Showing posts with label State Department. Show all posts
Showing posts with label State Department. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 10, 2022

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, June 22, 1865

I called early on the President in relation to Seward's letter concerning the blockade and courtesy to British vessels. He concurred in my views. I went to the State Department and saw Mr. Hunter. He agreed with me and complimented my letter, and also one I wrote a few days since regarding the Japanese vessel, which seems to have made an impression upon him, and which he complimented as very statesmanlike and instructive.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 320

Friday, May 29, 2020

Department of State Memorandum, May 30, 1862

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,          
May 30, 1862.
MEMORANDUM.]

Lord Lyons called to-day upon Mr. Seward and said, as perhaps was not extraordinary, the capture of New Orleans, which was expected by Mr. Seward to be a relief in the relations between the United States and other countries, on the contrary was, at the beginning, attended with new causes of uneasiness. He had received complaints from his consul in behalf of British subjects in New Orleans of harsh proceedings by General Butler. He had not time fully to digest them, but he called to see if the Secretary of State would not think it worth while to have the military authorities at New Orleans cautioned against exercising any doubtful severities, which would produce irritation and aggravate what had already happened.

Lord Lyons especially said that it had been reported to him that a British subject had been sent to Fort Jackson, which is understood to be a very unhealthy place at this season, and he trusted the military authorities would be requested not to expose the health of such prisoners to unnecessary risks. Mr. Seward replied that he cordially appreciated the value of Lord Lyons' suggestions, and that he would submit to the Secretary of War the expediency of giving instructions to General Butler of the character suggested, and he felt authorized to say at once that they would be adopted.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 2 (Serial No. 123), p. 130-1

Department of State Memorandum, May 31, 1862

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,            
Washington, May 31, 1862.
MEMORANDUM.]

Mr. Mercier called upon Mr. Seward informally to speak of some irritation among the consuls at New Orleans, resulting from irregularities and severities reported to have been practiced by Major-General Butler toward them on the occasion of his taking military possession of that city. Mr. Mercier said that he had not called now to present any complaint on the part of the French consul, and explanations which had been already made by General Butler perhaps would relieve him of any necessity for doing so.

Mr. Seward said that he had seen newspaper reports of the occurrence at New Orleans, but as yet had received nothing official either from any representative of any foreign Government or from the War Department. But he had had no hesitation about interposing in the matter at once.

Yesterday, after a brief conversation with Lord Lyons, when the subject was first brought to his notice, he had procured orders from the Secretary of War to Major-General Butler directing him to refrain from practicing any severities or strictness of doubtful right toward any consul or subject of any foreign power, which orders had been already transmitted.

To-day it had been decided to devolve the civil government of New Orleans upon a provisional military Governor, who would proceed with the utmost dispatch to New Orleans and relieve General Butler of civil administration there.

Mr. Seward said that he had already appointed a commissioner for the State Department, of distinguished ability and character, to proceed to New Orleans as speedily as possible and inquire and take evidence of the transactions which have occurred there in which any complaint of violation of consular rights, privileges, and courtesies has arisen under the administration of General Butler, to redress any such clear violation which he may ascertain to have occurred, by making restitution, and in every other case to make full report to the Secretary of State for his decision thereupon.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 2 (Serial No. 123), p. 131

Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, October 23, 1863

Navy Department,      
24 October, 1863.
Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, enclosing a translation of a note addressed to you by Mr. Bruzual, in which he speaks of an intention of buying a steamer in this country for the government of Venezuela, of which he is the representative, and in connection with which you ask if I am aware of any objection to the arming of the steamer in the manner indicated in Mr. Bruzual's dispatch.

I am not sufficiently informed of the condition of affairs in Venezuela to express an opinion upon the subject of your inquiry. The subject is one of extreme delicacy, and should, and I doubt not will, be duly considered by the Department of State, especially in view of occurrences transpiring abroad affecting our own country.

Herewith, I have the honor to transmit a letter to Commo Stribling, conformably to the request made in our personal interview last evening. The request of Mr. Bruzual appears to be, under the circumstances, one of extraordinary and unusual character, and such as, had the application been made by that gentleman to this Department, would not have been granted. He is not, it seems, accredited, by reason of the unsettled condition of affairs in Venezuela, and yet it is proposed he shall have extended to him the unusual favor of a public officer in obtaining an armed vessel.

Excuse me for suggesting doubts as to the policy of this step, but they are such that I have declined the responsibility, and placed the letter exclusively on your request, so that you can present or withhold it, as in your judgment, with a full knowledge of the facts and my doubts, may seem best.

Very respectfully,
Gideon Welles, 
Secty. of Navy.
Hon. William H. Seward,
Secty of State.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 475-6

Friday, August 11, 2017

Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, August 26, 1863

Navy Department,
26 Aug. 1863.
Sir,

I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 4th Ins't. & 14th Ins't., in relation to the case of the British schooner "Mont Blanc," captured by the U. S. Steamer “Octorara,” Commander Collins, and released by the Prize Court at Key West.

In your letter of the 4th Ins't., which gives a summary of the correspondence in relation to this case, you refer to the order of the prize court, in which “it is declared that the cause of the U. S. against the schooner ‘Mont Blanc’ and cargo, having come on to be heard, it is ordered by consent of all the parties interested that the vessel and cargo be released to the claimant for the benefit of whom it may concern; that there was probable cause for the capture and detention of the vessel and that each party pay his own costs.”

And in the same letter you state that “so far as relates to damages, the ground was expressly taken in the correspondence with Lord Lyons that the master and owner had waived damages by accepting the decree and restitution of his vessel. But there still remained a party and rights which the prize court did not foreclose. That party was the Government of Great Britain, and its claim was one for redress for injuries to its sovereignty and dignity by a violation of her territory. No prize court of our country can try and decide a National claim of this sort."

Your letter of the 14th Ins't. encloses a copy of a note from Lord Lyons, in which he says that on being informed by you that directions to proceed to the assessment of damages in this case would be given to Rear Admiral Bailey, he would on his part take care that proper directions should be sent to Mr. Vice Consul Butterfield and that he, Lord Lyons, is waiting for this information before taking any further steps.

It appears, therefore, that this Depar't is expected to give directions for the assessment of damages in a case where it has repeatedly stated it would be improper for the Department to interfere, where the Judicial tribunal, which had cognizance, had decided that no damages are due, and where it is admitted that the master and owner have renounced all claim to damages.

The Department has been placed in this unfortunate and somewhat anomalous position, partly by its own fault in too readily acquiescing in the proffered reparation by the State Department, and an arrangement that had been made by that Department with Her Majesty's representative, to ascertain and agree upon the damages to be paid, and to consider and dispose of the whole subject.

In consequence of the representations communicated in your letter of the 7th of May, the Department has conveyed to the Commander of the Octorara the Executive censure for doing what the Court has decided he was excusable in doing. Although in this case of the “Mont Blanc,” as on repeated occasions, the impropriety of interfering in matters of prize, which belong legitimately to the courts, was freely expressed, yet under the urgent appeals that were made, an assurance that the amount was small, and the case could be more speedily and satisfactorily disposed of, by referring it to some person at or near Key West to consider and dispose of the whole subject without an appeal to the Court, the Department, without fully considering the effect, and the legal power to afford reparation, was induced, in accordance with your request that some suitable person should be designated to take part in a conference as to damages, to name Acting Rear Admiral Bailey, for it knew no other in that locality unconnected with the Court.

No instructions, however, have yet been given Acting Rear Admiral Bailey, and the case, as it now stands, is such that the Department doubts its power to give the instructions which seem to be required and expected. The powers of the Department are limited by law, and I am aware of no law which authorizes it to decide what you represent as a political claim only to be tried and adjudicated by the two Governments concerned, — “a national claim of this sort.” The authority of the Department extends only to legal, individual claims, in cases where it is clearly responsible in law for the acts of its agents. But in this case the law, or the tribunal which had authority to expound and administer the law, has exonerated the agent of the Department from any responsibility. It is admitted that there is no claim in law — only a political claim: no individual claim, but “a national claim.”

In such a case the Depar't would be perplexed in attempting to assess the damages, or in instructing others how to assess them. If it admits in this case that the legal renunciation of damages was of no effect, and that the claimant retained a legal claim for damages, it must make the same admission in every case, and ignore a well settled rule of admiralty and international law.

If it undertakes to estimate a pecuniary equivalent for an aggression upon the dignity of a foreign government, its action might seem offensive, while it had every disposition to avoid giving offense. An apology for an injury to “sovereignty and dignity” may be more or less earnest, but how can such injuries be estimated in dollars and cents, or pounds, shillings and pence? It is to be presumed that the British Government does not desire the claim to be considered in this light.

It may be said the amount of damages in this case would be the amount which the Court at Key West would have awarded, had its decision been what a foreign government claims would have been righteous. But the Department cannot assent to this, for it has no authority to repudiate or set aside the decision of a Court of the United States. That can be done only by a Superior Court or by Congress. It is the duty of this Department to respect and obey the decisions of the Courts of the United States.

It is said that the decree “did not foreclose” the rights of the Government of Great Britain to claim redress in this case. In one sense — to a certain extent — this is true. The decision of the highest court in the land would not be conclusive on a foreign government. But if a claimant voluntarily renounces his claim, or right to appeal, can his government claim that justice has been denied him? Does not ordinary comity “foreclose” any government from taking it for granted that it cannot obtain justice from the tribunals of another, until it has at least made the attempt? In this case of the “Mont Blanc” there was an appeal open to the Supreme Court of the United States. Had it been taken, the result might possibly have been that the decree of the lower court would have been set aside and the case remanded with directions to grant ample damages; or, on the other hand, the decree of the lower court might have been confirmed, for reasons so clear and convincing that the claimant himself would have acquiesced, and his government have been foreclosed by its own sense of justice.

Viewing the matter in this light, it appears to me that the right of the British Government to claim damages in this particular case has been foreclosed, not by the decision of the Prize Court at Key West, but by the acquiescence of the claimants in that decision. The question of damages for injuries to “sovereignty and dignity” is one which this Department has no authority to investigate or settle, and should pecuniary amends be required, it has no fund at its disposal to which the disbursement could be charged.

Acting Rear Admiral Bailey having been designated as a suitable person to confer on the subject of damages, before it was known that the Court had adjudicated the case, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the order which has been sent to that officer, directing him to attend to the duty, should it be further prosecuted, whenever he shall receive instructions from the Secretary of State in the premises.

Very respectfully,
Gideon Welles,
Secty. of Navy.
Hon. Wm. H. Seward,
Secty. of State.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 423-6

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 11, 1863

The President sent a note to my house early this morning, requesting me to call at the Executive Mansion on my way to the Department. When there he took from a drawer two dispatches written by the Secretary of State to Lord Lyons, in relation to prize captures. As they had reference to naval matters, he wished my views in regard to them and the subject-matter generally. I told him these dispatches were not particularly objectionable, but that Mr. Seward in these matters seemed not to have a correct apprehension of the duties and rights of the Executive and other Departments of the Government. There were, however, in this correspondence allusions to violations of international law and of instructions which were within his province, and which it might be well to correct; but as a general thing it would be better that the Secretary of State and the Executive should not, unless necessary, interfere in these matters, but leave them where they properly and legally belonged, with the judiciary. [I said] that Lord Lyons would present these demands or claims as long as the Executive would give them consideration, — acquiesced, responded, and assumed to grant relief, — but that it was wholly improper, and would, besides being irregular, cause him and also the State and Navy Departments great labor which does not belong to either. The President said he could see I was right, but that in this instance, perhaps, it would be best, if I did not seriously object, that these dispatches should go on; but he wished me to see them.

When I got to the Department, I found a letter from Mr. Seward, inclosing one from Lord Lyons stating that complaint had been made to his Government that passengers on the Peterhoff had been imprisoned and detained, and were entitled to damages. As the opportunity was a good one, I improved it to communicate to him in writing, what I have repeatedly done in conversation, that in the present state of the proceedings there should be no interference on his part, that these are matters for adjudication by the courts rather than for diplomacy or Executive action, and until the judicial power is exhausted, it is not advisable for the Departments to interfere, etc. The letter was not finished in season to be copied to-day, but I will get it to him to-morrow, I hope in season for him to read before getting off his dispatches.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 296-7

Sunday, March 12, 2017

Diary of John Hay: Thursday, December 17, 1863

One morning this week I went to the State Department. . . . Found Seward very busy over the complication arising from the “Chesapeake piracy.” He said Sumner had just come in and said with great glee: — “This proves my position to be correct, that England was wrong in conceding belligerency to these people.” “Of course,” said Seward: “but how the devil does that help the matter?” Sumner was delighted to have his theory vindicated even by such trouble.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 141; Michael Burlingame, Editor, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 128

Thursday, February 9, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, April 3, 1863

Had some side talk with Seward at the Cabinet-meeting, on letters of marque. He persists in the policy, but I think begins to have some misgivings. Insists on having a naval officer assigned him, on whom he can devolve the labor. I requested him to employ some of his own Department force or a civilian in whom he had confidence; told him the subject belonged exclusively to the State Department; the Secretary of State had it in charge in the War of 1812 by law, and I desired the Navy should not now be blended with the proceeding. He admitted his object in asking for a naval officer was to be relieved of responsibility and details. The truth is, he has pressed forward this measure without knowledge or examination, or practical experience, but has vague indefinite notions that privateers may be efficient against the Rebels, that they will constitute a force appendant to his Department, that there will be many of them, and that he will derive credit from their exploits. If his scheme fails, and a naval officer has charge of that part of his duties, the Navy and Navy Department will bear the censure. Foote, whom he most desires should be detailed, adroitly declines the honor of being attached to the State Department in this work, and has recommended Admiral Davis, who is acceptable and willing to take the position which Foote declines.

Seward tells me he already has an application from responsible parties who want a letter of marque, and assures me there will be a flood of applications, but I am still incredulous. Our merchants will not spend their money in the idle scheme of attempting to spear sharks for wool. In the case of this first application Seward wishes me, as he is not yet prepared and the parties are ready, to take the case as I have suggested might be done under the Act of July, 1861; says it will only be temporary.

Late in the day Davis came to me from the State Department with the papers in this case. I find they are not unknown to me. One Sybert, a Prussian, I believe, by birth but a citizen of South Carolina, wants to go privateering. He called on me some days ago for papers, and I sent him to the State Department. I warned Davis to beware of adventurers, and expressed my want of confidence in the man and the movement, though Seward declared the parties were responsible.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 259-60

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: April 2, 1863


Had a call last evening and again to-day from Senator Sumner. Our conversation was chiefly on our foreign relations, the unfortunate condition of public affairs, the inexcusable attitude of England, and the question of letters of marque. On the latter subject he is much dissatisfied with Mr. Seward. He informs me that he was opposed to the passage of the law at the late session, and is, I am glad to see, quite sensitive on the subject. I thought the law well enough as a precautionary measure, a warning to the mischievous spirits abroad, an authorization to the President in case of necessity, and especially as a weapon to coerce England into propriety. The power granted was extraordinary and to be used with discretion, but Mr. Seward, having obtained the authority, is disposed to exercise it. The merchants having been loud and profuse in their complaints and promises, he has taken it for granted that they would at once avail themselves of the law, and make a rush in a random search for a couple of lean and hungry wolves that are abroad, which would be difficult to catch and valueless when caught. I have questioned whether he could beguile merchants into such an investment, and he begins to feel uneasy that none have come forward as he expected.

In a letter which I commenced some days since and finished Saturday night, I put upon paper some of the suggestions, views, and doubts I have from time to time expressed in our discussions. This letter I gave out to be copied, and it was on my table for signature when I returned yesterday from Cabinet council. The English news was such that I laid it aside unsigned, and it was lying on the table when Sumner came in. He stated, among other things, he had been to the State Department and that Seward had given him the substance of the last dispatches. He asked if I had seen them. I answered that I had, and was so disgusted with them that I had laid by a letter which I had prepared in opposition to the current feeling which prevailed on the subject of letters of marque. He wished to read it, and after doing so complimented the letter with emphasis, and begged I would sign and send it.

Informed Admiral Foote that the Secretary of State desired he should go to New York in the service of the State Department, on the subject of letters of marque. He expressed his readiness to obey orders, but asked the object of detailing him. I gave him an outline of proceedings and what appeared to be the purpose of Mr. Seward, which was not very clear, or could not be plainly stated. No doubt he believes it will give importance to the Secretary of State to have a naval officer of the standing of Foote attached to the State Department and acting under its orders.

The President called at my house this evening, chiefly to see the letter which I had prepared concerning letters of marque. Senator Sumner had gone directly from the Navy Department to him, and so made known his gratification at my views and the manner in which I had stated them that the curiosity of the President was excited and he desired to read the letter. I informed him that the last thing I did before leaving the Department was to sign and send it to the Secretary of State; that I perhaps should not have done it, though, as he (the President) was aware, I had differed with him and others on this subject and looked upon it as a dangerous step, but since reading the last English dispatches, I was less opposed to the measure than I had been.

The opportunity being favorable and he disposed to converse and apparently interested in my remarks, I took occasion to enlarge upon the topic more fully than I had done in our Cabinet discussions. I started out with the proposition that to issue letters of marque would in all probability involve us in a war with England. [I said] that I had so viewed this question from the beginning, though he and Mr. Seward had not; that I was not prepared to deny that it might not be best for us to move promptly with that object in view, though it had not yet been urged or stated; but that if we were to resort to letters of marque we should do it understandingly and with all the consequences before us. The idea that private parties would send out armed ships to capture the Alabama and one, possibly two, other rovers of the Rebels was too absurd to be thought of for a moment. If privateers were fitted out for any purpose it would be to capture neutral vessels intended to run the blockade or supposed to be in that service. It was not difficult for us to foresee that such a power in private hands would degenerate into an abuse for which this Government would be held responsible. The Rebels have no commerce to invite private enterprise. So far as the Rebels were concerned, therefore, I had been opposed to committing the Government to the measure. But the disclosures recently made had given a different aspect to the question. There was little doubt the British Government and British capital were encouraging the rebellion; that that Government intended to interpose no obstacle to prevent the sending out of privateers from British ports to depredate upon our commerce; that these privateers, though sailing under the Confederate flag, would be the property of British merchants; that the rich plunder would repay the lawless English adventurer, knowing he had the sanction of his Government; that this combination of British capital with Rebel malignity and desperation would despoil our commerce and drive it from the seas. Our countrymen would not quietly submit to these wrongs and outrages, and allow Englishmen to make war upon us in disguise under the Rebel flag. We ought, therefore, to have an immediate and distinct understanding with the English Government. It should be informed in terms that could not be mistaken or misunderstood that if this policy was persisted in we should in self-defense be under the necessity of resorting to reprisals. In this view the law which authorized letters of marque had appeared to me proper, and might be made useful as a menace and admonition to England; and I repeated what I had said to the Secretary of State in reply to a remark of his that we must make more extensive naval operations against the Rebels by issuing letters of marque to annoy them, — that letters of marque, instead of annoying them, destitute as they were of commerce, would aid them, for that step would involve war with England. If the Secretary of State would be less yielding and more decisive in asserting our rights with that power, it would, I thought, be better for the country.

I then opened on the subject generally. England is taking advantage of our misfortunes and would press upon us just as far as we would bear to be pressed. She rejoiced in our dissensions and desired the dismemberment of the Union. With this rebellion on our hands we were in no condition for a war with her, and it was because we were in this condition that she was arrogant and presuming. A higher and more decisive tone towards her will secure a different policy on her part. A war with England would be a serious calamity to us, but scarcely less serious to her. She cannot afford a maritime conflict with us, even in our troubles, nor will she. We can live within ourselves if worse comes to worse. Our territory is compact, facing both oceans, and in latitudes which furnish us in abundance without foreign aid all the necessaries and most of the luxuries of life; but England has a colonial system which was once her strength, but is her weakness in these days and with such a people as our countrymen to contend with. Her colonies are scattered over the globe. We could, with our public and private armed ships, interrupt and destroy her communication with her dependencies, her colonies, on which she is as dependent for prosperity as they on her.

I was therefore in favor of meeting her face to face, asking only what is right but submitting to nothing that is wrong.

If the late dispatches are to be taken as the policy she intends to pursue, it means war, and if war is to come it looks to me as of a magnitude greater than the world has ever experienced, — as if it would eventuate in the upheaval of nations, the overthrow of governments and dynasties. The sympathies of the mass of mankind would be with us rather than with the decaying dynasties and the old effete governments. Not unlikely the conflict thus commenced would kindle the torch of civil war throughout Christendom, and even nations beyond. I desired no such conflict in my day, and therefore hoped and believed the policy and tone of England might be modified, but it would require energy, resolution, and a firm determination on our part to effect it.

The President listened, for I did most of the talking, as he evidently wished, and showed much interest and accord in what I said. He assented consequently to most that I uttered and controverted nothing. It was evident I suggested some ideas that had not before occurred to him, and I am not without hope that the tone of our foreign affairs, particularly with England, may be different.

The President spoke, as he always has done with me, doubtingly of Porter's schemes on the Mississippi, or rather the side movements to the Yazoo on the east and Red River on the west. Said the long delay of Du Pont, his constant call for more ships, more ironclads, was like McClellan calling for more regiments. Thought the two men were alike, and said he was prepared for a repulse at Charleston.

[The letter referred to above was signed and sent with date of March 31.]

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 251-9

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, March 17, 1863

Returned last evening from strictly confidential visit to New York.

Some discussion in Cabinet-meeting to-day on letters of marque. Seward and Chase are both strong advocates of the measure. Am surprised that Chase should favor it, for he must be sensible of the consequences. He has, I think, committed himself somewhat hastily to some of the indignant but inconsiderate men in the shipping interest who are sufferers. Seward has no knowledge on the subject, nor any conception of the effect of letting loose these depredators under government sanction. There is such a general feeling against the English, who are conniving with and aiding the Rebels, that privateering is becoming popular with the Administration and country. Statesmen who should check and restrain the excited, erring popular current are carried along with it. I suggested some doubts of the expediency of the proposed proceedings, and the principles involved. In the first place I queried whether Congress could depute legislative power to the Executive, as was assumed. I asked Seward if he had any money to pay the promised bounties, and if he was of opinion there could be fines and criminal punishment inflicted by Executive regulations merely. Seward said he had no money; knew not whether there was any appropriation from which funds could be taken; if not, he must pledge the Government. This I opposed, and no one sustained Seward or expressed an opinion on the subject. As regarded penal inflictions, fines, criminal punishment by regulation he had no doubt whatever, should not hesitate in the least. I could admit no such power on the part of the Executive. My doubts and suggestions, I perceived, set others thinking. Chase became silent.

These notions in regard to privateers and letters of marque, though crude, erroneous, and fraught with evil, have been maturing for some time, and I do not mistake in placing much of the mischief to the State Department, which would be irresponsible for Navy transgressions. The Times of New York and the Chronicle of this city and papers of that particular phase of partyism, which never [act] without prompting from a certain quarter, have been writing up the matter and getting the public mind excited. The Chronicle pronounces the privateers to be a volunteer navy like volunteer forces on land. The Times mixes up letters of marque with the Navy Department, which it blames for delaying to issue the necessary authority, innocently unaware that it is a subject pertaining to that Department of the Government whose head it would never intentionally injure.

Conflicting accounts concerning Farragut's command on the lower Mississippi. The Rebel accounts state he passed Port Hudson with his vessel, the others being driven back, with the exception of the steamer Mississippi, which all say was grounded and blown up. Our account represents that all the fleet passed up except the Mississippi.

The accounts from Porter, above Vicksburg, are not satisfactory. He is fertile in expedients, some of which are costly without adequate results. His dispatches are full of verbosity of promises, and the mail which brings them also brings ludicrous letters and caricatures to Heap, a clerk who is his brother-in-law, filled with laughable and burlesque accounts of amusing and ridiculous proceedings. These may be excusable as a means of amusement to keep up his spirits and those of his men, but I should be glad to witness, or hear of something more substantial and of energies employed in what is really useful. Porter has capabilities and I am expecting much of him, but he is by no means an Admiral Foote.

The progress of the squadron and troops at Charleston is slow and unsatisfactory. I apprehend the defenses are being strengthened much faster than the assailants. Du Pont has attacked Fort McAllister and satisfied himself that the turret vessels are strong and capable of great endurance, but at the same time he doubtless made the Rebels aware of these facts.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 247-9

Thursday, January 26, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, March 10, 1863

I saw last evening a communication from the State Department inclosing several pages of regulations for letters of marque. The subject was to-day before the Cabinet, and there is a stronger disposition for the policy than I expected. I told the President I had given the proposed regulations but a cursory examination. The subject was therefore postponed to our Friday meeting, with an understanding that I should in the mean time examine them and report if they were objectionable. On looking over the sections, I find they are a transcript of the laws of 1812 and 1813, which the Secretary of State has embodied in a series of regulations which he proposes to issue. The old laws of half a century ago have expired. It is not pretended they have vitality. But the Secretary of State legislates by regulations. I am not favorably impressed with the law or the regulations, nor with the idea of sending out privateers against a couple of piratical cruisers, even if there are private parties fools enough to go on that hunt, which he says there are, but I doubt. The law undertakes to delegate legislative power to the President, which is in itself wrong. But the subject is, I fear, a foregone conclusion. Both Seward and Chase favor it, and the commercial community is greatly exasperated against the robbers. If the subject goes forward, S. will turn the whole labor and responsibility over to the Navy Department.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 246-7

Saturday, August 15, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, September 29, 1862

Seward brought me to-day a long dispatch from Dudley, consul at Liverpool. Although his fears were somewhat simulated, I saw he was really excited and alarmed. He is easily frightened. I therefore talked on general subjects, but he turned away, said there were terrible combinations in Europe to break the blockade, that there was evidence of it in the documents he brought and wished me to read. They were getting eight or ten steamers ready to break the blockade. I told him I had no apprehensions from any general concerted attack, such as he dreaded, but that I was annoyed by the sneaking method which the Englishmen practiced of stealing into Charleston in the darkness of the night. On reading the principal dispatch, I assured him there was no evidence in that document of any purpose to break the blockade, that there was no mention of an armed vessel by Consul Dudley, that there was activity among the merchant adventurers of Great Britain, stimulated by the Bull Run tidings, which they had just previously received. I did not doubt that British merchants were actively preparing to try to run the blockade, but we would be active in trying to catch them.

He seemed relieved yet not perfectly satisfied. We had some conversation in relation to letters of marque, which he favors. Wishes me to purchase the Baltic and give Comstock the command. Told him I trusted our naval cruisers, though some were not as fast as I wished, would perform the service, and that were we to buy and arm the Baltic, a naval officer must command her.

This scheme for Comstock and the Baltic is a key to the affected alarm. It has been concocted by Thurlow Weed, who has a job in view for himself or friends, perhaps both. Though Seward was somewhat frightened, his fears may have been greater in appearance than reality. He did not alarm me. It is shameful that an old profligate party-debaucher like Weed should have such influence, and Seward is mistaken in supposing I could be deceived by this connivance. His own fears of breaking the blockade were in a degree simulated. Weed is the prompter in this Comstock and Baltic intrigue. It is a job. Wrote Seward a letter of some length on the subject of cruising to suppress the slave trade under the treaty which he, without consulting the Cabinet, had recently negotiated with Great Britain. The letter is in answer to one addressed to him by Mr. Stuart, the British Chargé d’Affaires. The treaty looks to me like a trap, and as if the Secretary of State had unwittingly “put his foot in it.” He thinks it would be popular to make a demonstration against slavery and the slave trade, — would conciliate the Abolitionists, who distrust him, and be a feather in his administration of the State Department. But he has been inconsiderate or duped, perhaps both. I declined to furnish cruisers as requested, for it would weaken our position, and I cannot consent to cripple our naval strength at this time, but prefer to retain, and to act under, the belligerent right of search, to that of restricted right conferred by the treaty.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 154-6

Sunday, August 9, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, September 27, 1862

Governor Tod1 called on me to-day. Is hopeful and earnest. Thinks delay is necessary. His confidence in McClellan is unimpaired, and in the President it is greatly increased. Has full, unwavering confidence the country will be extricated and the Union maintained. The Republican State Convention of New York, which met at Syracuse, has nominated General James S. Wadsworth for Governor. There has been a good deal of peculiar New York management in this proceeding, and some disappointments. Morgan, who is, on the whole, a good Governor, though of loose notions in politics, would, I think, have been willing to have received a third nomination, but each of the rival factions of the Union party had other favorites. The Weed and Seward class wanted General Dix to be the conservative candidate, — not that they have any attachment for him or his views, but they have old party hate of Wadsworth. The positive Republican element selected Wadsworth. It is an earnest and fit selection of an earnest and sincere man. In bygone years both Wadsworth and Dix belonged to the school of Silas Wright Democrats. It would have been better had they (Seward and Weed) taken no active part. I am inclined to believe Weed so thought and would so have acted. He proposed going to Europe, chiefly, I understand, to avoid the struggle, but it is whispered that Seward had a purpose to accomplish, — that, finding certain currents and influences are opposed to him and his management of the State Department, he would be glad to retreat to the Senate. Seymour, the Democratic candidate, has smartness, but not firm, rigid principles. He is an inveterate partisan, place-hunter, fond of office and not always choice of means in obtaining it. More of a party man than patriot. Is of the Marcy school rather than of the Silas Wright school, — a distinction well understood in New York.
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1 David Tod, Governor of Ohio.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 153-4

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, September 20, 1862

Am troubled by Preble's conduct. There must be a stop put to the timid, hesitating, and I fear sometimes traitorous course of some of our officers. Tenderness, remonstrance, reproof do no good. Preble is not a traitor, but loyal. An educated, gentlemanly officer of a distinguished family and more than ordinary acquirements, but wants promptitude, energy, decision, audacity, perhaps courage. I am inclined to believe, however, an excess of reading, and a fear that he might violate etiquette, some point of international law, or that he should give offense to Great Britain, whose insolence the State Department fears and deprecates and submits to with all humility, had its influence. He paused at a critical moment to reflect on what he had read and the state of affairs. A man less versed in books would have sunk the pirate if she did not stop when challenged, regardless of her colors. No Englishman had a right to approach and pass the sentinel on duty. Preble was placed there to prevent intercourse, — was a sentinel to watch the Rebels and all others, — and no Englishman had a right to trespass. A board of officers would be likely to excuse him, as in the case of —— and ——,1 on account of his amiable qualities, general intelligence, and good intentions. The time has arrived when these derelictions must not go unpunished. I should have preferred that some other man should have been punished. I have had the subject under consideration with some of the best minds I could consult, and found no difference of opinion. I then took the dispatches to the President and submitted them to him. He said promptly: “Dismiss him. If that is your opinion, it is mine. I will do it.” Secretary Seward and Attorney-General Bates, each of whom I casually met, advised dismissal. It is painful, but an unavoidable duty. I am sorry for Preble, but shall be sorry for my country if it is not done. Its effect upon the Navy will be more salutary than were he and fifty like him to fall in battle.

Commander Joe Smith,2 who died at his post when the ill-fated Congress went down from the assault of the Merrimac, perished in the line of duty. I have never been satisfied with the conduct of the flag-officer3 in those days, who was absent in the waters of North Carolina, — purposely and unnecessarily absent, in my apprehension, through fear of the Merrimac, which he knew was completed, and ready to come out. It was like dread of the new Merrimac at Richmond, which was nearly ready, that led him finally to resign his squadron command. He has wordy pretensions, some capacity, but no hard courage. There is a clan of such men in the Navy, varying in shade and degree, who in long years of peace have been students and acquired position, but whose real traits are not generally understood. The Department is compelled to give them commands, and at the same time is held responsible for their weakness, errors, and want of fighting qualities.

Nothing conclusive from the army. The Rebels have crossed the river without being hurt or seriously molested, — much in character with the general army management of the war. Little is said on the subject. Stanton makes an occasional sneering remark, Chase now and then a better one, but there is no general review, inquiry, or discussion. There is no abatement of hostility to McClellan.
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1 No names in original.
2 Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith.
3 Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, Louis M. Goldsborough.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 141-2

Sunday, April 19, 2015

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 4, 1861

I had a long interview with Mr. Seward today at the State Department. He set forth at great length the helpless condition in which the President and the Cabinet found themselves when they began the conduct of public affairs at Washington. The last cabinet had tampered with treason, and had contained traitors; a miserable imbecility had encouraged the leaders of the South to mature their plans, and had furnished them with the means of carrying out their design. One Minister had purposely sent away the navy of the United States to distant and scattered stations; another had purposely placed the arms, ordnance, and munitions of war in undue proportions in the Southern States, and had weakened the Federal Government so that they might easily fall into the hands of the traitors and enable them to secure the war materiel of the Union; a Minister had stolen the public funds for traitorous purposes — in every port, in every department of the State, at home and abroad, on sea and by land, men were placed who were engaged in this deep conspiracy — and when the voice of the people declared Mr. Lincoln President of the United States, they set to work as one man to destroy the Union under the most flimsy pretexts. The President's duty was clearly defined by the Constitution. He had to guard what he had, and to regain, if possible, what he had lost. He would not consent to any dismemberment of the Union nor to the abandonment of one iota of Federal property— nor could he do so if he desired.

These and many more topics were presented to me to show that the Cabinet was not accountable for the temporizing policy of inaction, which was forced upon them by circumstances, and that they would deal vigorously with the Secession movement — as vigorously as Jackson did with nullification in South Carolina, if they had the means. But what could they do when such a man as Twiggs surrendered his trust and sacrificed the troops to a crowd of Texans; or when naval and military officers resigned en masse, that they might accept service in the rebel forces? All this excitement would come right in a very short time — it was a brief madness, which would pass away when the people had opportunity for reflection. Meantime the danger was that foreign powers would be led to imagine the Federal Government was too weak to defend its rights, and that the attempt to destroy the Union and to set up a Southern Confederacy was successful. In other words, again, Mr. Seward fears that, in this transition state between their forced inaction and the coup by which they intend to strike down Secession, Great Britain may recognize the Government established at Montgomery, and is ready, if needs be, to threaten Great Britain with war as the consequence of such recognition. But he certainly assumed the existence of strong Union sentiments in many of the seceded States, as a basis for his remarks, and admitted that it would not become the spirit of the American Government, or of the Federal system, to use armed force in subjugating the Southern States against the will of the majority of the people. Therefore if the majority desire Secession, Mr. Seward would let them have it — but he cannot believe in anything so monstrous, for to him the Federal Government and Constitution, as interpreted by his party, are divine, heaven-born. He is fond of repeating that the Federal Government never yet sacrificed any man's life on account of his political opinions; but if this struggle goes on, it will sacrifice thousands — tens of thousands, to the idea of a Federal Union. “Any attempt against us,” he said, “would revolt the good men of the South, and arm all men in the North to defend their Government.”

But I had seen that day an assemblage of men doing a goose-step march forth dressed in blue tunics and gray trousers, shakoes and cross-belts, armed with musket and bayonet, cheering and hurrahing in the square before the War Department, who were, I am told, the District of Columbia volunteers and militia. They had indeed been visible in various forms parading, marching, and trumpeting about the town with a poor imitation of French pas and élan, but they did not, to the eye of a soldier, give any appearance of military efficiency, or to the eye of the anxious statesman any indication of the animus pugnandi. Starved, washed-out creatures most of them, interpolated with Irish and flat-footed, stumpy Germans. It was matter for wonderment that the Foreign Minister of a nation which was in such imminent danger in its very capital, and which, with its chief and his cabinet, was almost at the mercy of the enemy, should hold the language I was aware he had transmitted to the most powerful nations of Europe. Was it consciousness of the strength of a great people, who would be united by the first apprehension of foreign interference, or was it the peculiar emptiness of a bombast which is called Buncombe? In all sincerity I think Mr. Seward meant it as it was written.

When I arrived at the hotel, I found our young artist waiting for me, to entreat I would permit him to accompany me to the South. I had been annoyed by a paragraph which had appeared in several papers, to the effect that “The talented young artist, our gifted countryman, Mr. Deodore F. Moses, was about to accompany Mr. &c. &c, in his tour through the South.” I had informed the young gentleman that I could not sanction such an announcement, whereupon he assured me he had not in any way authorized it, but having mentioned incidentally to a person connected with the press that he was going to travel southwards with me, the injudicious zeal of his friend had led him to think he would do a service to the youth by making the most of the very trifling circumstance.

I dined with Senator Douglas, where there was a large party, among whom were Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Forsyth, Southern Commissioner; and several members of the Senate and Congress. Mrs. Douglas did the honors of her house with grace and charming good-nature. I observe a great tendency to abstract speculation and theorizing among Americans, and their after-dinner conversation is apt to become didactic and sententious. Few men speak better than Senator Douglas; his words are well chosen, the flow of his ideas even and constant, his intellect vigorous, and thoughts well cut, precise, and vigorous — he seems a man of great ambition, and he told me he is engaged in preparing a sort of Zollverein scheme for the North American continent, including Canada, which will fix public attention everywhere, and may lead to a settlement of the Northern and Southern controversies. For his mind, as for that of many Americans, the aristocratic idea embodied in Russia is very seductive; and he dwelt with pleasure on the courtesies he had received at the court of the Czar, implying that he had been treated differently in England, and perhaps France. And yet, had Mr. Douglas become President of the United States, his good-will towards Great Britain might have been invaluable, and surely it had been cheaply purchased by a little civility and attention to a distinguished citizen and statesman of the Republic. Our Galleos very often care for none of these things.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 60-3

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Abraham Lincoln to William H. Seward, December 8, 1860

Private & Confidential
Springfield Ill. Dec. 8th, 1860

My dear Sir:

In addition to the accompanying, and more formal note, inviting you to take charge of the State Department, I deem it proper to address you this. Rumors have got into the newspapers to the effect that the Department, named above, would be tendered you, as a compliment, and with the expectation that you would decline it. I beg you to be assured that I have said nothing to justify these rumors. On the contrary, it has been my purpose, from the day of the nomination at Chicago, to assign you, by your leave, this place in the administration. I have delayed so long to communicate that purpose, in deference to what appeared to me to be a proper caution in the case. Nothing has been developed to change my view in the premises; and I now offer you the place, in the hope that you will accept it, and with the belief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, ability, learning, and great experience, all combine to render it an appointment pre-eminently fit to be made.

One word more. In regard to the patronage, sought with so much eagerness and jealousy, I have prescribed for myself the maxim, “Justice to all”; and I earnestly beseech your co-operation in keeping the maxim good.

Your friend, and obedient servant
A. LINCOLN

Hon. William H. Seward
Washington D.C.

Monday, March 2, 2015

John Lothrop Motley to Mary Benjamin Motley, June 17, 1861

Washington,
June 17, 1861.

My Dear Mary:  . . . After being at home three days, I left by the afternoon boat of Saturday, 15th, for New York, where I was obliged to remain all Sunday till 6 P.M. I did not find Mr. Grinnell, unluckily, who is out of town for the summer. In the night I came on to Washington, reaching here at six this morning. I went up to the State Department in the forenoon, and had the merest moment of a conversation with Mr. Seward, who begged me to come and dine with him to-day at seven, and requested, as it was his despatch day, to defer all further colloquy until then. I had afterward a very brief interview with the Secretary of War, Cameron, to whom Governor Andrew begged me to give some information concerning Cobb's battery of flying artillery, which is of more interest to the War Department than to you, so I will not enlarge on that subject. I also introduced Tom, who had something to communicate concerning Gordon's regiment; and the secretary took occasion to say that Massachusetts — and, indeed, all New England — did everything so well that improvement seemed impossible, and that the country was more indebted to it than could ever be repaid for its conduct in the present crisis.

Afterward I saw a small crowd waiting on the pavement, and Lee, who was with us (and who, as you know, has a place in the War Department), told me that they were waiting to see General Scott come out of his office. It reminded me of the group I so often saw in Piccadilly waiting to see Lord Palmerston come out. We stood looking on, too, and very soon he appeared. He has a fine, soldierly, and yet benignant countenance, very much resembling Dr. Reynolds in face as well as stature, and not seeming much older than he. Presently Lee, who knows him very well, went up and mentioned my name. He turned round with much vivacity, with his hand stretched out very cordially, and expressed himself very happy to make my acquaintance, being pleased to add that my writings were “an honor to the age.” Of course I say these little things to you because it will please you and the children. He asked us to come and see him of an evening, and I certainly shall do so as soon as possible.

No one here knows what the plans of the campaign are; all is conjecture. You will see by the papers that go with this that Harper's Ferry has just been evacuated by the rebels. Those with whom I converse seem to imagine that the plan is to strengthen and improve day by day the great national army, gradually surrounding the rebellion by an impenetrable cordon, and thus compelling them, by sheer exhaustion, to lay down their arms before the close of the year. The blockade, bankruptcy, and famine, it is thought, will be potent enough without many very severe pitched battles. The show of force is already so imposing and so utterly beyond any previous calculation of the rebels that they are thought to be rapidly demoralizing, while, on the other hand, every day strengthens the government. There are at least 100,000 well-furnished government troops here and in the immediate neighborhood, or within twelve hours' march, and they are coming daily. The government has plenty of money, plenty of men, and is constantly improving its commissariat and arranging all the details of a great war. It has entered into no man's head that the rebellion is not to be put down. I doubt not that the English government have been fully informed upon this point now, for when I expressed this sentiment just now to Lord Lyons, he responded, “Certainly not; it is only a question of time.”

I went to see him after leaving Mr. Seward. In fact, Seward was kind enough to send me there in his carriage. I found him little changed from the Dresden days, except that he has grown stouter. He was very cordial, frank, and friendly, and we had a long and full conversation on American affairs. He was himself sure that every thinking person in England would deplore a rupture between the two countries as a calamity too painful to contemplate, and that all his efforts would be to avert it.

There is a review of 8000 government troops on the sacred soil of Virginia going on just now. General McDowell invited us to go. My dinner engagement prevents me, but Tom has gone. The town is full of troops. A Massachusetts regiment left Boston the day we did, and a Michigan regiment arrived the same day. All are enlisted for the war just now. There is no lack of good officers. McClellan, who commands the Western Division and is next to Scott, is very competent to command the whole if anything should happen to the veteran. But of that there seems no fear. He looks vigorous, healthful, and young. There seems nothing senile about him.

To-morrow we are going across the Potomac to see the encampments, the fortifications, etc. Pay no heed to anything you may see from time to time of intentions of the rebels to attack Washington. They are as likely to attack Boston. The thing I believe to be utterly out of the question, although Scott would like nothing better than that they should try it on.

I dine with Lord Lyons to-morrow, and I dare say I shall spend the rest of the week here. I have not quite decided whether to go to Fortress Monroe or not, but probably shall do so. Secretary Cameron has given us a pass recommending us especially to the commander of troops, etc., etc. I may as well repeat what I said in my last, that here, as in Boston, every one to whom I speak thanks me for the article in the “Times.” Lord Lyons said it was considered the principal document in the whole affair, and the French minister said the same thing. Everybody says it has done much good, and it most sincerely rejoices me to hear it.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, editor, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley in Two Volumes, Library Edition, Volume 2, p. 136-40

Monday, February 16, 2015

Diary of William Howard Russell: March 27, 1861


This morning, after breakfast, Mr. Sanford called, according to promise, and took me to the State department. It is a very humble — in fact, dingy — mansion, two stories high, and situated at the end of the magnificent line of colonnade in white marble, called the Treasury, which is hereafter to do duty as the head-quarters of nearly all the public departments. People familiar with Downing Street, however, cannot object to the dinginess of the bureaux in which the foreign and state affairs of the American Republic are transacted. A flight of steps leads to the hall-door, on which an announcement in writing is affixed, to indicate the days of reception for the various classes of persons who have business with the Secretary of State; in the hall, on the right and left, are small rooms, with the names of the different officers on the doors — most of them persons of importance; half-way in the hall a flight of stairs conducts us to a similar corridor, rather dark, with doors on each side opening into the bureaux of the chief clerks. All the appointments were very quiet, and one would see much more bustle in the passages of a Poor Law Board or a parish vestry.

In a moderately sized, but very comfortable, apartment, surrounded with book-shelves, and ornamented with a few engravings, we found the Secretary of State seated at his table, and enjoying a cigar; he received me with great courtesy and kindness, and after a time said he would take occasion to present me to the President, who was to give audience that day to the minister of the new kingdom of Italy, who had hitherto only represented the kingdom of Sardinia.

I have already described Mr. Seward's personal appearance; his son, to whom he introduced me, is the Assistant-Secretary of State, and is editor or proprietor of a journal in the State of New York, which has a reputation for ability and fairness. Mr. Frederick Seward is a slight delicate-looking man, with a high forehead, thoughtful brow, dark eyes, and amiable expression; his manner is very placid and modest, and, if not reserved, he is by no means loquacious. As we were speaking, a carriage drove up to the door, and Mr. Seward exclaimed to his father, with something like dismay in his voice, “Here comes the Chevalier in full uniform!” — and in a few seconds in effect the Chevalier Bertinatti made his appearance, in cocked hat, white gloves, diplomatic suit of blue and silver lace, sword, sash, and ribbon of the cross of Savoy. I thought there was a quiet smile on Mr. Seward's face as he saw his brilliant companion, who contrasted so strongly with the more than republican simplicity of his own attire. “Fred., do you take Mr. Russell round to the President's, whilst I go with the Chevalier. We will meet at the White House.” We accordingly set out through a private door leading to the grounds, and within a few seconds entered the hall of the moderate mansion, White House, which has very much the air of a portion of a bank or public office, being provided with glass doors and plain heavy chairs and forms. The domestic who was in attendance was dressed like any ordinary citizen, and seemed perfectly indifferent to the high position of the great personage with whom he conversed, when Mr. Seward asked him, “Where is the President?” Passing through one of the doors on the left, we entered a handsome spacious room, richly and rather gorgeously furnished, and rejoicing in a kind of “demi-jour,” which gave increased effect to the gilt chairs and ormolu ornaments. Mr. Seward and the Chevalier stood in the centre of the room, whilst his son and I remained a little on one side: “For,” said Mr. Seward, “you are not to be supposed to be here.”

Soon afterwards there entered, with a shambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet. He was dressed in an ill-fitting, wrinkled suit of black, which put one in mind of an undertaker's uniform at a funeral; round his neck a rope of black silk was knotted in a large bulb, with flying ends projecting beyond the collar of his coat; his turned-down shirt-collar disclosed a sinewy muscular yellow neck, and above that, nestling in a great black mass of hair, bristling and compact like a ruff of mourning pins, rose the strange quaint face and head, covered with its thatch of wild republican hair, of President Lincoln. The impression produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and wide projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness, sagacity, and the awkward bonhommie of his face; the mouth is absolutely prodigious; the lips, straggling and extending almost from one line of black beard to the other, are only kept in order by two deep furrows from the nostril to the chin; the nose itself—a prominent organ — stands out from the face, with an inquiring, anxious air, as though it were sniffing for some good thing in the wind; the eyes dark, full, and deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almost amounts to tenderness; and above them projects the shaggy brow, running into the small hard frontal space, the development of which can scarcely be estimated accurately, owing to the irregular flocks of thick hair carelessly brushed across it. One would say that, although the mouth was made to enjoy a joke, it could also utter the severest sentence which the head could dictate, but that Mr. Lincoln would be ever more willing to temper justice with mercy, and to enjoy what he considers the amenities of life, than to take a harsh view of men's nature and of the world, and to estimate things in an ascetic or puritan spirit. A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street would not take him to be what — according to the usages of European society — is called a “gentleman;” and, indeed, since I came to the United States, I have heard more disparaging allusions made by Americans to him on that account than I could have expected among simple republicans, where all should be equals; but, at the same time, it would not be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street without notice.

As he advanced through the room, he evidently controlled a desire to shake hands all round with everybody, and smiled good-humoredly till he was suddenly brought up by the staid deportment of Mr. Seward, and by the profound diplomatic bows of the Chevalier Bertinatti. Then, indeed, he suddenly jerked himself back, and stood in front of the two ministers, with his body slightly drooped forward, and his hands behind his back, his knees touching, and his feet apart. Mr. Seward formally presented the minister, whereupon the President made a prodigiously violent demonstration of his body in a bow which had almost the effect of a smack in its rapidity and abruptness, and, recovering himself, proceeded to give his utmost attention, whilst the Chevalier, with another bow, read from a paper a long address in presenting the royal letter accrediting him as “minister resident;” and when he said that “the king desired to give, under your enlightened administration, all possible strength and extent to those sentiments of frank sympathy which do not cease to be exhibited every moment between the two peoples, and whose origin dates back as far as the exertions which have presided over their common destiny as self-governing and free nations,” the President gave another bow still more violent, as much as to accept the allusion.

The minister forthwith handed his letter to the President, who gave it into the custody of Mr. Seward, and then, dipping his hand into his coat-pocket, Mr. Lincoln drew out a sheet of paper, from which he read his reply, the most remarkable part of which was his doctrine “that the United States were bound by duty not to interfere with the differences of foreign governments and countries.” After some words of compliment, the President shook hands with the minister, who soon afterwards retired. Mr. Seward then took me by the hand and said — “Mr. President, allow me to present to you Mr. Russell, of the London ‘Times.’” On which Mr. Lincoln put out his hand in a very friendly manner, and said, “Mr. Russell, I am very glad to make your acquaintance, and to see you in this country. The London Times’ is one of the greatest powers in the world, — in fact, I don't know anything which has much more power, — except perhaps the Mississippi. I am glad to know you as its minister.” Conversation ensued for some minutes, which the President enlivened by two or three peculiar little sallies, and I left agreeably impressed with his shrewdness, humor, and natural sagacity.

In the evening I dined with Mr. Seward, in company with his son, Mr. Seward, junior, Mr. Sanford, and a quaint, natural specimen of an American rustic lawyer, who was going to Brussels as Secretary of Legation. His chief, Mr. Sanford, did not appear altogether happy when introduced to his secretary, for he found that he had a very limited knowledge (if any) of French, and of other things which it is generally considered desirable that secretaries should know.

Very naturally, conversation turned on politics. Although no man can foresee the nature of the crisis which is coming, nor the mode in which it is to be encountered, the faith of men like Mr. Sanford and Mr. Seward in the ultimate success of their principles, and in the integrity of the Republic, is very remark able; and the boldness of their language in reference to foreign powers almost amounts to arrogance and menace, if not to temerity. Mr. Seward asserted that the Ministers of England or of France had no right to make any allusion to the civil war which appeared imminent; and that the Southern Commissioners who had been sent abroad could not be received by the Government of any foreign power, officially or otherwise, even to hand in a document or to make a representation, without incurring the risk of breaking off relations with the Government of the United States. As regards the great object of public curiosity, the relief of Fort Sumter, Mr. Seward maintains a profound silence, beyond the mere declaration, made with a pleasant twinkle of the eye, that “the whole policy of the Government, on that and other questions, is put forth in the President's inaugural, from which there will be no deviation. Turning to the inaugural message, however, there is no such very certain indication, as Mr. Seward pretends to discover, of the course to be pursued by Mr. Lincoln and the cabinet. To an outside observer, like myself, it seems as if they were waiting for events to develop themselves, and rested their policy rather upon acts that had occurred, than upon any definite principle designed to control or direct the future.

I should here add that Mr. Seward spoke in high terms of the ability, dexterity, and personal qualities of Mr. Jefferson Davis, and declared his belief that but for him the Secession movement never could have succeeded as far as it has gone, and would, in all probability, indeed, have never taken place at all. After dinner cigars were introduced, and a quiet little rubber of whist followed. The Secretary is given to expatiate at large, and told us many anecdotes of foreign travel; — it I am not doing him injustice, I would say further, that he remembers his visit to England, and the attention he received there, with peculiar satisfaction. He cannot be found fault with because he has formed a most exalted notion of the superior intelligence, virtue, happiness, and prosperity of his own people. He said that it would not be proper for him to hold any communication with the Southern Commissioners then in Washington; which rather surprised me, after what I had heard from their friend, Mr. Banks. On returning to my hotel, I found a card from the President, inviting me to dinner the following day.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 36-40

Monday, January 12, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 11, 1862

A busy day, reading and preparing dispatches. State Department is sensitively apprehensive that our naval officers will not be sufficiently forbearing towards Englishmen. The old error, running back to the commencement of difficulties, when the Rebels were recognized as belligerents, and a blockade was ordered instead of closing the ports. We are not, it is true, in a condition for war with Great Britain just at this time, but England is in scarcely a better condition for a war with us. At all events, continued and degrading submission to aggressive insolence will not promote harmony nor self-respect. It is a gratification to me that our naval officers assert our rights. I have no fears they will trespass on the rights of others. Full dispatches received from Admiral Farragut, who has got his larger vessels down the river to New Orleans. I had been under apprehensions that the Mississippi was getting so low he would experience difficulty.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 79

Saturday, November 8, 2014

William H. Seward to Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood, March 18, 1863

Department Of State,
Washington, March 18th, 1863.
Samuel J. Kirkwood Esq.,
Iowa City, Iowa.

Sir:—The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate having appointed you to be Minister Resident of the United States to Denmark, I have the honor to announce the same to you, and to request that you will inform this department how soon, in the event of your accepting the appointment, you will be prepared to proceed to Copenhagen.

I am, sir,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM H. SEWARD

SOURCE: Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood, Iowa's War Governor, p. 276