Laird's friend Howard telegraphs Fox that he has a letter of
F.'s which conflicts with my letter to Sumner, and, while he does not want to
go counter to the country, does not wish to be sacrificed. Faxon, who has
charge of Fox's letters and correspondence, is disturbed by this; says that Fox
has been forward, and too ready with his letters substituted for those of the
Secretary or chiefs of bureaus; has an idea that Fox took upon himself to
correspond with Howard and perhaps L. when I turned them off.
There may be something in these surmises, not that Fox
intended to go contrary to my decision, but he was perhaps anxious to do
something to give himself notoriety. At times he is officious. Most men like to
be, or to appear to be, men of authority, he as well as others. I have observed
that when he knows my views and desires he likes to communicate them to the
parties interested as his own. Orders which I frequently send to chiefs of
bureaus and others through him, he often reduces to writing, signing his own name
to the order. These are little weaknesses which others as well as Faxon detect,
and I permit to give me no annoyance; but Faxon, who is very correct, is
disturbed by them and thinks there is an ulterior purpose in this. Admiral
Smith, Lenthall, and Dahlgren have been vexed by them, and not infrequently,
perhaps always, come to me with these officious, formal orders signed by the
Assistant Secretary, as if issued by himself. Faxon thinks Fox may have taken
upon himself to correspond with Howard, and committed himself and the
Department. There can, I think, have been no committal, for Fox is shrewd, and
has known my policy and course from the beginning. He doubtless wrote Howard,
from what the latter says, but without any authority, and he saw my letter to Sumner
without a suggestion that he had given other encouragement.
Chase spent an hour with me on various subjects. Says the
Administration is merely departmental, which is true; that he considers himself
responsible for no other branch of the Government than the Treasury, nor for
any other than financial measures. His dissent to the War management has become
very decisive, though he says he is on particularly friendly terms with
Stanton. In many respects, he says, Stanton has done well, though he has unfortunate
failings, making intercourse with him at times exceedingly unpleasant; thinks
he is earnest and energetic, though wanting in persistency, steadiness. General
Halleck Chase considers perfectly useless, a heavy incumbrance, with no heart
in the cause, no sympathy for those who have. These are Chase's present views.
They are not those he at one time entertained of Halleck, but we all know H.
better than we did.
We had some talk on the policy that must be pursued
respecting slavery and the relation of the State and Federal Governments
thereto. It was, I think, his principal object in the interview, and I was glad
it was introduced, for there has been on all sides a general avoidance of the
question, though it is one of magnitude and has to be disposed of. His own
course, Chase said, was clear and decided. No one of the Rebel States must be
permitted to tolerate slavery for an instant. I asked what was to be done with
Missouri, where the recent convention had decided in favor of emancipation, but
that it should be prospective, — slavery should not be extinguished until 1870.
He replied that the people might overrule that, but whether they did or not,
Missouri is one of the excepted States, where the Proclamation did not go into
effect.
“What, then,” said I, “of North Carolina, where there is
beginning to be manifested a strong sentiment of returning affection for the
Union? Suppose the people of that State should, within the next two or three
months, deliberately resolve to disconnect themselves from the Confederacy, and
by a popular vote determine that the State should resume her connection with
the Union, and in doing so, they should, in view of the large slave population
on hand, decide in favor of general but prospective emancipation, as Missouri
has done, and enact there should be an entire abolition of slavery in 1875.” He
said he would never consent to it, that it conflicted with the Proclamation,
that neither in North Carolina, nor in any other State must there be any more
slavery. He would not meddle with Maryland and the excepted States, but in the
other States the evil was forever extinguished.
I said that no slave who had left his Rebel master could be
restored, but that an immediate, universal, unconditional sweep, were the
Rebellion crushed, might be injurious to both the slave and his owner,
involving industrial and social relations, and promoting difficulties and
disturbances; that these embarrassments required deliberate, wise thought and
consideration. The Proclamation of Emancipation was justifiable as a military
necessity against Rebel enemies, who were making use of these slaves to destroy
our national existence; it was in self-defense and for our own preservation,
the first law of nature. But were the Rebellion now suppressed, the disposition
of the slavery question was, in my view, one of the most delicate and important
problems to solve that had ever devolved on those who administrated the
government. Were all the Slave States involved in the Rebellion, the case would
be different, for then all would fare alike. The only solution which I could
perceive was for the Border States to pass emancipation laws. The Federal
Government could not interfere with them; it had with the rebellious States,
and should morally and rightfully maintain its position. They had made war for
slavery, had appealed to arms, and must abide the result. But we must be
careful, in our zeal on this subject, not to destroy the great framework of our
political governmental system. The States had rights which must be respected,
the General Government limitations beyond which it must not pass.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30,
1864, p. 401-3
