Official Reports: The Gettysburg Campaign, June3 – August 1,1863: No. 338. Reports of Col. William Gamble, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, commanding First Brigade.

No. 338.

Reports of Col. William Gamble, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, commanding First Brigade.

HDQRS. FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,   

June 22, 1863.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the cavalry fight of yesterday.

The brigade—composed of the Eighth New York, Eighth Illinois, three squadrons Third Indiana, and two squadrons Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, with one section of the First U.S. Artillery, under Lieutenant Michalowski, in all about 1,600 strong—left Aldie at 5 a.m.; marched to Middleburg; from thence west across a ford at Goose Creek. The rebel skirmishers occupying the opposite bank under cover of a stone wall at the ford, one squadron of the Third Indiana Cavalry was dismounted, and, with the advance guard deployed, drove the rebels from the opposite bank, when the column crossed, and advanced south on the Upperville road. Encountered the enemy 1 mile from the ford, on the right of the road: deployed the column in line of battle, and a few well-directed shells into the enemy's column dispersed him rapidly in retreat through the woods southward. One mile farther, found the enemy behind stone walls, near a house; a few more shells drove them again toward Upperville. Two miles farther, the enemy's skirmishers, supported by artillery, were found strongly posted. I deployed the column in line; advanced and drove the enemy from two strong positions behind stone walls, his guns continually throwing shells at us.

We continued the march, and found the enemy strongly posted west of Upperville, at the base of the mountain. The Eighth Illinois, Third Indiana, and Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, about 900 strong, leading the column, came on rapidly at a gallop; formed in line; charged up to the enemy's five guns amid a shower of shells, shrapnel, and case shot; drove the rebel gunners from their pieces, when the enemy's cavalry, seven regiments strong, emerged from the woods, and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued, the enemy outnumbering us three to one. We retired a short distance behind a stone wall, and maintained our position, repulsing the repeated charges of the enemy by well-directed carbine and pistol firing.

The enemy then, on account of his superior numbers, attempted to turn both flanks, when a squadron of the Eighth Illinois and one of the Third Indiana Cavalry were deployed to cover the flanks, and, after a sharp conflict, repulsed the enemy, after which the section of artillery arrived, supported by the Eighth New York Cavalry, and shelled the enemy from his position. The enemy then retreated toward Ashby's Gap, pursued for 2 miles by the First and Second Cavalry Brigades, which at sunset returned, and encamped on the battle-field, buried the dead, and took care of the wounded. Eighteen dead bodies of the enemy were buried, and over 30 of their wounded were found, in addition to what they carried away, besides prisoners, the exact number of which the provost-marshal of the division will report.

Our loss is as follows:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
8th Illinois Cavalry	2	17	....	19
3d Indiana Cavalry	....	4	1	5
12th Illinois Cavalry (Captain Brown wounded)	2	14	4	20
Total	4	35	5	44

Horses killed—Third Indiana Cavalry, 18; Eighth Illinois Cavalry, 17. Total, 35 horses of enlisted men; 1 horse of Colonel Gamble; 36 horses in all killed.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

 WM. GAMBLE,                   

 Colonel, Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.

Capt. T. C. BACON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Cavalry Division.

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HDQRS. FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,                  

Camp near Catlett's, Va., August 24, 1863.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the several engagements with the enemy, from June 28 to July 31 last, in accordance with orders from division headquarters:

NEAR GETTYSBURG, PA., JULY 1.

About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st instant, while in camp at the seminary building, the officer commanding the squadron on picket in front gave me notice that the enemy, consisting of infantry and artillery, in column, were approaching his pickets from the direction of Cashtown, with deployed skirmishers in strong force, about 3 miles distant. This information was immediately communicated to the general commanding the division, who ordered my command to be in immediate readiness to fight the enemy. My brigade—consisting of the Eighth New York, Eighth Illinois, three squadrons of the Third Indiana, and two squadrons of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, about 1,600 strong, with Tidball's battery, Second U.S. Artillery—was placed in line of battle about 1 mile in front of the seminary, the right resting on the railroad track and the left near the Middletown or Fairfax [Fairfield] road, the Cashtown road being a little to the right of the center, at right angles with the line. Three squadrons, part dismounted, were ordered to the front, and deployed as skirmishers to support the squadron on picket, now being driven back by the enemy's artillery and skirmishers. Our battery of six 3-inch rifled guns was placed in battery, one section on each side of the Cashtown road, covering the approaches of the enemy, and the other section on the right of the left regiment, to cover that flank. The enemy cautiously approached in column on the road, with three extended lines on each flank, and his and our line of skirmishers became engaged, and our artillery opened on the enemy's advancing column, doing good execution. The enemy moved forward; two batteries opened on us, and a sharp engagement of artillery took place. In a short time we were, by overpowering numbers, compelled to fall back about 200 yards to the next ridge, and there make a stand.

In the meantime our skirmishers, fighting under cover of trees and fences, were sharply engaged, did good execution, and retarded the progress of the enemy as much as could possibly be expected, when it is known they were opposed by three divisions of Hill's corps. After checking and retarding the advance of the enemy several hours, and falling back only about 200 yards from the first line of battle, our infantry advance of the First Corps arrived, and relieved the cavalry brigade in its unequal contest with the enemy.

In the afternoon, the enemy, being strongly re-enforced, extended his flanks, and advanced on our left in three strong lines, to turn that flank. The general commanding division ordered my brigade forward at a trot, and deployed in line on the ridge of woods, with the seminary on our right. Half of the Eighth New York, Third Indiana, and Twelfth Illinois were dismounted and placed behind a portion of a stone wall and under cover of trees.

The enemy being close upon us, we opened a sharp and rapid carbine fire, which killed and wounded so many of the first line of the enemy that it fell back upon the second line. Our men kept up the fire until the enemy in overwhelming numbers approached so near that, in order to save my men and horses from capture, they were ordered to mount and fall back rapidly to the next ridge, on the left of the town, where our artillery was posted. The stand which we made against the enemy prevented our left flank from being turned, and saved a division of our infantry.

My brigade fought well under disadvantageous circumstances against a largely superior force. Every officer and soldier did his duty. The list of casualties is large, but could not be less, considering the position we occupied. Major Lemon, Third Indiana, was mortally wounded, since dead; Lieutenant Conroe, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, killed; Captain Fisher and Lieutenant Voss, same regiment, wounded; Captain Follett, Eighth New York, severely wounded; Captain Martin, Third Indiana, wounded; Captain Morris, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, serving on my staff, was wounded, and one of my orderlies killed. Tidball's horse battery, under Lieutenant Calef, attached to my brigade, was worked faithfully, did good execution, and fully sustained its former high reputation. This brigade had the honor to commence the fight in the morning and close it in the evening.

NEAR WILLIAMSPORT, MD., JULY 6.

This brigade was ordered to engage the enemy on the left of the Boonsborough road, near Williamsport, the Reserve Brigade being on the right of the road. The Third Indiana Cavalry was ordered to capture and destroy a train of seven wagons of the enemy on our left, on the Downsville road, which was successfully accomplished, making prisoners of the drivers and those in charge of the train. The brigade was then placed in line of battle, and three-fourths of it dismounted to drive in the enemy's skirmishers; and Tidball's battery of four guns, placed in position, supported by the balance of the mounted men, opened on the enemy, many times our superior in numbers, and did excellent execution; the dismounted men in the meantime, keeping up a sharp carbine fire, drove in the rebel pickets on their reserve. The dismounted men were under the immediate command of the gallant and lamented Major Medill, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, who fell, mortally wounded.

We held our position until dark, and were then relieved by Colonel Devin's brigade, and ordered to fall back to Jones' Cross-Roads, in the direction of Boonsborough, which we reached about midnight, the delay being caused by Kilpatrick's division having been driven back in confusion from the direction of Hagerstown, completely blockading the road in our rear, making it impassable for several hours.

NEAR BOONSBOROUGH, MD., JULY 8.

The enemy was reported advancing on the Hagerstown road. General Buford ordered my brigade to take position on the crest of the ridge on the right of the road to Hagerstown, about 1½ miles from Boonsborough, my dismounted men thrown out to the front and in the strip of woods on the right of the road; the battery in position in the center of the line, supported by the mounted men. The rebels moved forward to drive in our skirmishers, supported by their battery, but after a sharp contest were unable to drive me from my position on the right. The enemy, however, gradually worked round on the left, driving in the skirmishers of Kilpatrick's division; placed a section of artillery so as to bring a cross-fire on my brigade, when I was ordered to' fall back on Boonsborough. Afterward Kilpatrick's division was relieved on the left and placed on the right, but being unable to dislodge the enemy from the woods I formerly occupied, my brigade was again ordered forward; the battery placed in position under a heavy fire; three-fourths of the brigade dismounted and ordered to drive the enemy out of the woods in front, which was accomplished rapidly under a heavy fire of shell and musketry, General Buford in person leading the advance line of skirmishers; drove the enemy 3 miles, and across Beaver Creek, on the Williamsport or Funkstown road. General Kilpatrick, with two squadrons of his command, galloped down the road within a short distance of the enemy; halted, looked at each other, and retired, when the dismounted men of my brigade came up and drove the enemy across Beaver Creek.

NEAR FUNKSTOWN, MD., JULY 10.

The brigade having driven the rebels along the Hagerstown road from Beaver Creek to within 3 miles of Funkstown on the 9th instant, we advanced again on the 10th instant with dismounted skirmishers and artillery, supported by the balance of the mounted men. The division advanced in line of battle, Reserve Brigade on the right, First Brigade in the center and on both sides of the road, and the Second Brigade on the left. Drove the enemy rapidly, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, into Funkstown, on a large reserve of the enemy. We occupied the heights above Funkstown, with Tidball's battery, under Lieutenant Calef, which did good execution, and our skirmish line was advanced to the suburbs of the town. The enemy tried hard with a much superior force to dislodge us from our position, but so long as our ammunition lasted he was unable to do so. Our infantry finally arrived to within half a mile in our rear, and although we were hard pressed by the enemy, and nearly all our ammunition expended, the infantry pitched their shelter-tents, and commenced cooking and eating, in spite of repeated and urgent requests to the commanding officer of the infantry to occupy our excellent position and relieve us. When our ammunition was expended, we were ordered by General Buford to fall back. The rebels then occupied our position, and our infantry afterward had to retake it, with the unnecessary loss of several killed and wounded.

NEAR FALLING WATERS, MD., JULY 14.

On the morning of the 14th instant, the brigade was ordered to march on the enemy in the direction of Downsville from our camp, near Bakersville. We proceeded in that direction, found the enemy's earthworks at Downsville abandoned, and were informed that the enemy had retreated toward Falling Waters and Williamsport, to cross the Potomac during the night. The brigade marched rapidly toward Falling Waters, and when near there observed a division of the enemy intrenched on a hill, covering the approaches to the ford. While the brigade was moving round to flank and attack the enemy in rear, to cut them off from the ford and capture them all, in connection with the other two brigades of the First Cavalry Division, which we could easily have accomplished, I saw two small squadrons of General Kilpatrick's division gallop up the hill to the right of the rebel infantry, in line of battle behind their earthworks, and, as any competent cavalry officer of experience could foretell the result, these two squadrons were instantly scattered and destroyed by the fire of a rebel brigade, and not a single dead enemy could be found when the ground there was examined a few hours afterward. This having alarmed the enemy, he fell back toward the ford before we could get round to his rear. We, however, with our dismounted men, attacked him in flank on rough ground, and had a sharp carbine engagement, taking about 511 prisoners, 61 of whom, together with 300 stand of arms, were turned over to an officer of Kilpatrick's division by mistake; also a 3-inch Parrott gun, captured from the enemy by the Eighth New York Cavalry, which was afterward sent by General Kilpatrick to the camp of this brigade, where it properly belonged.

NEAR CHESTER GAP, VA., JULY 21 AND 22.

In obedience to orders, this brigade marched from near Rectortown, Va., to Chester Gap (about 20 miles), arriving in that vicinity at 3.30 p.m., July 21. About a mile from the Gap our advance line of skirmishers encountered the enemy's pickets. I dismounted six squadrons, and drove the enemy's pickets to the crest of the Gap their reserve, which was found to consist of Pickett's division of infantry, one regiment of Jones' cavalry, and a battery of six guns, occupying the Gap, on the crest of the mountain. Upon obtaining this information, and not having a sufficient force to drive the enemy from the Gap, having no support nearer than 20 miles, we fell back 1½ miles from the Gap, and took position so as to cover the two roads leading from the Gap, one toward Barbee's Cross-Roads, the other to Little Washington and Sperryville; placed the guns in battery, and a strong line of pickets in front and flanks.

We captured to-day 23 prisoners, 84 horses, 12 mules, 664 beef-cattle, 602 sheep, all purchased and on the way to be delivered to the rebel army at the Gap, in charge of a commissary agent and his son, who were also captured.

July 22, at 8 a.m., my pickets reported the enemy advancing in column with skirmishers on the road from the Gap toward Sperryville. When the head of the enemy's column came within easy range, we opened fire on it with artillery and the carbines of the dismounted men so effectually that his column, with his wagon train, halted and fell back out of our range, his advance guard and skirmishers being still engaged with ours, and continued firing, we holding our position, and preventing the head of Longstreet's corps from moving forward from the Gap from 8 a.m. till 6 p.m., when the enemy brought five regiments of infantry around out of sight in the woods, and, approaching my left flank, drove in our skirmishers, and only by overwhelming numbers compelled me to fall back slowly toward Barbee's Cross-Roads, keeping my vedettes and pickets watching the enemy.

I think it proper to state that our battery, under Lieutenant Heaton, Second U.S. Artillery, had the very worst kind of ammunition, and consequently could do but comparatively little execution. About one shell in twelve would explode, and then it would be prematurely, over the heads of our own men.

A tabular recapitulation of killed, wounded, and missing is herewith appended, the usual list of casualties by name having previously been forwarded, according to orders.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

 WM. GAMBLE,                   

 Col., Comdg. First Brigade, First Cavalry Division.

Capt. T. C. BACON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Cavalry Division,

[Inclosure.]

Number of killed, wounded, and missing of First Cavalry Brigade,

from June 28 to July 31, 1863.

Locality.	Date.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Gettysburg, Pa(*)	July   1, 1863	16	80	29
Williamsport, Md.	July   6, 1863	3	....	1
Boonsborough, Md.	July   8, 1863	2	14	1
Funkstown, Md.	July 10, 1863	3	3	1
Failing Waters, Md.	July 14, 1863	....	5	....
Chester Gap, Va.	July 21, 22, 1863	1	8	16
Total		25	110	48

WM. GAMBLE Colonel,                  

Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE,

August 24, 1863.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 932-8

John L. Motley Mary Benjamin Motley,* July 20, 1863

Monday, July 20, 1863.

My Dearest Mary: Hurray! I have just got the telegram. Vicksburg surrendered on the glorious Fourth. “Good,” as Turner Sargent says. The details are, of course, wanting. We shall not receive the papers containing the Gettysburg battle history until Thursday. There can be no doubt, however, that Lee has been tremendously licked. Meade occupied his headquarters after the battle, and has since been pursuing him for sixty miles.

Meade seems to me to be a trump, the man we have been looking for ever since the war began. What a tremendous responsibility it was for him to be placed at the head of the army at the eleventh hour, in the very face of the chief rebel general and their best army! So far as we can yet judge, he has acted with immense nerve, rapidity, skill, and I think has achieved a very great success. To us who know the country the telegram says simply, “Lee, after losing 30,000 men [probably 15,000], is trying to get off into Virginia as fast as he can. He may offer battle if he can't get across the Potomac before Meade catches him. If not, not, and if not, why not?” I have never felt so sanguine about our affairs since the very beginning. To be sure, I never believed, as you know, in the fudge about Baltimore and Washington, but one could n't help the fidgets when all the world in Europe was sounding the rebel trumpets in such a stunning way.

Now, if Lee is able to do us much damage, all I can say is that I shall be very much astonished. I suppose he will get back to Winchester, and so to the Rappahannock, with a good deal of bacon and other provender, and then claim a great victory. There is no meaning at all in that bit in the telegram about Buford and Kilpatrick's cavalry being repulsed. Obviously they were only reconnoitering in force to find out where the enemy was, and it could only have been an insignificant skirmish, such as happens daily. If there is any truth in the story about “Vice-President” Stephens wishing to come to Washington, it must have been something about negro troops. Now that we must have taken in Pennsylvania and Vicksburg at least 20,000 prisoners, I do hope the President will issue an unmistakable edict about that hanging officers of black troops. There couldn't be a better time.

Devotedly and affectionately,

J. L. M.

_______________

* During a short absence to meet their second daughter on her return from America. See p. 344.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, editor, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley in Two Volumes, Library Edition, Volume 2, p. 338-9

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, September 19, 1864 – Part 14

Who but Sheridan, as at Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864, just a month to a day after his splendid victory at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, or Winchester, Va., as now more properly known, could have rallied a defeated and routed army en route to the front and after and so enthused it in the act, simply by dashing, alert and crafty through its broken ranks after a twenty mile race with time from Winchester, with flashing eyes, bared head and waving hat, on a spirited foaming horse, shouting to his men: “Get back into line, men! Get into line, quick! We can lick ’em! We can lick h--1 out of ’em yet!” and do it almost at once, even as brilliantly so as at Winchester a month previous? How often are such things done? Such a man outclasses all others in military history, not excepting Wellington or Marlborough, for such a man as Sheridan is without a peer as a field marshal in the annals of warfare; and had he been found sooner and given greater responsibilities he would not only have surely proved it, but would have more fully electrified the world than he did and have been its idol as a military genius and hero for all time.

He or Grant would never have used such woefully poor judgment as to have assaulted an army equally as valiant, splendidly posted, fully as large, if not larger than their own, across an open, level space without cover quite a mile in extent, as Lee did at Gettysburg on July 3, 1864. If that act showed ability, good judgment, or a military genius, then I am lacking in mature sound judgment, and my lifetime of military training, including my three years and threescore battles or more in the Civil War and in Indian wars, has been in vain. This would be equally true even though the armies had been equal in numbers. General Longstreet's suggestion to Lee to place his army on General Meade's flank between him and Washington would have been a splendid substitute for Pickett's forlorn charge.¹ It was abler and just what Grant did with Lee hardly a year later, successfully and repeatedly and forced Lee back to Richmond and Petersburg, as the world now knows, which indicates superior generalship both on Grant's part as well as Longstreet's.

Would either Grant or Sheridan have lost their cavalry for several days, as Lee did, when on such a campaign in an enemy's country or anywhere else?² Would either, with three such splendid cavalry divisions as Meade, not have used a part of one division if necessary to have patrolled barely seventy-five miles between York, Pa., or the Susquehanna, and the Potomac river, in order to detect any movement by the enemy on Washington? Would this have made the Union Commander, whoever he might have been, timid about moving to any point where battle was offered, fearing a fake attack by Lee in order to cover a movement on Washington or Baltimore? One brigade would have established a line of patrol posts less than a quarter of a mile apart of six men each, which would have detected at once any movement south by Lee, or if preferred, posts one-eighth of a mile apart of three men each.

Would Grant or Sheridan have remained so near a great battle as at Gettysburg, July 1, 1864, and not have furnished an opportunity for another soul-stirring poem like “Sheridan’s Ride”? When they were informed that the enemy had attacked their forces barely three hours’ ride away, would they have loitered a whole day away like dullards, as both army commanders did at Gettysburg?³ Aye! either would have made the ride in two hours or even less, and even though their steeds were as black as night, on their arrival at Gettysburg they would have been as white as snow or as foam could have made them; and, still better, they would not only have known, too, through their cavalry, spies, etc., for we were at home among friends, where Lee's army corps were, but when each broke camp to concentrate at Gettysburg, and their own corps close by them would have been there in season to have met the enemy in at least equal numbers, instead of being outnumbered all day July 1, two to one, as was the case.⁴ If necessary, too, as at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, the different corps would have marched at 2 o'clock instead of 8 o’clock A. M. or even earlier if thought necessary.

Was there any excuse for the Confederates not driving the Union forces from the field in a rout on July first? They would have done so, too, except that their forces were fought in detail, its reserves not even being brought into action when needed.⁵ Did Ewell take the best advantage of his opportunities? The enemy outnumbered us quite two to one the first day from first to last after the battle commenced, but still at the first dash of two brigades of our Infantry — Wadsworth's Division — against two brigades of the enemy, when Reynolds was killed, we placed hors de combat over half of each of their brigades and captured Archer, a brigade commander; and still the enemy had two brigades in immediate reserve as support, but they were not used.⁶ This is what I call fighting an army in detail, a total waste of material. In case Sheridan hadn't thrown his support or reserve — Russell's division — into the fight at the right moment at Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864, his results would have been equally as ignominious as his victory was brilliant, because he did use his reserve correctly on that occasion; and so it would have been with the enemy at Gettysburg had it used its reserve. It would probably have captured many of our men and driven the balance of them from the field in a rout, as Sheridan did Early at Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; there was nothing to prevent it.

Does Lee deserve being classed among the greatest field marshals of modern times for such field marshalship as was displayed at the first day’s fighting at Gettysburg? But, says the incompetent critic who forms his conclusions from gush, policy, favoritism, sentiment, or weakly otherwise, instead of for the sake of truth and correct history, Lee wasn't there! Aye! but wasn't it an alert Commander's—a genius's —business to have been there? What was he in Pennsylvania for or selected and paid for handling such an important matter to the Confederacy for? Who gave the order to concentrate for battle at Gettysburg but he?⁷ Does not every experienced soldier know that under such circumstances no one can tell exactly at what moment a battle will commence? And would not an alert, sagacious commander have made a forced night ride in order to have been with the first of his forces on the field? Lee knew he was going to fight if the enemy would fight him, but Meade didn't; hence Lee knew exactly what to do.⁸ A great field marshal would have been more alert — on hand — it seems to me.

Lee commanded in person the second day at Gettysburg, and not only failed to attack early in the morning, when he should, but, as usual, when he did, fought his army in detail using Longstreet's corps largely against two of our corps in turn which, being overwhelmed by numbers, and Meade failing to reinforce them, as he should or not have sent them where he did, they were of course forced back to their proper positions onto the correct line of battle beyond which they should never have been advanced, and with a sagacious, alert, competent commander would not have been except the whole army advanced together in a general assault which it should have done anyway after Wright's brigade was repulsed.⁹

From first to last in the battle of Gettysburg, I fail to see anything to commend on the enemy's part in any of its generals except in Longstreet; nor on the Union side so far as Meade was concerned, but do in many others, and especially Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and Howard, each of whom in turn successively commanded our forces in the order mentioned without being routed, against great odds under exceedingly trying circumstances owing to Meade's failure apparently, to fully grasp the situation fourteen miles away. It shows what splendid fighters Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and Howard's men were to stand off double their number for an entire day, with what help they got from Schurz's men.

That Lee did not grasp the situation is evident or else he would have assaulted our lines early on the morning of July second before Meade's forces arrived on the field. It is said he did give the order to do so, but if he had been a great military genius wouldn't he have seen that it was done? Instead of this owing largely probably, to Meade's lack of alertness and enterprise, Lee from lack of sagacity became apparently dizzy and unbalanced, as was most of his command, because of his apparently misunderstood partial successes, of the first and second days' fights, and was so criminally lacking in good judgment on the third day as to be led into the mistake of ordering Pickett's charge which, for obvious reasons, could only result in calamity to the Southern cause.¹⁰ This even an amateur soldier of ordinary judgment should have been able to have foreseen.

_______________

¹ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 29-30.

² See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 12.

³ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 16-17.

⁴ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁵ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁶ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁷ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 57.

⁸ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 52-3.

⁹ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 34-45.

¹⁰ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 34-45.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 197-203

Diary of John Hay: September 10, 1863

. . . I dined to-night at Wormley’s with Hooker, Butterfield, Fox, Wise , and Col. Rush of Philad^a . . . . Hooker says: — “Our war has developed no great cavalry officer. Stoneman  has good points, but does not fulfil his early promise. Pleasanton is splendid, enterprising and brave, but full of mannerisms and weaknesses. Buford is far superior to any others in all the qualities of a great rider. But none of them approach the ideal.”

Speaking of Lee, he expressed himself slightingly of Lee’s abilities. He says he was never much respected in the army. In Mexico he was surpassed by all his lieutenants. In the cavalry he was held in no esteem. He was regarded very highly by Gen^l Scott. He was a courtier, and readily recommended himself by his insinuating manner to the General, whose petulant and arrogant temper has driven of late years all officers of spirit and self-respect away from him.

“Look at all his staff-officers! sleek and comfortable and respectable and obsequious: Townsend, Cullum, Hamilton, Wright, etc.”

“The strength of the rebel army rests on the broad shoulders of Longstreet. He is the brain of Lee as Stonewall Jackson was his right arm. Before every battle he has been advised with. After every battle Lee may be found in his tent. He is a weak man and little of a soldier. He naturally rests on Longstreet, who is a soldier, born.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 99-100; For the whole diary entry see Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 86-9.

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, October 14, 1864

CEDAR CREEK, Oct. 14, 1864.

You’re an innocent. Go on with the shoulder-straps, you needn’t be expecting any change, — those eagles will flourish a good while yet. I'm perfectly satisfied too, now that I have this Brigade; it has only been commanded before by Buford and Merritt, Colonel Gibbs had it for a few weeks at a time temporarily.¹

Our movements here are so entirely dependent on Grant's success before Richmond, that I can't form the faintest idea of the prospect of a speedy rest here.

_______________

¹ Perhaps Mrs. Lowell thought that before her shoulder-straps — the silver eagles on yellow ground of a cavalry colonel — were finished, her husband would be entitled to the single star of a brigadier-general. For more than a year he had borne the responsibility and done the work of one.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 359-60, 473

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, November 19, 1863

Headquarters Army Of Potomac

November 19, '63

The Britons still continue with us. Yesterday we took them, with a small escort, to Buford's Headquarters beyond Culpeper. By Brandy Station we came across a line of rifle-pits that the Rebs had thrown up, probably on the Saturday night of their retreat, so as to cover the trains falling back on the Rapid Ann. We found the cavalry Chief afflicted with rheumatism, which he bore with his usual philosophy. Hence we made haste, across the country, to General Warren's, where he had prepared some manoeuvres of infantry for us. This was one of the finest sights I have seen in the army. There were some 6000 or 7000 men on the plain, and we stood on a little hill to look. The evolutions ended by drawing up the force in two lines, one about 300 yards in rear of the other; and each perhaps a mile long. Then they advanced steadily a short distance, when the order was given to charge, and, as if they were one man, both lines broke into a run and came up the hill, shouting and yelling. I never saw so fine a military spectacle. The sun made the bayonets look like a straight hedge of bright silver, which moved rapidly toward you. But the great fun was when part of the line came to a stone wall, over which they hopped with such agility as to take Colonel Earle prisoner, while Captain Stephenson's horse, which was rather slow, received an encouraging prod from a bayonet. Which events put us in great good humor, and we rode merrily home.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 50

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, November 1, 1863

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac

November 1, 1863

Buford was here last night, and said he thought he could just “boolge” across the river and scare the Rebels to death; which would certainly be a highly desirable event, for we should have quite a chance of a visit home. As it is, no resignations are accepted and scarcely a soul is allowed to go home, even for a visit of two or three days. The life here is miserably lazy; hardly an order to carry, and the horses all eating their heads off. The weather is fine, to be sure, and everybody, nearly, is well; but that is all the more reason for wishing something done. I do not even have the drudgery of drill and parade and inspection, that the infantrymen have. If one could only be at home, till one was wanted, and then be on the spot; but this is everywhere the way of war; lie still and lie still; then up and manoeuvre and march hard; then a big battle; and then a lot more lie still.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 40-1

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, October 19, 1863

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC

October 19, 1863

It seems to me I had got to Sunday morning, the 11th, when we began to march back. We started from Headquarters and passed through Brandy Station, forded the Rappahannock, close to the railroad, and took up our camp near the railroad and about two miles from the river.  . . . This move, though in the wrong direction, was, without question, a good one, as it bothered the enemy and caused them to hesitate. ... In the morning we got off about ten (for the General does not mount till he has heard that the army is properly under way) and rode along the north side of the railroad, past the camp I first came to (H.Q. near Warrenton Junction), and so to Catlett's Station, where we found the 1st Corps taking their noon rest; also their chief, General Newton, and General (Professor) Eustis, partaking from a big basket. A spy came in also, who gave such information as showed that the Rebels had made less rapid progress than we supposed. Going a mile or two on, we saw a spectacle such as few even of the old officers had ever beheld; namely, 2500 waggons, all parked on a great, open, prairie-like piece of ground, hundreds of acres in extent. I can compare it to nothing but the camp of Attila, where he retreated after the “Hun Schlacht,” which we saw at the Berlin Museum. They were here got together, to be sent off to the right, by Brentsville, to Fairfax Station, under escort of General Buford's division. How these huge trains are moved over roads not fit for a light buggy, is a mystery known only to General Rufus Ingalls, who treats them as if they were so many perambulators on a smooth sidewalk! We turned off to a house, two miles from Catlett's, and again pitched our movable houses, on a rocky bit of a field. . . .

At daylight next morning, every corps was in motion, tramping diligently in the direction of the heights of Centreville, via Manassas Junction. We of the Staff had hardly dressed, when there was a great cracking of carbines in the woods, not a mile off, and we discovered that a Rebel regiment of horse had coolly camped there during the night, and were now engaged with our cavalry, who soon drove them away. Pretty soon the sound of cannon, in the direction of Auburn, announced that the Rebels, marching down from Warrenton, had attacked General Warren's rear. He, however, held them in check easily with one division, while the other two marched along, passing our Headquarters at 9.30 A.m. As they went on, I recognized the Massachusetts 20th, poor Paul Revere's regiment. And so we jogged, General Meade (who has many a little streak of gunpowder in his disposition) continually bursting out against his great bugbear, the waggons; and sending me, at full gallop, after General Sykes, who was a hundred miles, or so, ahead, to tell him that the rear of his ambulance train was quite unprotected.  . . . The 15th was employed in feeling the intentions of the enemy and resting the exhausted men. On the 16th came on a deluge of rain which spoiled our contemplated move next day. On the 18th, yesterday, we got some information of reliable character for the first time, viz: that they had torn up the railroad and were falling back on Warrenton. Before that there was every kind of report: that they were going up the Shenandoah Valley; marching on Washington, and falling back on Richmond; and they keep so covered by cavalry, that it is most difficult to probe them. Thus far in the move they have picked up about as many prisoners as we, say 700; but we have the five guns and two colors, they having none. To-day we all marched out at daylight, and are now hard after them, the General praying for a battle. Our cavalry has been heavily engaged this afternoon, and they may make a stand, or indeed, they may not. I think I was never so well and strong in my life. General Buford came in to-day, cold and tired and wet; “Oh!” said he to me, “do you know what I would do if I were a volunteer aide? I would just run home as fast as I could, and never come back again!” The General takes his hardships good-naturedly.

[The result of the manoeuvres brought the army toward Washington, which caused uneasiness and dissatisfaction at the Capitol. “At Centreville,” writes Lyman, “we had a set-to between Meade and Halleck. Meade had asked, by telegraph, for some advice, and stated that he was not sufficiently assured of the enemy's position to risk an advance; so conflicting were the reports. Halleck, apparently after dinner, replied in substance, ‘Lee is plainly bullying you. If you can't find him, I can't. If you go and fight him, you will probably find him!’ General Meade, much offended, prepared a reply in some such words as these: ‘If you have any orders, I am ready to obey them; but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in guise of opinions as I have recently been favored with. If my course is not satisfactory, I ought to be and I desire to be relieved.’ He had written ‘bunsby opinions,’ and consulted me as to whether it would do; to which I replied that the joke was capital, but not in accordance with the etiquette of a commander-in-chief; so he substituted the other. Poor General Meade! Said he, ‘I used to think how nice it would be to be Commander-in-Chief; now, at this moment, I would sooner go, with a division, under the heaviest musketry fire, than hold my place!’” Lee, finding that he could not outflank Meade, fell back, and Halleck apologized.]

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 33-6

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, September 22, 1863

Headquarters Army Of Potomac

September 22, 1863

We have had an Austrian officer, awfully arrayed, making a visit to see the telegraphs and the signal corps. He looked so natural with his sprig little bob-tail coat and his orange sash, and presented a funny contrast to our officers, who with their great boots and weather-beaten slouched hats looked as if they could swallow him and not know it. Captain Boleslaski (such was his name) was selected probably for two reasons, in this military mission: 1st, because he could speak no word of English; and 2d, because he was very deaf. Notwithstanding which little drawbacks, he ran about very briskly, from morn to eve, and really saw a great deal. I roared French in his ear, till I nearly had the bronchitis, but succeeded in imparting to him such information as I had. He addressed me as “Mon Colonel” and looked upon me as the hero of a hundred campaigns; though he did rather stick me, when he asked me whether our pontoons were constructed on the system of Peterhoff or of Smolenski! He was much pleased with the attention he got, and was extremely surprised when he beheld the soldiers all running to buy newspapers.

Yesterday came General Buford, commander of the second Cavalry Division, and held a pow-wow. He is one of the best of the officers of that arm and is a singular-looking party. Figurez-vous a compactly built man of middle height, with a tawny moustache and a little, triangular gray eye, whose expression is determined, not to say sinister. His ancient corduroys are tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots, and his blue blouse is ornamented with holes; from one pocket thereof peeps a huge pipe, while the other is fat with a tobacco pouch. Notwithstanding this get-up he is a very soldierly looking man. He is of a good-natured disposition, but not to be trifled with. Caught a notorious spy last winter and hung him to the next tree, with this inscription: “This man to hang three days: he who cuts him down before shall hang the remaining time.”

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 20-1

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, September 17, 1863

Headquarters Army Of Potomac

Between The Rappahannock And Rapidan

September 17, 1863

Having again got “home,” I find leisure and paper to write you a rather longer letter than you have got of late. Perhaps you would like to hear about our little cavalry performance. Of course there was not hard fighting, and a hundred or so will cover all the killed and wounded; nevertheless, as the whole was new to me and as the operations covered a good deal of country, they were interesting and instructive both. The whole Cavalry Corps (a good many thousand men) had been massed the day before, and had orders to cross the Rappahannock early next morning. I was to ride down in time to join General Pleasonton. The distance to the river is some eight miles, so I was up at 4.30 — rain pitchforks! dark as a box — thunder and lightning — everything but “enter three witches.” However, in my india-rubber coat and much-insulted large boots, much of the water could be kept out, and, by the time we were saddled and had had some tea, behold it stopped raining and away I went, quite thankful, and with a tail of six orderlies and a corporal. The ground was very wet, and we went slipping and sliding, in the red mud, till we drew near the river, when, behold, the whole country alive with train-waggons, columns of infantry, batteries, and ambulances; the latter with the stretchers fastened outside disagreeably suggestive of casualties. The rear of the cavalry had just crossed, when I got there; and General Pleasonton was on the opposite bank, where I presently joined him, crossing by the railroad bridge. He had with him a good many aides, besides orderlies and escort. Just at this point we held the southern, as well as the northern, bank and the pickets were some two miles out. The country is rolling, but not quite hilly; there are very large open fields (now filled mostly with weeds) and again, considerable woods. In these last our cavalry were hidden, so that you would have said there were not 300 of them all together. This I found, presently, was a great point, to conceal men, behind woods and ridges, as much as possible.

We all now rode to our extreme picket line and took a view; and there, sure enough, was Mr. Reb with his picket line, about one third of a mile off. We could see a chain of mounted videttes, and, behind these, on a little knoll, a picket reserve, with their horses tied to trees. We waited some time to give a chance to General Gregg who had crossed on our right, and General Kilpatrick on our left, to get into the proper positions. Then General Pleasonton ordered an advance, and, in a few moments, quite as if by magic, the open country was alive with horsemen; first came columns of skirmishers who immediately deployed and went forward, at a brisk trot, or canter, making a connected line, as far as the eye could reach, right and left. Then followed the supports, in close order, and with and behind them came the field batteries, all trooping along as fast as they could scramble. It was now between eight and nine and the sun was bright, so that the whole spectacle was, to a greenhorn like me, one of the most picturesque possible. Not the least remarkable feature was the coolness of Mr. Reb under these trying circumstances. Their videttes stared a few moments, apparently without much curiosity, then turned tail and moved off, first at a walk, then at a trot, and finally disappeared over the ridge at a gallop. We rode on about a mile, keeping a little behind the skirmishers; General Buford and his Staff being just ahead and to the left. To the left we could hear cannon, General Kilpatrick having got into a skirmish there. Presently I saw a puff of smoke, on a ridge in front of us, and then hm-m-why-z-z-z, bang! went the shell, right by General Buford's Staff, taking the leg off a poor orderly. Much pleased with their good shot, they proceeded to give our Staff a taste; and missiles of various kinds (but all disagreeable) began to skip and buzz round us. It was to me extraordinary to see the precision with which they fired. All the shot flew near us, and, while I had gone forward to the crest of the ridge to get a better view, a shell exploded directly in the midst of the Staff, wounding an orderly and very neatly shaving a patch of hair off the horse of Captain Hutchins. However, two could play at that game, and Captain Graham soon made the obnoxious guns limber up and depart to the next ridge, where they would again open and stay as long as they could. By the time we had got a few miles further, the enemy had brought forward all his cavalry and began firing with rifles, to which our men replied with their carbines.

We now entered a wooded tract, interspersed with mudholes and springy ground, and here the enemy made quite a hard stand, for the town of Culpeper lay a couple of miles beyond and they wished to gain time to get off their stores by the railroad. The advanced regiments were therefore dismounted and sent into the woods, while the artillery tried to find some place whence the guns could be used. It was at this place that I first heard the yells, for which the Rebels are noted. They were the other side of a high bank, covered with bushes, and they yelled to keep their spirits up as long as possible. But they were soon driven through the woods and then we came on an open country, in full view of Culpeper. This was a very interesting sight. The hills are, hereabout, quite large, and on the one opposite us stood Culpeper, very prettily situated, the railroad running through the lower part of the town. Just in the outskirts the Rebels had planted two batteries, as a last check, and behind were drawn up their supports of cavalry. Our cavalry were coming out of the woods, on all sides, moving on the town in form of a semi-circle, while the guns were pelting those of the enemy with might and main. Suddenly we were aware of a railroad train slowly leaving the depot, and immediately several guns were turned on it; but it went off, despite the shells that burst over it. Then there suddenly appeared a body of our cavalry, quite on the left of the town, who made a rush, at full speed, on three cannon there stationed, and took the whole of them with their caissons. This was a really handsome charge and was led by General Custer, who had his horse shot under him. This officer is one of the funniest looking beings you ever saw, and looks like a circus rider gone mad! He wears a huzzar jacket and tight trousers, of faded black velvet trimmed with tarnished gold lace. His head is decked with a little, gray felt hat; high boots and gilt spurs complete the costume, which is enhanced by the General's coiffure, consisting in short, dry, flaxen ringlets! His aspect, though highly amusing, is also pleasing, as he has a very merry blue eye, and a devil-may-care style. His first greeting to General Pleasonton, as he rode up, was: “How are you, fifteen-days'-leave-of-absence? They have spoiled my boots but they didn't gain much there, for I stole ’em from a Reb.” And certainly, there was one boot torn by a piece of shell and the leg hurt also, so the warlike ringlets got not only fifteen, but twelve [additional] days' leave of absence, and have retreated to their native Michigan!

The Rebels now retreated in all haste, and we rode at once in, and found a good many supplies at the depot with a number of rifles and saddles. As we rode up, the building was beset with grinning dragoons, each munching, with great content, a large apple, whereof they found several barrels which had been intended for the comfort of Mr. Stuart's dashing knights. I was surprised at the good conduct of the gypsy-looking men. They insulted no one, broke nothing, and only took a few green peaches, which, I fancy, amply revenged themselves. Culpeper is a really decent place, with a brick hotel, and a number of good houses, in front of which were little gardens. I send you a rosebud, which I picked as we rode through the town; there were plenty of them, looking rather out of place there, in the midst of muddy batteries and splattered cavalrymen! A queer thing happened in the taking of the three guns. An officer was made prisoner with them, and, as he was marched to the rear, Lieutenant Counselman of our side cried out, “Hullo, Uncle Harry!” “Hullo!” replied the captain uncle. “Is that you? How are you?” And there these two had been unwittingly shelling each other all the morning!

After resting the horses we pushed on to the south, towards what is called Pong Mountain, for you must know that this region is more hilly, and Pong Mountain is about comparable to the Blue Hills (not quite so high, perhaps).  . . . We drove the enemy five miles beyond Culpeper, making fifteen miles, in all, and there a halt was ordered and pickets thrown out. Our Headquarters were a wretched house, of two rooms, inhabited by two old women. We gave them one room and took the other ourselves. And now I loomed out! The Staff had, in the way of creature comforts, nothing but sabres and revolvers. It was dark and raining guns, and the Chief-of-Staff had the stomachache! I took from my saddle-bags a candle and lighted the same, prepared tea from my canteen, and produced a loaf of bread and a Bologna sausage, to the astonishment of the old campaigners, who enquired, “Whether I had a pontoon bridge about me?” Then I rolled myself in my coat and took a good night's sleep on the floor.

The next morning we started for Raccoon Ford, on the Rapidan, five miles distant. The enemy were mostly across and only opposed us with a few skirmishers. As we got in sight of it, the prospect was not cheering. The opposite bank, partly wooded and partly covered with cultivation, rose in steep, high hills, which completely commanded our side of the river. It was a fine sight to see the column splashing along the wood road, lying between fine oak trees; but the fine sight was presently interrupted by a shell, which exploded about 100 yards ahead of me and right among the horses' legs, without touching me! The General rode into the open field to reconnoitre the position, and I with him, because he wanted my glass; but Mr. Secesh has a sharp eye for gold cords round hats, and, in a minute, wh-n-n-g, flwp! wh-z-z-z! a solid shot struck just in front of us, and bounced over our heads. The General ordered us to disperse about the field, so as not to make a mark; but, as I rode off, they sent a shell so near me that a facetious officer called out: “I guess they think you're somebody pretty distinguished, Kun'l.” However, there may be a good deal of cannon shooting, without many hits; in proof of which I will say that we had a brisk fire of artillery from 10.30 to 2.30, together with a sharp spattering of rifles and carbines, and that our loss was five killed and fifteen wounded! Shells do not sound so badly as I expected; nor did I feel as I expected on the occasion. There is a certain sense of discipline and necessity that bears you up; and the only shell I “ducked” was the first one.

After some difficulty we got some guns in position and drove off those opposed. Then General Kilpatrick's division went to a better ford below, and tried to get over there; but the Rebels opened on him with fourteen cannon and silenced his guns after a hard fire. So we concluded the fords were not practicable for cavalry, which I think might have been apparent from the outset. Whereupon both parties stopped and stared at each other; and we heroes of the Staff went to a house (much better than that of last night) and partook of mutton which, during the day, we had valiantly made the prey of our bow and our spear. On our right General Gregg had driven the enemy beyond Cedar Mountain and nearly to the river, but was there brought up by a heavy force of artillery in position. All day Tuesday we lay doing nothing. I rode over with the General to Cedar Mountain, passing close to the battlefield, and ascended, thus getting a fine view of the Rapidan valley, which is very beautiful and would, in the hands of good farmers, yield a thousandfold.  . . . We have taken on our reconnaissance in force about 150 prisoners, three guns, and five caissons. Yesterday the entire army crossed the Rappahannock, and I got orders to return to Headquarters, which I did.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 14-20

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, October 12, 1863

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, October 12, 1863.

On Saturday I found Lee was turning my right flank and assuming an offensive position. As to have remained where I was would have endangered my communications, I yesterday fell back to the Rappahannock. As I do not hear to-day anything of his movement on my right being continued, I have sent a force back towards Culpeper, to see whether he will give me battle at any point between the two rivers. If he will, I shall fight him at all hazards. At the present moment there is firing heard, but I have not received any report.

I have most earnestly, by special telegram, recommended Gibbon for promotion. Indeed, himself and Buford are the only two that I have urged in this special manner on the attention of the department. The difficulty is that there are no vacancies in the grade of major general, and several appointments have been made in excess of the number authorized by law.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 153

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, August 3, 1863

Monday, August 3, 1863.

I send a few lines by Sergeant,¹ who returns to-day. We see by the Herald that two of General Meade's sons are drafted, and the inference is that Sergeant's name has been drawn, and he ought therefore to be at home to attend to it. He has had a very nice time, of which he will give you the particulars. There was a handsome little fight that Buford's cavalry had day before yesterday, that he might have seen, but the weather was very warm and the scene of operations quite distant from my headquarters, so I did not say anything to him about it. He will give you all the news and tell you all my troubles.

The Government, for some reason best known to itself, has ordered me to cease the pursuit of Lee, though I strongly recommended an advance. This is confidential, though the newspapers for some days have been announcing that I would have to assume the defensive. Halleck in one despatch said it was because a considerable part of my army would be required to enforce the draft, but afterwards said he would only require sixteen hundred men, which I have sent. I don't know what this all means, but I suppose in time it will all come right.

_______________

¹ Son of General Meade.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 141

Brigadier-General John Buford to Major-General George G. Meade, July 1, 1863 – 10:10 a.m.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,

Gettysburg, July 1, 1863 – 10.10 a.m.

The enemy's force (A. P. Hill's) are advancing on me at this point, and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is also a large force at Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. General Reynolds is advancing, and is within 3 miles of this point with his leading division. I am positive that the whole of A. P. Hill’s force is advancing.

 JNO. BUFORD,

 Brigadier-General, Commanding.

General MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 36; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 924

Major-General George G. Meade to Major-General John F. Reynolds, July 1, 1863

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863.

Major-General REYNOLDS,

Commanding, &c., Gettysburg:

GENERAL: The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Mummasburg and to the north of Gettysburg.

The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile, he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. If the enemy is concentrating to our right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army.

If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character for either an offensive or defensive position. The numbers of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from 6,000 to 8,000. Our numbers ought to equal it, and, with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up to-morrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

The general having just assumed command, in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does. General Humphreys, who is at Emmitsburg with the Third Corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, without interference with the responsibilities that devolve upon you both, please do so. You have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views.

The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

Very respectfully, &c.,

 S. WILLIAMS,

 Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Copy to Major-General Howard.)

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 33-4; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 460-1