond of alluding to his English connections and predilections, and is intolerant of New England to the last degree. I received from him, ere I left, a pamphlet on his life, career and services. In the newspaper offices there was nothing worthy of remark; they were possessed of that obscurity which is such a characteristic of the haunts of journalism — the clouds in which the lightning is hiding. Thence to haunts more dingy still where Plutus lives — to the counting-houses of the cotton brokers, up many pairs of stairs into large rooms furnished with hard seats, engravings of celebrated clippers, advertisements of emigrant agencies and of lines of steamers, little flocks of cotton, specimens of rice, grain, and seed in wooden bowls, and clerks living inside railings, with secluded spittoons, and ledgers, and tumblers of water. I called on several of the leading merchants and bankers, such as Mr. Rose, Mr. Muir, Mr. Trenholm, and others. With all it was the same story. Their young men were off to the wars — no business doing. In one office I saw an announcement of a company for a direct communication by steamers between a southern port and Europe. “When do you expect that line to be opened?” I asked. “The United States cruisers will surely interfere with it.” “Why, I expect, sir,” replied the merchant, “that if those miserable Yankees try to blockade us, and keep you from our cotton, you'll just send their ships to the bottom and acknowledge us. That will be before autumn, I think.” It was in vain I assured him he would be disappointed. “Look out there,” he said, pointing to the wharf, on which were piled some cotton bales; “there's the key will open all our ports, and put us into John Bull's strong box as well.” I dined to-day at the hotel, notwithstanding many hospitable invitations, with Messrs. Manning, Porcher Miles, Reed, and Pringle. Mr. Trescot, who was Under Secretary of State in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, joined us, and I promised to visit his plantation as soon as I have returned from Mr. Pringle's. We heard much the same conversation as usual, relieved by Mr. Trescot's sound sense and philosophy. He sees clearly the evils of slavery, but is, like all of us, unable to discover the solution and means of averting them. The Secessionists are in great delight with Governor Letcher’s proclamation, calling out troops and volunteers, and it is hinted that Washington will be attacked, and the nest of Black Republican vermin which haunt the capital, driven out. Agents are to be at once despatched to get up a navy, and every effort made to carry out the policy indicated in Jeff Davis's issue of letters of marque and reprisal. Norfolk harbor is blocked up to prevent the United States ships getting away; and at the same time we hear that the Unites States officer commanding at the arsenal of Harper's Ferry has retired into Pennsylvania, after destroying the place by fire. How “old John Brown” would have wondered and rejoiced, had he lived a few months longer!

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 122-4

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 4, 1861

I had a long interview with Mr. Seward today at the State Department. He set forth at great length the helpless condition in which the President and the Cabinet found themselves when they began the conduct of public affairs at Washington. The last cabinet had tampered with treason, and had contained traitors; a miserable imbecility had encouraged the leaders of the South to mature their plans, and had furnished them with the means of carrying out their design. One Minister had purposely sent away the navy of the United States to distant and scattered stations; another had purposely placed the arms, ordnance, and munitions of war in undue proportions in the Southern States, and had weakened the Federal Government so that they might easily fall into the hands of the traitors and enable them to secure the war materiel of the Union; a Minister had stolen the public funds for traitorous purposes — in every port, in every department of the State, at home and abroad, on sea and by land, men were placed who were engaged in this deep conspiracy — and when the voice of the people declared Mr. Lincoln President of the United States, they set to work as one man to destroy the Union under the most flimsy pretexts. The President's duty was clearly defined by the Constitution. He had to guard what he had, and to regain, if possible, what he had lost. He would not consent to any dismemberment of the Union nor to the abandonment of one iota of Federal property— nor could he do so if he desired.

These and many more topics were presented to me to show that the Cabinet was not accountable for the temporizing policy of inaction, which was forced upon them by circumstances, and that they would deal vigorously with the Secession movement — as vigorously as Jackson did with nullification in South Carolina, if they had the means. But what could they do when such a man as Twiggs surrendered his trust and sacrificed the troops to a crowd of Texans; or when naval and military officers resigned en masse, that they might accept service in the rebel forces? All this excitement would come right in a very short time — it was a brief madness, which would pass away when the people had opportunity for reflection. Meantime the danger was that foreign powers would be led to imagine the Federal Government was too weak to defend its rights, and that the attempt to destroy the Union and to set up a Southern Confederacy was successful. In other words, again, Mr. Seward fears that, in this transition state between their forced inaction and the coup by which they intend to strike down Secession, Great Britain may recognize the Government established at Montgomery, and is ready, if needs be, to threaten Great Britain with war as the consequence of such recognition. But he certainly assumed the existence of strong Union sentiments in many of the seceded States, as a basis for his remarks, and admitted that it would not become the spirit of the American Government, or of the Federal system, to use armed force in subjugating the Southern States against the will of the majority of the people. Therefore if the majority desire Secession, Mr. Seward would let them have it — but he cannot believe in anything so monstrous, for to him the Federal Government and Constitution, as interpreted by his party, are divine, heaven-born. He is fond of repeating that the Federal Government never yet sacrificed any man's life on account of his political opinions; but if this struggle goes on, it will sacrifice thousands — tens of thousands, to the idea of a Federal Union. “Any attempt against us,” he said, “would revolt the good men of the South, and arm all men in the North to defend their Government.”

But I had seen that day an assemblage of men doing a goose-step march forth dressed in blue tunics and gray trousers, shakoes and cross-belts, armed with musket and bayonet, cheering and hurrahing in the square before the War Department, who were, I am told, the District of Columbia volunteers and militia. They had indeed been visible in various forms parading, marching, and trumpeting about the town with a poor imitation of French pas and élan, but they did not, to the eye of a soldier, give any appearance of military efficiency, or to the eye of the anxious statesman any indication of the animus pugnandi. Starved, washed-out creatures most of them, interpolated with Irish and flat-footed, stumpy Germans. It was matter for wonderment that the Foreign Minister of a nation which was in such imminent danger in its very capital, and which, with its chief and his cabinet, was almost at the mercy of the enemy, should hold the language I was aware he had transmitted to the most powerful nations of Europe. Was it consciousness of the strength of a great people, who would be united by the first apprehension of foreign interference, or was it the peculiar emptiness of a bombast which is called Buncombe? In all sincerity I think Mr. Seward meant it as it was written.

When I arrived at the hotel, I found our young artist waiting for me, to entreat I would permit him to accompany me to the South. I had been annoyed by a paragraph which had appeared in several papers, to the effect that “The talented young artist, our gifted countryman, Mr. Deodore F. Moses, was about to accompany Mr. &c. &c, in his tour through the South.” I had informed the young gentleman that I could not sanction such an announcement, whereupon he assured me he had not in any way authorized it, but having mentioned incidentally to a person connected with the press that he was going to travel southwards with me, the injudicious zeal of his friend had led him to think he would do a service to the youth by making the most of the very trifling circumstance.

I dined with Senator Douglas, where there was a large party, among whom were Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Forsyth, Southern Commissioner; and several members of the Senate and Congress. Mrs. Douglas did the honors of her house with grace and charming good-nature. I observe a great tendency to abstract speculation and theorizing among Americans, and their after-dinner conversation is apt to become didactic and sententious. Few men speak better than Senator Douglas; his words are well chosen, the flow of his ideas even and constant, his intellect vigorous, and thoughts well cut, precise, and vigorous — he seems a man of great ambition, and he told me he is engaged in preparing a sort of Zollverein scheme for the North American continent, including Canada, which will fix public attention everywhere, and may lead to a settlement of the Northern and Southern controversies. For his mind, as for that of many Americans, the aristocratic idea embodied in Russia is very seductive; and he dwelt with pleasure on the courtesies he had received at the court of the Czar, implying that he had been treated differently in England, and perhaps France. And yet, had Mr. Douglas become President of the United States, his good-will towards Great Britain might have been invaluable, and surely it had been cheaply purchased by a little civility and attention to a distinguished citizen and statesman of the Republic. Our Galleos very often care for none of these things.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 60-3

William Henry Trescot to Governor Francis W. Pickens, December 21, 1860

Washington, December 21, 1860.

To His Excellency F. W. Pickens,

Governor of South Carolina:

Sir: Your confidential letter to the President was duly delivered to him yesterday by D. H. Hamilton, Esq., according to your instructions. It was withdrawn (no copy having been taken) this morning by me, under the authority of your telegraphic despatch. Its withdrawal was most opportune. It reached here under circumstances which you could not have anticipated, and it produced the following effect upon the President:

He had removed Colonel Gardiner from command at Fort Moultrie, for carrying ammunition from the arsenal at Charleston; he had refused to send reinforcements to the garrison there; he had accepted the resignation of the oldest, most eminent, and highest member of his Cabinet, rather than consent to send additional force; and the night before your letter arrived, upon a telegraphic communication that arms had been removed from the arsenal to Fort Moultrie, the Department of War had issued prompt orders, by telegraph, to the officer removing them, to restore them immediately. He had done this upon his determination to avoid all risk of collision, and upon the written assurance of the majority of the Congressional Delegation from the State that they did not believe there was any danger of an attack upon the forts before the passage of the Ordinance, and an expression of their trust and hope that there would be none after, until the State had sent Commissioners here. His course had been violently denounced by the Northern press, and an effort was being made to institute a Congressional investigation. At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of action you desired, and I felt confident that, if forced to answer your letter then, he would have taken such ground as would have prevented his even approaching it hereafter — a possibility not at all improbable, and which ought to be kept open. I considered, also, that the chance of public investigation rendered the utmost caution necessary as to any communications from the State; and having presented the letter, and ascertained what the nature of the reply would be, you had all the advantage of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having it put on record. Besides this, the President seemed to think that your request was based upon the impossibility of your restraining the spirit of our people — an interpretation which did you injustice, and the possibility of which I deemed it due to you to avoid. He also appeared to labor under the impression that the representations of the Members of Congress and your own differed essentially, and this, I thought, on account of both, should not be stated in any reply to you. I was also perfectly satisfied that the status of the garrisons would not be disturbed.

Under these circumstances, if I had been acting under formal credentials from you, and the letter had been unsealed, I would have delayed its presentation for some hours until I could have telegraphed you; but that was impossible. As Major Hamilton, therefore, had brought with him General McQueen and General Bonham, when he called upon me and delivered the letter, and had even gone so far as to express the wish that they should be present when he delivered it to the President—a proposition which they declined, however — I deemed it not indiscreet, nor in violation of the discretionary confidence which your letter implied, to take their counsel. We agreed perfectly, and the result was the telegraphic despatch of last night. The withdrawal of the letter was a great relief to the President, who is most earnestly anxious to avoid an issue with the State or its authorities, and, I think, has encouraged his disposition to go as far as he can in this matter, and to treat those who may represent the State with perfect frankness.

I have had, this morning, an interview with Governor Floyd, the Secretary of War. No order has been issued that will at all disturb the present condition of the garrisons; and while I cannot even here venture into details, which are too confidential to be risked in any way, I am prepared to say, with a full sense of the responsibility, that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm. Of course, when your Commissioners have succeeded, or failed to effect their negotiations, the whole issue is fairly before you, to be met as courage, honor and wisdom may direct.

My delay in answering your telegram concerning Colonel Huger was caused by his absence from this place. He came, in reply to my telegram, last night, and this morning I telegraphed you his decision, which I presume he has explained by a letter of this same date. As Major Hamilton leaves this evening, I have only time to write this hurried letter, and am, sir,

Very respectfully,

wm. Henry Trescot.

I inclose your confidential letter in this.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 85-6

John Lothrop Motley to Anna Lothrop Motley, March 15, 1861

31 Hertford Street,

March 15, 1861.

My Dearest Mother:  . . . It is not for want of affection and interest, not from indolence, but I can hardly tell you how difficult it is to me to write letters. I pass as much of my time daily as I can at the State Paper Office, reading hard in the old MSS. there for my future volumes; and as the hours are limited there to from ten till four, I am not really master of my own time.

I am delighted to find that the success of the “United Netherlands” gives you and my father so much pleasure. It is by far the pleasantest reward for the hard work I have gone through to think that the result has given you both so much satisfaction. Not that I grudge the work, for, to say the truth, I could not exist without hard labor, and if I were compelled to be idle for the rest of my days, I should esteem it the severest affliction possible.

My deepest regret is that my work should be for the present on the wrong side of the Atlantic. Before leaving the subject of the new volumes, I should like to say that I regret that no one has sent me any of the numerous reviews and notices in the American papers and magazines to which you allude. I received a number of the New York “Times” from the governor, and also the “Courier,” containing notices. The latter, which was beautifully and sympathetically written, I ascribed to Hillard's pen, which I do not think I can mistake. If this be so, I hope you will convey my best thanks to him.

These are the only two which have been sent to me, and it is almost an impossibility for me to procure American newspapers here. Of course both Mary and Lily, as well as myself, would be pleased to see such notices, and it seems so easy to have a newspaper directed to 31 Hertford Street, with a three-cent stamp. Fortunately, I recently subscribed to the “Atlantic Monthly,'” and so received the March number, in which there is a most admirably written notice, although more complimentary than I deserve. It is with great difficulty that I can pick up anything of the sort, and I fear now that as the time passes it will be difficult for me to receive them from America.

The Harpers have not written to me, but I received a line from Tom showing that the book was selling very well considering the times. As to politics I shall not say a word, except that at this moment we are in profound ignorance as to what will be the policy of the new administration, how the inauguration business went off, and what was the nature of Mr. Lincoln's address, and how it was received, all which you at home at this moment have known for eleven days. I own that I can hardly see any medium between a distinct recognition of the Southern Confederacy as an independent foreign power, and a vigorous war to maintain the United States government throughout the whole country. But a war without an army means merely a general civil war, for the great conspiracy to establish the Southern Republic, concocted for twenty years, and brought to maturity by Mr. Buchanan's cabinet ministers, has, by that wretched creature's connivance and vacillation, obtained such consistency in these fatal three months of interregnum as to make it formidable. The sympathy of foreign powers, and particularly of England, on which the seceders so confidently relied to help them on in their plot, has not been extended to them. I know on the very highest authority and from repeated conversations that the English government looks with deepest regret on the dismemberment of the great American Republic. There has been no negotiation whatever up to this time of any kind, secret or open, with the secessionists. This I was assured of three or four days ago.  . . . At the same time, I am obliged to say that there has been a change, a very great change, in English sympathy since the passing of the Morrill Tariff Bill. That measure has done more than any commissioner from the Southern Republic could do to alienate the feelings of the English public toward the United States, and they are much more likely to recognize the Southern Confederacy at an early day than they otherwise would have done. If the tariff people had been acting in league with the secessionists to produce a strong demonstration in Europe in favor of the dissolution of the Union, they could not have managed better.

I hear that Lewis Stackpole is one of the most rising young lawyers of the day, that he is very popular everywhere, thought to have great talents for his profession, great industry, and that he is sure to succeed. You may well suppose with how much delight we hear such accounts of him.

My days are always spent in hard work, and as I never work at night, going out to dinners and parties is an agreeable and useful relaxation, and as I have the privilege of meeting often many of the most eminent people of our times, I should be very stupid if I did not avail myself of it; and I am glad that Lily has so good an opportunity of seeing much of the most refined and agreeable society in the world.

The only very distinguished literary person that I have seen of late for the first time is Dickens. I met him last week at a dinner at John Forster's. I had never even seen him before, for he never goes now into fashionable company. He looks about the age of Longfellow. His hair is not much grizzled and is thick, although the crown of his head is getting bald. His features are good, the nose rather high, the eyes largish, grayish, and very expressive. He wears a mustache and beard, and dresses at dinner in exactly the same uniform which every man in London or the civilized world is bound to wear, as much as the inmates of a penitentiary are restricted to theirs. I mention this because I had heard that he was odd and extravagant in his costume. I liked him exceedingly. We sat next each other at table, and I found him genial, sympathetic, agreeable, unaffected, with plenty of light, easy talk and touch-and-go fun without any effort or humbug of any kind. He spoke with great interest of many of his Boston friends, particularly of Longfellow, Wendell Holmes, Felton, Sumner, and Tom Appleton. I have got to the end of my paper, my dearest mother, and so, with love to the governor and A–––, and all the family great and small, I remain

Most affectionately your son,

J. L. M.

P. S. I forgot to say that another of Forster's guests was Wilkie Collins (the "Woman in White's" author). He is a little man, with black hair, a large white forehead, large spectacles, and small features. He is very unaffected, vivacious, and agreeable.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, editor, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley in Two Volumes, Library Edition, Volume 2, p. 117-21

William Henry Trescot to Governor William H. Gist, November 26, 1860

(strictly Confidential.)

washington, November 26, 1860.

Dear Sir: I am aware (and I do not deem it necessary to specify my source of information) that apprehensions exist in the mind of the President that before the State acts in convention some attempt will be made to take the forts in Charleston harbor. Feeling that his personal honor would be involved in such an attempt, he may make his apprehensions the pretext or ground on which to order an increased force to those posts. This order will be resisted to the very last, and at any cost, by the Southern members of the Cabinet, but they would be incalculably strengthened in their position if you were at liberty to say directly to the President that you could answer, on your responsibility, that so long as no change was made in these garrisons, so long as no additional force was sent there and the State remained in the Union, no such attempt would be made, and that any increase of force made in the face of this notice would lead to instant collision, and that for every drop of blood shed under such circumstances he, and he alone, would be responsible.

I wish you distinctly to understand that there is no possibility of such an order being issued without the dissolution of the Cabinet and your receiving ample notice. While I answer for this, I write with the confidence that such an assurance will prevent any hasty and indiscreet movement on the part of the State. Believing that you agree fully with me that, for the sake of the State and of the South, our move toward secession ought to be regular and orderly, and that all collision should be avoided, and feeling that the Southern members of the Cabinet are entitled to the support of the State, I write to you to indicate how you can support them. To that point alone, this letter is addressed. If it becomes necessary for the State to look to itself, you shall know promptly and certainly.

If, therefore, you can write such a letter as I indicate, the Southern members of the Cabinet can rest upon it triumphantly no such order will be issued in the face of it, and if it is, you will be free to act, will have ample information as to the necessity of action, and the whole responsibility of what comes will be, not on the head of South Carolina, but of the President of the United States.

If so, your letter must be here by return mail, directed under cover to me. Telegraph me also when this is received, and if you intend to answer yes or no to my proposition. Details I cannot give you, but trust that my signature will command your confidence.

I am, yours respectfully,

wm. Henry Trescot.

To Governor Gist.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 30-1

William Gilmore Simms to William Porcher Miles, probably January 13, 1861

Sunday¹ Night, 12 P. M.

I am sleepless, my dear Miles, and must write. If you should be sleepless also, it is not improbable but that my letters will help you to a soporific condition. It seems to me that you will have a little respite. The opening fire upon the Star of the West changes materially the aspect of things to the Federal government, and they will hardly think to send supplies to Sumter except under cover of armed vessels, which is the inauguration of open war upon the State, which the President and cabinet will hardly attempt unless under authority of Congress. Congress alone, I believe, has the power to declare war. There is no telling, however, what may be done when the power is under the hands of a weak administration, counseled and governed, in fact, by a person whose whole training has endowed [him] with military ideas as paramount to all.² We must, of course, prepare for two dangers, treachery and assault. But it strikes me that the unexpected fire of Fort Morris will compel a pause in the Federal councils, for the better maturing of plans, and some respite for preparation will be allowed you. Not an hour should be lost in preparation. To have numerous guns, to bear equally upon an assailing squadron and Fort Sumter, seems to be the necessity. Looking at the map, I note that Mount Pleasant is distant from Fort Sumter some two miles, while I estimate Moultrie to be some one and a quarter. A battery at Mount Pleasant, cutting the western angle of Sullivan's Island, seems to be in direct range with Sumter, and if within reach of heavy cannon, then a battery of earth at this point, with half a dozen thirty-two pounders, might operate successfully against it, at all events compel a very useful diversion of its fires. So I find that on the sandhills below Fort Johnson, and on the sandhills at the extreme western verge of Fort Morris, batteries of say three heavy cannon each might face Fort Sumter, framed of logs faced with iron and filled in with sand, which could contribute largely to its distraction, if not its injury. On these sandhills, also, you possess an advantage in their elevation, which will tend to reduce the superiority of Sumter in height. Two or three batteries along these hills and at these points, mere bastions, having two or three guns each of heavy calibre, could be thrown up very suddenly, assuming, as I do, that you can command, from the popular patriotism, any amount of slave labor. I would have them so planted as not to face the portholes of Sumter, yet be able to take them at an angle. Shot entering a porthole obliquely would be more mischievous, perhaps, than if direct, since the zigzag course they would pursue would be likely to kill every man on one side or other of the guns, besides abrading the embrasure very seriously. In reference to Wappoo Cut, let me mention that, as the obvious entrance to that cut is by the Stono, there is an old fort, once thought a pretty strong one, at the mouth of the Stono, on Cole's Island. This might be manned by volunteers from the precinct, officered by some good military man. It covers Bird Key [?] and is very well placed, though still, I think, it would be good policy to stop up Wappoo Cut, or keep an armed schooner in Ashley River, at the mouth of it. I am writing, you perceive, without the slightest knowledge of what has been done; and it is quite probable that all my suggestions have been anticipated. If, however, you fancy there is anything in them, communicate with Jamison and any military friends on whose judgment you rely. Ranging timbers properly mortised might be prepared by the mechanics of the city, and the iron bars laid on, if desired, before shipment to the desired points. It is my impression that old Fort Johnson ranges Moultrie in the same line with Sumter. If so, it is a question how far it would be proper to use the former place with heavy cannon which might range across the strait. You should employ all the heavy cannon you can. Jamison told me that you had an abundance. Unless Fort Morris has numerous pieces, she could hardly play any efficient game with many assailing vessels. I do not know where Fort Morris is placed, but suppose it to be fronting equally the Ship and the Twelve-feet channel. In that event, unless the sandhills interpose, it is under the range of Fort Sumter, provided the distance be within three miles, as I suppose it to be. I should have said four, but for the threat of Anderson to fire on Fort Morris. A battery between Fort Morris and the Lighthouse, on the edge of the sandhills, might rake the Ship Channel with a plunging fire, yet I should think be out of range and even sight of Fort Sumter. I think I said, in a previous letter, that in sighting the guns for long distances telescopes should be used; of course, I meant only the ordinary ship spyglasses, of which a sufficient number for each battery could be obtained in the city. With another battery to second Fort Morris, each of twelve guns at least, and heavy ones, you could give a telling account of all entering vessels. They might all be sunk with good gunnery. But two shot only taking effect out of eighteen fired, would seem to show that the gunnery was not sufficiently practiced. I write only from report. To-night, I learn that (on dit) there has been a mutiny in Fort Sumtsr, and that Anderson has had to shoot one of his men, and put ten more in irons; and that this was the reason why he did not fire on Forts Morris and Moultrie. By the “Mercury” it is said that some negotiations are on foot which will prevent bloodshed. The inference is that Fort Sumter will be given up. This is hardly probable. I suspect treachery. We should suspect nothing else. Anderson wishes communication with the city. If opportunity is allowed him to see what we are doing, or to hear of it, or if he is allowed to corrupt mercenaries, we shall have worse mischief. We must not be too confiding, too easy of faith, too courteous, even to an enemy, who, if he had the right feeling, would at once resign his command and throw up his position on the distinct ground of his Southern birth and associations. He should be kept corked up closely, until we are quite ready to draw him off. If he still keep his position, and we are to have an attempt by the war steamers, Fort Sumter must and will take part in it; the vital point is how to neutralize his action in the engagement. I see but the one suggested, to keep as many batteries at work on him, breaching and otherwise, and a cloud of vessels and men ready for scaling, as will effectively divert his regards from those forts which are designed for the defense of the harbor. And unless Fort Morris be made strong in guns, I see that vessels of heavy draft in deep water may shell it ad libitum, while the smaller craft passes in. I am very doubtful whether a fort on the east end of Sullivan's can do more than cover the Maffit and Rattlesnake channels, if these. It can hardly do much mischief to vessels entering the Ship Channel. Something will depend upon the calibre of its guns. Do, if you can spare a half hour, write me, in charity, how we stand, and with what degree of preparation, and believe me

W. GlLMORE SlMMS

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¹ Probably the Sunday that followed the firing on the Star of the West, i. e. January 13, 1861.

² It seems plain that Simms here alludes to General Winfield Scott. Cass had had a military training, hut he had resigned from the Cabinet when the above was written.

SOURCE: William Peterfield Trent, William Gilmore Simms, p. 255-60