War Department
March 16th 1861
Sir,
In reply to the
letter of inquiry, addressed to me by the President, whether “assuming it
to be possible now to provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, it is
wise to attempt it,” I beg leave to say, that it has received the careful
consideration, in the limited time I could bestow upon it, which its very grave
importance demands, and that my mind has been, most reluctantly, forced to the
conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an attempt.
In coming to this conclusion, I am free to say, I am greatly influenced
by the opinions of the Army officers who have expressed themselves on the
subject, and who seem to concur that it is, perhaps, now impossible to succor
that fort, substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition
of ships of war and troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. All
the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten,
express this opinion, and it would seem to me that the President would not be
justified to disregard such high authority without over-ruling considerations
of public policy.
Major Anderson, in his report of the 28 ultimo, says, “I confess that I
would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw
reinforcements into this harbor, within the time for our relief rendered
necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well
disciplined men.”
In this opinion, Major Anderson is, substantially, sustained by the
reports of all the other officers within the fort, one of whom, Capt. Seymour,
speaks thus emphatically on the subject: “It is not more than possible
to supply this fort by ruse, with a few men or a small amount of provisions.
Such is the unceasing vigilance employed to prevent it. To do so, openly, by
vessels alone, unless they are shot proof, is, virtually impossible, so
numerous and powerful are the opposing batteries. No vessel can lay near the
fort without being exposed to continual fire, and the harbor could, and
probably would, whenever necessary, be effectually closed, as one channel has
already been. A projected attack, in large force, would draw to this harbor all
the available resources, in men and materiel, of the contiguous States.
Batteries of guns of heavy calibre, would be multiplied rapidly and
indefinitely; at least 20,000 men, good marksmen and trained for months past
with a view to the this very contingency, would be concentrated here before the
attacking force could leave Northern ports. The harbor would be closed; a
landing must be effected at some distance from our guns, which could give no
aid. Charleston harbor would be a Sebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited
means would probably be required to ensure success, before which time the
garrison of Fort Sumter would be starved out.”
General Scott, in his reply to the question, addressed to him by the
President, on the 12th instant, what amount of means and of what description,
in addition to those already at command, it would require to supply and reinforce
the fort, says, “I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports, which, in
the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collected in
less than four months; 5000 additional regular troops, and 20.000 volunteers –
that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor
(including Fort Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise,
organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by
Congress not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a
practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means
at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a surrender under
assault, or from starvation, has been merely a question of time.”
It is true, there are those whose opinions are entitled to respectful
consideration, who entertain the belief that Fort Sumter could yet be succored
to a limited extent, without the employment of the large army and naval forces
believed to be necessary by the Army officers whose opinions I have already
quoted. Captain Ward, of the Navy, an officer of acknowledged merit, a month
ago, believed it to be practicable to supply the fort with men and provisions
to a limited extent, without the employment of any very large military or naval
force. He then proposed to employ four or more small steamers belonging to the
coast survey to accomplish the purpose, and we have the opinion of General
Scott that he has no doubt that Captain Ward, at that time, would have
succeeded with his proposed expedition, but was not allowd by the late
President to attempt the execution of his plan. Now it is pronounced, from the change
of circumstances, impracticable, by Major Anderson, and all the other officers
of the Fort, as well as by Generals Scott and Totten, and in this opinion
Captain Ward, after full consultation with the latter named officers and the
Superintendent of the Coast Survey, I understand now reluctantly concurs.
Mr. Fox, another gentleman of experience as a seaman, who, having
formerly been engaged on the Coast Survey, is familiar with the waters of the
Charleston harbor, has proposed to make the attempt to supply the Fort with by
the aid of cutters of light draught and large dimensions, and his proposal has,
in a measure, been approved by Commodore Stringham; but he does not suppose, or
propose, or profess to believe that provisions for more than one or two months
could be furnished at a time.
There is no doubt whatever in my mind, that when Major Anderson first
took possession of Fort Sumter he could have been easily supplied with men and
provisions, and that when Captain Ward, with the concurrence of General Scott,
a month ago, proposed his expedition, he would have succeeded, had he been
allowed to attempt it, as, I think, he should have been. A different state of
things, however, now exists. Fort Moultrie is now re-armed and strengthened in
every way; many new land batteries have been constructed; the principal channel
has been obstructed; in short, the difficulty of re-inforcing the Fort has been
increased ten, if not twenty fold. Whatever might have been done as late as a
month ago, it is too sadly evident that it cannot now be done without the
sacrifice of life and treasure not at all commensurate with the object to be
attained, and as the abandonment of the Fort in a few weeks, sooner or later,
appears to be an inevitable necessity, it seems to me that the sooner it be
done, the better.
The proposition presented by Mr. Fox, so sincerely entertained and ably
advocated, would be entitled to my favorable consideration, if, with all the
lights before me, and in the face of so many distinguished military authorities
on the other side, I did not believe that the attempt to carry it into effect
would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict. Should he succeed in relieving
Fort Sumter, which is doubted by many of our most experienced soldiers and
seamen, would that enable us to maintain our authority against the troops and
fortifications of South Carolina? Sumter could not now contend against these
formidable adversaries, if filled with provisions and men. That fortress was
intended, as her position on the map will show, rather to repel an invading
foe. It is equally clear, from repeated investigations and trials, that the
range of her guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston, if that were
desirable. No practical benefit will result to the Country or the Government by
accepting the proposal alluded to, and I am, therefore, of opinion that the
cause of humanity and the highest obligations to the public interest would be
best promoted by adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose
suggestions I have laid before you.
I have, sir, the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your Obt. Servt.
Simon Cameron
SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers
at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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