Major-General Philip H. Sheridan to Lieutenant-General Ulysses. S. Grant, August 17, 1864—9 p.m.

BERRYVILLE, VA., August 17, 1864—9 p.m.

Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,

Commanding Armies of the United States:

All your dispatches have been received. Kershaw's division is here, and Wickham's and Lomax's brigades, of Fitz Lee's cavalry division, also another brigade from Reams' Station. The First Cavalry Division captured 300 prisoners yesterday; most of them belonged to Kershaw's division. One division of A. P. Hill's corps is reported here, but no prisoners taken. The position that I held in front of Strasburg was a very bad one, from which I could be forced at any time precipitately. Winchester is untenable except as a provisioned garrison. I have, therefore, taken a position near Berryville, which will enable me to get in their rear if they should get strong enough to push north. Winchester is now held by the cavalry, with one brigade of infantry of the Sixth Corps to act with it. The cavalry engagement in front of Front Royal was splendid; it was on open ground; the saber was freely used by our men. Great credit is due to Generals Merritt and Custer and Colonel Devin. My impression is that troops are still arriving.

Kershaw's and Fitz Lee's divisions came through Culpeper. Mosby has annoyed me and captured a few wagons. We hung one and shot six of his men yesterday. I have burned all wheat and hay, and brought off all stock, sheep, cattle, horses, &c., south of Winchester. The prisoners captured belong to Kershaw's division, and Wickham's and Lomax's brigades, of Fitz Lee's cavalry division.

P. H. SHERIDAN,                

Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1 (Serial No. 90), p. 822

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to John M. Forbes, October 17, 1864

Cedar Creek, Oct. 17, '64.

There's really nothing to tell here; I never have anything to tell even to E. We are in a glorious country, with fine air to breathe and fine views to enjoy; we are kept very active, and have done a good deal of good work; I have done my share, I think, — but there's nothing to make a letter of.

We hear to-day that Pennsylvania and Indiana are all right. Poor Grant seems to have a hard task at Richmond: he hasn't the same army now that he started with in May, and I shall not be surprised if he is obliged to go into winter-quarters soon and re-organize, or at least drill. If so, people must be patient; we are going quite fast enough. I only write this to make you write to me. Isn't it lucky that I keep always well and hearty? My friends never feel any anxiety on that account and I never have to write letters to tell them how I am.¹

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¹ General Sheridan had travelled by night, reached Washington on the morning of the 17th, had his interview with the powers there, and left at noon, reaching Martinsburg at night by rail. On the 18th, he rode twenty-eight miles to Winchester, where, hearing by courier from General Wright that all was quiet at his camp, he spent the night. Next morning, he planned to make some examinations with regard to repairing the Manassas Gap Railroad, with two engineer officers sent with him from Washington.

Meantime, let us see what was going on at Cedar Creek. From the abrupt mountain Three Top, close by Early's army, the camp of Sheridan's army, the division of the forces and guns, the river and creek, the fords and roads, could be plainly seen in bird's-eye view. Early saw that the Union left flank was less strongly guarded, as the country was more difficult than on their right, and yet was accessible to his infantry. He determined to flank it, and take the camp there in reverse by surprise before daylight, and sent Gordon on that errand, while his cavalry was to demonstrate on the left, and he, with Kershaw and Wharton and his artillery, attack simultaneously in front. He even hoped the master-stroke of capturing Sheridan (of whose absence he did not know), by the rush of his flanking party around his headquarters. I am permitted to quote the striking description of the scene before the battle, from Mr. George E. Pond's book, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, in Scribner's "Campaigns of the Civil War."

“Stealthily, an hour after midnight, the Confederate columns moved forward. Since silence was essential to success, swords and canteens were left in camp, lest their clinking should betray the march; while the artillery was massed on the pike at Fisher's Hill, there to wait until the hour set for the infantry attack, when it was to move at a gallop through the town [Strasburg] to Hupp's Hill; for an earlier advance might betray the secret by the rumbling of the heavy wheels, in the dead of night, over the macadamized road. Early accompanied Kershaw, his centre column, and ‘came in sight of the Union fires at 3.30 o'clock; the moon,’ he adds, ‘was now shining, and we could see the camps.’ Kershaw was halted under cover, and while his men shivered in the chill night air, Early, during the hour that followed, pointed out precisely how and when this part of the attack should be made. Kershaw was to ‘cross his division over the creek as quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork.’ The scene was memorable. The Union camps, on the hills beyond the creek, wrapped in slumber; a corps of infantry, Jackson's old corps, and a brigade of cavalry, stealing along the base of Massanutten [Mountain], to gain the rear of its unsuspecting foes; in the background, forty guns and more awaiting the signal to rush down the pike; an infantry division creeping over Hupps, and another crouching yonder nearer the creek. Before five o'clock Early ordered Kershaw forward again, and after a time came the welcome sound of a light crackle of musketry on the Confederate right, where Union picket-stations had been set, near the fords at which Gordon was crossing. This petty sound did not disturb the dreaming camps, but to the attent ears of Kershaw and Wharton it was the signal of attack. Kershaw quickly moved down to the creek; and meanwhile, as if Nature had enlisted to aid this enterprise, the moon had vanished and a thick fog, clouding the landscape, now hid from sight the Confederate march.”

Sheridan, at Winchester, was considering the questions of the Manassas Gap Railroad with the engineers, when, at seven o'clock, it was reported that some artillery firing could be heard in the direction of Cedar Creek. This was supposed to be from a reconnoissance, but later the sound grew nearer, and the General, mounting with his staff and escort, rode rapidly towards his camp. The heavy cannonade of a battle became unmistakable, and before long he met wagons and stragglers in great numbers. Mr. Pond continues: “Hastily giving orders to park the retreating trains, and to use the spare brigade at Winchester to form a cordon across the pike and fields, so as to stop the stragglers, Sheridan dashed up the pike with an escort of twenty men. He called to the fugitives to turn about and face the enemy, and, as he well phrases it, ‘hundreds of men, who, on reflection, found they had not done themselves justice, came back with cheers.’ On reaching the army, then eleven and a half miles from Winchester, he was received with a tempest of joy.”

In the text of Colonel Lowell's Life, some account of the part played by his brigade in the action has been given. Below, I give extracts from General Sheridan's official report of the battle to General Grant, and also from the reports, to their respective superiors, of Generals Torbert, Merritt, and Devin, in which they pay tribute to the memory of Colonel Lowell.

General Sheridan, at ten o'clock on the night of the battle, wrote: —

“I have the honour to report that my army at Cedar Creek was attacked this morning before daylight, and my left was turned and driven in confusion: in fact, most of the line was driven in confusion, with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery. I hastened from Winchester, where I was, on my return from Washington, and joined the army between Middletown and Newtown, [it] having been driven back about four miles. Here I took the affair in hand, and quickly united the corps; formed a compact line of battle just in time to repulse an attack of the enemy's, which was handsomely done, about I P. M. At 3 P. M., after some changes of the cavalry from the left to the right flank, I attacked with great vigour, driving and routing the enemy, capturing, according to last reports, forty-three pieces of artillery and very many prisoners. Wagon trains, ambulances, and caissons in large numbers are in our possession.

"Affairs at times looked badly, but by the gallantry of our brave officers and men, disaster has been converted into a splendid victory. Darkness again intervened, to shut off greater results.”

And in his second report from the battlefield, written the next day, he speaks of “a great victory — a victory won from disaster.  . . . The attack on the enemy was made about 3 P. M. by a left half-wheel of the whole line, with a division of cavalry turning each flank of the enemy, the whole line advancing. The enemy, after a stubborn resistance, broke and fled, and were pushed with vigour.  . . . At least 1600 prisoners have been brought in, also wagons and ambulances in large numbers.  . . . I have to regret the loss of many valuable officers killed and wounded, among them  . . . Colonel C. R. Lowell, commanding Reserve Cavalry Brigade, killed.”

General Torbert, Chief of Cavalry, reports :—

“As soon as the cavalry was in position on the left, they attacked the enemy. Colonel Lowell, commanding the Reserve Brigade, First Division, dismounted a part of his little band, and they advanced to a strong position behind a stone wall, from which the enemy's infantry failed to drive them after repeated attempts. About 12 M. the cavalry was moved to the left about 300 yards, thus bringing it to the left of the pike. Thus matters stood with the cavalry until 3 P. M., holding on to this ground with more than their usual dogged persistence, displaying gallantry which has never been surpassed, while most of the infantry was reforming several miles to their right and rear.  . . . About 2 P. M. Major-General Sheridan arrived on the ground. . . . On the left, the battle was going well for us; in fact, it could not be otherwise, with the cool and invincible Merritt on the ground, supported by such soldiers as Devin and Lowell."

[Sheridan had come on the field, and communicated with Lowell and the Sixth Corps commanders before noon, but probably General Torbert had not seen him personally. In his report he also makes a mistake as to the circumstances of Colonel Lowell's first wounding, so I omit that part.] He goes on : —

“About 4.15 o'clock a general advance of the army was made, and it was truly grand to see the manner in which the cavalry did their part. In this general advance Colonel Lowell,  . . . while charging at the head of his brigade, received a second wound, which proved to be mortal. Thus the service lost one of its most gallant and accomplished officers. He was the beau ideal of a cavalry commander, and his memory will never die in the command. . . . The cavalry advanced on both flanks, side by side with the infantry, charging the enemy's lines with an impetuosity which they could not stand. The rebel army was soon routed, and driven across Cedar Creek in confusion; the cavalry, sweeping on both flanks, crossed Cedar Creek about the same time, charged, and broke the last line the enemy attempted to form (it was now after dark), and put out at full speed for their artillery and trains.”

General Wesley Merritt, Lowell's immediate commander, said in his report: —

“No one in the field appreciated his worth more than his division commander. He was wounded painfully in the early part of the day, soon after which I met him; he was suffering acutely from his wound, but to ask him to leave the field was to insult him almost. A more gallant soldier never buckled sabre. His coolness and judgment in the field were unequalled. An educated and accomplished gentleman, his modest, amiable yet independent demeanour endeared him to all his superiors in rank. His inflexible justice, temperate yet unflinching conduct of discipline, made him respected and loved by his subordinates. He was upright as a man, pure as a patriot, and eminently free from the finesse of the politician. Young in years, he died too early for his country.”

Lastly, Brigadier-General Thomas C. Devin, who commanded the Second Brigade of Merritt's Division, ends his report thus: —

“During the early part of the engagement at Cedar Creek, when all seemed lost, I did not see a single cavalry straggler, and the men stood up nobly under a most withering fire. When obliged to retire, the movement was effected in perfect order and new lines formed, as if on parade.

“I respectfully trust that it may not be considered out of place here to mention the hearty and brave cooperation that was at all times extended to me by the brave and lamented Colonel Lowell, commanding the Reserve Brigade. In him the service lost an estimable gentleman and gallant soldier, whose future was bright with promise.”

It has been remarked of Lowell that, in each new place or kind of work to which his path of life led him, his new acquaintances believed that in him they had discovered a remarkable man, made for just that place. Yet all soon saw the performance of the work in hand was but a low power of a force dimly seen behind.

Many years after the war, General Sheridan wrote the following letter to his friend, Mr. John M. Forbes : —

Chicago, Ill., Dec. 31, 1881.

My Dear Mr. Forbes, — Your letter in reference to the late General Lowell is received. Among those who fell in my Shenandoah Valley Campaign there was no better soldier or brighter man than young Charles Lowell. Youthful in appearance and only twenty-three [sic] years of age,² he united the rare judgment and good eye of a leader to the unflinching courage which marked so many others. Commanding one of the best brigades of the army, comprised of three regiments of Regulars and his own, — the 2d Mass. Cavalry, raised by himself, — he was always found at the front in the advance. He had three horses killed under him in the first battle of Winchester (Opequan, Sept. 19, 1864), and in the morning of Oct. 19th, Cedar Creek, same year, he was mortally wounded while holding an advance position with his brigade on the left of the retreating army in the village of Middletown. On my arrival on the field, my first order was sent to Gen. Lowell through an aide-decamp to hold the position he then occupied, if it was possible. His reply was that he would. And when the final charge was made by the whole line in the evening, he was lifted on his horse, but could only whisper his last order for his men to mount and advance against the enemy. I watched him closely during the campaign and, had he survived that day at Cedar Creek, it was my intention to have more fully recognized his gallantry and genius by obtaining for him promotion in rank, and a command which would have enlarged his usefulness and have given more scope to his remarkable abilities as a leader of men. I am, my dear Mr. Forbes,

Sincerely and truly your friend,

P. H. Sheridan,

Lt. -General.

Perhaps a fitting close is this extract from a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Forbes, returning to his regiment after imprisonment in the South: —

“Oh, you don't know how I missed Colonel Lowell as soon as I rejoined the regiment! Every time the bugles sounded in the morning, I half looked to see his light figure in the saddle leading the column; and each night when, the day's hard marching done, we gathered round the camp fires, whose charm used to be doubled by his presence and conversation, and listened to the band playing the tunes we used to listen to with him, the choking feeling would come, and it always will with me, whenever I think of him. Every one else is a dead weight in comparison."

² His age was twenty-nine.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 364-5, 475-83

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, Sunday, October 9, 1864 – 7 a.m.

Near Strasburg, Sunday, 7 A. M., Oct. 9.

Our boys haven't been able to find any water for us this morning and we haven't washed our faces, — the first time that I remember in the “history of the war.” It's jolly cold however, so we don't mind so much. We actually had snow flurries yesterday, and to-day promises worse.

We had a skirmish yesterday with their cavalry.¹ Lieutenant Tucker wounded and Sergeant Wakefield; — the roan horse killed, and to-day I shall have to ride the gray unless I can find Sergeant Wakefield's horse. Enos has been looking for him for two hours. We are expecting another brush with their cavalry today, as we are ordered to advance again. I should like to have Sundays quiet.

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¹ October 8. The Reserve Brigade was sent back to reconnoitre, and met a superior force of Rebel cavalry. The Second Brigade (Devin's) was sent to reenforce Lowell, who attacked. There was a hard fight till dark, with some loss.

This annoyance of his rear by General Rosser, who had been eagerly looked for to deliver the Valley from the Yankees, caused Sheridan, that night, to order his chief of cavalry, Torbert, to go in and whip Rosser next morning, or get whipped himself.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 355, 470

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, Tuesday Evening, September 20, 1864

Tuesday evening (September 20).

We had a very successful action yesterday, and the cavalry did well. Both the other brigades of the division got battle-flags, — one two, the other four; we got none, but did well and took a couple of guns. Poor Billy was shot in three places and is dead. I had not an orderly near at the time, or I should have changed him. During the afternoon, I had one horse killed and two wounded, — all taken from orderlies. I couldn't get the gray to go anywhere: I have not a scratch. We have two officers of the Second Massachusetts wounded, the Doctor fears, mortally,— Lieutenants Baldwin and Thompson; Lieutenant Home prisoner: but the Second Massachusetts was not in the real fight, for some unaccountable reason it stayed behind, — so that I had not over 150 men in the command at Winchester, — otherwise I think we should have done even better. I feel very badly about it, but it can't be helped.¹ We are now in front of Strasburg, and the infantry will attack if they come up in time: I fear that the enemy will make off in the night, if we do not press them.

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¹ Lowell, with his three Regular regiments and a battalion of the Second Massachusetts, did admirable service, however. On hearing certain news of the withdrawal of Kershaw's force from the Valley, Sheridan, given carte blanche by Grant, moved instantly on Early's somewhat scattered command, and the Battle of the Opequan resulted. Torbert reported that Merritt's division, on the right, fording that creek at daylight, “was opposed by the rebel infantry; but the cavalry gallantly charged across the creek and drove them . . . about a mile and a half . . . where the infantry held the cavalry in check for some time, they being posted behind stone walls and rail breastworks; but General Averell, farther to the right turned the flank of this infantry and caused them to fall back.” Merritt advanced again, and these two commands drove the infantry and cavalry before them (part of Breckenridge's command) towards Winchester. They endeavoured to make a stand. What followed is thus described by General Sheridan: —

“The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an opportunity such as seldom has been presented during the war for a mounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it. The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it went at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, with such momentum as to break the Confederate left just as Averell was passing around it. Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, and Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and, with sabre and pistol in hand, literally rode down a battery of five guns and took about 1200 prisoners." At the same time, Crook and Wright forced the rebel infantry so hard, that the whole Confederate Army fell back to breastworks formerly thrown up before Winchester. Here Early strove hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalry began to pass around his left flank, and the infantry made a front attack. A panic ensued. The result was that Sheridan, after the supplementary routing of Early's army two days later at Fisher's Hill (in which Torbert's cavalry had no part), regained the Valley from the Potomac to Strasburg.

The unhappy General Early wrote as follows, to General Lee, after this defeat: —

"The enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, and the inefficiency of the greater part of mine, has been the cause of all my disasters. In the affair at Fisher's Hill the cavalry gave way, but it was flanked. This would have been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and without being defeated they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully. . . . My troops are very much shattered, the men very much exhausted, and many of them without shoes."

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 347-8, 463-5

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, September 8, 1864 – 9 p.m.

Near Summit, 9 P. M., Sept. 8, 1864.

To-day has quite changed the face of things, — the Third Brigade (my brigade) has been broken up: the Second Massachusetts is transferred to the “Reserve Brigade,” and I take command thereof, Colonel Gibbs being transferred to command of Second Brigade: the change looks like making the Second Massachusetts a permanent member of the Army of the Potomac, or that portion of it which is here.¹

I am now where, if there is anything to be done for Mr. Linkum² in the way of fighting, I may have a chance to do it. Good-night, — it's dark and rainy and windy enough to make a move to-morrow certain, — it's just the night to injure forage and rations, and very naturally they have arrived.

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¹ The reorganization of General Merritt's Division was as follows: First Brigade, Brigadier-General Custer; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Devin; Reserve Brigade, Colonel Lowell. The Reserve Brigade consisted of the First, Second, and Fifth United States Cavalry and the Second Massachusetts Cavalry; also Battery D (horse artillery) of the Second United States Artillery.

² The negro “contrabands” called their far-off benefactor “Massa Linkum,” and the Union Army the “Linkum soldiers.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 337, 460-1

Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 337 Report of Brig. Gen. John Buford, U.S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,

August 27, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the First Cavalry Division, from its crossing the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, on June 27, to its crossing of the Rappahannock on August 1:

After passing the Potomac on the upper pontoon bridge, the division marched over almost impassable roads, crossing the Monocacy near its mouth by a wretched ford, and bivouacked on the east side of the mountains, 3 miles from Jefferson, being halted there by the whole train of General Stahel's division blockading the road through the mountains.

June 28, the division moved through Jefferson, and went into camp near Middletown, for the purpose of shoeing and refitting.

June 29, the Reserve Brigade was detached and moved to Mechanicstown. The First and Second Brigades moved through Boonsborough, Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, and encamped near Fairfield, within a short distance of a considerable force of the enemy's infantry. The inhabitants knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy's camp, yet not one of them gave me a particle of information, nor even mentioned the fact of the enemy's presence. The whole community seemed stampeded, and afraid to speak or to act, often offering as excuses for not showing some little enterprise, “The rebels will destroy our houses if we tell anything.” Had any one given me timely information, and acted as guide that night, I could have surprised and captured or destroyed this force, which proved next day to be two Mississippi regiments of infantry and two guns.

June 30, the two brigades moved out very early to go to Gettysburg, via Fairfield. At the latter place my advance ran upon the force referred to. I determined to feel it and drive it, if possible, but, after a little skirmishing, found that artillery would have to be necessarily used.  Resolved not to disturb them, for fear cannonading from that quarter might disarrange the plans of the general commanding. Fairfield was 4 or 5 miles west of the route assigned me, and I did not wish to bring on an engagement so far from the road I was expected to be following. I immediately turned my column toward Emmitsburg without serious molestation, and was soon on my proper road and moving on Gettysburg, where I had reason to suppose I should find some of General Stahel's [Kilpatrick's] cavalry. We entered Gettysburg in the afternoon, just in time to meet the enemy entering the town, and in good season to drive him back before his getting a foothold. He withdrew toward Cashtown, leaving his pickets about 4½ miles from Gettysburg.

The night of the 30th was a busy night for the division. No reliable information of value could be obtained from the inhabitants, and but for the untiring exertions of many different scouting parties, information of the enemy's whereabouts and movements could not have been gained in time to prevent him from getting the town before our army could get up.

By daylight on July 1, I had gained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and my arrangements were made for entertaining him until General Reynolds could reach the scene.

On July 1, between 8 and 9 a.m., reports came in from the First Brigade (Colonel Gamble's) that the enemy was coming down from toward Cashtown in force. Colonel Gamble made an admirable line of battle, and moved off proudly to meet him. The two lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers. The First Brigade held its own for more than two hours, and had to be literally dragged back a few hundred yards to a position more secure and better sheltered. Tidball's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Calef, Second U.S. Artillery, fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery from twelve guns, all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns deliberately with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful effect upon the enemy. The First Brigade maintained this unequal contest until the leading division of General Reynolds' corps came up to its assistance, and then most reluctantly did it give up the front. A portion of the Third Indiana found horse-holders, borrowed muskets, and fought with the Wisconsin regiment that came to relieve them. While this left of my line was engaged, Devin's brigade, on the right, had its hands full.  The enemy advanced upon Devin by four roads, and on each was checked and held until the leading division of the Eleventh Corps came to his relief.

After the fall of General Reynolds, whose advance troops partially drove back the enemy and made heavy captures of prisoners, the enemy brought up fresh troops, and engaged General Doubleday's command, which fought bravely, but was greatly outnumbered and forced to fall back. Seeing our troops retiring, and their need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble's brigade to Doubleday's left, and dismounted it in time to render great assistance to our infantry, and to check and break the enemy's line. My troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in short carbine range. Their fire was perfectly terrific, causing the enemy to break and rally on their second line, which made no farther advance toward my position.

Shortly after this, I placed my command on our extreme left, to watch and fight the enemy should he make another attack, and went to Cemetery Hill for observation. While there, General Hancock arrived, and in a few moments he made superb disposition to resist any attack that might be made.

My division bivouacked that night on the left of our position, with pickets extending almost to Fairfield.

The zeal, bravery, and good behavior of the officers and men on the night of June 30, and during July 1, was commendable in the extreme. A heavy task was before us; we were equal to it, and shall all remember with pride that at Gettysburg we did our country much service.

July 2, the division became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters on our left, and held its own until relieved by General Sickles' corps, after which it moved to Taneytown, and bivouacked for the night.

The next day, July 3, it moved to Westminster, to guard the trains of the army at that point.

July 4, the division marched toward Frederick, en route to Williamsport.

July 5, reached Frederick, drew supplies, and remained all night.

July 6, the whole division (the Reserve Brigade having joined the night before) marched at 4 a.m. toward Williamsport, to destroy the enemy's trains, which were reported to be crossing the Potomac into Virginia.

At about 5 p.m., when near Saint James' College, the enemy's pickets were discovered, driven in, and preparations made to capture the town. The enemy was driven handsomely to within half a mile of his trains, at the town, when he came out strong enough to prevent our farther progress. General Merritt's brigade, with Graham's battery, was on the right, Colonel Gamble's (First) brigade on the left, and Colonel Devin's (Second) brigade on the left rear as reserves. The enemy made an attack upon Gamble, who had posted his men under shelter, and who held his fire until the rebel line came within short carbine range, when he opened upon it, doing terrible execution, and driving it back into its stronghold. This was repeated with similar success. In Merritt's front the enemy made no direct attack, but were so obstinate that General Merritt could not dislodge them without too much sacrifice. The enemy, however, attempted to turn our right with a brigade of infantry. This attempt was most admirably foiled by General Merritt.

While our hottest contest was in progress, General Kilpatrick's guns were heard in the direction of Hagerstown, and as they grew nearer, I sent word to him to connect with my right for mutual support. The connection was made, but was of no consequence to either of us. Just before dark, Kilpatrick's troops gave way, passing to my rear by the right, and were closely followed by the enemy.

It now being dark, outnumbered, and the First and Reserve Brigades being out of ammunition, Devin was ordered to relieve Gamble and a portion of Merritt's troops. This being done, I ordered the command to fall back, Devin to hold his ground until the entire road to the Antietam was clear. Devin handsomely carried out his instructions, and the division bivouacked on the road to Boonsborough.

The expedition had for its object the destruction of the enemy's trains, supposed to be at Williamsport. This, I regret to say, was not accomplished. The enemy was too strong for me, but he was severely punished for his obstinacy. His casualties were more than quadruple mine.

Colonel Chapman, with his regiment, dashed off to the road leading from Falling Waters to Williamsport, and destroyed a small train of grain, and returned with about 40 mules and their harness.

At Williamsport, Captain Graham fought his battery with marked ability, and to the admiration of all witnesses. The officers and men behaved with their usual courage, displaying great unwillingness to fall back, and requiring repeated orders before they did so.

July 7, the division moved to Boonsborough, the Reserve Brigade camping well in advance on the Hagerstown road, after having a successful cavalry brush with the enemy's advance, of which I have as yet received no report.

July 8, the enemy attacked at 5 a.m., and the fighting lasted until about 5 p.m. He was driven back about 4 miles, when the division then bivouacked for the night.

July 9, attacked the enemy at 4 p.m. and drove him handsomely about 2 miles.

July 10, attacked the enemy at 8 a.m. and drove him through Funkstown to his intrenchments beyond Antietam, when he came out with a heavy force of infantry and artillery and gave battle. The division held the crest on our side of the town like veterans until its ammunition was exhausted. Howe's division, of the Sixth Corps, was in easy supporting distance, but had no orders to aid me. At 3 p.m. I could no longer reply with carbines, for want of cartridges, and consequently ordered the division to fall back. A brigade of the Sixth Corps then began to advance, but did not occupy the position that I held when I left the field.

There was splendid fighting on the part of the division on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th. There was no faltering or hesitation. Each man went to work determined to carry anything in reason. For the particulars I refer you to the reports of the brigade commanders.

July 11, the First and Second Brigades moved in the afternoon to the vicinity of Bakersville. The Reserve Brigade was detached.

July 12 and 13, remained at Bakersville, and pushed pickets to within 800 yards of the enemy's intrenchments at Downsville.

July 14, at 7 a.m., the division was ordered to advance, and at 7.30 o'clock it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The few remaining scouts were run into the rear guard of Lee's army, which was soon seen in front of Kilpatrick, who had advanced from the north. Kilpatrick was engaged. I sent word to him that I would put my whole force in on the enemy's rear and flank, and get possession of the road and bridge in their rear. The division succeeded in getting the road, and attacked the enemy in flank and rear, doing him great damage, and scattering him in confusion through the woods and ravines. Our spoils on this occasion were one 10-pounder Parrott gun, one caisson, over 500 prisoners, and about 300 muskets. General Merritt came up in time to take the advance before the enemy had entirely crossed, and made many captures. The enemy's bridge was protected by over a dozen guns in position and sharpshooters on the Virginia side. As our troops neared the bridge, the enemy cut the Maryland side loose, and the bridge swung to the Virginia side.

July 15, the division moved to Berlin.

July 16, moved camp to Petersville.

July 17, remained at Petersville.

July 18, crossed during the afternoon, and encamped near Purcellville.

July 19, marched through Philomont, and encamped on Goose Creek, near Rector's Cross-Roads.

July 20, marched to Rectortown. Detached General Merritt with his brigade to hold Manassas Gap, Gamble to hold Chester Gap, and Devin, with all the train, moved to Salem.

July 21, Merritt in Manassas, Gamble near Chester Gap, finding it already in possession of a superior force of the enemy. General Merritt and Colonel Gamble each had a fight and made captures, for particulars of which see their reports.

July 22, wagon train sent to Warrenton in charge of Sixth New York Cavalry. Devin moved toward Barbee's Cross-Roads.

July 23, whole division concentrated at Barbee's Cross-Roads, and remained until the 26th, when the division took position at Warrenton and Fayetteville, picketing the Rappahannock River from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford.

During the whole campaign, from June 27 to July 31, there has been no shirking or hesitation, no tiring on the part of a single man so far as I have seen; the brigade commanders report none.

To General Merritt and Colonels Gamble and Devin, brigade commanders, I give my heartfelt thanks for their zeal and hearty support. Neither of them ever doubted the feasibility of an order, but on its reception obeyed its dictates to the letter.

My staff – Captains [Charles E.] Norris, Keogh, [Craig W.] Wadsworth, and Bacon, and Lieutenants Mix, P. Penn Gaskill, Dean, [Albert P.] Morrow, [Malcomb H.] Wing, and [George M.] Gilchrist – were always on hand, and gave me much valuable information from where the fire was hottest, and were of immense assistance in conveying orders on the field of battle, and seeing that they were obeyed. During the campaign they were all under heavy fire on different occasions, and for coolness and gallantry cannot be excelled in this army.

Lieutenant [Aaron B.] Jerome, signal corps, was ever on the alert, and through his intrepidity and fine glasses on more than one occasion kept me advised of the enemy's movements when no other means were available. Surgeon Hard, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, surgeon-in-chief to the division, deserve great credit for his zealous and untiring attention and labors with the sick and wounded. Through his exertions their sufferings have been greatly alleviated, their wants supplied, and many lives saved. Many wounded soldiers are indebted to him for his timely aid on the battle-field, who, but for his energy, would have shared the fate of many poor fellows who had less attentive surgeons.

I transmit with this the reports of the brigade commanders.

The First Brigade captured 854 head of beef-cattle and 602 sheep at Chester Gap, which were turned over to the subsistence department at Markham, July 24.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JNO. BUFORD,

 Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. C. Ross SMITH,

Chief of Staff, Cavalry Corps.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 926-30