Diary of Corporal Lawrence Van Alstyne: Wednesday, October 1, 1862

Another hot day. How hot I don't know, but it wilted me. I tumbled down, completely used up while at drill. Several others did the same. We seem to be getting over it to-night, as the air cools off. The nights are cool, and that is all that keeps us from melting. Not cool enough, however, to stop the mosquitoes. The heat, together with our changed condition of living, is beginning to get in its work. Several are in the hospital.

Later. There is great excitement in Company B to-night. Orderly Sergeant Lewis Holmes, the one we voted to be our orderly, is to be set back and a corporal named Gilbert Kniffen is to be put in his place. As soon as the companies were organized at Hudson, we were allowed to vote which of the five sergeants of Company B should be orderly sergeant. We did not know then, but have since learned that the orderly sergeant stands next in the line of promotion to the commissioned officers. Kniffen is only a corporal, but he has friends at home who have influence, and this influence has been brought to bear so heavy that this move has been decided upon.

9 p. m. It is all over, and Lew Holmes is still orderly sergeant of Co. B, 128th N. Y. Vols. We, the enlisted men of the company, talked the thing over and decided we would not put up with it. We did not know if we would be able to prevent it, but we finally decided we would stand by Holmes, and fight the thing to a finish, whatever the outcome might be. When we spoke to Captain Bostwick he acted as if he was ashamed of himself, but he said the change had already been made and could not be unmade. We told him we could unmake it, and would, or die in the company street. So the matter rested until time for roll-call, when Kniffin came out with the book and called the name of William H. Appleby, the first name on the list. To his honor be it said, he remained silent, and was immediately put in the mule-stable, which was our guard-house. The next man's name was called, and he went to join Appleby. This went on until the guardhouse was full, when a council of the company officers was held, after which the captain gave us a lecture, telling us what insurbordination [sic] meant, and that the whole regiment, if necessary, would be used to enforce obedience. We had agreed not to talk back, but to simply refuse to answer to our names when called by Corporal Kniffin, or in any way acknowledge him as orderly sergeant, so we said nothing. The men were brought back from the guard-house, and Kniffin again called William H. Appleby. He did not answer and was again put in the guard-house. After a few more had been sent to keep him company another halt was made, the prisoners were again brought out, and the captain called the roll, when every man responded promptly. We were then ordered to break ranks and so the matter stands. But we have won our first battle, we feel sure of that, although we are warned that a company, and if necessary the whole regiment, will be called upon to shoot any who do not answer roll-call in the morning. My name is so near the bottom of the list it was not reached, and so I had nothing to do but look on and listen, but I am as determined as any, and I flap my wings and crow just as loudly as William H. Appleby does.

SOURCE:  Lawrence Van Alstyne, Diary of an Enlisted Man, p. 41-3

Diary of Corporal Lawrence Van Alstyne: Thursday, October 2, 1862

Holmes called the roll this morning and we hear no more about being shot for mutiny. It may possibly come later, but from all I can see and hear the trouble was entirely a company affair and did not reach beyond it. If Colonel Smith, who is said to be very strict on discipline, had taken a hand in it, we might have fared worse, but I doubt if he would allow such a cowardly trick to be played on so good a soldier as Holmes is, and has been, to say nothing of jumping a corporal over the heads of five sergeants, who have all been prompt and faithful in the discharge of their duties. Our first real sick man was sent to the hospital to-night, one of Company B, from Dover.

SOURCE:  Lawrence Van Alstyne, Diary of an Enlisted Man, p. 43

Captain William Thompson Lusk to Elizabeth Adams Lusk, July 25, 1862

Headquarters Stevens' Div.

July 25th, 1862.

My dear Mother:

Your letter has just reached me. I have only to say that it has long been my earnest desire to serve with the troops of my native state where there are so many who feel an interest in me. I have many times sought an opportunity to change to the troops from Old Connecticut, but the mutiny in the Highland Regiment, then being sent to S. Carolina, and other things have prevented. Should I be selected for the position of Major in one of the new Regiments, I think I can bring the necessary testimonials to my fitness. As a staff officer I have been too long employed in teaching field officers their duty, to feel many scruples about accepting the position, if offered me. I will see Gen. Stevens, and ask his advice. The mail is about closing now, so good-bye.

Lovingly,

Will.

SOURCE: William Chittenden Lusk, Editor, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 169

Diary of 1st Lieutenant John S. Morgan: Sunday, April 16, 1865

Spend most of this day writing have a little difficulty in co. col Mackey orders me to tie one of my men for refusing to clean his gun which he brought on inspection dirty. Dick Tol heads a party to cut him loose & is arrested by the col & sent under guard to the Provost Martial to await trial for Mutiny. I prefer charges. &c This P. M Genl Canby sends arond a circular that he has official notice that Genl Lee has surrendered his entire army to Grant. The Chaplain deliver a sermon in camp this evening. Reported that money to pay this army is on the way. see quite a no of ladies promenading today but do not go out of camp to look arond.

SOURCE: “Diary of John S. Morgan, Company G, 33rd Iowa Infantry,” Annals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 13, No. 8, April 1923, p. 592

Diary of John Hay: August 22, 1861

A long hiatus! The nights have been too busy for jottings.

. . . . We went over to Seward’s, found him comfortably slippered, and after talking about consular nuisances, went over to McClellan’s. Everything seems going right. Discipline is perfecting. The Dry Tortugas have squelched mutiny. The drills and reviews keep the men alive. Hunter is soon to go to Illinois as they need a head. At first he wanted to take McDowell but Scott objected. Regiments are constantly coming in, and arms for them. McClellan is growing jolly. Seward is in better humor than I have lately seen him.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 40; Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, p. 25.

Lieutenant William Thompson Lusk to Elizabeth Adams Lusk, August 17, 1861

Maryland,

Camp Causten, Aug. 17th, 1861.

My dear Mother:

This has been a busy and painful week for the officers of the Highland Regiment. You have seen various accounts of our troubles in the papers, but they contain nothing authentic, although perhaps about as much as an outsider can understand. The mutiny of Thursday is only the legacy of a quarrel begun among the officers before the Regiment left for the seat of war. The quarrel ended after the battle of Bull Run, in the resignation of several of the officers whose ambition was disappointed as to governing the affairs of the Regiment. Not content with withdrawing their services, these men resolved to undermine the Regiment itself. Their plans were well laid. In an underhand way they conveyed papers among the men purporting that, as State Militia they were entitled to return home at the expiration of three months service, but that an effort would be made to detain them for the war. By going home, it was represented the men would receive a grand ovation, would meet their families, and be enabled to tell their tale of the Bull Run battle. Those who had had enough of fighting could resume their old employments, while the greater part who were ready to re-enlist for the war, would be entitled to the re-enlistment bounty of $30. A Government which would give $30 bounty for re-enlisted three month soldiers must place a high value upon them. “Now,” the men were told, “a secret plan has been formed to prevent your return home at all. Lieut.-Col. Elliott has received from Government $10,000.00 to sell you all for the war, and to cheat you of your rights and privileges.”Some little things occurred, which as far as the men were concerned, seemed corroborative of these statements, viz: — An order which had been issued by the Secretary of War for us to return to NewYork to recruit, was recalled as inexpedient on the day the three-month service of our men expired. This was sufficient for them. They believed they had been sold; and the train which had been carefully laid, exploded upon our being ordered, not into the boat for home, but onto the road into Maryland. Since the battle, owing to the loss through resignations or deaths, of our Colonel, Major and 9 of the 10 Captains, besides that of many of the Lieutenants, we were left in a condition peculiarly unfavorable to discipline; and this much is to be said that the companies of Captain Ellis (my own) and that of Captain Elliott, which were provided with officers, obeyed their orders, and refused to join the mutineers. The mutiny commenced in the morning by the men's refusing to strike their tents as commanded. They were to have been struck at 5 a.m. and the Regiment was to move at 6 o'clock. Col. Stevens repeated the orders, but they were still silently and sullenly neglected. He then went among the men and used all his powers of persuasion, but they had been told that they had the law on their side, and if they only persevered, they would be able to return home as a militia regiment. Col. Stevens next went to each company singly and read the articles of war, appending to them such remarks as would enforce in the men the danger of their course; but by this time, the camp, left without sentry, became exposed to the whiskey dealers who made good use of their opportunities. Soon a scene of the wildest confusion took place. The soldiers, throwing off all authority, presented the hideous and disgusting spectacle of a debauched and drunken Helotry. It was a time trying to one's nerves — more trying far than the musketry or cannonading of Bull Run. The Colonel ordered the officers to strike the tents themselves. This we did amid the jeers, the taunts, and the insults of an infuriated mob. One man brought me his gun, cocked it, showed me it was capped, and reminded me it was intended for one officer at least to die, should our release be attempted. Still we worked quietly on, obeying our orders. Some of the Lieutenants were allowed to take down the tents undisturbed, but on leaving them a moment, they were again pitched by the men. Everywhere we were threatened, and it became equally necessary to show neither fear of the men, nor, on the other hand, to allow ourselves any act of violence which would precipitate bloodshed. Luckily for us, when the men were most maddened by drink, an old country quarrel broke out among them, viz: — the feud between the Orangemen and the Ribandmen, which we only know of through English novels, and history. We were not, however, altogether forgotten. Names neither poetical, decent, or complimentary were freely bestowed upon us. Finally afternoon advanced, and nothing was gained. The Colonel called on the men for the last time to render obedience. Soberness and reflection had begun their work upon a few. These fell into their places, and were stationed around the Camp as a guard over the others. Still, though thus yielding, their sympathies were either extended to their mutinous comrades, or else they were too fearful to render much assistance. It was necessary for the officers to be everywhere, and I confess I was quite exhausted when a body of cavalry and a line of infantry appeared, coming toward us. This was a great relief. The mutineers, all unconscious, were surrounded, and, when it was too late to resist, obeyed the orders issued, a death penalty being promised to those who wavered. You have seen in the papers the punishment awarded to the Regiment — the taking of our colors and the disgrace from which we are suffering.

Dear Mother, I feel heartsick and much depressed. I begin to repent bitterly of having cast my lot with a foreign Regiment. Our men have not the feelings of Americans, and cannot, when a reverse comes, be inspired to renewed efforts by enthusiasm for the cause. I am eager for another battle in order that we may have an opportunity to regain our colors, yet dread to risk it now that our men are much demoralized. I wish old Connecticut had a place for me.

Col. Stevens, who is an able man, thinks though, in less than a month he can make us once more the finest Regiment in the field. These stories regarding the Lieut.Col. are simply absurd. I have just received a letter from you. I endorse fully the bravery of Gen'l Tyler. His chief fault was his paying the Connecticut Volunteers the high compliment of believing they could fight like veterans, a compliment not at all to the taste of the Connecticut boys.

Good bye, dear mother.

Love to sisters and all.

Affec'y.,

W. T. Lusk.

_______________

Note. — Dr. Lusk once said that at the time of the mutiny among the 79th Highlanders he had one of the narrowest escapes of his life. A drunken soldier pointed a rifle at his head and fired, but a friend seeing the danger, knocked the muzzle of the gun in the air, just in time to avert catastrophy. In narrating this episode Dr. Lusk remarked with characteristic modesty, “You know I never was very brave, but when the men refused to strike the tents, the officers had to do it themselves.”

SOURCE: William Chittenden Lusk, Editor, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 72-6

William Gilmore Simms to William Porcher Miles, probably January 13, 1861

Sunday¹ Night, 12 P. M.

I am sleepless, my dear Miles, and must write. If you should be sleepless also, it is not improbable but that my letters will help you to a soporific condition. It seems to me that you will have a little respite. The opening fire upon the Star of the West changes materially the aspect of things to the Federal government, and they will hardly think to send supplies to Sumter except under cover of armed vessels, which is the inauguration of open war upon the State, which the President and cabinet will hardly attempt unless under authority of Congress. Congress alone, I believe, has the power to declare war. There is no telling, however, what may be done when the power is under the hands of a weak administration, counseled and governed, in fact, by a person whose whole training has endowed [him] with military ideas as paramount to all.² We must, of course, prepare for two dangers, treachery and assault. But it strikes me that the unexpected fire of Fort Morris will compel a pause in the Federal councils, for the better maturing of plans, and some respite for preparation will be allowed you. Not an hour should be lost in preparation. To have numerous guns, to bear equally upon an assailing squadron and Fort Sumter, seems to be the necessity. Looking at the map, I note that Mount Pleasant is distant from Fort Sumter some two miles, while I estimate Moultrie to be some one and a quarter. A battery at Mount Pleasant, cutting the western angle of Sullivan's Island, seems to be in direct range with Sumter, and if within reach of heavy cannon, then a battery of earth at this point, with half a dozen thirty-two pounders, might operate successfully against it, at all events compel a very useful diversion of its fires. So I find that on the sandhills below Fort Johnson, and on the sandhills at the extreme western verge of Fort Morris, batteries of say three heavy cannon each might face Fort Sumter, framed of logs faced with iron and filled in with sand, which could contribute largely to its distraction, if not its injury. On these sandhills, also, you possess an advantage in their elevation, which will tend to reduce the superiority of Sumter in height. Two or three batteries along these hills and at these points, mere bastions, having two or three guns each of heavy calibre, could be thrown up very suddenly, assuming, as I do, that you can command, from the popular patriotism, any amount of slave labor. I would have them so planted as not to face the portholes of Sumter, yet be able to take them at an angle. Shot entering a porthole obliquely would be more mischievous, perhaps, than if direct, since the zigzag course they would pursue would be likely to kill every man on one side or other of the guns, besides abrading the embrasure very seriously. In reference to Wappoo Cut, let me mention that, as the obvious entrance to that cut is by the Stono, there is an old fort, once thought a pretty strong one, at the mouth of the Stono, on Cole's Island. This might be manned by volunteers from the precinct, officered by some good military man. It covers Bird Key [?] and is very well placed, though still, I think, it would be good policy to stop up Wappoo Cut, or keep an armed schooner in Ashley River, at the mouth of it. I am writing, you perceive, without the slightest knowledge of what has been done; and it is quite probable that all my suggestions have been anticipated. If, however, you fancy there is anything in them, communicate with Jamison and any military friends on whose judgment you rely. Ranging timbers properly mortised might be prepared by the mechanics of the city, and the iron bars laid on, if desired, before shipment to the desired points. It is my impression that old Fort Johnson ranges Moultrie in the same line with Sumter. If so, it is a question how far it would be proper to use the former place with heavy cannon which might range across the strait. You should employ all the heavy cannon you can. Jamison told me that you had an abundance. Unless Fort Morris has numerous pieces, she could hardly play any efficient game with many assailing vessels. I do not know where Fort Morris is placed, but suppose it to be fronting equally the Ship and the Twelve-feet channel. In that event, unless the sandhills interpose, it is under the range of Fort Sumter, provided the distance be within three miles, as I suppose it to be. I should have said four, but for the threat of Anderson to fire on Fort Morris. A battery between Fort Morris and the Lighthouse, on the edge of the sandhills, might rake the Ship Channel with a plunging fire, yet I should think be out of range and even sight of Fort Sumter. I think I said, in a previous letter, that in sighting the guns for long distances telescopes should be used; of course, I meant only the ordinary ship spyglasses, of which a sufficient number for each battery could be obtained in the city. With another battery to second Fort Morris, each of twelve guns at least, and heavy ones, you could give a telling account of all entering vessels. They might all be sunk with good gunnery. But two shot only taking effect out of eighteen fired, would seem to show that the gunnery was not sufficiently practiced. I write only from report. To-night, I learn that (on dit) there has been a mutiny in Fort Sumtsr, and that Anderson has had to shoot one of his men, and put ten more in irons; and that this was the reason why he did not fire on Forts Morris and Moultrie. By the “Mercury” it is said that some negotiations are on foot which will prevent bloodshed. The inference is that Fort Sumter will be given up. This is hardly probable. I suspect treachery. We should suspect nothing else. Anderson wishes communication with the city. If opportunity is allowed him to see what we are doing, or to hear of it, or if he is allowed to corrupt mercenaries, we shall have worse mischief. We must not be too confiding, too easy of faith, too courteous, even to an enemy, who, if he had the right feeling, would at once resign his command and throw up his position on the distinct ground of his Southern birth and associations. He should be kept corked up closely, until we are quite ready to draw him off. If he still keep his position, and we are to have an attempt by the war steamers, Fort Sumter must and will take part in it; the vital point is how to neutralize his action in the engagement. I see but the one suggested, to keep as many batteries at work on him, breaching and otherwise, and a cloud of vessels and men ready for scaling, as will effectively divert his regards from those forts which are designed for the defense of the harbor. And unless Fort Morris be made strong in guns, I see that vessels of heavy draft in deep water may shell it ad libitum, while the smaller craft passes in. I am very doubtful whether a fort on the east end of Sullivan's can do more than cover the Maffit and Rattlesnake channels, if these. It can hardly do much mischief to vessels entering the Ship Channel. Something will depend upon the calibre of its guns. Do, if you can spare a half hour, write me, in charity, how we stand, and with what degree of preparation, and believe me

W. GlLMORE SlMMS

_______________

¹ Probably the Sunday that followed the firing on the Star of the West, i. e. January 13, 1861.

² It seems plain that Simms here alludes to General Winfield Scott. Cass had had a military training, hut he had resigned from the Cabinet when the above was written.

SOURCE: William Peterfield Trent, William Gilmore Simms, p. 255-60

Brigadier General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, August 19, 1861

FORT CORCORAN, August 19, 1861.

. . . Among my regiments are three who claim to have been enlisted only for three months, but the Secretary of War has decided they are in for two years. In each of the regiments there has been a kind of mutiny, not open and decided, but a determination to do no duty.

Yesterday, Sunday, I had two companies of regular cavalry and one of artillery ready to attack one of these regiments. For some hours I thought I would have to give an order to fire, but they did not like the artillery and have gone to duty; but I think this is a bad class of men to depend on to fight. They may eat their rations and go on parade, but when danger comes they will be sure to show the white feather.

Still, they are now in a state of subjection. I went over to Washington on this business some days ago, saw the President and General Scott; at the table of the latter I met Robert Anderson for the first time. I only had a few words with him, but on Saturday he sent for me to meet him at Willard's. There I found Senator Johnson, a Mr. Maynard, and two or three other members of Congress from Kentucky and Tennessee. One of them, Senator Johnson I think, premised by saying that it was the determination of the government to send assistance to the Union men of Kentucky and Tennessee; that there were large numbers of them who merely needed arms, money and organization; that Anderson was the proper general to organize and lead the movement; but that his health was liable at any moment to fail him, and the President had agreed that he might select any three of the Brigadiers to go with him; that he had at once asked for me, and two others, Burnside and Thomas, which was conceded; that when McClellan heard I was asked for he did not want to spare me, as he thought there remained imminent danger of an attack here. Then Anderson said he would prefer to wait a few days till things assumed a more settled shape — say seven to ten days, at the expiration of which time I should be relieved, and ordered to Kentucky. I have said or done nothing one way or other, but in about seven days I will, if nothing threatening happens, apply for relief that I may stop at Lancaster to see you, for a day or so. I expect to go to Louisville and thence through East Kentucky and Tennessee, to see myself the state of the country, and if possible, to organize resistance to the southern Confederacy. It is a matter of great importance and upon it may hang the existence of the present government.

Most assuredly events have favored the southern Confederacy, and instead of making friends, the administration seems to have lost ground, not only in the South and Middle States, but also in the North. The clamor for discharge on every possible frivolous pretext has been a severe blow to the army and may be to the country. I hear that the new enlistments drag. This every reasonable person must have apprehended from the foolish cry first raised, a mere impulse sure to be followed by reaction. . . .

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 217-8.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 1/139.

Brigadier General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, August 17, 1861

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

August 17, 1861.

. . . I have not undressed of a night since Bull Run, and the volunteers will not allow of sleep by day. Two regiments have mutinied, claiming that the United States has no right to hold their services. Under the influence of a battery of artillery and squadron of regular cavalry the number who refused duty dwindled down to sixty-five in one regiment and thirty-five in another, all of whom were marched down to the Navy Yard and placed in irons on board a man-of-war. The remainder of the men and officers of these regiments are sick of the war and want to go home. McClellan still thinks Beauregard will attack the city. Most assuredly he should do so, but it may be he will not.

I was over here a few days ago and met Robert Anderson who sent for me today. It seems he is to organize some kind of a force in Kentucky and Tennessee to support the general government, and has asked for me. The President agrees to send me as soon as McClellan can spare me and McClellan will not leave me go, until he conceives the city to be out of danger — say one week – then I am to be sent into Kentucky post haste. Whether I am to be allowed to stop a day at Lancaster or not I cannot imagine, but I suppose not. I will endeavor to stop to see you for a moment, but I know how it will be — McClellan will not relieve me from duty till the latest moment, when Anderson will be calling for me in Kentucky. The bluer the times the more closely should one cling to his country. . . .

I do not know why we should not have a government. The old government was as mild as any on earth, and it may be that it is the best; but true it is, its administration had become very corrupt. Even now, it is hard to hold her people to their allegiance; but we must have a future, and a government, and I will not attempt to advise or guide events till I see some end to this muddle. Thus far, the Union party has the worst of the fight, and our armies are too scattered. If they order me to any place I'll go if I can. With Anderson I suppose we will have to go into Kentucky and Tennessee to organize an army in the face of that prejudice which you complained so much about in Missouri. That prejudice pervades the public mind and it will take years to overcome. In all the southern states, they have succeeded in impressing the public mind that the North is governed by a mob (of which unfortunately there is too much truth) and in the South that all is chivalry and gentility.

Out of this chaos some order in time must arise, but how or when I cannot tell. . . .

I have just sworn in as a Brigadier General, and therefore I suppose I might as well admit the title. . . .

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 215-7.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 1/139.

Times’ Dispatch

A gentleman arrived here to-day, directly from Gen. McClellans’s headquarters, and reports that our forces have greatly the advantage of the enemy, as time will show, that our sharpshooters are the terror of the rebel gunners and that our approaches command the rebel entrenchments. Everything is working as well as the most sanguine could wish.

On Monday last there was firing between two rebel regiments within the rebel works causing much commotion in our camp. It continued so long and so severe that it was mistaken at first for a regular assault on our out posts, and the long roll was beaten in our camp. It turned out that one of their regiments were firing into another, which returned the fire with spirit. Our forces could distinctly see them carry off the dead and wounded. The affair is believed to have been a mutiny and measures taken to quell it. The Virginians now being forced into the service at the point of the bayonet, resist as far as they can, more especially those being drafted and forced into regiments from other States, to fill the latter to their respective quotas. It is supposed the mutiny grew out of something of the sort.

Information was received in our headquarters at Yorktown, that the rebels were concentrating a large force at Gordonsville, hoping to bag Gen. Banks, and that it was their intention to allow McDowell to get across the Rappahannock and then precipitate a superior force upon him.

The Richmond Examiner, of the 22d says:

“Official dispatches received yesterday state that the bombardment of the forts below New Orleans continued during the whole of Saturday, and that there were no [casualties] on our side. It is stated that the enemy’s armament, owing to the shallowness of the water cannot bet sufficiently near to the forts to bother the walls to any extent, that there is no possibility of reducing them but by shelling the garrison out.”

[Note: this article is a continuation of the column headed “From Washington.”]

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Saturday Morning, April 26, 1862, p. 1