Admiral Farragut writes that his health is giving way under
the great labor imposed and long-continued service in the Gulf and the
Caribbean Sea. Says he must have rest and shore exercise. The Department had
ordered him North to command the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron and capture
Wilmington. These orders he had not received when his dispatch was written, and
I am exceedingly embarrassed how to proceed. Fox tells me that Grant, with whom
he has conversed, would not be satisfied with Lee. Grant had so said or
intimated to him when Fox was sent with Gillmore to consult with Grant in
regard to operations at Wilmington. My own convictions are that Lee is not the
man for that. That kind of work is not in him, except under the immediate
orders of another. He is true and loyal, prudent and cautious. Farragut would
take the place three times while Lee was preparing, and hesitating, and looking
behind for more aid. It pains me to distress him and the Blairs by detaching
him and ordering another to the work, but individual feelings, partialities,
and friendships must not be in the way of public welfare.
The importance of closing Wilmington and cutting off Rebel
communication is paramount to all other questions, more important, practically,
than the capture of Richmond. It has been impossible to get the War Department
and military authorities to enter into the spirit of this work. They did not
appreciate it. But they and Grant have now engaged in it, and Grant is
persistent. Just at this crisis Farragut unfortunately fails. It is
unavoidable, a necessity. He would not ask relief if not compelled to, and may
try to obey the orders, though I think not; and if he offers to, I shall not,
under the present aspect of affairs, accept the service from him. But who shall
take his place? Lee is not the man, whatever his worth in other respects.
Admiral Porter is probably the best man for the service, but his selection will
cut Lee to the quick. Porter is young, and his rapid promotion has placed him
in rank beyond those who were his seniors, some of whom it might be well to
have in this expedition. But again personal considerations must yield to the
public necessities. I think Porter must perform this duty. Neither Goldsborough
nor Du Pont are men for such service. Nor is Davis. Dahlgren has some good
qualities, but lacks great essentials and cannot be thought of for this
command. His promotion is not and never will be popular with the Navy. Men as
well as officers participate in this feeling. I regret it. I strove to have him
suppress his aspirations as premature and not earned afloat. But it is
difficult to reason with vain ambition. Dahlgren is not for such a duty the
equal of Porter, even were he popular with the service and the country. I see
no alternative but Porter, and, unprejudiced and unembarrassed, I should select
him. The movement is secret, and I have no one to confer with but Fox, who is
over-partial to Porter and whose opinion is foregone, and known already before
asking.
Now, how to dispose of Lee? I think we must send him for the
present to the West Gulf, and yet that is not strictly right, perhaps, to
others. His harvest of prize money, I think, is greater than that of any other
officer, and the West Gulf, should Wilmington be closed, will be likely, the
war continues, to be the theatre of blockade-running. I think, however, Lee
must, for a time at least, have the position.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the
Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866,
p. 145-7
