George L. Stearns, August 7, 1862

[Office of John Hopper, New York, New York, August 7, 1862]

I am safely here, and have met General Doubleday. He is rather too lymphatic for a general, but for all that may be the best man to be had. He is yet in doubt as to his course; is afraid that the War Department would not give him the command. I shall probably get useful information and hear some history from him about McClellan and others. If so you shall have it.

SOURCE: Preston Stearns, The Life and Public Services of George Luther Stearns, p. 266

Brigadier-General Robert Anderson to Edwin M. Stanton, December 1862

New York, December, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir: Although by the strict advice of my medical advisers I am prevented from undertaking any correspondence, the subject upon which I now have the honor to address you is one involving so much that I am induced to incur a risk, in order to bring it to your notice. I have observed in published Orders No. 181 that the brevet of major for the distinguished part taken by him in the transfer of the garrison of Fort Moultrie to Sumter, South Carolina, has been conferred upon Captain John G. Foster, Engineer Corps, to date from December 26, 1860. It is proper that I should here refer to the part taken by the different officers in that move; the only part Captain Foster took in the removal was his compliance with my request in directing Lieutenants Snyder and Meade to report to me with their boats' crews to aid in the move. To Lieutenants Snyder and Meade we were greatly indebted for their active and laborious exertions in making the transfer. I regret more deeply that neither of those officers can receive the favorable notice of our Government; the former is dead, and the latter has left our service. Assistant Surgeon Crawford returned to Fort Moultrie on the 27th, and was very active in sending over some ammunition, which was of material and essential service to us during our fight; and articles which Lieutenant Hall, to whom I was greatly indebted for his activity and energy in sending off the greater part of the stores which I had been unable to take over. From this it will be seen that if the Department desires to reward any officers for this service, that Brevets should be conferred upon those just named.

In my letters to the Adjutant-General, whilst at Fort Sumter, numbered 43, 44, 45, 58, 62, 74, 54, 66, 83, 93, and 94, I make a special mention of the services of Captain Seymour, Dr. Crawford, Lieutenants Snyder and Meade; these officers, in addition to their appropriate duties, contributed in no small degree to the maintenance of our position at Fort Sumter, and whose service deserves a special mention from me. If the Government deems any brevets due, it is to these officers.

It will be seen by reference to my letters I have mentioned, I have in letter No. 83 given credit to Captain Doubleday for an important suggestion; I now take advantage of this occasion to renew the commendation thus made, and to respectfully recommend that as a measure of justice to the officers named, a brevet, to date from April 14, 1861, should be bestowed either upon those of whom a special mention is made, or, as an act of justice to all, each one of the officers under my command should alike receive a brevet; and I again implore the Department that the distinction now contemplated for one only of the officers shall not be bestowed alone, it being in my estimation neither deserved upon his part nor just to his brother officers. As this matter has become the subject of official notice, it renders it more important that I should, as soon as possible, undertake an official report of the closing scenes of the occupancy of that work, which I have been thus far prevented from complying with from the strict orders of my physician. As soon as I can write, with the assistance of my friends I will make the report.

Very respectfully,

Robert Anderson,

Brigadier-General.

Letter No. 54, thanks to Dr. Crawford, and to Lieutenant Snyder, and Lieutenant Meade.

SOURCE:  Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 471-2

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, September 19, 1864 – Part 14

Who but Sheridan, as at Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864, just a month to a day after his splendid victory at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, or Winchester, Va., as now more properly known, could have rallied a defeated and routed army en route to the front and after and so enthused it in the act, simply by dashing, alert and crafty through its broken ranks after a twenty mile race with time from Winchester, with flashing eyes, bared head and waving hat, on a spirited foaming horse, shouting to his men: “Get back into line, men! Get into line, quick! We can lick ’em! We can lick h--1 out of ’em yet!” and do it almost at once, even as brilliantly so as at Winchester a month previous? How often are such things done? Such a man outclasses all others in military history, not excepting Wellington or Marlborough, for such a man as Sheridan is without a peer as a field marshal in the annals of warfare; and had he been found sooner and given greater responsibilities he would not only have surely proved it, but would have more fully electrified the world than he did and have been its idol as a military genius and hero for all time.

He or Grant would never have used such woefully poor judgment as to have assaulted an army equally as valiant, splendidly posted, fully as large, if not larger than their own, across an open, level space without cover quite a mile in extent, as Lee did at Gettysburg on July 3, 1864. If that act showed ability, good judgment, or a military genius, then I am lacking in mature sound judgment, and my lifetime of military training, including my three years and threescore battles or more in the Civil War and in Indian wars, has been in vain. This would be equally true even though the armies had been equal in numbers. General Longstreet's suggestion to Lee to place his army on General Meade's flank between him and Washington would have been a splendid substitute for Pickett's forlorn charge.¹ It was abler and just what Grant did with Lee hardly a year later, successfully and repeatedly and forced Lee back to Richmond and Petersburg, as the world now knows, which indicates superior generalship both on Grant's part as well as Longstreet's.

Would either Grant or Sheridan have lost their cavalry for several days, as Lee did, when on such a campaign in an enemy's country or anywhere else?² Would either, with three such splendid cavalry divisions as Meade, not have used a part of one division if necessary to have patrolled barely seventy-five miles between York, Pa., or the Susquehanna, and the Potomac river, in order to detect any movement by the enemy on Washington? Would this have made the Union Commander, whoever he might have been, timid about moving to any point where battle was offered, fearing a fake attack by Lee in order to cover a movement on Washington or Baltimore? One brigade would have established a line of patrol posts less than a quarter of a mile apart of six men each, which would have detected at once any movement south by Lee, or if preferred, posts one-eighth of a mile apart of three men each.

Would Grant or Sheridan have remained so near a great battle as at Gettysburg, July 1, 1864, and not have furnished an opportunity for another soul-stirring poem like “Sheridan’s Ride”? When they were informed that the enemy had attacked their forces barely three hours’ ride away, would they have loitered a whole day away like dullards, as both army commanders did at Gettysburg?³ Aye! either would have made the ride in two hours or even less, and even though their steeds were as black as night, on their arrival at Gettysburg they would have been as white as snow or as foam could have made them; and, still better, they would not only have known, too, through their cavalry, spies, etc., for we were at home among friends, where Lee's army corps were, but when each broke camp to concentrate at Gettysburg, and their own corps close by them would have been there in season to have met the enemy in at least equal numbers, instead of being outnumbered all day July 1, two to one, as was the case.⁴ If necessary, too, as at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, the different corps would have marched at 2 o'clock instead of 8 o’clock A. M. or even earlier if thought necessary.

Was there any excuse for the Confederates not driving the Union forces from the field in a rout on July first? They would have done so, too, except that their forces were fought in detail, its reserves not even being brought into action when needed.⁵ Did Ewell take the best advantage of his opportunities? The enemy outnumbered us quite two to one the first day from first to last after the battle commenced, but still at the first dash of two brigades of our Infantry — Wadsworth's Division — against two brigades of the enemy, when Reynolds was killed, we placed hors de combat over half of each of their brigades and captured Archer, a brigade commander; and still the enemy had two brigades in immediate reserve as support, but they were not used.⁶ This is what I call fighting an army in detail, a total waste of material. In case Sheridan hadn't thrown his support or reserve — Russell's division — into the fight at the right moment at Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864, his results would have been equally as ignominious as his victory was brilliant, because he did use his reserve correctly on that occasion; and so it would have been with the enemy at Gettysburg had it used its reserve. It would probably have captured many of our men and driven the balance of them from the field in a rout, as Sheridan did Early at Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; there was nothing to prevent it.

Does Lee deserve being classed among the greatest field marshals of modern times for such field marshalship as was displayed at the first day’s fighting at Gettysburg? But, says the incompetent critic who forms his conclusions from gush, policy, favoritism, sentiment, or weakly otherwise, instead of for the sake of truth and correct history, Lee wasn't there! Aye! but wasn't it an alert Commander's—a genius's —business to have been there? What was he in Pennsylvania for or selected and paid for handling such an important matter to the Confederacy for? Who gave the order to concentrate for battle at Gettysburg but he?⁷ Does not every experienced soldier know that under such circumstances no one can tell exactly at what moment a battle will commence? And would not an alert, sagacious commander have made a forced night ride in order to have been with the first of his forces on the field? Lee knew he was going to fight if the enemy would fight him, but Meade didn't; hence Lee knew exactly what to do.⁸ A great field marshal would have been more alert — on hand — it seems to me.

Lee commanded in person the second day at Gettysburg, and not only failed to attack early in the morning, when he should, but, as usual, when he did, fought his army in detail using Longstreet's corps largely against two of our corps in turn which, being overwhelmed by numbers, and Meade failing to reinforce them, as he should or not have sent them where he did, they were of course forced back to their proper positions onto the correct line of battle beyond which they should never have been advanced, and with a sagacious, alert, competent commander would not have been except the whole army advanced together in a general assault which it should have done anyway after Wright's brigade was repulsed.⁹

From first to last in the battle of Gettysburg, I fail to see anything to commend on the enemy's part in any of its generals except in Longstreet; nor on the Union side so far as Meade was concerned, but do in many others, and especially Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and Howard, each of whom in turn successively commanded our forces in the order mentioned without being routed, against great odds under exceedingly trying circumstances owing to Meade's failure apparently, to fully grasp the situation fourteen miles away. It shows what splendid fighters Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday and Howard's men were to stand off double their number for an entire day, with what help they got from Schurz's men.

That Lee did not grasp the situation is evident or else he would have assaulted our lines early on the morning of July second before Meade's forces arrived on the field. It is said he did give the order to do so, but if he had been a great military genius wouldn't he have seen that it was done? Instead of this owing largely probably, to Meade's lack of alertness and enterprise, Lee from lack of sagacity became apparently dizzy and unbalanced, as was most of his command, because of his apparently misunderstood partial successes, of the first and second days' fights, and was so criminally lacking in good judgment on the third day as to be led into the mistake of ordering Pickett's charge which, for obvious reasons, could only result in calamity to the Southern cause.¹⁰ This even an amateur soldier of ordinary judgment should have been able to have foreseen.

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¹ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 29-30.

² See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 12.

³ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 16-17.

⁴ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁵ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁶ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 19-33.

⁷ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” p. 57.

⁸ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 52-3.

⁹ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 34-45.

¹⁰ See Burrage, “Gettysburg and Lincoln,” pp. 34-45.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 197-203

Opinions of Various Officers on Resupplying and Reinforcing Fort Sumter: Probably Presented to Lincoln and his Cabinet March 15, 1861

George W. Snyder, lieutenant of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 4 regiments, or 4,000 men; 4 vessels of war.

R. K. Meade, jr., second lieutenant of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 5,000 men, at least; supported by gunboats.

S. W. Crawford, February 28, 1861: 4,000 men, supported by the Navy.

Norman J. Hall, second lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,500 men; 7 war vessels.

J. C. Davis, first lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,000 men; 6 war vessels.

Theodore Talbot, first lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1861: 3,000 men and naval vessels.

T. Seymour, brevet captain and lieutenant, First Artillery, February 28, 1864.*

A. Doubleday, captain, First Artillery, February 28, 1861:10,000 men and Navy.

J. G. Foster, captain of Engineers, February 28, 1861: 6,000 regulars or 20,000 volunteers to take them; 10,000 regulars or 30,000 volunteers to hold them.

Captain Ward, who came here believing it practicable, abandoned it after consultation with General Scott. General Scott and the Chief of the Coast Survey, Mr. Foster, evidently a man of sound sense and experience as a seaman, who is acquainted with the waters, having formerly been attached to the Coast Survey, proposed to make the attempt with cutters of light draught and large dimensions. He was in a measure sustained by Commodore Stringham, but did not suppose provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time.

_______________

* See p. 197.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 1 (Serial No. 1), p. 202-3

Diary of Luman Harris Tenney: April 28, 1862

People began to come into town for their property. Six prisoners were released. Somebody shot at them. I am tired of this barbarous way of soldiering. Doubleday returned to Fort Scott with body guard.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 13

Diary of Luman Harris Tenney: April 22, 1862

General Doubleday and bodyguard and a few officers came. In the evening a man came in saying Union man was shot by jayhawkers. Thirty men of Co. "D", Major, Adjutant, Assistant Surgeon and I, with three or four others started at noon for Horse Creek, twenty miles away. Took a backwoods road. Found no enemy. Orders from the General to burn the house. Major gave the wife and two daughters at home time to take out their valuables. Wife was sick. Declared her husband's innocence. Finally concluded for the women's sake not to burn the house. The scene of the women crying and the desolation the boys were spreading about the premises was painful. Two men from Price's rebel army came up and were taken prisoners. Their horses and arms were taken and they were told to leave. When not more than three rods off, the boys, instigated by Major Purington, commenced shooting at them. They ran. Boys mounted and gave chase, shooting. Lieutenant Pike probably fired the fatal shot. One of the fellows not killed, was brought into the house. Two daughters — one married. Feared her husband was killed. At 8 P. M. we started back. Arrived in camp at 3:30 A. M. Wednesday morning.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 12

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw, June 26, 1863

Poolesville, June 26, 1863.

We have come to Poolesville just at the right moment — the whole army is passing here. I have seen a great many officers whom I know — especially at Headquarters, which are here to-night.

While I have been writing this, I have received orders to march to-morrow to Knoxville, to report to Major-General Slocum for temporary duty.¹

_______________

¹ General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, sent this order to Lowell, who was at Poolesville, Maryland, watching the Potomac for spies, blockade-runners, guerrillas, or important raids. Lowell obeyed, and reported to Slocum, and was sent to Sandy Hook. June 28, Major-General Schenck, commanding Middle Department at Baltimore, was hastily notified from Washington: “A strong brigade of the enemy's cavalry have crossed . . . near Poolesville. Colonel Lowell, with five companies of the 2d Mass. Cavalry, who are there, should be warned, so that he may be ready for an attack.” Then Halleck, General-in-Chief, learned that Lowell was not there, and telegraphed Hooker: “Lowell's cavalry is the only force for scouts in this department, and he cannot be taken from General Heintzelman's command.” Lowell was also telegraphed to take no orders from General Hooker, and to return and watch the fords from Poolesville to Harper's Ferry. But unhappily Stuart had passed in his absence. Lowell's force was not large enough to cope with the rebel force, had he been there, and the raid seems to have resulted in more good than harm. General Doubleday, in his Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, says: “It is thought that he [Stuart] hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg, and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly a mistake. When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted, his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly over.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 267, 428

Major Wilder Dwight: July 31, 1861

MARYLAND HEIGHTS, DEP’T OF THE SHENANDOAH,

July 31, 1861, in Camp.

Three letters?! Yes, one from you, one from father, one from C. Blake, — all at once. The sun shines less fiercely, and the glaring afternoon has lost its power, or is forgotten. I write in the memory of yesterday. This morning the rattle of the rain-drops on my tent roused me before the regular reveillé of the drum, and I am writing now, after breakfast, to the same cool music. If you really like to listen to the monotony of our eventless experience, I cannot do less than to write it for you. Yesterday was a busy day. Battalion drill after breakfast, and then a ride with Colonel Gordon over the mountain to head-quarters. We climbed, by a rough path cut two months ago by the Rebels, to the very top of the mountain. There we found a picket from the Twelfth Massachusetts Regiment (Colonel Webster), and upon the lookout floated the American flag. After a wide survey and a view most glorious, we descended the other side of the mountain to head-quarters. There, business and a short chat with Major Doubleday, whose battery is there in position. By the new organization of brigades, Doubleday is in ours. He is of Fort Sumter fame, as you know, and is a fine fellow with a grand battery.

I wrote thus far yesterday evening, and was expecting a quiet rainy day, when out blazed the sun and kindled our work again. Rations were to be issued, &c., then, at noon, came the sudden order: “Pack wagons with everything, and prepare to bivouac for several days.” It seems head-quarters got frightened about our wagons. The road is so exposed that, in case of attack, they would certainly be lost. Our pretty encampment had to yield, therefore, to the necessities of war. It made a long afternoon, and when the tents were struck, the wagons loaded, and the balking and unwilling teams made to draw, we were enjoying another sunset. The men were sent into the woods to cut brush for huts, and there sprang up a camp of green leaves, as if by magic. I am now writing under a bower of chestnut leaves, and am quite fascinated by my new quarters. The inconvenience of sending off all your luggage, most of your bedding and camp furniture, is not a slight one. In the absence of other hardships and perils, one can make a hardship of that. Last night we had an animated time. Just after taps one of our pickets fired, and it turned out that a man was prowling through the bushes. Soon after an excited Indiana picket fired on our men in a small picket down the hill, and that kicked up a small bobbery. But the morning makes all quiet again. The mists are lifting from the river and hillsides, and the day is already started on its uncertain course again. The kitchen fires are smoking, the axes are ringing in the wood. “Jim along Josey,” or sick-call, has just sounded. The thoughts turn fondly on breakfast. Good by. Love to all.

SOURCE: Elizabeth Amelia Dwight, Editor, Life and Letters of Wilder Dwight: Lieut.-Col. Second Mass. Inf. Vols., p. 64-5

Major Wilder Dwight: Sunday, July 28, 1861

Head-quarters, Harper's Ferry, Sunday, July 28, 1861.

There is so much of drag and so little of incident in my present life that a letter seems hardly worth while. The sunlight, as it breaks the fog this Sunday morning, discloses some of our batteries on the hills commanding our somewhat defenceless position. On Friday General Banks ordered all the wagons to be sent across the river, and all stores of every kind to be removed from our temporary storehouses. We have been in bivouac ever since, sleeping on hay, and indulging in every variety of soldierly discomfort. General Banks is unwilling to signalize his first military service by ordering a retreat; yet, unless we are promptly reinforced, there is no other way. I feel very sorry to desert the Union-loving men of this country. Our army never should retreat, because no sooner do loyal men under its protection avow themselves, than they are marked for the first prey by the rebels which our retreat allows. O for a strong will and a large energy and patience, till every preparation is made! Then we can walk to the Gulf and wipe out these villains. Yesterday we had scouting-parties out, and as our spies came in at night, they reported the enemy's pickets near our lines, and a movement of a large body making in our direction. So at eleven o'clock I took through the drowsy camp, rousing sleeping piles of humanity and blankets, an order for their action, in case of alarm during the night. No such alarm came. Yesterday the Massachusetts Twelfth, Colonel Webster, arrived on the other side of the river, and is now in camp there; so we are stronger by one regiment. I do not know how long we shall stay here, but suppose that either our wagons will come back or we shall join them soon. Indeed, a mere nominal holding of Harper's Ferry like the present one does not seem to indicate great strength. I am right in my conjecture. At this moment an order comes in from the commanding general directing the passage of the troops across the river to-day, and indicating the order of march. The order concluded, however, with the direction: “The Second Massachusetts Regiment will remain as a garrison to this place. The colonel of this regiment will so establish his pickets as to give him timely warning of the enemy's approach. For this object, twenty men of the cavalry and one non-commissioned officer will be left with the garrison of the place.” So we are to have the honor to be the first to occupy and the last to quit the sacred soil of Harper's Ferry. Well, we marched into Virginia full of hope and fight and purpose. We dinned the Star Spangled Banner into the unwilling ears of the startled villagers. We had doleful marches but delightful measures. “Grim-visaged war” had her front smoothed of its wrinkles, to be sure, but we thought to meet the front of fearful adversaries.

Now, however, instead of all this ecstasy of advance, we are employed in the anxious endeavor to retreat as little as possible. No matter, the fulness of time will bring only one result, and we can wait for it. Military glory, however, will not turn out to be so cheap an article as some of our holiday soldiers thought it. The price of it is rising everyday Doubleday's battery just went by with the long rifled cannon which throws a ball five miles, and now the air is full of the dust and music of the New York Twelfth, which is also on the march. They will soon leave us alone in our glory. We shall occupy the lower part of the town, near the ford, and shall only hold the place till some stronger force comes to claim it. This duty will exact a lively vigilance, but it is free from danger, I think, and my own strong belief is, that, with our cannon frowning from the hills, the Rebels will not think it worth while to claim the town, especially as it is utterly worthless for any military purpose.

I think of you all enjoying a quiet Sunday morning at home, and should like to join you for a time; but I am getting, in the presence of these outrages, to desire only the results of war. Cavalry and artillery, — we must have these before we can be completely effective.

SOURCE: Elizabeth Amelia Dwight, Editor, Life and Letters of Wilder Dwight: Lieut.-Col. Second Mass. Inf. Vols., p. 58-60

Wilder Dwight to Elizabeth White Dwight, Saturday, July 16, 1861

in Bivouac At Bunker Hill, July 16, 1861.

We paused last evening, on our march toward Winchester, and lay down on the side of a hill in a pine grove. Late Sunday evening, at Martinsburg, the order came to be in readiness to march at five o'clock the next morning. No intimation whither. We had reveillé at three o'clock, packed wagons, breakfasted, formed the battalion, and then came our marching orders. The whole command of General Patterson commenced its movement at five. The march was without incident. We found our place in column at about eight o'clock, and moved on till three, when we reached Bunker Hill. There was firing by our advanced guard, who drove fifteen hundred of the enemy's cavalry before them. We came upon their deserted camp. The movement was steady but slow. From the high ground, and in turnings of the road, the sight was a fine one. Our regiment excited universal admiration. It is already considered the regiment of the whole command. My horse works beautifully, and keeps perfectly well. I have great comfort in him. When one is twelve hours in saddle, it makes a difference what the saddle is on. The camp-ground assigned us was the one we now occupy. It is very much exposed, and in advance of the main body. On taking possession of it, we found every indication of recent occupation, and find that the Rebels occupied it night before last. The men lay right down to rest. I continued upon duty, under direction of the Colonel, till five o'clock in the afternoon. Then, a man who lived near by invited us to tea with him. Our wagons were back in the interminable train, and we had given up all hope of them till late. The man spoke strongly of Union, &c. We accepted his offer, and went down to his farm-house and ate our bacon and eggs in the midst of his pickaninnies and slaves. The poor man could not speak of the American flag without choking. He said the other army had pressed their horses and food, &c., and given them nothing in return but receipts of the Southern Confederacy, and “there ain't any Southern Confederacy,” said he. Still the prevailing tone here is secession. We lay down at night under the trees. I posted a picket-guard outside the lines, and, after attending to other duties, was right glad to go to sleep.

Our men are toughening to it slowly, but their knapsacks still pull heavily at them.

To-day we have been resting the men, and having skirmish-drill in the wheat-fields. One of our companies is off on picket duty, three miles down the road towards Winchester. We had a call this morning from Major Doubleday. His battery is the terror of the enemy. He got out his map, and we studied the localities. He talked very agreeably about Sumter, &c. We have just received (four P. M., Tuesday) our orders for the advance upon Winchester. A very good place is assigned us. The impression is that the advance forms part of a grand concerted movement, and that to-morrow will be a decisive day in the history of the campaign. I hope for a big, worthy battle, one that means something and decides something. And I hope to have strength, courage, and wisdom to do my duty in it. I never felt happier or more earnest than for the last few days, and I never realized more fully the best significance of life. I have always had a dream and theory about the virtues that are called out by war. I have nothing to say of the supply which I can furnish, but I am vividly impressed with the demand. The calling needs a whole man; and it exacts very much from him. Self gets thrown into the background. It straggles out of the column, and is picked up, if at all, very late, by the rear-guard. I am writing this letter upon an empty case of cartridges, which were distributed this morning, sitting under an oak-tree back of the lines by the side of the Colonel, who has just returned from a conference with Colonel Abercrombie, and who is full of the duties of to-morrow. Good by, and God bless you. Love to all.

If anything should happen to me, remember that I meant to do my duty.

SOURCE: Elizabeth Amelia Dwight, Editor, Life and Letters of Wilder Dwight: Lieut.-Col. Second Mass. Inf. Vols., p. 49-50

Wilder Dwight to Elizabeth White Dwight, Saturday, July 13, 1861

in Camp, Martinsburg, Saturday, July 13, 1861.

Voici que nous sommes arrivés. I am in my tent, on the high ground, south of the town of Martinsburg. Our regiment is a part of what is called General Patterson's column, and we are on the advance post. It would have done your pride good to have seen us form the regiment, and start on our march from Hagerstown. My own responsible position, in rear of the column, led me to watch its progress, to return to give orders to the rear-guard and wagons, and, in general, to be lively. I am very well, and, though living under high pressure, getting my load along. At about half past six on Thursday afternoon we reached the bank of the Potomac, passing down from the high ground on which Doubleday's battery stood two weeks ago. We camped on the bank, without crossing the river. It was a long job getting the men into camp, and getting their supper into the men. At four the next (yesterday) morning we were up striking tents and getting breakfast. Then the battalion formed, and then came our first regular undress parade. At the command, the men prepared to ford the Potomac. In a few moments, the regiment was without its pantaloons. The vulgar prejudices of society, I am aware, are on the side of these appendages, but society does not cross the Potomac on foot in the freshness of the morning. The column moved forward in regular order. The band advanced into the stream playing a confident march, and so we passed the river gayly. Then came a long march, — thirteen miles. We were told that the enemy's cavalry were on the hills on the Virginia bank of the river, but we saw nothing of them, though the regiment marched with loaded muskets. The march was a new experience, — it was an interesting one. The morning was fresh and cool; the horses and wagons were our chief source of delay. One balky horse jumped up, leaped over the wheel-horses, fell, and hooked himself to the pole. He was left behind. One team spent a long time in the river. Still, at last, the train moved on. With frequent halts, we reached Martinsburg at three in the afternoon. We marched with music playing, and amid some attention of thousands of troops, to our camping-ground. Then we pitched our tents, and, in the midst of a violent thunder-storm, mounted our guns, got supper, and then I suppose you expect me to say went to bed. Not so, however, the Major. Instead of bed, which I desired, I went about in the pouring rain to visit sentinels, see that the men had supper, &c., &c.  At twelve o'clock I crept under cover. At five this morning, got up, put on wet boots, and went on duty again. To-day I have been attending drills, &c. I see clearly that there is no rest in this life. With care, I can keep well, I think, and I hope can do well for the men. But the care is a very great one. I have written this note in the midst of interruptions of every kind, and I have no more time now. We are under orders to move on Monday somewhither. We are in a beautiful country; everything here is new under the sun, or rather under the clouds. That, in itself, is spicy and cheering. In great haste.  . . . with much love to all.

SOURCE: Elizabeth Amelia Dwight, Editor, Life and Letters of Wilder Dwight: Lieut.-Col. Second Mass. Inf. Vols., p. 47-8

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, November 9, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, November 9, 1864.

The election passed off very quietly yesterday. About nineteen thousand votes, of which thirteen thousand five hundred were for Lincoln, and five thousand five hundred for McClellan, giving Lincoln a majority in this army of about eight thousand votes. Of these, three thousand five hundred were the majority of the Pennsylvania soldiers. During the day, much to my horror, one of the Republican agents reported the distribution of spurious or altered poll books, and charged certain Democratic agents as the parties guilty of the act. I had no other course to pursue than to arrest the parties complained against, until an investigation could be had. To-day we have been examining the matter, and there appears to be no doubt that poll books were brought here and distributed, having names of Republican electors misspelled and some omitted. The Democrats declare it is only a typographical error, and does not vitiate the use of the books, whereas the Republicans charge that it is a grave and studied effort to cheat the soldiers of their vote. In this dilemma I have applied to the Secretary of War, and asked for authority to send the parties either to Pennsylvania, to be tried by the courts there, or to Washington, to be disposed of by the Department and Doubleday's Commission, now trying the New York agent. This affair has bothered me very much. All these people are citizens of Philadelphia, and are said to be respectable. I had, however, but one course to pursue, and was compelled to notice the complaints presented to me. We have no news from the elections outside of the army, except that they passed off quietly with you and in New York; in the latter place, doubtless, owing to the presence and order of Major General Butler. Well, the election is over, with the result I expected, and now I hope no time will be lost in regulating the army.

I trust, now the election is over, measures will be taken to raise men to fill our ranks, and no time should be lost, as I don't think we can count on more than a month of good weather. To-be-sure, we can and doubtless will stay here all winter; and being so near each other, may manage to keep fighting on. But I don't think any operations involving any movement can be had after the beginning of December.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 239-40

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, March 10, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, March 10, 1864.

The storm in which I have been involved seems to be subsiding, as I note the Tribune now says that no charges were preferred against me by General Sickles or Doubleday. Tell General Gibbon that I have received his letter, and am greatly obliged to him for his gallantry and daring in coming out so boldly in my defense; but I do not wish him to compromise himself, and affairs are becoming complicated.

I think I wrote you on my return from Washington I found a polite note from Reverdy Johnston, saying he had assumed the responsibility of denying Mr. Wilkinson's statement, and asking me if he was not right. This act of courtesy I considered entitled to an acknowledgment, so I replied to Mr. Johnston, and explained to him wherein I thought Mr. Wilkinson had been misled. This letter, it appears, Mr. Johnston showed to his friends, and its receipt was announced in Forney's Chronicle. To-day I got a sharp letter from the Secretary of War, asking by what authority I wrote to Senators on military operations. I have replied my note was private and not intended for publication or circulation, and that I was not aware I required any authority to write private letters defending myself from the false and slanderous reports with which the public press has been filled for a week, particularly as the military operations referred to took place nine months ago, and the official reports have been published. This may involve me in trouble with the Secretary, but I cannot help it; I will not yield my right to defend myself.

To-day Lieutenant General Grant arrived here. He has been very civil, and said nothing about superseding me.

I go to-morrow to Washington, and shall go again before the committee, to add to my testimony.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 176-7

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, March 8, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, March 8, 1864.

I am curious to see how you take the explosion of the conspiracy to have me relieved, for it is nothing less than a conspiracy, in which the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with Generals Doubleday and Sickles, are the agents. Grant is to be in Washington tonight, and as he is to be commander in chief and responsible for the doings of the Army of the Potomac, he may desire to have his own man in command, particularly as I understand he is indoctrinated with the notion of the superiority of the Western armies, and that the failure of the Army of the Potomac to accomplish anything is due to their commanders.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 176

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, March 6, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, March 6, 1864.

I returned from Washington to-day. I went there Friday morning on business connected with the reorganization of the army. The night before I left I saw Mr. Wilkeson's attack on me in the Senate and Reverdy Johnston's reply and defense. When I reached Washington I was greatly surprised to find the whole town talking of certain grave charges of Generals Sickles and Doubleday, that had been made against me in their testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. On Saturday I was summoned before the committee. I found there only Mr. Wade, of Ohio. He was very civil, denied there were any charges against me, but said the committee was making up a sort of history of the war and was now taking evidence to enable it to give an account of the battle of Gettysburg, and my administration since commanding the army. I then occupied about three hours giving a succinct narrative of events. Subsequently Mr. Stanton told me (this is strictly confidential), that there was and had been much pressure from a certain party to get Hooker back in command, and that thinking, through Sickles and others, they might get me out (a preliminary step) they had gotten up this halloobaloo in the Committee on the Conduct of the War; but that I need not worry myself, there was no chance of their succeeding. The only evil that will result is the spreading over the country certain mysterious whisperings of dreadful deficiencies on my part, the truth concerning which will never reach the thousandth part of those who hear the lies. I suppose and fear you will be worried about them, but I beg you to be calm and quiet, and rest satisfied that I will come out all right in the end.

I saw nobody in Washington, except people about the Government, except Mr. Howard, of Michigan, whom I went to see and to whom I explained the absurd charge of Sickles, that I had ordered a retreat at Gettysburg, and that that battle was fought in spite of all my efforts to prevent it.

It is a melancholy state of affairs, however, when persons like Sickles and Doubleday can, by distorting and twisting facts, and giving a false coloring, induce the press and public for a time, and almost immediately, to take away the character of a man who up to that time had stood high in their estimation. However, I suppose we cannot change human nature; we must be patient, await the period when the truth will slowly and surely make itself be known.

You have doubtless seen that Kilpatrick's raid was an utter failure. I did not expect much from it. Poor Dahlgren I am sorry for.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 169-70

Major-General George G. Meade to Major Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and Abner Doubleday, July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1863 – 6 p.m.

Major-Generals HANCOCK and DOUBLEDAY:

If General Slocum is on the field, and I hope he is, of course he takes command. Say to him I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third Corps at Emmitsburg, to hold in check any force attempting to come through there. It can be ordered up to-night, if' necessary. Sedgwick is moving up here, and will be pushed forward in the night, if required. It seems to me we have so concentrated that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on us, and that, if we get up all our people, and attack with our whole force to-morrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has.

Very respectfully, &c.,

 GEO. G. MEADE,

 Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 39; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 466

Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock to Major-General Daniel A. Butterfield, July 1, 1863 – 5:25 p.m.

5.25 [P.M., JULY 1, 1863.]

GENERAL: When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken. It is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have, as yet, no troops on the left, the Third Corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, its flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left, to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this dispatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes, it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

General Warren is here.

Your obedient servant,

 WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

 Major-General, Commanding Corps.

 General BUTTERFIELD,

 Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 38-9; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 366

Major General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, January 23, 1863

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., January 23, 1863.

I have not written to you for several days, for the reasons that I have had no opportunity, and that I was aware all letters from the camp were stopped in Washington, so that there was no use in writing. On the 19th, in the night, we received orders to move the next day. On the 20th, the whole army moved from their camp to a position four miles up the river, where crossing places had previously been selected. Everything went off very well up to about 8 P. M. of the 20th. The army reached its position. The pontoons, artillery and all other accessories were up in time, and we all thought the next morning the bridges would be thrown over and we should be at it. But man proposes and God disposes. About 9 P. M. a terrific storm of wind and rain set in and continued all night. At once I saw the game was up. The next day the roads were almost impassable; the pontoons, in attempting to get them to the water's edge, stuck on the bank, and a hundred men could not budge them. Instead of six bridges being thrown over by 8 A. M., it was found late in the day that the materials for one only could be got to the water's edge. Burnside visited us, and soon saw the state of the case. Still in hopes something might happen, he directed we should remain in position. All that night, the 21st, and the next day, the 22d, it continued to rain, and the roads to get into such a condition, that early yesterday, the 22d, I had to turn out the whole of my corps, fifteen thousand men, and go to work and bridge with logs, or corduroy, as it is called, nearly the whole road from our camp to the crossing place, eight miles. The men worked cheerfully at this, which was accomplished by early this morning, and Burnside having recalled the army to its old camp, we have been all day getting our artillery back, and to-morrow the infantry will return, thus consuming two days to get back, when it took only a few hours to get there. I never felt so disappointed and sorry for any one in my life as I did for Burnside. He really seems to have even the elements against him. I told him warmly, when I saw him, how sorry I felt, and that I had almost rather have lost a limb than that the storm should have occurred. He seemed quite philosophical, said he could not resist the elements and perhaps it was as well, for that his movement had been most strongly opposed and some of his generals had told him he was leading the men to a slaughter pen; and I am sorry to say there were many men, and among them generals high in command, who openly rejoiced at the storm and the obstacle it presented. We were very much amused to see in the papers to-day, flaming accounts of our crossing, of the battle, and of Hooker being mortally wounded. I hope you did not attach any importance to these absurd reports, which, when I saw, I feared you might have been anxious. I presumed the truth had been telegraphed and that you would know the storm had frustrated our plans. The plan was based on the presumption that we would take the enemy unawares, at least so far as the place of crossing was concerned, and I believe, but for the storm, we should have succeeded in this. What will be done now I cannot imagine, the mud is at present several feet thick wherever any wagons pass over a road, and if the weather from this time, should at all resemble that of last year, it will effectually stop all operations for two months to come.

I did not see George¹ during our fiasco, though I was at one time bivouacked near a part of his regiment, but his company was not with that part.

Doubleday has been assigned to the Reserves, which is a good thing for me, for now they will think a great deal more of me than before.

__________

¹ Son of General Meade.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 348-9

Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 337 Report of Brig. Gen. John Buford, U.S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,

August 27, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the First Cavalry Division, from its crossing the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, on June 27, to its crossing of the Rappahannock on August 1:

After passing the Potomac on the upper pontoon bridge, the division marched over almost impassable roads, crossing the Monocacy near its mouth by a wretched ford, and bivouacked on the east side of the mountains, 3 miles from Jefferson, being halted there by the whole train of General Stahel's division blockading the road through the mountains.

June 28, the division moved through Jefferson, and went into camp near Middletown, for the purpose of shoeing and refitting.

June 29, the Reserve Brigade was detached and moved to Mechanicstown. The First and Second Brigades moved through Boonsborough, Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, and encamped near Fairfield, within a short distance of a considerable force of the enemy's infantry. The inhabitants knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy's camp, yet not one of them gave me a particle of information, nor even mentioned the fact of the enemy's presence. The whole community seemed stampeded, and afraid to speak or to act, often offering as excuses for not showing some little enterprise, “The rebels will destroy our houses if we tell anything.” Had any one given me timely information, and acted as guide that night, I could have surprised and captured or destroyed this force, which proved next day to be two Mississippi regiments of infantry and two guns.

June 30, the two brigades moved out very early to go to Gettysburg, via Fairfield. At the latter place my advance ran upon the force referred to. I determined to feel it and drive it, if possible, but, after a little skirmishing, found that artillery would have to be necessarily used.  Resolved not to disturb them, for fear cannonading from that quarter might disarrange the plans of the general commanding. Fairfield was 4 or 5 miles west of the route assigned me, and I did not wish to bring on an engagement so far from the road I was expected to be following. I immediately turned my column toward Emmitsburg without serious molestation, and was soon on my proper road and moving on Gettysburg, where I had reason to suppose I should find some of General Stahel's [Kilpatrick's] cavalry. We entered Gettysburg in the afternoon, just in time to meet the enemy entering the town, and in good season to drive him back before his getting a foothold. He withdrew toward Cashtown, leaving his pickets about 4½ miles from Gettysburg.

The night of the 30th was a busy night for the division. No reliable information of value could be obtained from the inhabitants, and but for the untiring exertions of many different scouting parties, information of the enemy's whereabouts and movements could not have been gained in time to prevent him from getting the town before our army could get up.

By daylight on July 1, I had gained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and my arrangements were made for entertaining him until General Reynolds could reach the scene.

On July 1, between 8 and 9 a.m., reports came in from the First Brigade (Colonel Gamble's) that the enemy was coming down from toward Cashtown in force. Colonel Gamble made an admirable line of battle, and moved off proudly to meet him. The two lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers. The First Brigade held its own for more than two hours, and had to be literally dragged back a few hundred yards to a position more secure and better sheltered. Tidball's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Calef, Second U.S. Artillery, fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery from twelve guns, all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns deliberately with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful effect upon the enemy. The First Brigade maintained this unequal contest until the leading division of General Reynolds' corps came up to its assistance, and then most reluctantly did it give up the front. A portion of the Third Indiana found horse-holders, borrowed muskets, and fought with the Wisconsin regiment that came to relieve them. While this left of my line was engaged, Devin's brigade, on the right, had its hands full.  The enemy advanced upon Devin by four roads, and on each was checked and held until the leading division of the Eleventh Corps came to his relief.

After the fall of General Reynolds, whose advance troops partially drove back the enemy and made heavy captures of prisoners, the enemy brought up fresh troops, and engaged General Doubleday's command, which fought bravely, but was greatly outnumbered and forced to fall back. Seeing our troops retiring, and their need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble's brigade to Doubleday's left, and dismounted it in time to render great assistance to our infantry, and to check and break the enemy's line. My troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in short carbine range. Their fire was perfectly terrific, causing the enemy to break and rally on their second line, which made no farther advance toward my position.

Shortly after this, I placed my command on our extreme left, to watch and fight the enemy should he make another attack, and went to Cemetery Hill for observation. While there, General Hancock arrived, and in a few moments he made superb disposition to resist any attack that might be made.

My division bivouacked that night on the left of our position, with pickets extending almost to Fairfield.

The zeal, bravery, and good behavior of the officers and men on the night of June 30, and during July 1, was commendable in the extreme. A heavy task was before us; we were equal to it, and shall all remember with pride that at Gettysburg we did our country much service.

July 2, the division became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters on our left, and held its own until relieved by General Sickles' corps, after which it moved to Taneytown, and bivouacked for the night.

The next day, July 3, it moved to Westminster, to guard the trains of the army at that point.

July 4, the division marched toward Frederick, en route to Williamsport.

July 5, reached Frederick, drew supplies, and remained all night.

July 6, the whole division (the Reserve Brigade having joined the night before) marched at 4 a.m. toward Williamsport, to destroy the enemy's trains, which were reported to be crossing the Potomac into Virginia.

At about 5 p.m., when near Saint James' College, the enemy's pickets were discovered, driven in, and preparations made to capture the town. The enemy was driven handsomely to within half a mile of his trains, at the town, when he came out strong enough to prevent our farther progress. General Merritt's brigade, with Graham's battery, was on the right, Colonel Gamble's (First) brigade on the left, and Colonel Devin's (Second) brigade on the left rear as reserves. The enemy made an attack upon Gamble, who had posted his men under shelter, and who held his fire until the rebel line came within short carbine range, when he opened upon it, doing terrible execution, and driving it back into its stronghold. This was repeated with similar success. In Merritt's front the enemy made no direct attack, but were so obstinate that General Merritt could not dislodge them without too much sacrifice. The enemy, however, attempted to turn our right with a brigade of infantry. This attempt was most admirably foiled by General Merritt.

While our hottest contest was in progress, General Kilpatrick's guns were heard in the direction of Hagerstown, and as they grew nearer, I sent word to him to connect with my right for mutual support. The connection was made, but was of no consequence to either of us. Just before dark, Kilpatrick's troops gave way, passing to my rear by the right, and were closely followed by the enemy.

It now being dark, outnumbered, and the First and Reserve Brigades being out of ammunition, Devin was ordered to relieve Gamble and a portion of Merritt's troops. This being done, I ordered the command to fall back, Devin to hold his ground until the entire road to the Antietam was clear. Devin handsomely carried out his instructions, and the division bivouacked on the road to Boonsborough.

The expedition had for its object the destruction of the enemy's trains, supposed to be at Williamsport. This, I regret to say, was not accomplished. The enemy was too strong for me, but he was severely punished for his obstinacy. His casualties were more than quadruple mine.

Colonel Chapman, with his regiment, dashed off to the road leading from Falling Waters to Williamsport, and destroyed a small train of grain, and returned with about 40 mules and their harness.

At Williamsport, Captain Graham fought his battery with marked ability, and to the admiration of all witnesses. The officers and men behaved with their usual courage, displaying great unwillingness to fall back, and requiring repeated orders before they did so.

July 7, the division moved to Boonsborough, the Reserve Brigade camping well in advance on the Hagerstown road, after having a successful cavalry brush with the enemy's advance, of which I have as yet received no report.

July 8, the enemy attacked at 5 a.m., and the fighting lasted until about 5 p.m. He was driven back about 4 miles, when the division then bivouacked for the night.

July 9, attacked the enemy at 4 p.m. and drove him handsomely about 2 miles.

July 10, attacked the enemy at 8 a.m. and drove him through Funkstown to his intrenchments beyond Antietam, when he came out with a heavy force of infantry and artillery and gave battle. The division held the crest on our side of the town like veterans until its ammunition was exhausted. Howe's division, of the Sixth Corps, was in easy supporting distance, but had no orders to aid me. At 3 p.m. I could no longer reply with carbines, for want of cartridges, and consequently ordered the division to fall back. A brigade of the Sixth Corps then began to advance, but did not occupy the position that I held when I left the field.

There was splendid fighting on the part of the division on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th. There was no faltering or hesitation. Each man went to work determined to carry anything in reason. For the particulars I refer you to the reports of the brigade commanders.

July 11, the First and Second Brigades moved in the afternoon to the vicinity of Bakersville. The Reserve Brigade was detached.

July 12 and 13, remained at Bakersville, and pushed pickets to within 800 yards of the enemy's intrenchments at Downsville.

July 14, at 7 a.m., the division was ordered to advance, and at 7.30 o'clock it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The few remaining scouts were run into the rear guard of Lee's army, which was soon seen in front of Kilpatrick, who had advanced from the north. Kilpatrick was engaged. I sent word to him that I would put my whole force in on the enemy's rear and flank, and get possession of the road and bridge in their rear. The division succeeded in getting the road, and attacked the enemy in flank and rear, doing him great damage, and scattering him in confusion through the woods and ravines. Our spoils on this occasion were one 10-pounder Parrott gun, one caisson, over 500 prisoners, and about 300 muskets. General Merritt came up in time to take the advance before the enemy had entirely crossed, and made many captures. The enemy's bridge was protected by over a dozen guns in position and sharpshooters on the Virginia side. As our troops neared the bridge, the enemy cut the Maryland side loose, and the bridge swung to the Virginia side.

July 15, the division moved to Berlin.

July 16, moved camp to Petersville.

July 17, remained at Petersville.

July 18, crossed during the afternoon, and encamped near Purcellville.

July 19, marched through Philomont, and encamped on Goose Creek, near Rector's Cross-Roads.

July 20, marched to Rectortown. Detached General Merritt with his brigade to hold Manassas Gap, Gamble to hold Chester Gap, and Devin, with all the train, moved to Salem.

July 21, Merritt in Manassas, Gamble near Chester Gap, finding it already in possession of a superior force of the enemy. General Merritt and Colonel Gamble each had a fight and made captures, for particulars of which see their reports.

July 22, wagon train sent to Warrenton in charge of Sixth New York Cavalry. Devin moved toward Barbee's Cross-Roads.

July 23, whole division concentrated at Barbee's Cross-Roads, and remained until the 26th, when the division took position at Warrenton and Fayetteville, picketing the Rappahannock River from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford.

During the whole campaign, from June 27 to July 31, there has been no shirking or hesitation, no tiring on the part of a single man so far as I have seen; the brigade commanders report none.

To General Merritt and Colonels Gamble and Devin, brigade commanders, I give my heartfelt thanks for their zeal and hearty support. Neither of them ever doubted the feasibility of an order, but on its reception obeyed its dictates to the letter.

My staff – Captains [Charles E.] Norris, Keogh, [Craig W.] Wadsworth, and Bacon, and Lieutenants Mix, P. Penn Gaskill, Dean, [Albert P.] Morrow, [Malcomb H.] Wing, and [George M.] Gilchrist – were always on hand, and gave me much valuable information from where the fire was hottest, and were of immense assistance in conveying orders on the field of battle, and seeing that they were obeyed. During the campaign they were all under heavy fire on different occasions, and for coolness and gallantry cannot be excelled in this army.

Lieutenant [Aaron B.] Jerome, signal corps, was ever on the alert, and through his intrepidity and fine glasses on more than one occasion kept me advised of the enemy's movements when no other means were available. Surgeon Hard, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, surgeon-in-chief to the division, deserve great credit for his zealous and untiring attention and labors with the sick and wounded. Through his exertions their sufferings have been greatly alleviated, their wants supplied, and many lives saved. Many wounded soldiers are indebted to him for his timely aid on the battle-field, who, but for his energy, would have shared the fate of many poor fellows who had less attentive surgeons.

I transmit with this the reports of the brigade commanders.

The First Brigade captured 854 head of beef-cattle and 602 sheep at Chester Gap, which were turned over to the subsistence department at Markham, July 24.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JNO. BUFORD,

 Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. C. Ross SMITH,

Chief of Staff, Cavalry Corps.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 926-30

E. P. Halstead to Lieut. Col. John D. Shaul, April 6, 1862

HDQRS. MILITARY DEFENSES NORTH OF THE POTOMAC,

Washington, April 6, 1862.

 Lieut. Col. JOHN  D. SHAUL,

Commanding Seventy-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers.

SIR: I am directed by General Doubleday to say in answer to your letter of the 2d instant that all negroes coming into the lines of any of the camps or forts under his command are to be treated as persons and not as chattels.

Under no circumstances has the commander of a fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as fugitive slaves as it cannot be done without determining their character.

The additional article of war recently passed by Congress* positively prohibits this.

The question has been asked whether it would not be better to exclude negroes altogether from the lines. The general is of the opinion that they bring much valuable information which cannot be obtained from any other source. They are acquainted with all the roads, paths, fords and other natural features of the country and they make excellent guides. They also know and frequently have exposed the haunts of secession spies and traitors and the existence of rebel organizations. They will not therefore be excluded.

The general also directs me to say that civil process cannot be served directly in the camps or forts of his command without full authority be obtained from the commanding officer for that purpose.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. P. HALSTED,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

__________

* See p. 810

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series II, Volume 1 (Serial No. 114), p. 815