Who but Sheridan, as at Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864,
just a month to a day after his splendid victory at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19,
1864, or Winchester, Va., as now more properly known, could have rallied a
defeated and routed army en route to the front and after and so enthused it in
the act, simply by dashing, alert and crafty through its broken ranks after a
twenty mile race with time from Winchester, with flashing eyes, bared head and
waving hat, on a spirited foaming horse, shouting to his men: “Get back into
line, men! Get into line, quick! We can lick ’em! We can lick h--1 out of ’em yet!” and do it almost at once,
even as brilliantly so as at Winchester a month previous? How often are such things
done? Such a man outclasses all others in military history, not excepting
Wellington or Marlborough, for such a man as Sheridan is without a peer as a
field marshal in the annals of warfare; and had he been found sooner and given
greater responsibilities he would not only have surely proved it, but would
have more fully electrified the world than he did and have been its idol as a
military genius and hero for all time.
He or Grant would never have used such woefully poor
judgment as to have assaulted an army equally as valiant, splendidly posted,
fully as large, if not larger than their own, across an open, level space
without cover quite a mile in extent, as Lee did at Gettysburg on July 3, 1864.
If that act showed ability, good judgment, or a military genius, then I am
lacking in mature sound judgment, and my lifetime of military training,
including my three years and threescore battles or more in the Civil War and in
Indian wars, has been in vain. This would be equally true even though the
armies had been equal in numbers. General Longstreet's suggestion to Lee to
place his army on General Meade's flank between him and Washington would have
been a splendid substitute for Pickett's forlorn charge.1 It was
abler and just what Grant did with Lee hardly a year later, successfully and
repeatedly and forced Lee back to Richmond and Petersburg, as the world now
knows, which indicates superior generalship both on Grant's part as well as
Longstreet's.
Would either Grant or Sheridan have lost their cavalry for
several days, as Lee did, when on such a campaign in an enemy's country or
anywhere else?2 Would either, with three such splendid cavalry
divisions as Meade, not have used a part of one division if necessary to have
patrolled barely seventy-five miles between York, Pa., or the Susquehanna, and
the Potomac river, in order to detect any movement by the enemy on Washington?
Would this have made the Union Commander, whoever he might have been, timid
about moving to any point where battle was offered, fearing a fake attack by
Lee in order to cover a movement on Washington or Baltimore? One brigade would
have established a line of patrol posts less than a quarter of a mile apart of
six men each, which would have detected at once any movement south by Lee, or
if preferred, posts one-eighth of a mile apart of three men each.
Would Grant or Sheridan have remained so near a great battle
as at Gettysburg, July 1, 1864, and not have furnished an opportunity for another
soul-stirring poem like “Sheridan’s Ride”? When they were informed that the
enemy had attacked their forces barely three hours’ ride away, would they have
loitered a whole day away like dullards, as both army commanders did at
Gettysburg?3 Aye! either would have made the ride in two hours or
even less, and even though their steeds were as black as night, on their
arrival at Gettysburg they would have been as white as snow or as foam could
have made them; and, still better, they would not only have known, too, through
their cavalry, spies, etc., for we were at home among friends, where Lee's army
corps were, but when each broke camp to concentrate at Gettysburg, and their
own corps close by them would have been there in season to have met the enemy
in at least equal numbers, instead of being outnumbered all day July 1, two to
one, as was the case.4 If necessary, too, as at Opequan Creek, Sept.
19, 1864, the different corps would have marched at 2 o'clock instead of 8 o’clock
A. M. or even earlier if thought necessary.
Was there any excuse for the Confederates not driving the
Union forces from the field in a rout on July first? They would have done so,
too, except that their forces were fought in detail, its reserves not even
being brought into action when needed.5 Did Ewell take the best
advantage of his opportunities? The enemy outnumbered us quite two to one the
first day from first to last after the battle commenced, but still at the first
dash of two brigades of our Infantry — Wadsworth's Division — against two
brigades of the enemy, when Reynolds was killed, we placed hors de combat over
half of each of their brigades and captured Archer, a brigade commander; and
still the enemy had two brigades in immediate reserve as support, but they were
not used.6 This is what I call fighting an army in detail, a total
waste of material. In case Sheridan hadn't thrown his support or reserve — Russell's
division — into the fight at the right moment at Winchester, Va., Sept. 19,
1864, his results would have been equally as ignominious as his victory was
brilliant, because he did use his reserve correctly on that occasion; and so it
would have been with the enemy at Gettysburg had it used its reserve. It would
probably have captured many of our men and driven the balance of them from the field
in a rout, as Sheridan did Early at Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; there was
nothing to prevent it.
Does Lee deserve being classed among the greatest field
marshals of modern times for such field marshalship as was displayed at the first
day’s fighting at Gettysburg? But, says the incompetent critic who forms his
conclusions from gush, policy, favoritism, sentiment, or weakly otherwise,
instead of for the sake of truth and correct history, Lee wasn't there! Aye!
but wasn't it an alert Commander's—a genius's —business to have
been there? What was he in Pennsylvania for or selected and paid for handling
such an important matter to the Confederacy for? Who gave the order to
concentrate for battle at Gettysburg but he?7 Does not every experienced
soldier know that under such circumstances no one can tell exactly at what
moment a battle will commence? And would not an alert, sagacious commander have
made a forced night ride in order to have been with the first of his forces on
the field? Lee knew he was going to fight if the enemy would fight him,
but Meade didn't; hence Lee knew exactly what to do.8 A great field
marshal would have been more alert — on hand — it seems to me.
Lee commanded in person the second day at Gettysburg, and
not only failed to attack early in the morning, when he should, but, as usual,
when he did, fought his army in detail using Longstreet's corps largely against
two of our corps in turn which, being overwhelmed by numbers, and Meade failing
to reinforce them, as he should or not have sent them where he did, they were
of course forced back to their proper positions onto the correct line of battle
beyond which they should never have been advanced, and with a sagacious, alert,
competent commander would not have been except the whole army advanced together
in a general assault which it should have done anyway after Wright's
brigade was repulsed.9
From first to last in the battle of Gettysburg, I fail to
see anything to commend on the enemy's part in any of its generals except in
Longstreet; nor on the Union side so far as Meade was concerned, but do in many
others, and especially Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and Howard, each of whom in
turn successively commanded our forces in the order mentioned without being
routed, against great odds under exceedingly trying circumstances owing to
Meade's failure apparently, to fully grasp the situation fourteen miles
away. It shows what splendid fighters Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and
Howard's men were to stand off double their number for an entire day, with what
help they got from Schurz's men.
That Lee did not grasp the situation is evident or else he
would have assaulted our lines early on the morning of July second before
Meade's forces arrived on the field. It is said he did give the order to do so,
but if he had been a great military genius wouldn't he have seen that
it was done? Instead of this owing largely probably, to Meade's lack of
alertness and enterprise, Lee from lack of sagacity became apparently dizzy and
unbalanced, as was most of his command, because of his apparently misunderstood
partial successes, of the first and second days' fights, and was so criminally
lacking in good judgment on the third day as to be led into the mistake of
ordering Pickett's charge which, for obvious reasons, could only result in calamity
to the Southern cause.10 This even an amateur soldier of ordinary
judgment should have been able to have foreseen.
_______________
1 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
29-30.
2 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 12.
3 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
16-17.
4 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
19-33.
5 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
19-33.
6 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
19-33.
7 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 57.
8 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
52-3.
9 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
34-45.
10 See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp.
34-45.
SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections
and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 197-203
